A CRITIQUE
OF
THE BRAHMASŪTRA

PART II

SYSTEM OF THE SŪTRAS (III. 2. 11-IV).

P. M. Modi

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of
THE BRAHMASŪTRA
(III. 2. 11-IV)
(With special reference to Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary)

PART II
SYSTEM OF THE SŪTRAS (III. 2. 11-IV).

By

P. M. Modi

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With a Preface by :

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With a Foreword by

Prof. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, M. A., Ph. D.,
Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Philosophy,
University of MADRAS.

इदमेव (ब्रह्मसूत्रशास्त्रम्) सर्वशास्त्राणां मूर्धन्यं,
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PREFACE

When I was writing my Thesis for Ph.D. under Prof. Dr. F. Otto Schrader at Kiel in 1929–31 I came to realise the importance of the Brahmasūtra for the history of Indian Philosophy. My earlier study of the Bhāṣyas, particularly that of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra, under Pandit Achyutji and Pandit Chinnuswāmi, and Prof. Schrader's guidance enabled me to discover the meaning of the Sūtras, while my study of the Tibetan translation of the Buddhacarita and the textual criticism on it under Prof. Schrader helped me in making out the Text of the Brahmasūtra. I could discover much more than I needed then and Prof. Schrader encouraged me to devote myself to the study of the Brahmasūtra after my return to India.

In course of time I contributed several Papers and prepared a work on (a substantial part of) the Brahmasūtra to be called " A Critique of the Brahmasūtra ". Scholars like Ācārya A. B. Dhruva, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Dr. Ganga Nath Jha and Prof. R. D. Ranade whom I consulted, asked me to prepare a separate book about the " System " of Bādarāyaṇa from the book which was ready for the Press and which they advised me to publish as "Part I : Interpretation of the Sūtras". This is how I came to write the present volume, which gives in a nutshell the results of Part I both as regards Bādarāyaṇa's System and the critical method of interpretation as applied to his work.

It is hardly possible to give a briefer account of Bādarāyaṇa's System than the one given in the Introduction and in Chapter 13. I may mention here only what appears to me to be the most striking feature of his Doctrine. According to him Brahman has two aspects, *a-puruṣavidha* and *puruṣavidha*, like the same two aspects of the Ṛgvedic deities, according to Yāska. They are both of equal status. He calls them "Avyakta" and "Puruṣa." Each has its own attributes (*guṇas)*. The Śrutis

discussed in Bra.Sū.I.1 are those of the Avyakta while the Śrutis considered in Bra.Sū.I.2 and 3 belong to the Puruṣa and "optionally to the Avyakta", because "the Scripture describes each aspect of the Supreme One with the attributes of the other" and, thus, in the Scripture itself we have an "Interchange of the attributes" of the two aspects of the Reality (Bra.Sū.III. 3.11 and 37–39).

The most important portion of the Brahmasūtra is Bra.Sū. III.3, called Guṇopasaṁhāra Pāda which must mean, like the Pāda of the same name in the Jaiminisūtra (II.4), a "collected statement of the minor items *(guṇas)*" (of the meditation on Brahman). About the history of the earlier Vedanta thought we know from the sixtysix Sūtras of this Pāda much more than from any other existing work. Bra.Sū.III.3 is the Key to Bādarāyaṇa's work (Bra.Sū.I.1–3) and System.

The present study has enabled the author to make a number of major and minor discoveries; only some of which are mentioned here. (a) Jñāna is an "Act to be performed" *(anuṣṭheya)*. (b) Bādarāyaṇa believes in the Grace of God. (c) Upaniṣads were interpreted differently in the days of Bādarāyaṇa. (d) There were many Oppositional Vedanta Schools besides those of the sages named by Bādarāyaṇa, based upon different Upaniṣads. (e) The correct tradition of the *viṣayavākyas* of Bra.Sū.III and IV was not known even to Saṅkara. (f) The Text of the Brahmasūtra, came to Śaṅkara in a mutilated condition. (g) Ample Internal Evidence for the recovery of the Meaning as well as the Text of the Brahmasūtra is available. (h) Strict adherence to the context in filling up the ellipses of the Sūtras leads to wonderful results as regards the meaning of the Sūtras. (i) Saṅkara's Method in this respect is not satisfactory. details and illustrations of all these points will be found in the Introduction and in the book proper under various chapters.

Bādarāyaṇa has worked out his System sticking to the very word of the Upaniṣadic Śrutis. He rarely twists their sense. He knows the literal and straightforward sense and interpretation of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads, the Earlier Metrical

Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. He refutes several Vedantic Pūrvapakṣas based upon the latter two and seems to establish boldly a Siddhānta supported by the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa. and more on the former than on the latter. He rejects from the Upaniṣads what he finds unsuitable to his System and re-interprets in the light of the Upaniṣads the non-Upaniṣadic principles and views of the Gītā as far as possible; otherwise he openly rejects them also. He has saved the Vedanta School from being a purely theistic doctrine or a dualistic one with one lower and one higher aspect of Brahman itself, as in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Gītā. He was the first to establish a Vedenta School in place of the many schools of the many Upaniṣads. His Brahman is simultaneously both Monistic (believing in the Avyakta) and Monotheistic (believing in the Puruṣa), like a serpent which is simultaneously both *ahi* (serpent as such) and *kuṇḍala* (the coiled serpent).

I have taken Śaṅkara, with whose Bhāṣya I happen to be quite familiar, as an Interpreter of the Brahmasūtra. I believe, we have reached a stage in Oriental Scientific Research, when we can and should distinguish, appreciate and evaluate distinctly and duly the roll of an Ācārya as an Interpreter of the Scripture from his other roll as the Leader of the Religious and Philosophical Thought of his Age. The constructive side of the modern scholarship lies in the search after the possible non-sectarian meaning of a Text, arrived at through several means and helps, one of which only is naturally a comparison of the fresh interpretation with that of an Ācārya and a critical study of the latter.

While I offer a fresh interpretation and an account of the System of a substantial part of the Brahmasūtra, I must confess that I myself do not as yet fully understand some Sūtras, as has been admitted by me in my Notes in Part I. There are other handicaps also, one of which is my ignorance of the Jaiminisūtras. I am still in search of a better meaning of some

of the Sūtras, I have interpreted. I offer my conclusions as only tentative.

I may hear draw the attention of the reader to some Papers† on various problems of the Brahmasūtra, already published in Research Journals, which deal with portions of Bādarāyaṇa's book (Bra.Sū. I and II), and thus at least partly remove the incompleteness of my work on these Sūtras. I have planned and partly finished one more volume on the Brahmasūtra which contains only a fresh running interpretation of all the Sūtras without the back-ground of a Bhāṣya.

I feel very grateful to Prof. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, M. A., PH. D., Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, who has kindly contributed the Foreword to the present volume. His blessings have immensely enhenced the worth of my work.

I respectfully remember on this occasion Pandit Achyutji and Pandit (now Mahāmahopādhyāya) Chinnuswami Shastri who taught me the *Śāṅkara* Bhāṣya, line by line and word by word, at B. H. U., Banaras, 1921–1923. I also remember with humble and respectful homage Ācbārya A. B. Druva who initiated me in Indian Philosocphy (both at the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, and at B. H. U., Banaras) and under whom I prepared the whole of Part I and the first draft of Part II. Prof. Dr. F. Otto Schrader,

† **A list of the author's Papers on the Brahmasutra, published in Journals :—**

(1) Problem of the *Tad uktam* Sūtras in the Brahmasūtra. Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta, Vol. XIII, 1937, PP. 514-520.

(2) Bādarāyaṇa's Conception of Brahman (A Fresh Interpretation of Bra. Sū. I.2), Journal of the University of Bombay, Volume XXIII, Part 2, September 1954.

(3) Bādarāyaṇa's Conception of Brahman (A Fresh Interpretation of Bra. Sū. I.3); Journal of B. B. R. A. Society, Vol. 29, Part II, Dec. 1954.

(4) Meaning of " Smṛti " in the Brahmasūtra, Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1936.

(5) The Scheme of Brahamasūtra I. 1-3 : A Rapprochement. The Journal of the University of Bombay, (Vol. IV, Part III) 1935.

(6) Pre-Śāṅkara Mutilation of the Text of the Brahmasūtra: Some suggestions for its correction. Proceedings of All India Oriental Conference Baroda, 1933.

Kiel University, who taught me the application of the modern critical method as regards both the Interpretation and the Text of our Scriptures in general and the Brahmasūtra in particular, comes to my mind and I get overcome with feelings of gratitude love and respect. He has also inspired me with a living faith in the modern scientific approach. I also acknowledge thankfully my indebtedness to Prof. S. N. Dasgupta and Prof. M. Hiriyanna, who encouraged me in my viewpoint re: the Brahmasūtra.

I have also derived great benefit from the works on the Bra.Sū. by Thibaut, Deussen, Teliwala, Prof. M. G. Sastri, Dr. Ghate and specially Dr. S. K. Belvalkar (Poona).

It is the close personal touch with Prof. Dr. R. D. Ranade at Nimbal that has made me look to our Scriptures, particularly the Brahmasūtra, with a view to understand and to try to adopt in my life the doctrine of the Vedanta which I have been continuously for several years studying from these works. I always remember with loving respect for this saintly Professor the question by which he made me, not a *pandit*, but if I may be allowed to put the word, a *muni*. The question which he once asked me was this :—"Well, Modi, you have told me how you understand the conception of Brahman according to Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara, according to the Upaniṣads and the Gītā; now, tell me *your own idea* about Brahman!" I cannot adeqately describe the effect of this question of Dr. Ranade on my study and on me ever since. This happened when I saw him and saught his advice with reference to my study of the Brahmasūtra in 1942. I cannot but remember him and pay my homage to this sage-saint here.

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the University of Bombay for the grant-in-aid received by him from the University towards the cost of publication of this work. I am also under deep obligation to Shree B. G. Mehta the Ex-Chief Minister, Bhavnagar State, during the Popular Government, 1948, and to Shree J. K. Modi, the present Minister for Education, Saurashtra State, who respectively sanctioned and paid a solid grant for this publication of mine, from the Bhavnagar Darbar

Granthottejan Fund. Both these learned gentlemen are great lovers of scholarship and I owe a great deal to them for my publications as well as in many other matters.

The Preface by Dr. B. L. Atreya is really an Appreciation from one who is a great scholar and at the same time a loving friend of mine, intimately knowing both myself and my work, since my College days in 1921-23. I owe a great deal to him.

Besides these there are a few good sincere friends of mine, my own colleagues both in the College and in my studies, whom I may call my *sahabramacārins*, who have helped me in the preparation of this volume. I always remember them with deep love and gratitude.

I thank sincerely also Shree K. V. Marathe, B. A., the learned proprietor of the Ram Vijay Printing Press, Baroda, who helped me a great deal in bringing out this volume.

Lastly, I earnestly crave indulgence of the learned reader for the mistakes which could have been avoided, but which have remained here due to my inability to rectify them.

हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।
तत्त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ॥

Giridhar Niwas,
Raopura,
Baroda,
Dt. 22-7-56.

गुरुपूर्णिमा,
वि. स. २०१२.
वृन्दावन.

P. M. MODI.

FOREWORD

Dr. P. M. Modi requires no introduction to the world of Vedantic scholarship. The books that he has already published have achieved for him a high place among the interpreters of Vedantic texts.

In Part I of the present work, printed in 1945, Dr. Modi gave us his interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra*, III.2.11-IV. In the preface to that Part he promised to present "The System of the Sūtrakāra" in Part II. It is that promise that is being fulfilled now. Dr. Modi summarises here the conclusions he has arrived at as a result of his interpretation of the *sūtras* considered in Part I. There is no particular reason why the *sūtras*, III.2.11-IV should have been chosen, and not the earlier *sūtras*. As Dr. Modi has made it clear, the choice is a matter of accident. Regarding the the importance of *Brahmasūtra* III.3, however, he is very definite. According to him, it provides the key to the entire work of Bādarāyaṇa.

The method of study adopted by Dr. Modi is what has come to be called the historico-critical method. He himself styles it as the historico-critical-cum-philological method. The orientalists of the West have, in general, favoured this method; and Dr. Modi's early training under Dr. Schrader in Germany has evidently set the model for him. The application of this method to ancient Indian philosophical classics has certainly yielded rich results. What Dr. Modi attempts here is to use this method for reconstructing Bādarāyaṇa's system of philosophy from the words of the *sūtras* themselves, without relying on any of the commentaries.

Any construction has to be through some criticism. Dr. Modi selects for criticism Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, for, as he says, he is most acquainted with it, and probably because

it is the most outstanding of all the classical commentaries. The classical commentators assume that the three *prasthānas* of Vedānta, viz., the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the *Brahmasūtra*, teach the same philosophy, although each of them has his own view as to what that philosophy is. In other words, so the modern critical scholar thinks, each *bhāṣyakāra* starts with a system of his own, and seeks to fit in every statement made in the *prasthānas* with that system. This has led him to a great deal of text-torturing, and tortuous interpretation of express statements whose plain meaning is inconvenient.

The critical scholar claims to go to the text without any initial bias for a system. He seeks to understand the mind of the author or authors of the text from the structure of the statements made, the type of the words used, the context, etc. To study even the *Upaniṣads* or the *Bhagavadgītā* with the help of the critical method is a difficult task. Just as the traditional commentators have differed among themselves regarding the interpretation of these texts, even so the critical scholars disagree on the meanings they assign to passages in these *prasthānas*. The difficulty of interpreting the *Brahmasūtra* is all the greater because the aphorisms are cryptic, often consisting of two or three words. Probably, they were designed to serve as memory-aids to those who had actually listened to discourses bearing on the topics. Even in regard to certain verses of Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*, for instance, commentators are not sure whether they express the *prima facie* view *(pūrvpakṣa)* or the final position *(siddhānta)*. It is no wonder, therefore, that there should be similar uncertainties with regard to the *sūtras*. The merit of Dr. Modi's work is that, for the first time, he has employed the critical apparatus to a study, *in detail*, of the *Brahmasūtra*. The true scholar that he is, he is candid enough to say that his conclusions are not final. Also, his criticism of Śaṅkara's interpretation does not mean any disrespect to the Ācārya or belittling the greatnes of his *bhāṣya*. This is in the true spirit of even the traditional Indian scholarship. Sureśvara, one of Śaṅkara's most beloved disciples, differs

from his Master in certain contexts, while interpreting the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* for example; but he differs respectfully. So, Dr. Modi's procedure is perfectly legitimate; and he is right in following the lead of his own light. Everyone has to do this if he is to be honest with himself. And, Dr. Modi is also aware that he may not expect everyone to agree with him in every respect. That is the mark of a great mind and a good scholar.

The problem with which Dr. Modi is concerned is to reconstruct the text of the *Brahmasūtra* and to understand from the text what should have been the doctrines taught by Bādarāyaṇa. As a result of his investigation he finds that Śaṅkara has not always interpreted the text correctly. It is only fair to point out that there is another problem which does not come under the purview of Dr. Modi's present work. That problem relates to the soundness or otherwise of Śaṅkara's philosophy taken by itself. Great as he was as a commentator, Śaṅkara was even greater as a constructive and original thinker. His independent contribution to the philosophy of India still remains to be properly assessed. But Dr. Modi's task which is different has been well performed. The amount of work he has put in is prodigous. He writes clearly, and always gives reasons for what he writes. His work is a significant contrbution to our understanding of the *Brahmasūtra*.

University of Madras,
MADRAS-5.
24th August 1956.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN.

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University of Madras,
Madras-5,
24th August 1956.

T. M. P. Mahadevan

PREFACE

By

Dr. B. L. ATREYA

Dr. P. M. Modi and I have been co-pupils of late Professor A. B. Dhruva; have lived together in the same hostel of the Banaras Hindu University and for some time in the same room; and have enjoyed life-long friendship. In the year 1923 he took his Master's Degree in Samskrit and I in Philosophy. The subject which we studied in common with our reverved teacher was the *Brahmasūtra*, with its various Commentaries. While I was mainly interested in the philosophical aspect of it, Dr. Modi (then Mr. Modi) was also interested in the textual aspect of it. He was a very painstaking, persevering, earnest and intelligent student, and had no other interest in life than study. Even a third of a century has not brought any change in the interests of Dr. Modi who continues te be a student. And as a consequence of his erudite labour he has given to the world, among others, three great works, *viz.*, *Akṣara : A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy*, *The Bhagavadgītā : A Fresh Approach*, and *A Critique of the Brahmasūtra*. Although on account of a pernicious practice of retiring Professors at an age when they are most capable of intellectual work, Dr. Modi has retired from his job as a Professor of Samskrit, in reality, however, he has not retired, and refuses to retire from work. He still continues to be a student, a research worker, and a writer, and as such he has settled in a small hut in the Vaishnava Research Institute at Vrindaban to which several retired scholars have flocked. Ever since we were together at Banaras I have been in close academic touch with Dr. Modi, and I have nothing but admiration for his pure, simple and scholarly life. In his literary career he has always been free from bias and dogma, and has been a seeker of truth and a frank teller of it. His name, I am sure, will go down the ages as a great scholar of the *Prasthāna-traya* and as one who has made a valuable contribution to their understanding.

The present volume, to which Dr. Modi has asked me to write a Foreword, is a part of his erudite work on the *Brahmasūtra*. It deals with the third and the fourth *Adhyāyas* of the work mainly. A perusal of the book will reveal the labour Dr. Modi has done and the great contribution he has made to our understanding of the real meaning of the *Sūtras*. He has tried to follow *not* the footsteps of any known Acharyas who have commented on the *Prasthāna-*

traya (*Upanishads, Bhagavadgītā*, and *Brahmasūtra*) in order to get support from them for their traditional schools of philosophy, *but* "the modern, historical, critical, comparative, and scientific method of interpretation". Honestly and patiently pursued, this method has enabled Dr. Modi to discover the real views of Bādarāyaṇa and to present them to the reader with great conviction. Earlier modern writers on the *Brahmasūtra* have tried to find out in vain which of the great commentators presesnted the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa more correctly than others; and in their attempt they too were consciously or unconsciously under the influence of a wish to support one or the other of the great Acharyas. Dr. Modi's is perhaps the first attempt to approach the *Brahmasūtra* directly and objectively keeping the historical background in view. He has been thus able to give us (1) the salient points of Bādarāyaṇa's own philosophy, (2) Bādarāyaṇa's own interpretation of the *Upanishads*, and (3) the Vedanta Schools known to Bādarāyaṇa. About Shankarāchārya's commentary on the third *Pāda* of the third *Adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtra*, which Dr. Modi regards as "the very key of the entire work of Bādarāyaṇa", he thinks, on the basis of his study, that "Shaṅkara had the correct tradition *neither of the Meaning nor of the Text* of this *Pāda*" (Italics are mine). Dr. Modi claims, and I think, rightly, to have discovered "the lost meaning of a number of the Sūtras" and he has tried to fix a proper reading of the *Sūtras* and a correct classification of them under proper *Adhikaraṇas* in accordance with purely scientific method.

I leave it to the scholarly critics to judge the merits of the present work. I have only to congratulate my friend and old class-fellow, Dr. P. M. Modi on his great and valuable attempt which, I hope, will be highly appreciated by posterity of scholars of the Vedanta philosophy, and I wish him a long and healthy life to continue to work.

Atreya-niwas,
October 10, 1956

B. L. Atreya

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INTRODUCTION

In the Preface I have stated how this volume came to be written. I would now say a few words about the System and the Text of the Brahma-sūtra, setting aside the technicalities in the chapters of Parts I and II.

I. BADARAYANA'S SYSTEM.

I would present here in bare outlines a few salient points of Bādarāyaṇas System[(a)] which, I think, I have rediscovered for the first time :—

(i) Brahman has two aspects, the *puruṣavidha (rūpavat*, or *sākāra)* and the *a-puruṣavidha (a-rūpavat*, or *nirākāra)*[1]. They are both of equal status and a complete option of choice between the two is given by the Sūtrakāra to the seeker because both lead *directly* to the same Mokṣa[2].

(ii) Both these aspect of the Supreme One have *their own attributes*. (See (i) under Sec.II of this Introduction).

(iii) The Sūtrakāra rejects the negative attributes of the Akṣara, viz., *a-sthūlam, anaṇu, a-hrasvam, a-dīrgham, a-lohitam*, etc., etc. (emphasised too much by S'aṅkara), as not useful for meditation on Brahman[3]. He also rejects the *priyaśirastvādi* attributes of Brahman[4].

(iv) The *apuruṣavidha* aspect is the fundamental (*Pradhāna, mukhya*) *aspect*[5]. The Sūtrakāra explains the relation between the *apruṣavidha* and the *puruṣavidha* aspects by saying that the Supreme One is like both *ahi* (the serpent as such) and *kuṇḍala* (the coiled serpent)[6].

(v) The Sūtrakāra calls the *apuruṣavidha* aspect by the name of the Avyakta[7] and the *puruṣavidha* by the name of the Puruṣa[8].

(a) For all references to the Sūtras and for their interpretations by the auther, see the corresponding portions of Part II and also Part I for details on the latter.

1. Bra.Sū.III.2.14. (अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्).
2. Bra.Sū.III.3.28 (छन्दत: उभयाविरोधात्) 29,30, and III.3.45 (तदपि पूर्व विकल्प:)etc.
3. Bra.Sū.III.3.14 (आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्); see also Bra.Sū.III.3.33 (अक्षराधियां त्ववरोध:)
4. Bra.Sū.III.3.12. 5. Vide 1 supra.
6. Bra.Sū.III.2.27 (उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वाहिकुण्डलवत्).
7. Bra.Sū.III.2.23 (तदव्यक्तमाह हि).
8. Bra.Sū.III.3.24 (पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात्).

(vi) The Prajāpatiloka is the *purṣavidha* aspect of the Supreme Reality. It is an aspect of Kāraṇa Brahman; it is not Kārya Brahman[9]. Saṅkara does not seem to be right in adding *'Prajāpatiloka'* to the S'ūtrakāra's list of the worlds, and as situated above the Varuṇaloka[10].

(vii) The Sūtrakāra mentions three kinds of meditations on Brahman, two of which lead directly to Mokṣa, while the third consists of the *kāmya upāsanās* of Brahman[11]. One of the former two is a meditation on Brahman not *conceived as consisting of aṅgas* (*limbs* or *parts*), e. g. Bhūman, Akṣara, etc. while in the other Brahman is meditated upon *as consisting of aṅgas*[12], e. g., the Vaiśwānara conceived as possessing limbs.

(viii) It is here discovered for the first time that several Sūtras deal with the meditation on the Praṇava the only symbol of Brahman[13].

(ix) The Sūtrakāra discusses *pariṇāma*, 'change', *vṛddhi*, increment, and *hrāsa*, decrement, three out of the six states of an entity (*ṣadbhāvavikārāḥ*) mentioned by Yāska, with reference to Brahman. He says that the *kārya* or *kṛti*, the effect, of Brahman is Brahman Itself. Brahman appears to grow, to increase or to evolve, and to decrease or decay, according as Brahman conceals Itself in Its effect-forms respectively to a lesser and a greater degree[14].

(x) In the above consideration and in taking *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha* as the two aspects of the Supreme One Bādarāyaṇa seems to be influenced by Yāska, the author of the Nirukta.

(xi) The Sūtrakāra mentions the Grace (*anugraha*) of Brahman (as *puruṣavidha* or as *a-puruṣavidha*) on two occasions[15]. He also seems to mean that the Lord Himself gives the fruit of Mokṣa out of His Grace[16].

(xii) The fruit in the form of liberation comes to the seeker from the Supreme One; and that fruit is nothing else but the Supreme One Itself[17].

(xiii) The Jñāna (the *act* of the knowing) of Brahman is *something to be performed* (*anuṣṭheya*). and there is a Vidhi (Injunction) laying down

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9. Bra.Sū.IV.3.7-16, 10. Vide S'ā. Bhaṣya Bra.Sū.IV.3.3.

11. Bra.Sū.III.3.60 (काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्).

12. Bra.Sū.III.3.55 (अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्).

13. Bra.Sū.III.3.25-27, IV.1.4-5, IV.3.15.

14. Bra.Sū.III.2.20 (वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावात्......)

15. Bra.Sū.III.4.38 (विशेषानुग्रहश्च); IV.2.17 (हार्दानुगृहीतः).

16. Bra.Sū.III.2.38 (फलमतः उपपत्तेः).

17. Bra.Sū.III.2.41 (पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्).

the Jñāna[18]. The meditation on Brahman *produces an effect* called Apūrva, (the extra-ordinary Principle)[19]. The identity of the Injunction (*codanā*) etc. in all the Vedantas proves that *all* of them teach the same Brahman.

(xiv) There is Scriptural Unanimity (*ekavākyatā*) of the Karmakāṇḍa and the Jñānakāṇḍa of the S'ruti in so for as *both* Karman and Jñāna are anuṣṭheya, "to be permormed"; both are laid down by the respective Injunctions[21], and both produce their respective Apūrvas.

(xv) Brahman is not the topic of the knowledge in the Pūrvakāṇḍa; only the Upaniṣads teach Brahman[22].

(xvi) In achieving Mokṣa Karman co-operates[23] with Jñāna which is the primary means of Mokṣa, says Bādarāyaṇa. Jaimini holds the reverse view. Both of them hold that all other means of Mokṣa stated in the Upaniṣads are subsidiary (to Karman, acc. to Jaimini and to Jñāna, acc. to Bādarāyaṇa[24]). The S'ūtrakāra rejects or rather refutes the Disinterested Action (Yoga) which the Gitā declares to be the means to Mokṣa[25].

(xvii) A seeker (*mumukṣu*) may belong to any stage of life[26]. The two sets of actions (1) *yajña-dāna-tapas* and (2) the duties of one's *āśrama* must be performed by every seeker. But a householder-seeker must also perform a *third* set of actions as helpful to the jñāna, such as silence, (*mauna*), etc. The *gṛhastha-mumukṣu* must also perform his worldly duties, not as a help to jñāna, but "in order that there be no obstruction to what has been already begun by him" (*aprastuta-pratibandhe*)[27].

(xviii) A *mumukṣu* may have *performed* both Jñāna (which the Sūtrakāra understands to be "*anuṣṭheya*" and Karman in this very birth, but even so there is no fixed rule that he would surely get the fruit

18. Bra.Sū.III.4.18-20 (अनुष्ठेयं बादरायण: Bra.Sū.III.4.19).
19. Bra.Sū.III.3.18 (कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्)
20. Bra.Sū.III.3.1 (सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात्).
21. Bra.Sū.III.4.24 (तथा चैकवाक्यतोपनिबन्धात्).
22. Bra.Sū.III.3.20-23, and 34.
23 Bra.Sū.III.4.33 (सहकारित्वेन च)
24. Bra.Sū.III.4.1-2 (शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्विति जैमिनि: Bra.Sū.III.4.2)
25. Bra.Sū.II.1.3 (एतेन योग प्रत्युक्त:)
26. Bra.SūIII.4. (कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहार :—Bra.Sū.III.4.48.)
27. Bra.Sū.III.4.47-51, Bra. Sū.III.4.39-46. (ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात्—Bra.Sū.III.4.51.)

of Mukti immediately on leaving the body or at a particular period after he has performed Jñāna and Karman prescribed for Mukti.[28] Hence the Sūtrakāra describes the movements, the residence, the work, and the functions, of an advanced seeker who has carried out all the means of Mokṣa, but has not yet got perfection, but goes on reincarnating on this earth in the state of an almost liberated seeker, matured in spiritual progress.[29]

(xix) There is no *Jīvan-mukti* because there can be no Mukti unless the *jñānin* reaches (*upasampadyate)* the Supreme One [30]

(xx) Only those who seek Mokṣa (and not the *iṣṭādikārins* and the ignorant) persue and proceed on the Devayāna Path, and, from the moment they start persuing this Path (*āsṛtyupakramāt*), everytime they leave the gross body they do so after the components of the subtle body unite together in a regular order[31].

The Sūtrakāra explains the S'ruti saying "His *prāṇas* do not depart", by interpreting it in a very strange way.[32] The subtle body of the jñānin who reaches Brahman seems then to unite with the Supreme Light and to be dissolved there, because only the soul of the mukta becomes manifest *after* his union with and merger into Brahman.[33]

(xxi) The *reaching* (*upasampatti*) of Brahman by the jñānin is explained by the Sūtrakāra as non-separation (*avibhāga*) of the Mukta Atman from the Supreme One.[34] Thus he enjoys all objects in company of Brahman which even then appears to the mukta soul to be two-fold, viz., *puruṣavidha* and also at the same time *a-puruṣavidha;* and the mukta eternally enjoys in Its company, either with a body or without a body.[35] When the Sūtrakāra gives option as regards the mukta possessing a body or not, he seems to imply that when the mukta feels the presence of the Puruṣa and enjoys in His company, he does so with a body; and when he feels the presence of the Avyakta and enjoys in Its company, he does so without a body. He compares the Enjoyment in company with the *puruṣavidha* aspect with

28. Bra.Sū.III.4.52 (एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः).
29. Bra.S.IV.1.1-12.
30. Bra.Sū.IV.1.13-19.
31. Bra Sū.IV.2.1-7,8-11;15-21.
32 Bra.Sū.IV.2.12 (प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात्); 13, 14. He interprets न तस्य प्राणा: उत्क्रामान्ति in the light of न तस्मात् प्राणा उत्क्रामान्ति which is the reading in another S'ākhā and which he construes to mean that प्राणs do not *go out of him* but they *go along with him.*
33 Bra.Sū.IV.4.
34. Bra.Sū.IV.4.4.
35. Bra.Sū.IV.4.10, 13-14. 36. Bra.Sū.IV.4.13-14.

the enjoyment in the waking state and the Enjoyment in company with *apuruṣavidha* aspect of the Supreme Being with that in the dream state.[36]

(xxii) The form of the liberated one is free from all entanglements of worldly transactions and relations, such as the relationship of father and son, sinner and sinless, criminal and righteous, the caste-system, the *āśrama*-system, the different religions and schools of philosophy, even the followers of the Vedas and the non-followers, etc[37]. One of the arguments for this statement is that the form of the liberated one is beyond any modification *(vikārāvartin)* because the S'ruti mentions the permanence of that form[38]. Another argument is that the only common characteristic between the mukta-state and the state in this *jagat* is that of enjoyment[39]. In one Sūtra the author of the Brahmasūtra refutes the "*lokāpatti*" *doṣa* on Brahman even though *bhoga* (Enjoyment) is a characteristic common (*sāmānya*) to It and to our world[40]. Also, it appears, as I have already noticed above in (vi) that acc. to Bādarāyaṇa the Prajāpatiloka is an aspect of the Kāraṇa Brahman; i.e., it is the *puruṣavidha* Brahman. S'aṅkara is not right in asking us to add Prajāpatiloka to the list of *lokas* and as situated above the Varuṇaloka[41].

In the above I have summed up in a somewhat popular way the more important points in the System of the author of the Brahmasūtra rediscovered by me. There are many more found out and stated by me in the respective chapters of this book and in the notes in Part I. The respective interpretations of the Sūtras from which the above information has been gathered have been fully given in Part I along with the relevant arguments, and have been summarised in detail in the chapters of this Part in their proper place.

II. BADARAYANA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE UPANISADS.

The above discovery of the System of the Brahmasūtra throws light on Bādarāyaṇa's interpretation of a number of Upaniṣadic S'rutis. I have collected them from Part I and also stated their meanings as they appear to me to have been understood by Bādarāyaṇa, in chapter 7 of this book.

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37. Bra.Sū.IV.4.17 (जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्).
38. Bra.Sū.IV.4.19 (विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह).
39. Bra.Sū.IV.4.21 (भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च) which must refer to the साम्य between मुक्त (IV.4.2) and जगत् (IV.4.17).
40. Bra.Sū.III.3.51 (न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः)
41. Vide (vi.) supra.

I shall here very briefly present only some of them just to illustrate the importance of the problem.

(I) The most important point for the history of the Vedanta Philosophy, noteworthy as discovered from the Brahmasūtra, is the fact that Bādarāyaṇa interprets only a few S'rutis, viz, the S'rutis discussed by him in Bra.Sū.I.I, as S'rutis dealing with *only* the *a-puruṣavidha* aspect,[42] while, the S'rutis and the thoughts (on Brahman) discussed by him in Bra.Sū.I.2 and 3 deal, according to him, with *both* the *apuruṣavidha* and the *puruṣavidha* aspects simultaneously. "These S'rutis distinguish the *apuruṣavidha* with attributes of the *puruṣavidha* and the *puruṣavidha* with those of the *apuruṣavidha*; and hence there is an "*interchange of the attributes*" of the two aspects in the Scripture"[43]. In Bra.Sū.I.2 and 3 he has interpreted the S'rutis under consideration as those of the Puruṣa, but in Bra. Sū III.3.38-39 he says that the same S'rutis may also be taken as the S'rutis of the Avyakta, the impersonal aspect of Brahman.[44]

(ii) The S'rutis of *cogita oppositorum*, e.g. *apāṇipādo javano grahītā, sa paśyaty acakṣuh sa śruṇoty akarṇah*[45] and similar Smṛtis, e.g., *sarvendriyaguṇābhāsam sarvendriyavivarjitam,*[46] are understood by Bādarāyaṇa as proving that Brahman *is simultaneously* both *puruṣavidha* and *a-puruṣavidha,*[47] that Brahman has to aspects, but there are not two Brahmans (higher and lower)[48], that both the aspects are of equal status[8], and also that the liberated soul is in the state of nonseparation with *Brahman having thesetwo aspects.*[50]

(iii) According to Bādarāyaṇa the S'rutis mentioning the *negative thoughts* known as the "thoughts of the Akṣara", e.g., *asthūlam, anaṇu, ahrasvam, adīrgham, alohitam*, etc. (emphasised too much by S'aṅkara) deny only the *rūpa* or *ākāra* of Brahman. He says that these thoughts of the Akṣara are not to be collected (*avarodha*) because they are not useful for meditation on Brahman[51].

42. Bra.Sū.III.3.11 (आनन्दादय: प्रधानस्य)
43. Bra.Sū.III.3-37 (व्यतिहारो विंशिपन्ति हीतरवत्)
44. Bra.Sū.III.3.38-39. (सत्यादय: कामादितरत्र तत्र च चायतनादिभ्य:)
45. S've.Upa. 46. Bha.Gī.XIII.
47. Bra.Sū.III.2.13 (अपिचैवमेके) and Bra.Sū.III.2.17.
48. Bra.SūIII.2.36 (तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात्).
49. Bra.Sū.III.2.27 (उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्).
50. See Bra.Sū.IV.4:4,10-12 and 13-14.
51. Bra.Sū.III.3.13 (इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्) and 14 (आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्); Bra,Sū. III.3.33 (अक्षरधियां त्ववरोध:).

(iv) The Katha Upaniṣad S'ruti which mentions the Puruṣa as higher than the Avyakta, i.e., the *puruṣavidha* aspect as "*higher*" than the *a-puruṣavidha* aspect of Brahman and which was so interpreted by an Opponent is set aside by Bādarāyaṇa [52].

(v) The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad was interpreted by an Opponent as holding that Brahman is *puruṣavidha* in Its states (*sthānas*) of waking and dreaming (*jāgaritasthāna* and *svapnasthāna*), while It is *apuruṣavidha* in Its state of dreamless sleep and in the fourth state (*suṣupta-sthāna* and *turīyāvasthā*). The Opponent also interpreted other S'rutis mentioning the Puruṣa and His attributes as dealing with the Supreme One (*para*, i. e., Brahman Itself) in Its waking and dreaming states (*sthāna*) and S'rutis mentioning the Avyakta and Its attributes as dealing with the Supreme One in Its state of dreamless sleep and in the *turīyāvasthā*. The Opponent taking the Māṇḍūkya Upa. as his authority thus explained the *two-fold* attributes and S'rutis (of *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* aspects) of the Supreme One 'by referring them to Its four states' (*sthānataḥ*).

The S'utrakāra rejects this view with the help of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which he interprets rightly as meaning that Brahman is both Avyakta and Puruṣa (*nirākāra* and *sākāra*) *in all states* because Prajāpati teaches Indra that Brahman is *the same in all the states*[53].

(vi) Bādarāyaṇa interprets the *śuklā* and *kṛṣṇā gatis* of the Bhagavadgītā as dealing with Brahmajñānins who are *yogins* and rejects them as being smārta only. It may also be noted here that Bādarāyaṇa rejects the Yoga of the Gītā as means to Mokṣa[54], because he identifies the Prakṛti of the Gītā with Brahman Itself[55]; and the Yoga of the Gītā traces all actions to the Prakṛti and asks man to return them to Prakṛti. This identity of the Prakṛti with Brahman leads to *Smṛtyanavakās'a*[15] (no scope for the Gītā Smṛti); and hence naturally the Yoga, (Disinterested Action) of the Gītā, has to be rejected. I have already shown elsewhere that the Smṛti Pāda of the Brahmasūtra gives Bādarāyaṇa's interpretation of those

52. Bra.Sū.III.2.31-37.

53. Bra.Sū.III.2.11 (न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयालिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि), and Bra.Sū.III.2.12 (न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्).

54. Bra.Sū.II.1.3 (एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः)

55. Bra.Sū.I.4.23 (प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्); I.4.24-27. This Adhikaraṇa means : "And Prakṛti of the S've.Upa. and the Gītā is Brahman Itself because, ..."

56. Bra.Sū.II.1.1 is closely connected with Bra.Sū.I.4.23-27.

principles and views of the Gītā which are not found in the Principal Upaniṣads [57].

Bādarāyaṇa's interpretations of other S'rutis, discovered by me, are collected in Chapter 7 of this book.

III. VEDANTA SCHOOLS KNOWN TO BADARAYANA.

It will be easily imagined that those who differed from Bādarāyaṇa as regards the interpretation of the several S'rutis and Smṛtis had their own views as to the nature of Brahman, the two aspects of the Supreme One, their characteristics, the means to Mokṣa, and other problems of the Vedanta Philosophy. There is no doubt that among the Opponents of Bādarāyaṇa in his own days there were many philosophical schools and many philosophers besides those whose names (Kārṣṇājini, Bādari, Kās'akṛtsna, Jaimini, etc.) are mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa. Their names are not stated in the Bra.Sū., but their views are certainly mentioned and refuted by Bādarāyaṇa. Some of these we have already mentioned above in presenting the Pūrvapakṣa-interpretation of several S'rutis. We shall here add only some of the more important Pūrvapakṣas.

(i) One School of Opponents objected to bringing *all* the Vedantas under ONE System, viz., that of Bādarāyaṇa. It held that every Vedanta or Upaniṣad was self-sufficient. In fact it argued that there were as a many independent Vedanta (or rather philosophical) schools, as there were Upaniṣads (Bra.Sū.III.3.1-5).

(ii) One S'rauta Vedanta School wanted to interpret the Pūrvakāṇḍa (Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa) in the light of the Uttarakāṇḍa by extending the Apūrva of the latter to the former also, simply on the ground that the two Kāṇḍas are linked up together (*saṁbandhāt*). Bādarāyaṇa admitted the connection of the two Kāṇḍas, but emphasised the speciality (*vis'eṣa*) of each Kāṇḍa and said that he would not collect in his Brahmasūtra even such attributes given in the Pūrvakāṇḍa, as clearly belong to Brahman, e.g., *saṁbhṛti and dyuvyāpti* [58]. He also argued that the Pūrvakāṇḍa did not mention such other attributes (other than *saṁbhṛti* and *dyuvyāptī*) as are mentioned in the Puruṣa Vidyā of the Upaniṣads.

(iii) Jaimini was the leader of the Opposition which sought to interpret the Uttarakāṇḍa in such a manner that it was subordinate to the Pūrvakāṇḍa. According to him the knowledge of Brahman was *merely of the nature of a thought* (*parāmars'a, dṛṣṭi* only); the greatness of Brahman was mere *stuti* "mere praise", and the stories and dialogues about

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57. Vide my Paper on "Smṛti" in the Brahmasūtra in JHQ, 1936.

58 Bra.SūIII.3.20-23. (सम्भृतिद्युव्याप्त्येपि चातः)

Brahman were meant for the sacrificial ceremony called Pāriplava. Bādarāyaṇa has refuted all these arguments and established his view that the knowledge of Brahman is 'an act to be performed' '*anuṣṭheya*' and that there is Vidhi in the Uttarakāṇḍa for Brahman only,[59] and that the knowledge of Brahman produces its own Apūrva.

(iv) Jaimini also held that the knowledge of Brahman was subordinate to Action (Karmaśeṣa). Bādarāyaṇa held that Mokṣa (Puruṣārtha) would result from the Jñāna of Brahman helped by *Karman* co-operating with that Jñāna.

(v) There were three Vedantin Oppositions, all of which have been refuted by Bādarāyaṇa. One held (a) that Puruṣa is different from the Avyakta, on account of *śabda, prakaraṇa* and *samjñā*[60]. Bādarāyaṇa admitted a difference between the two only on the ground of "two different names (*samjñā*)" of the same Brahman,[61] Avyakta and Puruṣa, which are like the two names of the same serpent viz., *ahi* (the serpent as such) and *kuṇḍala* (the coiled serpent).[62]

Probably this very Pūrvapakṣa argued that the Puruṣa is higher than the Avyakta.[63] All the arguments are from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. We have already noticed this above (II. iv.) According to Bādarāyaṇa as "Puruṣa" and "Avyakta" are only two names of the same Brahman, neither the Puruṣa nor the Avyakta can be higher (*para*) than the other.[64] He also gives other arguments.

(vi) Another Oppositional Vedanta School, probably, the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is important specially in so far as it takes the ultimate reality to be Puruṣa (or *sākāra*) only (Vide II. v above).

(vii) The third Pūrvapakṣa did not admit the Puruṣa at all. It said that the Puruṣa was a mere mental image projected on the Avyakta and that its conception was subject to *lokāpatti doṣa*. Perhaps Bādari might have been the leader of this view. He took the Puruṣa or Prajāpati as a Kārya of the Para[65]. Bādarāyaṇa has refuted this view and said that the Puruṣa Vidyā is Brahma Vidya; that it is taught in the S'ruti which is the strongest proof; that there is no *lokāpatti* even though *bhoga* is a feature common to the attainment of the Puruṣa and that of the *lokas*. Thus, an option (*vikalpa*) of a choice between the Puruṣa and the Avyakta was

59. Bra.Sū.III.4.18-26. 60. Bra.Sū.III.3.6-8. 61. Bra.Sū.III.3.9-10.

62. Bra.Sū.III.3.8 which refers to Bra.Sū.III.2.27-30.

63. Bra.Sū.III.2.26 and III.3.31.

64. Bra.Sū.III.2.27-30 and III.2.21-37. 65. Bra.Sū.IV.3.7

asserted and maintained by Bādarāyaṇa even though he said that (1) the Avyakta or *a-puruṣavidha* is "stronger (has a stronger claim to recognition) than the Puruṣa, "because a majority of the S'rutis mention the *a-puruṣavidha,*[66] and (b) that Brahman is *a-rūpavat* only in the sense that it is "*fundamentally arūpavat*"[67].

(viii) The view that the *prāṇas* of the Brahmajñānin do not depart from the body is a Pūrvapakṣa in the Brahmasūtra, as already noted.[68]

These are some of the very important Pūrvapakṣas discovered in my study of the Brahmasūtra (Vide chapter I). We may also note that there was no Opposition on many occassions which would have been serious enough in the days as S'aṅkara and other Ācaryas. Thus, Bādarāyaṇa does not mention any opposition (a) when he sets aside the "thoughts or attributes of Akṣara (*asthūlam, ananu,* etc.)", saying that they are "not useful for meditation",[69] (c) when he teaches his view regarding the interpretation of the S'ruti, viz., that there is an Interchange of the Attributes of the two aspects of Brahman, in these S'rutis"[70] and (c) when he rejects *priyśiarastvādi* on a logical ground.[71] Perhaps in the days of Bādarāyaṇa the correct interpretations of the Upaniṣads and the Gītā and the exact knowledge of the difference of doctrines among (a) the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads, particularly the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa. and (b) the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, particularly the the Kaṭha and the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads and (c) the Bhagāvadgītā, were not yet forgotten by the philosophers.

IV. IMPORTANCE OF BRAHMASUTRA III. 3.

The most important part out of Bra Sū III.2.11 – IV from which all the above information re. the Brahmasūtra has been derived is in my opinion Brahmasūtra III.3.

(a) S'aṅkara's own remarks in this Bhāṣya on this Pāda (III.3), (b) the strange topics of some Sūtras of this Pāda as interpreted by S'aṅkara, (c) S'aṅkara's free additions of words not warranted by the words of the Sūtras, all these make us doubt the accuracy of this portion of the S'āṅkara Bhāṣya. The application of the critical method has amply shown that S'aṅkara had the correct tradition neither of the Meaning nor of the Text of this Pāda. This Pāda as interpreted by me contains the

66. Bra.Sū.III.3.44-52.
67. Bra.Sū.III.2.14. 68. Bra.Sū.IV.2.12-13.
69. Bra.Sū.III.3.33 which refers to Bra.Sū.III.3.12-15.
70. Bra Sū.III.3.37, 38-39. 71. Bra.Sū.III.3.12.

most important statements re. the Vedanta Doctrine established by Bādarāyaṇa. Ample illustrations of all this have been given by us in Chapter[10].

Above all, the regular sequence of the topics of the sixtysix Sūtras of this Pāda (III. 3) as per the interpretation offered by me will speak for itself. This Pāda gives *a continuous account of the meditation on Brahman*, item by item, in its sixtysix Sūtras, the total number of such items being eighteen. I have shown this by comparing the interpretation suggested by me, Sūtra by Sūtra, with that of S'aṅkarācārya (chapter 9). Bra.sū.III.3 is called Guṇopasamhāra Pāda, and, like the Pāda of the Jaiminisūtra bearing the same name, it must contain a "collection of Minor Details (guṇas)" (about the meditation on Brahman) and not "the mutual transfer of the attributes of the Vidyās in two or more Upaniṣads" as understood by the Ācaryas.

V. THE CRITICAL APPROACH.

The above conclusions regarding the System of Bādarāyaṇa and the Interpretation of S'rutis and the Importance of Bra.Sū.III.3, have all been discovered by us by studying a substantial part of the Brahmasūtra (III.2.11-IV) according to what has now come to be known as the modern historical, critical, comparative, scientific method of interpretation. I shall here say a few words regarding its application to the Brahmasūtra and regarding the method of S'aṅkarācārya.

(A) By studying the nature of the relation between a Sūtra and its *viṣayavākya* wherever such a *viṣayavākya* exists, a number of the correct *viṣayavākyas* in the case of the Sūtras of Bra. Sū. III and IV have been discovered. An effort has been made to find out whether the Sūtrakāra refers in the Brahmasūtra to the Brahmasūtra itself. It is found out that *tad uktam* Sūtras always refer to some preceding Sūtras, and not to the Upaniṣads, the Jaiminisūtras, the Purāṇas, etc., as taken by some of the Ācāryas. It is also found that the *bahuvrīhi* compounds, *ānandādayḥ* (III.3.11), *satyādayaḥ*, *āyatanādibhyaḥ* (Bra.Sū.III. 3.38-39) refer to Bra. Sū. I.1, 1.2, and I.3 *respectively*, as also some other *bahuvrīhi* compounds do. Similarly, a comparison of important words (*pradhāna, sthāna*, etc), a study of synonyms (*pradhāna* and *mukhya; arūpavat, avyakta*, and *sūkṣma;* etc.), a comparison of expressions (e. g. *ekasyām* in III.3.2 and *s'ākhāsu* in III.3 55, etc.), a contrast of terms (e. g. *arūpavat* in III.2.14 and *rūpa* in I.2.23), a study of the exact context of words (like *ataḥ, pūrva, tad, asya, anya, anyatra, anyathā, itara, ime*, etc.), the use of *api*-all these have been very helpful in recovering what may be called the Lost Meaning of a

number of the Sūtras. Above all, the context must be strictly adhered to. Ample illustrations of these and several other "rules" of critical interpretation will be found in Chapter [11].

(B) The above critical method has been applied also to the Text of the Brahmasūtra to reconstruct its Sūtra Pāṭha and Adhikaraṇa Pāṭha.

In fixing the Text a study of the particles *hi*, *tathāhi*, *tu* and *ca*, has proved very useful. A Sūtra with *hi* as giving an argument in support of a preceding statement can be an independent Sūtra and can begin an Adhikaraṇa only if it has in it a " statement " (Pratijñā); otherwise it must belong to the same Ahikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra belongs. Thus a number of Sūtras with *hi*, which are the first Sūtras or the only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa in the S'āṅkara Pāṭha, become the last Sūtra of the preceding Adhikaraṇa. "*Tu*" signifies the rejection of a Pūrvapakṣa stated or implied in a preceding Sūtra in which the *tu* occurs. It has been found out that several Sūtras with *tu* which are the first or only Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa in the S'āṅkara Pāṭha, belong to the preceding Adhikaraṇa. As the use of *ca* is more frequent than that of *hi* and *tu*, the help derived from the study of the interpretation and the textual significance of *ca* is numerically the greatest. It is found out that several Sūtras with *ca*, which S'aṅkara takes as beginning a new Adhikaraṇa, do not really do so, that there are several cases where a Sūtra with *ca* is, in the S'āṅkara Pāṭha, followed by a Sūtra without *ca* which also belongs to the same Adhikaraṇa, that the latter must begin a new Adhikaraṇa. There are some other rules about the significance of *ca* in settling the Text of the Brahmasūtrā.

Among other tests for fixing the Adhikaraṇa Pāṭha I may mention what should be called *hetusūtras*, which are like the Sūtras with *hi* or *tathāhi*. Thus when a Sūtra gives only an argument (*hetu*) in the ablative, it cannot be taken as beginning a new Adhikaraṇa. By a reverse process I have tried to fix the nature of a Sūtra which would begin a new Adhikaraṇa. I have thus differed from S'aṅkara's view in several cases.

While trying to fix the Adhikaraṇa Pāṭha I had twelve occasions to suggest a change in the very reading in the Sūtra Pāṭha (vide Bra.Sū.III. 2.34,35;III.3.38,39,42,43,44,45,62,63;IV.1.17,18), in about 227 Sūtras. I have stated the reasons for these changes in their proper places.

If we apply these tests for the readings of the Sūtras and for their groupings into Adhikaraṇas we have the same number of Sūtras (viz.,227) as S'aṅkara in Bra.Sū.III.2.11 to IV.4.22; but the number of Adhikaraṇa

acc. to us would be 58, in place of S'aṅkara's 95 Adhikaraṇas[72]. In Part I the text of the Brahmasūtra has been printed and translated by us as reconstructed with the help of the new method (vide Chapter 12).

(C) I have tried to study the method of the Bhāṣya of S'aṅkara. He divides the Sūtras as those of Avidyā, Aparā Vidyā and Parā Vidyā, without giving any explanation re: the proportion or the order of such Sūtras. In fact no such classification seems to be in the mind of the Sūtrakāra. S'aṅkara takes some Sūtras as discussing topics like *ācamana*, *prāṇāgnihotra*, *mahāpātaka* or *upapātaka*, which have nothing to do with Brahmajijñāsā. The titles of the Adhyāyas and of some of the Pādas have been preserved by S'aṅkara, but there are cases where his Bhāṣya does not follow that tradition. According to the S'āṅkara Bhāṣya several Sūtras involve cross references, some times noted by S'aṅkara and some times not. On several (about 15) occasions S'aṅkara openly differs from Bādarāyaṇa. In a good number of cases (of course, in Bra.Sū.III.2.12-IV) S'aṅkara has not got the correct *viṣayavākya* or gives a *viṣayavākya* where none is intended by Bādarāyaṇa or gives a wrong *viṣayavākya* which does not exactly support him. He has therefore got no correct tradition about the *viṣayavākyas* in Bra.Sū.III and IV.

In filling up the natural ellipses in the Sūtras, S'aṅkara makes too many unwarranted additions, which mostly help him in making out his System from the Sūtras. Occasionaly he splits up the *padas* in a Sūtra wrongly; so, he makes two *sentences* out of only two *words*. There are cases where he does not give the exact sense to a word in a Sūtra. Some *bahuvrīhi* compounds are explained by him in such a way that they are no more *bahuvrīhi*. Some times he gives two or more meanings to a word. In a few cases his Pūrvapakṣas or Siddhāntas are either impossible or even absurd. Several examples of all these kinds will be found in Chapter 10. S'aṅkara's method may be taken as an example of the method of the Ācāryas. It has been rightly called the "*system-making method*" by Prof. Strauss.

CONCLUSION

By this brief Introduction I could only hope to tell the reader just what he may expect to find in the present book. I should have illustrated both the Modern Method and the Method of S'aṅkara by examples. But it became impossible for me to do so due to the great bulk of the work even otherwise. Moreover a brief summary with a few illustrations of each has been given in Chapter 13.

72 S'aṅkara has 4,36,17,14,11,6,7 Adhikaraṇas, while I have suggested 7,18,8, 6,5,6,8 respectively in Bra.Sū.III.2,3,4,IV.1.2.3 and 4.

accepts, we would be 25 in place of Śaṅkara's Adhikaraṇas. To [illegible] the text of the Brahmasūtras has been edited and translated by us after [illegible] with the help of the new method (Vide Chapter 13).

[illegible] I have [illegible] the [illegible] of the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. He [illegible] those of Avidyā, Ānanda, Vāyu and Para Vidyā, without giving any explanation re the propriety or the order of such Sūtras. In fact no such classification seems to be in the mind of the Sūtrakāra. Śaṅkara takes some Sūtras as dealing [illegible] topics like [illegible], [illegible] which have nothing to do with [illegible]. The titles of the Adhyāyas and of some of the Pādas have been preserved by Śaṅkara, but there are cases where his Bhāṣya does not follow that tradition. According to the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya several [illegible] some times noted by Śaṅkara and some [illegible] Śaṅkara openly differs from Bādarāyaṇa in a good number of cases (of course in Brs. Sū III.2.14 IV). Śaṅkara has not got the correct significance or gives a significance where none is intended by Bādarāyaṇa or gives a wrong significance which does not [illegible] support him. He has [illegible] no correct [illegible] about the [illegible] in Brs. Sū III and IV.

In filling up the natural ellipses, in the Sūtras, Śaṅkara makes too many unwarranted additions, which mainly help him in making out his system from the Sūtras. Occasionally he splits up the parts in a Sūtra [illegible] out of only two words. There are cases where he does not give the exact sense to a word in a Sūtra. (Some [illegible] are explained by him in such a way that they are [illegible]. Sometimes he gives two or more meanings to a word. [illegible] his [illegible] Siddhāntas are either impossible or [illegible]. Several examples of all these kinds will be found in Chapter 13. Śaṅkara's method may be taken as an example of the method of the [illegible]. It has been rightly called the [illegible] method by Prof. [illegible].

CONCLUSION

In this brief Introduction I could only hope to tell the reader just what he may expect to find in the present book. I should [illegible] the Modern Method and the Method of Śaṅkara by [illegible] [illegible] bulk of the work [illegible] summary with [illegible] illustrations of each has been given in Chapter 13.

72 Śaṅkara does [illegible] which I have [illegible] 7.18.9, [illegible] III.2.34, IV.1.3 and [illegible]

CHAPTER. 1.

CONCEPTION OF BRAHMAN AND MEDITATION ON IT

BEFORE we begin the subject proper, it will not be out of place to draw our attention to the position of Bādarāyaṇa in the history of the Vedanta philosophy. From the days of S'aṅkarācārya, or perhaps even of his predecessors, whose views he quotes, the Brahmasūtra has been regarded as one of the three Canons (Prasthānas) of the Vedanta School and as such it has been commented upon by the various Ācāryas who have tried to make out from it a system consistent with the principal Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā and, one may add, with their own individual sects of the Vedanta School. But, in the light of modern scholarship, it is not now necessary to prove that Bādarāyaṇa should be looked upon as an Ācārya of the Vedanta School, and his work as a record of the doctrine of his sect of the Vedanta School. It was the aim of Bādarāyaṇa to interpret the Scripture consisting of certain Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā which he refers to as authority and to evolve out of the same a system of Vedanta as conceived by him. The subsequent Ācāryas also have each of them tried not only to offer a system founded upon the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā but they have also tried to support it by interpreting the Brahmasūtra in their own way. Though Bādarāyaṇa has not written a *bhāṣya* on any Vedāntasūtra, he should be regarded only as an Ācārya because his Sūtras were originally meant to be only a *bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, which were the only Canons known to him. It should have been possible and permissible for Saṅkarācārya and the succeeding Ācāryas to

differ openly from and even reject the views of Bādarāyaṇa,[1] while professing to base their system only upon the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā as did Bādarāyaṇa; but instead of availing themselves of this freedom they preferred to revere Bādarāyaṇa by raising his work to the status of a Prasthāna. This reverence must have been due to two facts : (1) Bādarāyaṇa was the first known Ācārya of the Vedanta School and therefore every subsequent Ācārya must, in the opinion of the followers of the Vedanta School, follow (or profess to follow) Bādarāyaṇa, and (2) secondly, when the exact meaning of each Sūtra and the very doctrine of Bādarāyaṇa's work were forgotten, it was easy for each subsequent Ācārya to interpret Bādarāyaṇa's work in his own way and thereby to assert his allegiance to the first Ācārya of the Vedanta School. It is likely that Gauḍapāda did not profess to follow Bādarāyaṇa but rather criticised his views.[2] All this points to the fact that we should study Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtra as embodying Bādarayaṇa's system, which was the first Vedanta system, rather than as interpreted by Śaṅkara or any other Ācārya.

Here we shall state in brief the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman as it can be recovered from the Sūtras discussed in this work.[3] As this discussion includes the Sūtrakāra's Scheme[4]

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(1) This the Ācāryas have actually sometimes done. Cf. S'aṅkara's *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. I.1.19; III.4.11;III.3.12.

(2) Cf. Gauḍapāda Kārikā IV. 12. Gauḍapāda here seems to criticise '*tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* (Bra. Sū. II.1.14). Gauḍapāda also criticises the illustration of the seed and its plant given by S'aṅkara to explain Bra. Sū. II.1.35 (Vide Gauḍapāda Kārikā IV. 20). Vide the author's Paper on Gauḍapāda and Bādarāyaṇa in the Proceedings of the Lahore Session of the All India Oriental Conference.

(3) Only Bra. Sū. III.2.11-IV are discussed in this work. Their detailed explanations will be found in Part I.

(4) We believe, Sūtras III.3.11 and III 3.38-39 reveal the Sūtrakāra's Scheme of the division of the S'rutis selected and grouped for discussion in the first three Pādas of the first Adhyāya. Vide our Notes on these Sūtras.

of the discussion of the Śrutis chosen for consideration in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3 our statement will not suffer from being seriously incomplete.

The most striking characteristic of the conception of Brahman in Bādarāyaṇa's System is that of its two aspects. It is this characteristic of the doctrine, which stands at the bottom of the three groups of Śrutis in the first three pādas of the first Adhyāya and which is also discussed in detail in Bra. Sū. III. 2 and 3.

With Bādarāyaṇa the two aspects of Brahman are *arūpavat* or *nirākāra* and *rūpavat* or *sākāra*. As each of these aspects has its peculiar attributes,[5] neither of them, not even the *nirākāra*, is *nirguṇa* and therefore the *arūpavat* and the *rūpavat* do not correspond to the *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* aspects of the Śāṅkara School.

The *rūpa* or form of Brahman meant by the Sūtrakāra is that of the Puruṣa given in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, the Śruti referred to by Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23.[6] In that Adhikaraṇa (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 21-23) it is decided that the topic of Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5-6 is the Puruṣa, 'because the *rūpa* is introduced in the Upaniṣad.' Again, in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14[7] Bādarāyaṇa says that " Brahman or the Para is *arūpavat only* because the *arūpavat* aspect is the *chief* aspect of Brahman". We must consider these two Sūtras (*rūpopanyāsācca* and *arūpavad eva hi tatpradhānatvāt*) together, because then only we can get the exact sense of '*pradhāna*' in *tatpradhānatvāt* (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14,[8].

(5) Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37-42 deal with the *guṇas* of both these aspects.

(6) The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad S'ruti runs as follows :—
" अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ।
वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथ्वी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ Mu.Upa. II. 1. 4.
The Sūtra in question is :— रूपोपन्यासाच्च । Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23.

(7) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14.

(8) S'aṅkara explains *tatpradhānatvāt* by saying 'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8), अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम् । (Katha Upa. III. 15) इत्येवमादीनि वाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मत्वप्रधानानि नार्थान्तरप्रधानानि ।

If these two Sūtras are thus considered, they hardly leave any doubt about the nature of the two aspects of Brahman according to Bādarāyaṇa. He admits *both* these aspects, but believes that "the *arūpavat* aspect is the chief (*pradhāna*) of the two and that, therefore, Brahman may be said to be *only arūpavat*". That the Sūtrakāra takes the *arūpavat* aspect as the *chief* aspect of Brahman is clear not only from the Sūtra mentioning expressly the *rūpavat* aspect (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23) but also from the word *pradhāna* or its synonyms in other Sūtras besides Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14 (*tatpradhānatvāt*). Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11 says that "the attributes *ānanda* and those that follow it belong to the *pradhāna* or *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman.[9] Elsewhere[10] we have shown that Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43 which is traditionally read as *pradānavad eva tad uktam* should have been originally *pradhānavad eva tad uktam* and should then mean that the meditation on the *rūpavad* aspect or the Puruṣa should be practised by the method of *ātmagṛhīti*, the same method as that for the meditation on the Pradhāna or *arūpavat* aspect.[11] The word *mukhya* in *param Jaiminir mukhyatvāt* (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 12) is a synonym of the word *pradhāna* used three times in Bra. Sū. as just shown.

Another synonym of '*arūpavat*' is the word '*sūkṣmam*' in Bra. Sū. I. 4. 2,[12] which, in our opinion, means that the principle called *avyakta* in Kaṭha Upa. III. 10-11 and VI. 7–8 is not

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(9) Cf. प्रधान in अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14) with प्रधान in आनन्दादय: प्रधानस्य । (Bra. Sū III. 3. 11) and in प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् the proposed reading for Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43.

(10) Vide the author's Paper on Pre-S'āṅkara Mutilation of the Text of the Brahmasūtra, p. 433, Proceedings of the Seventh All India Oriental Conference.

(11) For a further discussion of this Sūtra (III. 3. 43) vide Notes on it.

(12) सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् । (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 2).

the *smārta avyakta* but it is the *sūkṣma* or *arūpavat* (formless or subtle) aspect of Brahman[13] in the Sūtrakāra's System.

We have shown above[14] that by the *rūpa* of Brahman the Sūtrakāra means the *rūpa* mentioned in Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4, i. e., the *rūpa* of the Puruṣa, which consists of head, eyes, ears, speech, breath, heart and feet. This *rūpavat* aspect is appropriately called by the Sūtrakāra the *Puruṣavidha* aspect, e. g., in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26.[15] The Adhikaraṇa (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 24-32) to which this Sūtra belongs follows immediately the Adhikaraṇa (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 21-23) about the Puruṣa Śruti of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad and discusses the Vaiśvānara Śruti of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which also mentions the head, the eyes, the breath, the body, the bladder, the feet, the chest, the hair on the body, the heart, etc. A comparision of the two Adhikaraṇas and the two *viṣaya vākyas*[16] would leave no doubt that according to

(13) The Puruṣa higher than the *avyakta* in the S'ruti (Kaṭha Upa. III.10-11) would be the *rūpavat* aspect and the *higherness* of the Puruṣa is, like the *higherness* of the objects which are higher than the senses, due to the fact that the Puruṣa is *dependent* (*adhīna*) on the *arūpavat*. Cf. तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् । (Bra. Sū. 1. 4. 3). For a detailed discussion of Kaṭha Upa. III. 10-11 vide our Notes on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23-30, 31, 37.

(14) Vide (6) supra

(15) S'aṅkara reads the part of the Sūtra in question as पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते but she himself notices in his commentary that some of his predecessors read the part of the सूत्र as 'पुरुषविधमपि चैनमधीयते' which is perfectly in agreement with the विषयवाक्य quoted by S'aṅkara, viz., स एषोऽग्निर्वैश्वानरो यत्पुरुषः स यो हैतमेवमग्निं वैश्वानरं पुरुषविधं पुरुषेऽन्तः प्रतिष्ठितं वेद ।" (S'atapatha Brā. X. 6. 1. 11).

(16) The one Adhikaraṇa (Sūtras I. 2. 21-23) emphasises the *rūpa* of the Puruṣa in deciding the topic of Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5-6, while the other Adhikaraṇa (Sūtra I. 2. 24) stresses the word पुरुषविध in the corresponding text of another S'ākha of the same Veda. The *viṣayavākyas* of the two Adhikaraṇas are respectively :—

अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ।
वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4);

and तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा संदेहो बहुलो बस्तिरेव रयिः पृथिव्येव पादावुर एव वेदिर्लोमानि बर्हिर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यो मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः ।
(Chā. Upa. V. 18. 2).

the Sūtrakāra the *rūpavat* is the same as the *Puruṣavidha* aspect and that he is really emphasising these points in order to decide that the topic of the Śrutis in question (Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6 and Chā. Upa. V. 11. 1, 6) is the Puruṣa the personal (or we may call it *super-personal*) aspect of Brahman,[17] and not the impersonal one.

Bra. Sū. III. 3. 24[18] uses the word *puruṣavidyā* to distinguish the *puruṣavidha* aspect from the Pradhāna or the *arūpavat* aspect. This Sūtra, as we have shown,[19] belongs to an Adhikaraṇa (Bra. Sū.III.3.20–24), the purpose of which is the extension of the rule of the Extra–ordinary Principle (called Apūrvam–Bra. Sū. III. 3. 18) established in the case of the Jñānkāṇḍa or the Upaniṣads, to the Karmakāṇḍa or the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa portion of the Śruti.[20] The Sūtrakāra says that *saṁbhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* mentioned in the Rāṇāyanīya Khila of the Sāmaveda are attributes of the Pradhāna and yet he has not collected them in Bra. Sū. I, because they occur in the portion of the Śruti which is not called Vedantas or the Upaniṣads. Similarly, another reason for separating the discussions of the Karmakāṇḍa and the Jñānakāṇḍa and not extending to the Karmakāṇḍa the principle called Apūrvam (established in the case of the Upaniṣads) is that the Karmakāṇḍa does not mention *(anāmnānāt)* the *guṇas* other than *saṁbhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* (*itareṣām*, i. e., the *guṇas* belonging properly to the Puruṣa only) as are mentioned in the Puruṣavidyā, the Science of the Puruṣa

(17) S'aṅkara, who in his *bhāṣya* on the Mu. Upa. explains Mu. Upa 1. 1. 5-6 as dealing with the *nirguṇa* Brahman, has to interpret the same in the Brahmasūtra (I. 2. 21-23) as pertaining to the *saguṇa* Brahman. About this and similar other inconsistencies of S'aṅkara's *bhāṣyas*, vide Chapter X.

(18) पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् । Bra. Sū. III. 3. 24.

(19) Vide our Notes on समान and अन्यत्र in Sūtra III. 3. 19 and 20 respectively.

(20) About the relation of the two Kāṇḍas of the S'ruti according to Bādarāyaṇa vide infra

or the super-personal aspect of Brahman taught in the Upanisads (*puruṣavidyāyāmiva*).[21] We believe, the word *puruṣavidyā* in the Sūtra in question has the same importance as the word '*puruṣavidha*' in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26.

Not less emphatic than the use of the word 'puruṣa' as distinguished from that of '*pradhāna*' is a series of arguments in Bra. Sū. 1. 3, which *all* mean that the topic of the Śruti, which forms the *viṣayavākya* of the particular Adhikaraṇa is the Puruṣa or the *rūpavat* (*sākāra*) aspect of Brahman, *because the Puruṣa is mentioned expressly in the Śruti in question*[22]. Thus, to give a few illustrations : (1) In Bra. Sū. I. 3. 2 the Sūtrakāra says that the topic of Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5 is the Puruṣa aspect of Brahman because that topic "is called *muktopasṛpya* or Puruṣa"– an argument which refers to Mu. Upa. III. 2. 8. [23]. (2) In Bra. Sū.I.3.13 the Sūtrakāra seems to argue that the *jīvaghana Brahmaloka* (a doubtful term in the Upaniṣadic literature and, therefore, requiring to be explained) of Pra. Upa. V. 5 is Puruṣa because the *jīvaghana Brahmaloka* is called *īkṣatikarma* or puruṣa." [24] (3) The topic of Kaṭha Upa. IV. 13 is declared by

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(21) This is the interpretation of Brahmasūtra III. 3. 24 proposed by us.

(22) Vide the author's Paper on the Scheme of Brahmasūtra 1. 1-3: A Reapproachement, Bombay University Journal Vol. IV, Pt. III, November, 1935.

(23) The Adhikaraṇa (Sūtras I. 3. 1-7) discusses Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5, viz.,

यस्मिन्द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः ।
तमेकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथामृतस्यैष सेतुः ।

Sūtra 1. 3. 2 reads मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् and refers to तथा विद्वान् नामरूपाद् विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् । (Mu. Upa. III.2.8). 'मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात्' means 'पुरुषव्यपदेशात्' because 'the One to be reached by the released in the S'ruti is पुरुष. It would be wrong to explain 'मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशे' as मुक्तोपसृप्यत्वव्यपदेश as done by S'aṅkara.

(24) The Sūtra reads ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः (Bra. Sū.I.3.13) and refers to स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते (Pra. Upa. V. 5). The one who is the object of *īkṣati* (seeing) is the Puruṣa. Here also S'aṅkara seems to us to miss the exact point of argument, (which is to emphasise the fact that the topic of the S'ruti *is called puruṣa* and therefore it is Puruṣa), because he explains ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेश as 'ईक्षतिकर्मत्वेन अस्य आभिध्यातव्यस्य पुरुषस्य वाक्यशेषे व्यपदेशो भवति." "ईक्षतिकर्मत्वेन व्यपदेशः" is different from "ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशः".

the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. 1.3.24 to be the Puruṣa aspect "because the very term *puruṣa* occurs in that S'ruti." [25] It seems to us that all these *hetus*, *muktopasṛpyavyadeśa*, *īkṣatikarmavyapadeśa* and *śabda* have *only one* meaning, viz., *puruṣa* and not *pradhāna* or *arupavat* aspect.

We believe that the above study of the Sūtras with the words *arūpavat*, *rūpopanyāsa*, *pradhāna*, and its synonyms *mukhya*, *sūkṣma*, and *puauṣavidha* or *puruṣa*, and words like *muktopasṛpya*, etc. which are coined to mean *puruṣa* and at the same time to refer to the Śruti in question, will not be insufficient to bring home to us the Sūtrakāra's view about the two aspects of Brahman. But, if further evidence for this twofold doctrine of Bādarāyaṇa is required, it is not wanting. There are several Sūtras in his work, which throw ample light on the nature and relation of these two aspects of Brahman in his System. We have fully discussed and explained these Sūtras in Part I. We will here give briefly the information that can be culled out from them.

In Bra. Sū. III.2.23-30 the Sūtrakāra seems to us to distinguish between the *arūpavat* and *rūpavat* aspects of Brahman.[27] In Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23[28] he declares that Brahman is the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) because the Śruti says so.[29] In Śutra

(25) The Sutra reads 'शब्दादेव प्रमित:' (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 24) and refers to अङ्गुष्ठमात्र: पुरुषो मध्ये आत्मानि तिष्ठति' (Kaṭha Upa. IV.13). The *śabda* is the term in the S'ruti.

(26) As to how the other Sūtras of Bra. Sū. I. 3 decide that the topic of the respective S'ruti is the Puruṣa, vide fnfra.

(27) We have proposed to take Sūtras III. 2. 23–30 as forming *one* Adhikaraṇa. According to S'aṅkara Sūtra III.2.23 is closely connected with Sūtra III. 2. 22.

(28) तदव्यक्तमाह हि । (Bra. Sū. III.2.23).

(29) In Notes on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23 we have shown that generally all the Sūtras with आह हि refer to a S'ruti which invariably contains the particular word in the Sūtra. Thus, we take Sūtra 23 as referring to अव्यक्त in

महत: परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुष:पर: । पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गति: ॥

(Kaṭha Upa. III. 11). S'aṅkara does not quote any S'ruti *with* the word अव्यक्त.

III. 2. 26 [30] an Opponent argues that "From this Unmanifest the knower of Brahman is united with the Infinite". This Sūtra, as we have shown, refers to Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8 [31] which says that 'higher than the Unmanifest there is Puruṣa, the *Omnipresent* One'. The Pūrvapakṣa implies that the Unmanifest is not the Omnipresent one but the Puruṣa is Omnipresent and that from the Unmanifest a knower of Brahman unites with (*ekatāṁ gacchati* – Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*) the Omnipresent One, i. e., the Puruṣa. In Sūtra III. 2.27 the Siddhāntin refers to two names (*ubhayavyapadeśa*) and these two names are (1) the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) and (2) the Super-person (*puruṣa*). This also shows that Sūtra III. 2. 26 refers to a Śruti with two names, and justifies our *viṣayavākya*. The Sūtrakāra replies to the Pūrvapakṣa of Sūtra III. 2. 26 by sayingt hat "because Brahman has *both* the names, viz., *avyakta* and *puruṣa*, it is like *ahi* and *kuṇḍala*, a serpent and its coil" (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27) or "It is like the light and its resort", e. g., the light (of the Sun) and the solar orb in which that light rests (*āśraya*, Bra. Sū. III. 2. 28).[32] These similes illustrate how one and the same principle has *two* aspects one of which is *arūpavat* and the other *rūpavat*. The words *ahi* and *kuṇḍala* are both used as names of a serpent, but *ahi* is used without any reference to the form of the serpent while '*kuṇḍala*' is used only in the sense of the coiled *form* of the serpent. Similarly, *prakāṣa* will be a common name for all

(30) We have taken Sūtra III. 2. 26 as a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra, because Sūtra III. 2. 27 has 'तु' which means the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa.

(31) अव्यक्ता-तु परःपुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च । (Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8). Here व्यापक corresponds to अनन्त in the Sūtra. We have shown that Sūtra III. 2. 31 refers to the Kaṭha Upa. (III. 10-11, VI. 8) and that सर्वगतत्वम् in Sūtra III. 2. 37 is a refutation of the अनन्तत्व of पुरुष only in Sūtra III. 2. 26. सवगत is the same as व्यापक. The Pūrvapakṣa in Sūtra III. 2. 26, implies that the अव्यक्त is not व्यापक but पुरुष is व्यापक because such is the sense of Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8. This part of the Pūrvapakṣa's implication is refuted in Sūtra III. 2. 37.

(32) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वाहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27), and प्रकाशाश्रयद्वा तेजस्त्वात् । (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 28). For the latter simile and the argument तेजस्त्वात vide *infra*..

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luminous objects and would refer to no form of a particular object but *prakāśāśrayas* denoted by such words as the Sun, the Moon, the lamp, would undoubtedly refer to the particular *forms* of those objects. It is in this sense that Brahman is *arūpavat* and also *rūpavat* or *puruṣavidha* (as already explained above) and is respectively called *avyakta* and *puruṣa.* The *arūpavat* aspect may be described as *apuruṣavidha* because *rūpa* means the *rūpa* of *puruṣa* We have shown that these two names, *avyakta* and *puruṣa,* are meant by *saṁjñe* (in *saṁjñātaḥ*) in Sūtra III. 3. 8 [33] and that *tad uktam*[34] in that Sūtra refers to Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27. We have also suggested that *ime* in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10 refers to this form '*(dve) saṁjñe*' in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 8. Bra. Sū III. 3. 8 appears to us to mean that an Opponent asserted *a difference about the principle* '*Brahman*' *(arthabheda) based upon the two names* of Brahman and that the Sūtrakāra accepted that difference and said that he had already stated it in Bra Sū III. 2. 27. Sūtra III. 3. 10 makes it clear that the Sūtrakāra would treat these two names or aspects of Brahman as distinct from each other.[36] Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra, the difference between the two aspects of Brahman, *arūpavat* and *rūpavat* or *avyakta* and *purusa,* is *the difference between the two names of one and the same object*, as between *ahi* and *kuṇḍala* or *prakāśa*

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(33) We have taken Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5-9 as one Adhikaraṇa. संज्ञा in Bra. Sū- III. 3. 8 corresponds to *vyapadeśa* in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27 and *tad uktam* in the former refers to the statement in the latter.

(34) We believe that *tad uktam* in all the Sūtras where it occurs refers to some Sūtra preceding the particular Sūtra in which it occurs.

(35) According to our suggestion 'संज्ञातश्चेत्' in Sūtra III. 3. 8, is a Pūrvapakṣa *against* the *upasamhāra* proposed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5 and 'तदपि' means that "Even though the Sūtrakāra accepts this difference, the *upsamhāra* stands (अस्ति)."

(36) 'सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे' (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10). 'अन्यत्र' means 'भेदे' because 'अभेदादन्यत्र' should mean '"भेदे". Vide onr Notes in Part I. How the सूत्रकार has treated these two aspects as different from each other will be clear also from our interpretation of the Sūtras that follow Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10.

and its *āśraya*. Brahman is called in the Śruti by two (sets of) names and these two names imply a difference; therefore, the Sūtrakāra admits two aspects of Brahman.

There are several Sūtras which greatly help to understand the *pūraṣa* or *rūpavat* aspect of Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra. Particularly, we will here notice Bra. Sū. III. 3. 45–49 and Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7–15. We have given our arguments for our interpretation of these Sūtras in Part I. We will here make a statement embodying only the result of these arguments.

In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 45-46[37] an Opponent says that Puruṣa or the *rūpavat* aspect may be taken as only a projection (*kriyā*) on Brahman which is only *arūpavat*. This projection is like a mentation *(mānasavat)* known in the Pūrvamīmāṁsa.[38] The discussion here seems to us to be based upon the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.[39] When the Śruti says, "येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यम्" it means one should "know *Akṣara* or the impersonal Brahman *as* Puruṣa (by projecting the latter idea on Brahman)".[40] This Opponent advanced two arguments, viz., (1) the Context[41] shows that the topic is only the impersonal Brahman, because we have only the impersonal mentioned in Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6; and (2) we have

(37) We read 'पूर्वविकल्पः' as part of Sūtra III. 3. 44 and Sūtra III. 3. 45 as प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत्. For the transference of पूर्वविकल्पः to Sūtra III. 3. 44 vide Note on Sūtra III. 3. 45.

(38) There are several मानस acts in the पूर्वमीमांसा. The Opponent does not accept the पुरुष as an aspect of Brahman; but he takes it only as a क्रिया, a projection on Brahman which is, in his opinion, only impersonal.

(39) Vide Note on सूत्र III.3.45.

(40) तस्मै स विद्वानुपसन्नाय सम्यक् प्रशान्तचित्ताय क्षमान्विताय ।
येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम् ॥ (Mu. Upa. I.2.13).

(41) प्रकरणात् in सूत्र III.3.45 refers to 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादं नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः ॥ (Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6).

an अतिदेश (Bra. Sū. III.3. 46; vide Notes) in which the nature of पुरुष is transferred to अक्षर (according to the Pūrvapakṣa's interpretation of that Śruti). On account of these two arguments the Puruṣa taught in the Upaniṣads, e. g., in Mu. Upa. I. 2. 11[42] is only क्रिया (projection of an idea) on the Akṣara. To these arguments of the Opponent the Sūtrakāra replies by saying, "*But* (the teaching about) the Puruṣa is *Vidyā*, i. e., *Brahmavidyā only, and not a* क्रिया[43]." The Sūtrakāra's arguments are (1) that in the Upaniṣad[44] we have *an assertion* that the *knowledge* of "अक्षर पुरुष" is Brahmavidyā, and (2) that we find (दर्शनात् Bra. Sū. III.3.48) that the Upaniṣad calls its teaching "(this) Brahmavidyā".[45] Though the fact of Brahman having two aspects one of which is अरूपवत् and the other रूपवत्–by which (fact) the Sūtrakāra disproves the Opponent's contention that the Puruṣa is only a क्रिया on the Akṣara–involves an apparent contradiction (बाध: in Sūtra III.3.49); really there is no such self–contradiction because the Śruti and S'mṛti are stronger than Perception and Inference.[46] Thus, Brahman is not to be regarded only as impersonal or अरूपवत् and पुरुष as merely a projection on it, as the Opponent here thinks it to be. The रूपवत् or the Puruṣa partakes of the nature of Brahmavidyā as much as the अरूपवत् or

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(42) सूर्यद्वारेण ते विरजा: प्रयान्ति यत्रामृतः स पुरुषो ह्यव्ययात्मा (Mu. Upa. I.2.11).

(43) विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.47).

(44) This refers to ब्रह्मविद्या in 'येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम् । (Mu. Upa. I.2.13). If one were asked by the S'ruti to meditate on अक्षर *as* पुरुष, it would be a क्रिया and not विद्या, but here a seeker is asked to know अक्षर पुरुष the immutable पुरुष (aspect) and *that* knowledge is called Brahmavidyā. 'येन' & 'तां' show the निर्धारण referred to in the सूत्र.

(45) This refers to तेषामेवैतां ब्रह्मविद्यां वदेत् शिरोव्रतं विधिवद्यैस्तु चीर्णम् । (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 10).

(46) श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः । (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 49).

About the other argument of the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra III. 3. 50 vide our interpretation of the Sūtra in Part I.

Avyakta.[47] The Puruṣa is not inferior to the Avyakta so far as the attainment of Mokṣa is concerned.

In the second group of the Sūtras, [48] which we propose to examine with regard to the nature of the *puruṣa* aspect of Brahman, we have two Pūrvapakṣa views from which we learn that both Bādari and Jaimini hold that the Puruṣa or the *rūpavat* aspect (here the Prajāpatiloka) is a kārya 'an effect of Brahman'. The Sūtrakāra holds that what Bādari and Jaimini regard to be Kārya of Brahman is nothing but the Kāraṇa 'the Cause', viz., Brahman. Thus the Puruṣa or the *rūpavat* aspect is an aspect of Brahman the Cause, the Para. The Sūtrakāra emphasises *the difference* between the two aspects as stated in Pra. Upa. V. 5.[49] To us the Sūtrakāra seems to correct both Bādari and Jaimini inasmuch as he looks upon the Puruṣa or रूपवत् and the 'जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक' or the अरूपवत्[50], as aspects of the Cause itself.

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(47) This *avyakta* aspect is the topic in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43 and 44. The masculine form of दृष्टः in प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टः (Sūtra III. 3. 50) should be taken as a sure indication that the subject of 'स्यात्' in Sūtra III. 3. 45 is पुरुष, not अव्यक्तम्.

(48) These Sūtras are Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7—15. Vide our interpretation. We have drawn attention to the fact that the question here is "How far can the conductor take the knower of Brahman?" The question is not whether Brahman is an object to be reached by going to it. We take अस्य in कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7) as referring to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक mentioned in सूत्र IV. 3. 6 and गति as गमनम्. S'aṅkara seems to be wrong in taking अस्य as ब्रह्मणः and गतिः as गन्तव्यता.

(49) विशेषं च दर्शयति (Bra. Sū. IV.3.16) refers to Pra. Upa. V. 5, viz., स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते । In this section of the Pra. Upa., we have four goals, viz., (1) मनुष्यलोक, (2) सोमलोक, (3) जीवघन-ब्रह्मलोक (= प्रजापतिलोक), and (4) परात्पर पुरुष. The first two cannot be regarded as Brahman; therefore, the पर ब्रह्मन् would be जीवघनब्रह्मलोक and अपर ब्रह्मन्. would be the पुरुष (Vide our Notes). "नयति" in Sūtra IV.3.15 refers also to सामभिः नीयते in Pra. Upa. V.5. मनुष्यलोक and सोमलोक are कार्य of ब्रह्मन्; but जीवघनब्रह्मलोक and परात्पर पुरुष are both the कारण ब्रह्मन् i. e., two aspects of Brahman the Cause.

(50) For our interpretation of जीवघन as the Impersonal Brahman, vide our Notes on Sūtras IV.3.15-16.

"जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक" means Brahman which is *a mass of life* (*jīvaghana* being a word like *prajñānaghana*) and Puruṣa means the Super-person, i. e., the personal (or रूपवत्) aspect of Brahman. In our explanation of these Sūtras (Bra. Sū. IV.3.7–16) we have drawn attention to several facts, all of which cannot be reproduced here. The most important of these is that अस्य in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7 refers to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक and that the problem with Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa was to decide "How far can the Conductor (आतिवाहिक) go?" *All* of them believed that Brahman was an object to be attained by the knower of Brahman by *going* to It. We have also shown that Bādari and Jaimini regarded the Prajāpatiloka as Kārya and Brahman (neu.) as Kāraṇa, while Bādarāyaṇa looked upon both these as aspects of the Kāraṇa only; and that therefore the Sūtrakāra discusses the Prajāpatiloka in Sūtras IV.3.7–16 and drops mentioning it in a Sūtra after Bra. Sū. IV.3.3.[51] As a result of this interpretation we conclude that Śaṅkara is not right in asking us *to add* the Prajāpatiloka *after* the Varuṇaloka.[52] We have also shown that "कार्यात्यये (in Sū. IV.3.10)" proves that the कार्य means the Prajāpatiloka. Moreover, according to our interpretation the word "प्रतीक" refers only to the *one* Symbol of Brahman, viz., the Praṇava, and the expression "अप्रतीकालम्बनान् नयति" (meaning 'the Conductor leads those who do not resort to the Symbol Om') refers to Pra. Upa. V. 5 which says that those who meditate on the syllable 'Om' are *led by the Sāmans* (not by the Conductors). All these and other very essential points involved in our interpretation of these Sūtras must be read from Part I, because want of space prevents us from repeating them here. Thus, we conclude that according to Bādarāyaṇa the Puruṣa or the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman is not to be counted as Effect or Kārya of Brahman, but it is only the *Cause* itself, i. e., an aspect of

(51) ताडितोऽधि वरुण: संभवात्। (Bra. Sū. IV.3.3.)

(52) Cf. वरुणादधीन्द्रप्रजापती स्थानान्तराभावात् पाठसामर्थ्याच्च। (शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra. Sū. IV.3.3).

Brahman, the Cause. The वैद्युत Conductor does carry those who know Brahman by *other* means than the Praṇava, *to Brahman the Cause itself* and these seekers are those who meditate *either on the* अरूपवत् *or* रूपवत् *aspect of Brahman.* The Puruṣa is an aspect of the Cause and, therefore, it is not an Effect of Brahman; and a Conductor takes the knower of Brahman to it as also to the अरूपवत् aspect.

We have above stated that the जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक is the *para* Brahman and the Puruṣa is the *apara* Brahman referred to in Pra. Upa. V. 2. We mean to convey the same idea when we say that the जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक is the अरूपवत् aspect and the Puruṣa is the रूपवत्. In this connection we shall now state what we think to be the Sūtrakāra's statements about the *relation* of these two aspects. We have already stated that the Sūtrakāra takes अव्यक्त in Kaṭha Upa. III.10-11 and VI.8 as the अरूपवत् aspect and पुरुष in the same text as the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman and that according to him the Puruṣa is said to be *higher* than the Avyakta because the former is dependent (अधीन) on the latter just as the objects of sense (अर्था:) are declared to be *higher* than the senses because the objects depend upon the senses for being perceived[53]. This same Śruti of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad seems to us to have been discussed, *merely from the stand-point of the relation of these two aspects*, once again in Bra. Sū. III.2.31-36.

We have shown that अत: in the Sūtra (Bra. Sū. III.2.31) refers to अव्यक्त in Bra. Sū. III.2.23 and that the Opponent here is one who bases his view on the Kaṭha Upaniṣad which says that "the Puruṣa is higher than the Unmanifest".[54] We have also proved that the four arguments of (1) सेतुव्यपदेश, (2) उन्मानव्यपदेश, (3) सम्बन्धव्यपदेश, and (4) भेदव्यपदेश refer respectively to (1) Kaṭha Upa. III.2,[55],

(53) तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् । (Bra. Sū. I.4.3).

(54) अव्यक्तात्पुरुष: पर: । (Katha Upa. III.10-11)

(55) य:सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् ।
अभयं तितीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतं शकेमहि ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. III.2)

Here the अव्यक्त is called "bridge", therefore, the Supreme One should be *beyond* that bridge. Thus, पुरुष is declared to be beyond the अव्यक्त.

(2) Kaṭha Upa. IV.12-13,[56] (3) Kaṭha Upa. IV.4[57] and (4) Kaṭha Upa. III.11[58]. To these arguments of the Opponent the Sūtrakāra replies that (1) the designation of a bridge is *common to both* the अव्यक्त and the पुरुष (सामान्यात्–Bra. Sū. III.2.32) and, therefore, the fact that in the Kaṭha Upa. the अव्यक्त *is called a bridge* cannot prove that there is a higher (aspect of) Brahman than the अव्यक्त[59], (2) that the अव्यक्त is called अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुष because in meditation the meditator has to form a notion (बुद्धि) of the अव्यक्त as "a person of the size of a thumb"[60], (3) that the *association* of the soul with the अव्यक्त mentioned in Kaṭha Upa. IV.4 should be taken as that which takes place when the soul is in the deep-sleep state (स्थानविशेष Sūtra III.2.34)[61] and (4) that the state-

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(56) अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्येआत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते एतद्वैतत् ॥ Kaṭha Upa. IV.12-13)

The Opponent seems to argue that the अव्यक्त is अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः and is lower than the Puruṣa who is declared to be the व्यापक पुरुष in Kaṭha Upa. VI.1. 'उन्मान' refers to अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः.

(57) स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. IV.4).

The Opponent seems to argue that in this S'ruti the अव्यक्त is declared to be that by which (येन) the individual soul sees or experiences both the states of dream and of waking. Thus, the soul is declared *to be connected* with the अव्यक्त (in these two states). Because there is already a connection between the अव्यक्त and the individual soul, the Supreme Being with which the soul *seeks* to be united in liberation is higher than this अव्यक्त.

(58) महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. III.11).

This S'ruti mentions अव्यक्त and पुरुष as *different* from each other. There are several other S'rutis in which the difference between the *arūpavat* and the *rūpavat*, the Avyakta and the Puruṣa, is mentioned e. g., Mu. Upa. II.1.1.–2 (अक्षरात्परतः परः); Mu. Upa. III.1 (उपासते पुरुषं ये ह्यकामास्ते शुक्रमेतदतिवर्तन्ति धीराः ।), Pra. Upa. V. 5. Vide Note (13) on सूत्र III.2.31.

(59) Vide Note (16) on सूत्र III.2.32.

(60) Vide Note (19) on सूत्र III.2.33.

(61) Vide Note (23) on सूत्र III.2.34. We have proposed a change in the readings of सूत्र III.2.34 & 35. Vide Note (22) on Sūtra III.2.34.

ment about the *difference* between the Avyakta and the Puruṣa can be explained like the भेदव्यपदेश between a serpent and its coil or light and its resort, as already mentioned in Sūtras III.2.27–29[62]. The Sūtrakāra, thus, refutes the four arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa and then adds one more argument in his own favour[63]. He says that the S'rutis deny 'a principle other than Brahman' or 'a second principle along with Brahman' and that therefore there can be no other principle *higher* than Brahman.

Thus, the Sūtrakāra's aim in Bra. Sū. III.2.31–36 is to prove that the Puruṣa is not higher than the Avyakta. The रूपवत् is not higher than and other than the अरूपवत्. These two are two aspects of *equal* status because the पुरुष or the रूपवत् is also not lower than the अरूपवत् aspect.

Another Sūtra about the relative importance of the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman is Bra. Sū. III.3.44.[64] The Sūtrakāra tells us in Sūtra III.3.43[65] that "The meditation on the Puruṣa is to be practised according to the method of आत्मगृहीति ("I am the Puruṣa",) exactly as in the case of the meditation on the Pradhāna or the अरूपवत् aspect; this has been stated in Bra. Sū. III 3.16."[66] In the Sūtra in question (Bra. Sū. III.3.44) he gives an argument ("हि"–in Sūtra III 3.44) for his statement in Bra. Sū. III 3.43 and says that as there is a majority of Śruti texts for the प्रधान or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, that aspect is *stronger* than the रूपवत् one and that *therefore* it is that the meditation on the Puruṣa should be practised by the आत्मगृहीति

(62) Vide Note (24) on सूत्र III.2.35. Vide Note supra.

(63) तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात् । (Bra. Sū. III.2.36). This seems to refer to S'rutis like नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता...... । (Bṛ. Upa. III.7.23). Also see Bṛ. Upa. III.8.11 & Bṛ. Upa. IV.3.30-31. Vide Note (28) on Bra. Sū. III.2.36.

(64) Cf. लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्ताद्धि बलीयः । in Sūtra III.3.44 which we have proposed to read as लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्ताद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः ।

(65) We read this सूत्र as प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् । Vide Note on the सूत्र in Part I.

(66) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.16). Vide infra and our Notes on Bra. Sū. III 3.43.

method, the method prescribed for the meditation on the प्रधान (अरूपवत्). Now, the fact that the प्रधान is *stronger* (i. e., supported by a greater number of Śruti texts) may lead to an assumption that the meditation on the Puruṣa may not give the same result as that on the Pradhāna. This assumption is refuted by the Sūtrakāra by saying that in spite of the greater authoritativeness (बलीयस्त्व) of the Pradhāna, the option of choice out of the two aspects of Brahman for the attainment of (direct) liberation already stated by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III.3. 28–30 stands.[67] In Bra. Sū. III.3.28 the Sūtrakāra says that "A seeker may, according to his wish, choose one of the two aspects of Brahman, viz., the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्, because neither of the two is inconsistent with the Scripture, i.e., both the aspects are sanctioned by the Scripture."[68] "Mokṣa would be fulfilled (i.e., achieved) in both the ways. If we do not accept this view, we contradict the Scripture."[69] This option (विकल्प) is quite appropriate and reasonable[70] *because* we find in the Scripture (उपलब्धि) an object with such characteristics, i.e., Brahman with अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects, the meditation on either of which gives Mokṣa; *just as in the world* one can reach the same destination by going to it from either of two opposite or contradictory directions.

Thus, according to the Brahmasūtra, Brahman has two aspects and the Sūtrakāra gives an option of choice to a seeker from these two. He sticks to this option of choice, even though he says that the अरूपवत् aspect which he calls "Pradhāna" is *stronger* than the रूपवत् one named "Puruṣa". Therefore, both

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(67) "पूर्वविकल्प:" in III.3.44 is, as we have shown, a reference to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28-30.

(68) छन्दत: उभयाविरोधात्। (Bra. Sū. III.3.28). We have proposed to take this and the two following सूत्रs as forming one अधिकरण. Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III.3.28.

(69) गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथाहि विरोध: (Bra. Sū. III.3.29).

(70) As an option is given in Bra. Sū. III.3.28, we take "विकल्प:" as understood in Bra. Sū. III.3.30.

these aspects are *equally important* so far as the attainment of Mokṣa is concerned, though a kind of *greater importance* attaches to the अरूपवत् because it is mentioned in a greater number of Śrutis than the रूपवत्.

We have already noticed Bra. Sū. III.2.14[71], which says that "Brahman is अरूपवत् *only*, because, It is *chiefly that* (i. e., अरूपवत्)" and also Bra. Sū. I.4.3[72] where the Sūtrakāra seems to us to mean that the Avyakta of Kaṭha Upa. III.10-11 and VI.8 is the subtle (सूक्ष्म-Bra. Sū. I.4.2), i. e., the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman because the Puruṣa or the रूपवत् aspect which is said to be *higher* than It, is *dependent* upon It just as the objects of sense which are said to be higher than the senses are dependent upon the senses (Bra. Sū. I.4.3). As we will see later on, by saying that Brahman is chiefly अरूपवत् the Sūtrakāra implies that It is not chiefly रूपवत् and that therefore It is the same in all the three states, viz., waking, dreaming and deep-sleep. The use of the word प्रधान for the अरूपवत् aspect does not mean that the meditation on the रूपवत् aspect is not a direct means to Mokṣa. The dependence of the रूपवत् upon the अरूपवत् aspect (Bra. Sū. I.4.3) is probably to be explained like the dependence of the form of coil *(kuṇḍala)* upon the serpent *(ahi)* itself or the dependence of the *substratum of light*, viz., the Solar orb, the lunar orb and the lamp upon the light itself (of the Sun, the Moon, the lamp, etc.). We can have no coil of a serpent, if we have no serpent at all. Similarly, we cannot talk of the various *substrata* of light, the Solar orb, the lamp, etc., if we have no *light* at all. The dependence of the various substrata of light upon light *itself* does not make them *two* independent entities, though, at the same time, we have a *distinct idea* of either of them. The dependence of the रूपवत् aspect of the serpent or of the light upon the serpent or the light itself which are themselves not referred to as having a form does not deprive the रूपवत् aspect of its importance and

(71) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । (Bra. Sū. III.2.14)

(72) तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् । (Bra. Sū. I.4.3)

efficacy. Thus, the statements of Bra. Sū. III.2.14 (Brahman is *chiefly* अरूपवत् and, therefore, *only* अरूपवत्) and Bra. Sū. I.4.3 (the रूपवत् aspect or Puruṣa *depends upon* the अरूपवत् or formless aspect) do not in the least aim at lessening the importance of the रूपवत् aspect as a means of Mokṣa. (Bra. Sū. III.3.28-30). Both are aspects of the Cause Itself.

We have already stated that the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects have each of them their *guṇas* or attributes and that therefore these two aspects do not correspond to the *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* aspects of Brahman in the Vedanta School of Śaṅkara. We will now say what appears to us, according to the Sūtrakāra, to be the attributes of each of these aspects. Bra. Sū. III.3.11-15, 31-33, 37-42, themselves seem to us to throw light on this question.

Bra. Sū. III.3.11-15 give the attributes of the अरूपवत् aspect or the Pradhāna which is mentioned in Bra. Sū. III.2.14[73]. We have shown that आनन्दादयः means "a group of attributes of which आनन्द is the first" and that this group means the attributes of Brahman mentioned in Bra. Sū. I.1 because आनन्द refers to Bra. Sū. I.1.2 which discusses Tai. Upa. III.6[74] and आदि "others" would be a reference to (1) आनन्दमय (Bra. Sū. I.1.12), (2) अन्तःपुरुष (Bra. Sū. I.1.20), (3) आकाश (Bra. Sū. I.1.22), (4) प्राण (Bra. Sū. I.1 23), (5) ज्योतिः (Bra. Sū. I. 1.24) and (6) प्राण (Bra. Sū.I.2.28)[75].

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(73) आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य । (Bra. Sū. III.3.11) and अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । (Bra. Sū. III.2.14). S'aṅkara makes a new Adhikaraṇa out of Sūtras III.3.14-15; but we have given our reasons in our Notes for taking these two Sūtras with Sū. III.3.13.

(74) आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति, आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति । (Tai. Upa. III.6).

(75) We have not mentioned ईक्षण (Bra. Sū. I.1.5) as referred to by आदि because the purpose of the reference to the ईक्षण S'ruti (i.e., Chā. Upa. VI. 2.1-3) in this context is, we think, to defend the statement in Bra. Sū. I.1.2 and therefore that S'ruti cannot form an independent विषयवाक्य, nor can that सूत्र (I.1.5) go to form a new अधिकरण.

We will later on give further reasons for our suggestion that आनन्दादयः means the attributes of Brahman collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I.1, when we shall discuss the meaning of सत्यादय: and आयतनादयः in Bra. Sū. III.3.38 and 39 respectively. In Bra. Sū. III.3.12[76] the Sūtrakāra says that the attributes प्रियशिरस्त्व[77] and others *are not accepted* (अप्राप्ति: in the सूत्र) *as attributes of the* अरूपवत् *aspect* or the Pradhāna, because the increment and decrement of bliss expressed by the words प्रिय, मोद, प्रमोद, आनन्द in these attributes are possible if there be a *difference* (भेद) of degrees of bliss (in the Supreme Being Itself). We have proposed that इतरे in Bra. Sū. III.3.13 refers to the attributes like अनणु, अह्रस्वम्, अदीर्घम्, etc. which are the attributes of the Akṣara and that अप्राप्ति should be taken as implied in सूत्र III.3.13 on the strength of its being mentioned in the preceding सूत्र[78]. Thus, सूत्र III.3.13 means that the Sūtrakāra does not accept (अप्राप्ति:-taken as implied) the other attributes like अस्थूलम् अनणु 'not gross', 'not subtle', अह्रस्व 'not short', अदीर्घम् 'not long', etc.[79] as the attributes of the Pradhāna, because these attributes have a common meaning or aim (अर्थसामान्य–Bra. Sū. III.3.13), viz., that of denying of Brahman all things that we know of in this world, because they are not useful for meditation on Brahman or, rather, the Pradhāna,[80] and because the word आत्मन् which occurs in such Srutis with अनणु, अहस्वम् etc.

(76) प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे । (Bra. Sū. III.3.12)

(77) प्रियशिरस्त्वादि refers to तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः मोदो दक्षिण: पक्ष: । प्रमोदः उत्तरः पक्षः । आनन्द आत्मा । ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । (Tai. Upa. II.5).

(78) S'aṅkara takes इतरे as आनन्दादय: and adds to the सूत्र "सर्वं सर्वत्र प्रतीयेरन् ।" Vide S'ā. bhā. on Bra. Sū. III.3.14. We have stated in our Notes on that सूत्र our reasons for differing from S'aṅkara.

(79) अस्थूलमनण्वन्ह्रस्वमदीर्घम्.........(Bṛ Upa. III 8.8); अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्...... (Kaṭha Up. III.15).

(80) For meditation some *positive* attributes would be useful, but अनणु etc., are negative attributes. These latter may be useful for *understanding* the Pradhāna but not for meditation on it. आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.14). This सूत्र is taken by S'aṅkara as discussing Kaṭha Upa. III. 10-11. We differ.

indicates that Brahman is अनणु, अह्रस्वम्, etc., as well as the individual soul who is also आत्मन्.[81] Whatever may be the interpretation of this last सूत्र (III. 3. 15), there is no doubt that सूत्रs III. 3. 11-15 describe the attributes of the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman and that the three groups of attributes, आनन्दादय:, प्रियशिरस्त्वादय: and इतरे (i.e., अनण्वादय: or thoughts on the Akṣara, e.g., in Bṛ. Upa. III.8.8), are discussed here with reference to the Pradhāna, out of which only *the first group* is, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, useful for meditation on the Pradhāna.

Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31–33 seem to us to discuss *how many* of the thoughts[82] of the Pradhāna should be compulsorily meditated upon by a seeker meditating on the अरूपवत् aspect (i. e., on the Pradhāna). सूत्र III.3.31 [83] says that there is no rule that *all* the attributes or thoughts of the Pradhāna (mentioned in the Śruti) should be meditated upon by such a seeker (अनियम: सर्वासाम्) though there is no objection from the Śruti and Smṛti if a meditator meditates on all of them, (because all of them are mentioned in Śruti and Smṛti). The attributes of the Pradhāna which are connected with official duties (आधिकारिकाणाम्),[84] such as are described, e.g,. in Chā. Upa. I.11.5,[85] should be meditated upon by a seeker of Brahman,

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(81) Our interpretation of आत्मशब्द in सूत्र III.3.15 depends upon तद्भाव in Sū. III.3.33. Vide Notes on सूत्र III.3.15 and III.3.33. 'आत्मशब्द' means that these attributes अनणु, अह्रस्वम्, etc. already belong to the individual soul just as they are declared to belong to Brahman and as the soul cannot start to meditate upon Brahman without realizing himself as अनणु etc., he has not to meditate on Brahman as अनणु etc.

(82) The feminine of सर्वासाम् is to be connected with the feminine of धियाम् in सूत्र III. 3. 33, while the masculine of आधिकारिकाणाम् in Bra. Sū. III.3. 32 should be explained by taking a masculine synonym of धी as under stood. Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III.3.31.

(83) अनियम: सर्वासामविरोध: प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् । (Bra. Sū. III. 3.31).

(84) यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् । (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 32). Cf. आधिकारिकाणाम् with आधिकारिक in न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात् । (Bra. Sū. III.4. 41), where आधिकारिक means official duties of a priest for instance. Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41.

(85) सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राणमेवाभिसंविशन्ति प्राणमभ्युज्जिहते सैषा देवता प्रस्तावमन्वायत्ता (Chā. Upa. I.11.5).

as long as his official duties last (यावदधिकारम्).[86] Thus, only as long as a seeker of Brahman performs some official duties, he should meditate on the attributes of Brahman connected with his official duties, as a part of his meditation on Brahman. But the thoughts on the Akṣara, e.g., अनणु, अह्रस्वम्, अदीर्घम्, etc., are banned (अवरोधः) because they all have a common meaning or aim,[87] and because the individual soul *is* already *what those* attributes are (तद्भाव).[88] In the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, the attributes of the Akṣara do belong to the Pradhāna (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13-15), but they are not to be used in the meditation on It (Bra. Sū. III.3.33).

The most essential information about the attributes of the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman seems to us to have been given by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37-42.[89]

Before we state the interpretation of these सूत्रs, we must explain how we understand the two groups of attributes viz., सत्यादयः and आयतनादयः in सूत्र III.3.39[90]. We have already said that आनन्दादयः in Bra. Sū. III.3.11 means the attributes of Brahman stated in Bra. Sū. I.1; here we have to add that

(86) According to the Sūtrakāra a seeker of Brahman is allowed to perform his official duties, e. g., those of a priest. Vide our interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41-46.

(87) सामान्य in Sū. III.3.33 is the same as अर्थसामान्य in Sūtra III.3.13. Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III.3.13.

(88) अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.33). We have shown that तदुक्तम् should be taken as referring to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13-15. Vide our interpretation of the same. The example of औपसद is not clear to us. Sūtra III. 3. 33 is a repetition of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13-15 in a different context, because Sūtras III. 3. 11-15 discuss *what* are the attributes of the Pradhāna, while Sūtras 31-33 tell us *how many* of these same attributes should be meditated upon by a seeker.

(89) We read सूत्र 38 as सैव हि and transfer सत्यादयः from that सूत्र to सूत्र 39 which we read as सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः । i. e., we have also changed कामादीतरत्र of the traditional पाठ to "कामादितरत्र" (we have shortened the ई). Vide our Notes on सूत्रs 38-39.

(90) We read सूत्र III.3.39 as सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः । Vide Note (89) supra.

सत्यादय: and आयतनादय: refer respectively to the attributes collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū I.2. and I.3. We give below a brief summary of our reasons for this conclusion about these three groups of attributes. If this conclusion of ours be true, we have here a statement by the Sūtrakāra himself about his scheme of the *three* divisions of the Śrutis selected for discussion into the *three* Pādas of Adhyāya I. We may at once say that (1) the Sūtrakāra has discussed in Bra. Sū. I.1 those Śrutis which according to him deal with the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman or the Pradhāna and which he also accepts as dealing with the same; (2) he has discussed in Bra. Sū I.2 those Śrutis, which in his opinion, expressly refer to the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman *but* which he takes as dealing with the रूपवत् or the Puruṣa and (3) that Bra. Sū. I.3 deals with those Śrutis which he believes to be directly referring to the रूपवत् aspect and which he also accepts as such.

Our reasons for the identification of the three groups of attributes with those mentioned respectively in Bra. Sū. I.1,2 and 3 are briefly as follows :—

1. The ancient commentators and the modern interpretors of the सूत्रs have not, within our knowledge, been able to point out anywhere the existence of *three* lists corresponding to the requirements of these three बहुव्रीहि compounds.

2 (a). As stated above, आनन्दादय: would mean (1) आनन्द (Bra. Sū. I.1.2 which refers to Tai. Upa. II.6), आनन्दमय (Bra Sū. I.1.12), (3) अन्तर पुरुष (Bra. Sū. I.1.20), (4) आकाश (Bra. Sū. I.1.22), (5) प्राण (Bra. Sū. I.1.23), (6) ज्योति: (Bra. Sū. I.1.24), and (7) प्राण (Bra. Sū. I.1.28).

(b). The list of the second बहुव्रीहि compound, सत्यादय:, seems to have been made up of the 'thoughts' (धीs–in Bra. Sū. III.3 33) mentioned in the second पाद of अध्याय I, of which the *first* विषयवाक्य is as follows:–मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसंकल्पः आकाशात्मा, etc. (Chā. Upa. III.14.2). The word सत्य in सत्यादयः seems to stand for सत्यसंकल्प in the *first* विषयवाक्य. So, सत्यादयः would imply the attributes of the

Supreme Being as collected in Pāda 2, viz., (1) मनोमय, etc., (Bra. Sū.I.2.1), (2) अत्तृ (Bra. Sū.I.2.9), (3) गुहां प्रविष्टः (Bra. Sū.I.2.11), (4) अन्तरः (Bra. Sū.I.2.13), (5) अन्तर्यामिन् (Bra. Sū.I.2.18), (6) अदृश्य-त्वादिगुणकः (Bra. Sū.I.2.21), (7) वैश्वानरः (Bra. Sū.I.2.24).

(c). The list of the *third* बहुव्रीहि compound, आयतनादयः, seems to be made up of (1) द्युभ्वाद्यायतन in the *first* सूत्र[91] in the *third* पाद of अध्याय I and of the other attributes collected by the Sūtrakāra in the same Pāda, viz., (2) भूमन् (Bra. Sū.I.3.8), (3) अम्बरान्तधृति (Bra. Sū. I.3.10), (4) ईक्षतिकर्मन् (Bra. Sū. I.3.13), (5) दहर (Bra. Sū. I 3·14), (6) अङ्गुष्ठमात्र (Bra. Sū. I.3.24), (7) कम्पन (Bra. Sū.I.3.39), (8) ज्योतिः (Bra. Sū.I.3.40), (9) आकाश (Bra. Sū.I.3.41), (10) विज्ञानमय (Bra. Sū. I.3.42) and (11) पति (Bra. Sū.I.3.43).

As the very words आनन्द and आयतन occur respectively in the विषयवाक्य of Bra. Sū. I.1.2 and in Bra. Sū. I.3.1, the words आनन्द and आयतन in आनन्दादयः and आयतनादयः can be well identified with the same occurring in the विषयवाक्य of Bra. Sū. I.1.2 and Bra. Sū. I.3.1. respectively, and consequently आनन्दादयः and आयतनादयः would imply the attributes or thoughts (in the Śrutis) collected in पादs 1 and 3. The word सत्य in सत्यादयः, however, does not occur in सूत्र 1.2.1, but it occurs as a member of the compound word सत्यसङ्कल्प in the Śruti referred to by that सूत्र. Thus, to our mind, there will be no difficulty in identifying सत्य with सत्यसङ्कल्प on the analogy of आयतन being identified with द्युभ्वाद्यातन. The बहुव्रीहि compound "सत्यादयः" seems to have been derived from the word "सत्यसङ्कल्प" in the Śruti referred to. Moreover, even by the rule of elimination (पारिशेष्य) the identification of the *first* and the *third* lists (आनन्दादयः in सूत्र III.3.11 and आयतनादयः in सूत्र III.3 39) with those of the thoughts in Bra. Sū. I.1 and I.3 itself helps to identify the *second* list (सत्यादयः in Bra. Sū. I.3.38–39) with that of the thoughts in Bra. Sū. I.2.

3. Though we have not offered in this work a detailed interpretation of Bra. Sū. I. 1–3 (Vide Appendix), we may be allowed

(91) द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् । (Bra. Sū. I.3.1).

here to write a few lines about what seems to us to be the nature of the Sūtrakāra's arguments and of the contents of the विषयवाक्यs in these three पादs, as this will give further evidence to strengthen our suggestion about the interpretation of आनन्दादय:, सत्यादय: and आयतनादय:.

In पाद 1, the Sūtrakāra's chief argument is that the विषयवाक्यs mention only that characteristic (धर्म or लिङ्ग) of Brahman, which is stated in Bra. Sū.I.1.2; and we find that the विषयवाक्यs of that पाद (except that of Bra. Sū. I.1.12),[92] are such as mention one or two or all out of the three functions of Brahman, viz., the creation, continuation and dissolution of Beings, though instead of the word 'Brahman' words like अन्तः पुरुष, आकाश, प्राण, (Chā. Upa. I.11.4–5 and also Kau. Upa. III.2.4) and ज्योतिः are used in them. In पाद I there are no arguments about the रूप of Brahman or those attributes which can properly belong only to the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman.

The main argument of the Sūtrakāra in the second पाद is the mention of the रूप or गुणs or विशेषणs (of the Puruṣa) in the विषयवाक्यs, and in one case he even points to the fact that the वैश्वानर आत्मन् of the विषयवाक्य is called पुरुष (or पुरुषविध) in a certain Branch of the Veda (Bra. Sū. I.2.26). If we look to the विषयवाक्यs themselves, we find that each of them contains clear unambiguous *words* like ब्रह्मन्, आत्मन्, instead of words like आकाश, प्राण, ज्योति; as in पाद I which do not primarily signify the Supreme Being, but the word 'पुरुष' does not occur in those विषयवाक्यs.

In the third पाद the Sūtrakāra often argues that the विषयवाक्य Śruti calls the topic of the Śruti "पुरुष". Thus, we have already shown that मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेश (Bra. Sū. I.3.2.), ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेश (Bra. Sū. I.3.13) and शब्दादेव (Bra. Sū. I.3.24) refer to the word "पुरुष" in the respective Śruti; and, lastly, पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः in Bra. Sū. I.3.43 shows that the Sūtrakāra emphasises the use of the word पति, ईश्वर, etc. in the Śrutis, which are synonyms of "पुरुष" and not

(92) We believe, the आनन्दमय S'ruti is discussed in Bra. Sū. I.1.12, because the आनन्द S'ruti is discussed in Bra. Sū. I.1.2.

of the अरूपवत् aspect of the Supreme Being. This पाद also discusses some Śrutis which mention some attributes like धृति, प्रशासन, which can only belong to the personal aspect of the Supreme Being.

Thus, generally speaking, the main point of argument in each of the three पादs is respectively (1) the statement about the creation, continuation or dissolution of beings from and into the Supreme One in the विषयवाक्यs, (2) the mention of गुणs or विशेषणs of the Puruṣa in the विषयवाक्यs, and (3) the occurrence of the word "पुरुष" or some of His exclusive attributes in the विषयवाक्यs. The विषयवाक्य Śrutis in the three पादs are respectively (1) such as mention a word other than ब्रह्मन्, आत्मन् or पुरुष, (2) such as mention a word *other than* पुरुष (i.e., a word like ब्रह्मन्, आत्मन्) and (3) such as mention the very word "पुरुष" or one of *His* exclusive attributes in case a word expressive of the अरूपवत् is *also* mentioned in the Śruti. In our opinion, the three lines of argument as adopted by the Sūtrakāra and the contents of the विषयवाक्यs in the first three पादs of the first अध्याय show that these पादs are aimed at discussing (1) only the अरूपवत्, (2) expressively chiefly the अरूपवत् and partly रूपवत् and (3) the expressively chiefly रूपवत् though partly the अरूपवत्[93] aspects of Brahman.

We do admit that one may find it difficult to explain some of the Sūtras and the विषयवाक्यs of Bra. Sū. I.1-3 in the light of the above analysis of the general trend of arguments and of the nature of the selected Śrutis, but *broadly speaking*, inspite of such difficulties the analysis seems to us to be more correct and we, therefore, venture to offer it for consideration to the students of the subject.[94]

(93) We have used expressively "रूपवत्" with reference to the occurrence of the word like Puruṣa or His exclusive attribute in the विषयवाक्य. This will also indicate what we mean by "expressively अरूपवत्."

(94) It will be out of place to notice briefly the views of the Ācāryas regarding the Sūtrakāra's scheme of selection and arrangement of the विषयवाक्यs in the first three पादs of the first अध्याय.

The above conclusion regarding the identification of the three sets of attributes, आनन्दादयः, सत्यादयः and आयतनादयः mentioned in Bra. Sū. III.3.11, 38–39 and arrived at as a result of (1) the absence of *any three* lists according to the requirements of the बहुव्रीहि compound, in the interpretations so far available to us, (2) an examination of the *first* and *subsequent* attributes in each of the three Pādas and (3) a general analysis of the nature of the Sūtrakāra's arguments and of the contents of the विषयवाक्यs in Bra. Sū. I.1–3, will, we hope, be further corroborated by the interpretation of Bra. Sū. III.3.11, 37–42 offered by us in Part I.

We have already offered above a summary of our interpretation of Bra. Sū. III.3.11. We have explained in Part I how Bra. Sū. III.3.37–42 deal with *the interchange of the attributes of* the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman, which a seeker is allowed to practise when he meditates on either of the two aspects.

In Sūtra III.3.37 the Sūtrakāra says that "In the Upaniṣads there is an interchange (व्यतिहार) of attributes because the S'rutis distinguish *one* aspect of Brahman with the attributes with which they characterise *the other* aspect."[95] Sūtra III.3.38 which we read as only "सैव हि", gives an example of such a Śruti and says that we may take any Śruti we like and we will find that "One and the same Śruti (or *Upaniṣad* text; note the feminine of "सा") distinguishes *the one* aspect of Brahman as it does *the other*".[96] This refers to the general tendency in the S'ruti, e. g., (1) the famous *Akṣara* text of Bṛ. Upa. III.8.8 assigns "प्रशासन" 'the function of ruling' to the Immutable which is the अरूपवत्

(95) व्यतिहारो विंशिषन्ति हीतरवत्। (Bra. Sū. III.3.37). We have shown in our Notes (1) that इतरवत् refers to the *two aspects* of Brahman viz., the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्, (2) that the subject of विंशिषन्ति should be "श्रुतयः", or उपानिषदः, (3) that व्यतिहारः should mean विशेषणानां (i. e. गुणानाम्) व्यतिहारः, and (4) that व्यतिहार is "*mutual interchange.*"

(96) सैव हि। (Bra. Sū. III.3.38)=सैव हि श्रुतिः (or उपनिषद्) एकं इतरवत् विशिनष्टि। We have shown in our Notes that we must take इतरवत् and विशिनष्टि as understood from the preceding सूत्र.

aspect, (2) the *puruṣa* text of Mu. Upa. II.1.2 describes Him as अप्राणः, अमनाः, attributes applicable primarily to the अरूपवत् aspect. Many other illustrations can be given. In fact, the Sūtrakāra seems to think that there is no Śruti which solely and purely characterises either of the two aspects with its own peculiar attributes *only*. Sūtra III.3.39 seems to us to contain a rule about the *application*, of the attributes of Brahman collected in Bra. Sū. I.2 and 3, during the practice of meditation. The Sūtrakāra says that "The group of attributes beginning with सत्य (the Śruti containing the word सत्यसङ्कल्प) in Bra. Sū. I.2.1 may according to the choice of the meditator (कामात्), be taken in (the meditation of the aspect) *other* (इतरत्र) (than that to which they have been explained by the Sūtrakāra to belong) and in (the meditation of) that aspect (तत्र च) a meditator may, according to his choice, take attributes from the group of those beginning with द्युभ्वाद्यायतन in Bra. Sū. I.3.1."

This, to our mind, is the interpretation of Bra. Sū. III.3.39. It makes two points clear, viz., (1) that in Bra. Sū. I.2 the Sūtrakāra has explained all the विषयवाक्य Śrutis of that Pāda as dealing with the Puruṣa, but in Bra. Sū. III.3.39 he allows a seeker to meditate on the attributes collected there, as those of the अरूपवत्, i. e., he allows the seeker to regard those Śrutis as Śrutis dealing with the अरूपवत्, and (2) that in Bra. Sū. I.3 the Sūtrakāra has explained all the विषयवाक्यs as dealing with the रूपवत् aspect, but in the latter half of Bra. Sū. III.3.39 he allows a seeker at his option to regard those Śrutis as dealing with the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman. Bra. Sū. III.3.40 gives the view of an Opponent who holds that "Out of respect (for this interchange of attributes of the two aspects of Brahman found in the Śruti) a meditator should not drop (the attributes of the *other* aspect when he is meditating on *either* aspect)." This view would not admit the *option of choice* about the attributes, given by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III.3.39.[97]

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(97) We have explained how सूत्र III.3.40 is closely connected with सूत्र III.3.39. 'अलोपः' in the former is meant to contradict 'कामात्' in the latter.

Sūtra III.3.41 gives the Sūtrakāra's reply, viz., a meditator *should not drop* only those attributes of the aspect *other* than the one on which he is engaged in meditating, *when* such attributes *are present* (i.e., occur) in the texts about that aspect which is the object of his own meditation. Thus, a meditator is not obliged to collect attributes of the other aspect from texts other than those which mention the aspect of his meditation. Lastly, in Bra. Sū. III.3.42 we are told that there is *no rule* by which one can *fix* what are purely and solely the *attributes* of either of the two aspects, and that the *result of this stand-point* is that from the side of the Śruti there is *no objection to separating the two aspects of Brahman.*[98] To the Sūtrakāra there is only *one definite point* about Brahman, viz., that It has *two* aspects, one अरूपवत् or अपुरुषविध and the other रूपवत् or पुरुषविध. As regards the attributes of these aspects there is no rule to fix them. Therefore, though he himself has made a distinction between the attributes of these aspects in Bra. Sū. I.2. and 3, he does not think that he can stick to it strictly, because the Śruti itself adopts an interchange of the attributes of the two aspects. And, therefore, he gives the option in Sūtra III.3.39. He makes out a very important corollary out of this position. He says that this absence of fixity about the attributes of the two aspects justifies the *option* of choice to a seeker to select either of the two aspects to reach the same goal, viz., Mokṣa. If one can fix even a few attributes as solely belonging to one of the two aspects, the result of the meditation on that aspect may possibly be at least slightly different from the result of the meditation on the other aspect and that possibility would go against the option about the choice of aspect of Brahman, which (option) means that a seeker is

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(98) तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । Bra. Sū. III.3.42. We have stated that the traditional reading पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः (=पृथक्+हि+अप्रतिबन्धः) should have been originally पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः because it corresponds to प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्व in Bra. Sū. III.3.50. We have also explained why तद् in तन्निर्धारण ... should refer to the विशेषणs of Brahman. 'तदुक्तम्' in Bra. Sū. III.3.50 is clearly a reference to Bra. Sū. III.3.42.

to make an independent or separate thought (or notion) about the aspect which he adopts.

The following conclusions can be deduced from what the Sūtrakāra says about the attributes of the two aspects :—

1. There are two aspects of Brahman, the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्.

2. Each of these two aspects is to be followed independently of the other.

3. The Śruti has no objection to the option of choice between the two aspects, because the Śruti makes an interchange of the attributes of these two aspects.

4. And consequently a meditator of either aspect may select whatever Śrutis he likes without observing the arrangement of these Śrutis in the *two* groups in Bra. Sū. I.2 and 3 given by the Sūtrakāra himself.

5. The Sūtrakāra has argued to show that the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I.2 deal with the Puruṣa, though these profess to deal with the Pradhāna. He has also argued in Bra. Sū. I 3 to prove that the S′rutis in question deal with the Puruṣa because they profess to deal with the Puruṣa; but he admits that these latter contain also indications of the Pradhāna.

We may here add that in the case of certain Śrutis discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I.2 and 3, the positiou of Śaṅkara becomes very awkward, if we compare his *bhāṣya* on those Śrutis when they occur in the respective Upaniṣads, with his *bhāṣya* on the same when he comments upon them in the course of his Brahmasūtra-*bhāṣya.* To give an example, Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad explains Mu.Upa. I.1 5–6 as dealing with the *nirguṇa* Brahman, but when he comments upon the same Śruti in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. I.2.21–23 he has to explain it as dealing with the *saguṇa* Brahman, because the Sūtrakāra gives रूपोपन्यास as an argument, which refers to Mu. Upa. II.1.2 which mentions the Puruṣa. Again, in his *bhāṣya* on

Mu. Upa. he takes this Puruṣa as the *nirguṇa* Brahman, but in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. he changes his view. This apparent inconsistency of Śaṅkara is easily explained in the light of the Sūtrakāra's view about those Śrutis, as reconstructed by us from our interpretation of Bra. Sū. III.3.37-42.

We have already mentioned some common points about both the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman discussed in the same Sūtras in our text. Thus, by इतर in Bra. Sū. III.3.37 the Sūtrakāra refers to both the aspects, because he thereby says that the Śrutis characterise the अरूपवत् aspect with the characteristics of the रूपवत् aspect and *vice versa*; by उभय in Bra. Sū. III. 3.28, because there he gives an option of choice between the two aspects for the same goal, viz., Mokṣa; by "संज्ञे" and "इमे" in Bra. Sū. III.3.8 and 10 respectively he says that the two aspects differ so far as the two names (अव्यक्त and पुरुष) differ, otherwise they do not differ at all; and there are some more सूत्रs already discussed above, which simultaneously deal with both these aspects. We shall now suggest what information we can get about *both* of these from similar other सूत्रs that deal with both these aspects at the same time.

सूत्रs III.3.16–17[99] are, in our opinion, meant by the Sūtrakāra to explain the *method* of meditation on both the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects. We have shown that सूत्र III.3.16 refers to Bṛ. Upa. I.4.10[100] and means that the अरूपवत् aspect is *to be comprehended* in meditation *as the self* of the meditator because of the succeeding sentence (उत्तर) of Bṛ. Upa. I.4.10. By इतरवत् in the सूत्र the Sūtrakāra indicates that *the other aspect*, i. e., the रूपवत् aspect is also to be comprehended in meditation as the self of

(99) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra. Sū. III. 3.16).

And अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात् । (Bra. Sū. III. 3.17).

(100) In our Notes we have shown that Sūtra III.3.16 should be compared with आत्मेत्युपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । (Bra. Sū. IV.1.3) and that Sūtra III.3.16 refers to तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति......अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुरेव ऽँ स देवानाम्.......... (Bṛ. Upa. I.4.10).

the meditator. This indicated sense of इतरवत् is referred to by "तद् उक्तम्" in Bra. Sū. III.3.43 which says that "The meditation on the Puruṣa is to be performed just as that on the Pradhāna; *this has been stated* (in Bra. Sū. III.3.16)."[101] सूत्र III.3.17 says that the आत्मगृहीति ("I am Brahman") method is adopted not because of the grammatical construction (अन्वय) of the Śruti in question, but rather because there is *an emphatic definite statement* (निर्धारण) about this method, viz., "आत्मेत्येव उपासीत" (Bṛ. Upa. I.4.7), "One should meditate on the अरूपवत् *only as his very Self.*" Thus, these two सूत्रs lay down the method of meditation for *both* the aspects of Brahman.

In Bra. Sū. III.3.18-19[102] the Sūtrakāra mentions the Extraordinary Principle (अपूर्वम्), in Vedanta, which is the result (कार्य) of the meditation practised as stated above. He says that this कार्य of the आत्मगृहीति meditation on Brahman is declared (आख्यान) in the (same) Śruti."[103] "In the beginning this (world) was Brahman; It thought of Itself 'I am Brahman'; *therefore, It became all;* then, whoever among the gods got this knowledge became the same; similarly among the Ṛṣis and among men; seeing this same Ṛṣi Vāmadeva realized : 'I have been Manu and (I have been) the Sun'; therefore even now he who knows this, viz., 'I am Brahman', *becomes all this.*" "The Sūtrakāra who believes that as in the Karmakāṇḍa of the Śruti, so in the Jñānakāṇḍa of the same we have the Extraordinary Principle (अपूर्वम्) as the effect of the meditation which is of the nature of

(101) Vide our Notes on "तद् उक्तम्" in Bra. Sū. III.3.43.

(102) कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् । (Bra. Sū. III 3.18) and एवं चाभेदात् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.19). Vide our Notes on अपूर्वम्. कार्य seems to us to mean the कार्य of आत्मगृहीति in Sūtra III.3.19-17.

(103) कार्याख्यान seems to us to refer to ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत्तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति । तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्, तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तदभवत् तथर्षीणां तथा मनुष्याणां, तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे 'अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति, तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति........ । (Bṛ. Upa. I.4.10).

the performance [104] *of an act* (अनुष्ठान–Bra. Sū. III.4.19) and a विधि (सूत्र III.4.20). This Principle "अपूर्वम्" is taught in Bṛ. Upa. I.4.10 with reference to the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman. In Bra. Sū. III.3.19 the Sūtrakāra says that similarly (एवम्) an "अपूर्वम्" should be taken as understood (implied) in a similar S'ruti, i. e., an Upaniṣad text about the Puruṣa (समाने), because both the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects are (aspects of) the same Principle (अभेदात्).[105] Thus the Sūtrakāra teaches an अपूर्वम् with reference to both the aspects of Brahman.

One more point which the Sūtrakāra seems to us to state regarding the meditation on both these aspects is brought out in Bra.Sū. III.3.34-36.[106] He says that the meditation should be practised *within one's self*, as is done in the case of the meditations on the भूतs, because the Śruti says that 'Brahman is of a limited size' (इयद् आमननात्). [107] The Sūtrakāra says the same also elsewhere in his book.[108] An Opponent says that Brahman is to be meditated upon within one's own self, "because otherwise the identity of the individual soul and Brahman would not be explained." To this the Sūtrakāra, who does not accept the

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(104) अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः । (Bra. Sū. III.4.19) and विधिर्वा धारणवत् । (Bra. Sū. III.4.20). We will later on show that according to Bādarāyaṇa, the Vedanta proceeds on the same lines as the Pūrvamīmāṁsā and in this lies the एकवाक्यता of both these Sciences.

(105) In Bra. Sū. III.3.19 we have suggested that अभेदात् means अर्थाभेदात् and that we should explain this सूत्र on the analogy of उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत् समाने च । (Bra. Sū. III.3.5).

(106) We have proposed to combine सूत्रs III.3.34-35 of S'aṅkara's पाठ and so we read *one* सूत्र, viz., इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः । Vide our Notes in Part I.

(107) 'इयदामननात्' in Bra. Sū.III.3.34 refers to such S'rutis as द्वा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते.

(108) Cf. अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तव्यपदेशाच्च नेतिचेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च । (Bra.Sū.I.2.7) which is referred to in अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.I.3.21).

absolute identity of the soul with Brahman, replies in the negative and says that he recommends the inward meditation in harmony with another precept[109] or a different precept (i. e., a precept about the non-identity of the soul and Brahman in the heart).

Thus, we have several Sūtras in the Brahmasūtra, which deal with the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. In fact the arrangement of the Śrutis in the first three Pādas of Bra.Sū. I is based upon a classification of the Śrutis distinguishing the two aspects. The same is discussed in Bra.Sū.III.2 and particularly in Bra.Sū.III.3 where the procedure of the meditation on these two aspects forms the main topic of discussion and which is in our opinion the most important portion of the Brahmasūtra.[110]

Now we propose to state briefly several points about the nature of Brahman, which are discussed in Bra. Sū.III.2 and III.3 without special reference to any particular aspect of Brahman, because these points pertain to Brahman itself, and, therefore, to both the aspects.

A very important point about Brahman in the system of the Sūtrakāra is that Brahman, Its meditation and Its realization or knowledge are, according to him, objects of Injunction (विधि) and are of the nature of something to be performed (अनुष्ठेय), as distinguished from things which are simply of the nature of reflection (परामर्श). It is evident that the Sūtrakāra's discussion of Brahman in Bra.SūtraIII.3 proceeds on the analogy of the explanation of Dharma given in the Jaiminisūtra. Thus, the identity of *Brahman* in *all* the Vedanta texts of the Śruti is established in Bra.Sū.III.3.1 on the analogy of the proof of the identity of *Karman* offered in Jai. Sū.II.4.6.[111] In Bra. Sū.III.3.2 the

(109) अन्यथाऽभेदानुपपात्तरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.36). उपदेशान्तर may refer to सं क्रतुं कुर्वीत।...एष म आत्माऽन्तर्हृदये in Chā. Upa.III.14.3.

(110) Vide the Chapter on Bra.Sū.III.3 in Part II.

(111) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.1). Jai.Sū.II.4.6—एक वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याऽविशेषात्।—gives four proofs of the identity of *a karman*, e. g., the Agnihotra. The author of the Brahmasūtra takes these proofs as granted and proceeds to prove the identity of Brahman on the analogy of the Jai.Sū. Vide Note (1) on Bra.Sū.III.3.1.

Sūtrakāra seems to remove a doubt about the propriety of the rule of स्वाध्याय laying down the study of the text of only *one's own* Śākhā, a doubt which arises if Brahman is to be known from *all* the Vedantas, i. e., the Vedantas of *all* the Śākhās of *all* the Vedas.[112] He says that "स्वाध्याय" is 'what it literally means' (स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन) and the religious obligation (अधिकार) of a twice-born is only for the text in vogue (in *his* family or Śākhā, समाचारेऽधिकारात्); and that this rule is like that about the sacrifices called सवs, which are the *only* sacrifices restricted to the followers of *only* one Veda (आथर्वणिकs), all other sacrifices being common to all the Vedas. The point in question is that the Sūtrakāra explains the rule of स्वाध्याय (of the Upaniṣads) on the analogy of *the sacrifices* called सवs. Again, the "*collection*" of attributes and other information pertaining to the meditation (उपसंहार) is compared with the collection of गुणs *(subordinate rites)* subsidiary to an Injunction (विधिशेष).[113] We have also seen above that in Bra. Sū.III.3.18[114] the Sūtrakāra explains how there is an Apūrva (अपूर्वम्) also in the Vedanta School, just as there is an *Apūrva* in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā School. In both the Schools the *Apūrva* is a unique merit *resulting* from an act. स्वर्ग is the अपूर्व resulting from the performance of the ज्योतिष्टोम Sacrifice; so the Upaniṣad in question (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10) mentions the Vedanta अपूर्वम्, viz., सर्वभवन "becoming all"[115] which is the result of the act of meditation. In Bra.Sū.III.2.24–25 the meditation or rather the propitiation (संराधन-Bra.Sū.III.2.24) of Brahman is compared with an act (कर्मणि-Bra.Sū.III.2.25).[116] As the Siddhāntin applies the rules of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā to the interpretation of the Upaniṣads,

(112) स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च सववच्च तन्नियमः। (Bra.Sū. III.3.2).

(113) उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च। (Bra.Sū.III.3.5). Vide Note (2) on Bra.Sū.III.3.5.

(114) कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.18).

(115) Vide supra.

(116) अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्। (Bra.Sū.III.2.24) and प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.25). Vide Note (12) on Bra.Sū.III.2.25.

the Pūrvapakṣin also supports his views with illustrations from the Pūrvamīmāṁsā. Thus, the latter argues that the meditation on the Puruṣa may be an act (क्रिया) like a mentation known in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā.[117] In Bra.Sū.III.3.57 the example of क्रतु, a particular kind of sacrifice, is given to explain the superiority of a meditation of Brahman consisting of parts (अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मण उपासनाः), about which we shall have to say something infra.[118]

The most important group of सूत्रs dealing with this problem is, we believe, Bra.Sū.III.4.18–26. In Bra. Sū.III.4.1–17 which precede these we have a discussion proving that the knowledge (ज्ञान) of Brahman is superior (अधिकम्) to कर्मन् 'any action' and refuting Jaimini's view that the *Knowledge* of Brahman is subsidiary to *Karman*.[119] We have given our reasons to prove that in Bra.Sū.III.4.18–26[120] the Sūtrakāra discusses the nature of the *knowledge* of Brahman. Jaimini who believes that the *knowledge* of Brahman is subsidiary to *rites* says that this knowledge is of the nature of a thought or reflection (परामर्श) and it cannot be of the nature of an Injunction (अचोदना) because the Scripture denies all actions as means to the realization of Brahman, e.g., "The Un-made cannot be achieved by means of that which can be made or performed."[121] Bādarāyaṇa holds that the knowledge of Brahman is *something to be performed*

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(117) Vide *supra* and also Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.45.

(118) भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथाहि दर्शयति । (Bra.Sū.III.3.57). क्रतु is greater than यज्ञ; so a meditation on Brahman consisting of parts is greater when a greater number of parts is contemplated upon than when a smaller number is thought of. Vide Notes on the Sūtra.

(119) Cf. शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.2) and अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.8).

(120) S'aṅkara makes five Adhikaraṇas of these nine Sūtras. Vide our reasons for taking them as *one* Adhikaraṇa only, in Part I.

(121) परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि । (Bra.Sū.III.4.18). अपवदति may refer to परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन । (Mu.Upa.I.2.12). S'aṅkara explains this Sūtra as referring to the आश्रमश्रुति, viz., अथ त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धाः. (Chā.Upa. II.23.1); but we have explained how this is not a correct interpretation.

(अनुष्ठेय)[122] because there is a Śruti stating the similarity between Brahman and Karman. This may be a reference to Mu.Upa.I.1.4–5 which declares both Brahman and Karman to be Vidyās. If *Karman* is a Vidyā and still something to be performed, Brahman which is a Vidyā, would also be something to be performed.[123] Or, rather the साम्य Śruti may refer to the *similarity* of such texts as "Atman should be seen, heard, reasoned out and meditated upon," "He should form a determination,"[124] etc., *to* Śrutis like "One desirous of the Heaven should perform the ज्योतिष्टोम sacrifice." The knowledge of Brahman is thus something to be performed (अनुष्ठेयम्); one may even say that it is a विधि, an Injunction, resembling the विधि of committing the text to mamory (धारण), viz., "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः," which is looked upon as a विधि by the Opponent (Jaimini) also.[125] In Bra.Sū.III.3.1 the Sūtrakāra already states that the Injunction (चोदना), Connection (संयोग), Form (रूप) and Name (आख्या) in all the Vedantas are the same and therefore all the Vedantas teach the same Brahman.[126] Thus, he already expresses his belief about Brahman being the subject of चोदना 'Injuction'. The Śrutis with 'उपासीत', 'द्रष्टव्यः', etc. have a similarity with यजेत and this similarity proves that the knowledge of Atman is not only अनुष्ठेय but clearly a विधि. In Bra.Sū.III.4.21-22 Bādarāyaṇa refutes a Pūrvapakṣa's argument that the साम्य Śruti is only a glorification स्तुतिमात्रम्, on the strength of the अपूर्वत्व, i.e., the fact that the knowledge of Brahman is not mentioned in the earlier portion (कर्मकाण्ड) of the Śruti;[127] it is mentioned *for the first time* in the Upaniṣads. In Bra.Sū.III.4.23 the Opponent argues that the episodes of the Upaniṣad texts are for the

(122) अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः । (Bra. Sū. III.4.19).

(123) The साम्यश्रुति may be a reference to a S'ruti in which the Knowledge of Brahman is declared to be अनुष्ठेय like Karman. Cf. अनुष्ठाय न शोचति (कठ उप.)

(124) आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । (Bṛ.Upa.II.4.5); स क्रतुं कुर्वीत । (Chā.Upa.III.4.1).

(125) विधिर्वा धारणवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.20). Vide Note (8) on the Sūtra.

(126) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1)

(127) स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् (Bra.Sū.III.3.21). Vide our Interpretation of this and the following Sūtras in Part I.

purpose of the पारिप्लव rite, while the Sūtrakāra refutes it by referring to the distinction made (विशेषितत्व) between the episodes of the Upaniṣads and the episodes recited in the पारिप्लव rite.[128] According to the Śūtrakāra the unanimity (एकवाक्यता) of the Pūrvakāṇḍa and the Uttarakāṇḍa is based upon the fact that the knowledge of Brahman is अनुष्ठेय and even a विधि and that there is an अपूर्वम् in each of the two Kaṇḍas.[129] The unanimity of sense of the two Kāṇḍas is not achieved or explained by subordinating the knowledge of Brahman to Karman or *vice versa*. Both the Kaṇḍas are portions of the same Scripture because both Brahman and Karman have independent विधिs and independent अपूर्वs.[130] Moreover, because the Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa have each of them an independent विधि and an independent अपूर्व, the latter does not stand in need of the sacred fire, fuel, etc., though there is a *unanimity* between the two.[131] In Bṛ. Upa.IV.4.22, the sacrifice (यज्ञ), and other things, e. g., donation (दान) and penance (तपस्) are prescribed as means to the knowledge of Brahman.[132] Somebody may ask, "How is this sacrifice to be performed, if not by fire, fuel, etc ?" To this, the Sūtrakāra replies :[133] "All requirements of the Jñānakāṇḍa arising from this यज्ञादि Śruti are of the nature of the Horse described in Bṛ. Upa. I.1, i.e., these requirements are mental and metaphorical.[134] In all these Sūtras (Bra. Sū.III.4.18-26)

(128) पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।(Bra. Sū.III.3.23). Here even S'aṅkara takes the episodes of the Upaniṣads as being argued by the Opponent to be पारिप्लवाथा: "विशेषितत्वात्" may refer to "श्रावयेद् ब्रह्मसंसादि" in Kaṭha Upa.III.16-17. Vide Note (18) on the Sūtra.

(129) तथा चैक्यवाक्यतोपबन्धनात् । (Bra. Sū.III.4.24).

(130) Ibid.

(131) अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा । (Bra.Sū.III.4.25). S'aṅkara connected this Sūtra with Bra.Sū.III.4.1. This rather favours our interpretation of Sūtras III.4.18-26. Vide our Notes on it.

(132) तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा नाशकेन। (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22).

(133) सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.26).

(134) उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य शिर: । सूर्यश्चक्षुर्वात: प्राणो व्यात्तमग्निर्वैश्वानर: संवत्सर आत्माऽश्वस्य मेध्यस्य । (Bṛ.Upa I.1.1-2).

the Sūtrakāra seems to us to argue that the knowledge of Brahman is *something to be performed and* Brahman is an *object of Injunction.* It is not a mere reflection, such as is found so often in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā.

We have seen above that with reference to the question of the nature of the knowledge of Brahman, which the Sūtrakāra believes to be something to be performed (अनुष्ठेय and विधि), he discusses the question of the unanimity of sense (एकवाक्यता) of the two Kāṇḍas of the Scripture. He says that each Kāṇḍa has its own Vidhi and its own Apūrva. As already stated the Sūtrakāra's view about this Apūrva in the Vedanta School is found in Bra. Sū.III.3.18. It is in connection with this latter Sūtra that the Sūtrakāra seems to us to throw some more light on the *relation of the two Kāṇḍas.* Though there is unanimity (एकवाक्यता) between the two, the subject-matter of each is different. The Jñānakāṇḍa teaches the knowledge of Brahman, which *is not taught* in the Karmakāṇḍa (अपूर्वत्वात् Bra.Sū.III.4.21). In Bra.Sū.III.3.18, the Sūtrakāra mentions the Extraordinary Principle (अपूर्व) in the case of the meditation on the अरूपवत् aspect and in Bra.Sū.III.3.19 he says that similarly an अपूर्व of the same nature should be taken as understood in the similar (Vedanta) Śrutis, viz., in the Śrutis of the रूपवत् aspect. Then, in Bra.Sū. III.3.20, an Opponent who is out and out a Vedantin seems to us to ask the Sūtrakāra to extend the अपूर्व of the Vedanta Śruti also to the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka and Khila Śrutis because these latter *are connected* with the Vedanta Śruti inasmuch as all the four belong to what we call Veda or Śruti.[135] The Sūtrakāra rejects the Opponent's view by emphasising the difference (विशेष) between the topic of the *dissimilar* Śruti literature and that of the Vedanta Śruti.[136] The Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Khila teach the Sacrifice, while the

(135) संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.20). 'अन्यत्र' means the texts of the S'ruti other than the Upaniśads. Vide Notes (11 & 12) on the Sūtra.

(136) न वा विशेषात् । (Bra. Sū. III.3.21).

Upaniṣads teach (the two aspects of) Brahman. The Śruti itself distinguishes Karman, the teaching of the Pūrvakāṇḍa, from Brahman, the teaching of the Uttarakāṇḍa.[137] The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad enumarates the four Saṁhitās, etc., as the अपरा विद्या and the knowledge of the Akṣara taught in the Upaniṣad as the परा विद्या.[138] In Chā.Upa.VIII.1.4, Nārada is told by Sanatkumāra that the former's knowledge of the Vedas is only "नामन्" and that the teaching of Atman is to be learnt from the Upaniṣads. In Bra.Sū.III.3.23, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to say that संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति[139] are attributes of the impersonal Brahman, but as they are taught in the Khila of the Rāṇāyanīya Śākhā of the Sāmveda and as there is a difference in the teaching of the two Kāṇḍas of the Scripture (Sūtra III.3.21–22), the Sūtrakāra does not accept (अप्राप्ताः or न उपसंहर्तव्याः in Śā. bhā. on the Sūtra) them in his lists of the attributes of Brahman (i.e., in Bra.Sū. I.1–3). He would have accepted them if these attributes occurred in the Upaniṣads, because they belong to Brahman. The Sūtrakāra gives one more reason for not extending the अपूर्व of the Vedanta Śrutis to the other (non–Upaniṣadic) Śruti literature. He says that attributes other than संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति, such as are stated in the lore of the Puruṣa (or personal aspect of Brahman) of the Upaniṣads are not stated in the non–Upaniṣadic Śruti literature. For this reason, the Sūtrakāra emphasises the fact that the topics of the two Kāṇḍas of the Śruti are quite different from each other, though there is a unanimity of the two Kāṇḍas. We believe that the purpose of the word 'Vedanta' in Bra.Sū.III.3.1[140] in which the Sūtrakāra says that Brahman is to be known from *all* the Vedantas, is to imply that It is not to be known from the non–Upaniṣadic portion of the Śruti. Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra only the Upaniṣads are

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(137) दर्शयति च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.22).
(138) Mu. Upa. I.1.4-5.
(139) ब्रह्मज्येष्ठा वीर्या संभृतानि ब्रह्माग्रे ज्येष्ठं दिवमाततान । (राणायनीयानां खिलेषु.)
(140) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1).

authentic among the verious parts of the Śruti, for the knowledge of Brahman.

Among the very important problems concerning the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman, that remain now to be stated, we have the one of "the *three kinds of the meditations on Brahman.*" If we look to the Upaniṣads, we find *five* types of meditations in all.

1. Meditations on Brahman, in which Brahman is associated with some idea, quality or qualities or attributes. Examples of this type are those collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.I.1–3. Thus, Brahman is to be meditated upon as that from which this world appears, in which it continues, and into which it returns.[141] Under this attribute Brahman can be meditated upon as ānanda, ānandamaya, prāṇa, jyotiḥ, ākāśa, etc. Or, Brahman can be meditated upon as either रूपवत् or अरूपवत् as described in Chā.Upa.III.14 (सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म), Chā.Upa.IV.15 (अक्षिणि पुरुषः), Chā. Upa.VII.23.1 (भूमन्), Chā.Upa.VIII.1–4 (दहर), etc.[142] When thus meditated upon, Brahman in its either aspect is *not thought of as consisting of parts or limbs.* To illustrate this, let us take two examples, viz., Mu.Upa.II.1.4 and Chā.Upa. V.11–18.[143] In both these Śrutis, Brahman is described as possessing अङ्गs. But a meditator meditating on Brahman as either रूपवत् or अरूपवत् *may* meditate on It only as Puruṣa (Mu. Upa.II.1.3) or as Vaiśvānara *without thinking of Its parts or limbs.* In his meditation, he would think of Brahman under the attributes enumarated by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū.I.1–3.

(141) This is the chief idea in all the Adhikaraṇas of Bra Sū.I.1.

(142) In fact, as possessing all the attributes collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū.I.1-3.

(143) अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः ।
वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ Mu. Upa.II.1.4.
तस्य ह वा एतस्य आत्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा संदेहो बहुलो बस्तिरेव रयिः पृथिव्येव पादावुर एव वेदिर्लोमानि बर्हिर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यो मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः । (Chā. Upa.V.18.2).

This kind of meditation may be called "निरङ्गाः ब्रह्मणः उपासनाः" in contrast with what the Sūtrakāra calls "अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मणः उपासनाः"[144]

2. When "वैश्वानर" (Bra.Sū.I.2.24) is one of the many attributes on which a seeker meditates, e.g., अन्तर्यामित्व (Bra.Sū.I.2.18), अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकत्व (Bra.Sū.I.2.21), Brahman would be thought of either as रूपवत् or as अरूपवत् and the meditation would be called "निरङ्गा उपासना" of Brahman. But, when a seeker meditates simply on Brahman (रूपवत् only in this case) as the वैश्वानर possessing so many अङ्गs, viz., the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेह), the bladder........the face,[145] the meditation would be called अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman. Similarly, Brahman may be meditated upon as having sixteen parts (कलाः) grouped into four quarters (पादs)[146]. In this meditation the पादs are given certain names (प्रकाशवान्, अनन्तवान्, ज्योतिष्मान्, आयतनवान्, etc.), but they or the कलाs are not said to be particular limbs, viz., the head, the eye, etc., of the Supreme Being as is the case with the parts of the वैश्वानर आत्मन्. This seems to be the difference between these two *upāsanās;* yet both of them are undoubtedly अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाs. The Upakośalavidyā[147] is also a similar *upāsanā* of Brahman; as also the teaching of Yājñavalkya to Janaka in Bṛ.Upa.IV.1.2-7.

3. The meditations described in 1 and 2 supra are the meditations of Brahman the फल of which is Mokṣa or final liberation. But in the Upaniṣads there is a third class of meditations on Brahman, *which gives to the meditator an object of his desire.* These are called "काम्य उपासनाः" of Brahman,[148] e.g., the meditation on the "Ether within the heart" (अन्त हृदये आकाशः) is said to bring "complete and steady (?) glory or wealth" (पूर्णमप्रवर्तिनीं श्रियम्).[149] In Chā.Upa.VII.1.14 we have a series of *fourteen*

(144) Cf. अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् । (Bra. Sū.III.3.55).

(145) Chā.Upa.V.18.

(146) Chā.Upa.IV.5-8; cf. ब्रह्मविदिव वै सोम्य भासि । in Chā.Upa.IV.9.2.

(147) Chā.Upa.IV.10-14.

(148) काम्यास्तुयथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा । (Bra.Sū.III.3.60).

(149) Chā.Upa.III.12.

items, नाम, वाक्, etc., etc., *to be meditated upon as Brahman* and in each case a particular fruit (फल) is said to be achieved by meditating on the respective item as Brahman. Only direct meditation on the highest item, viz., भूमन्, brings absolution, because भूमन् is Brahman Itself (Bra.Sū.I.3.8).[150]

4. There are several meditations of Brahman as identified with some part of Veda, or with some or all Vedas (Saṁhitās), e.g., "Now, the Puruṣa who is found in the interior of the eye is Himself the ऋक्, the सामन्, the उक्थ, the यजु.[151] Similarly the आकाश by which Brahman Itself is meant,[152] is identified with परोवरीयान् उद्गीथ.[153] So also प्राण which is a word for Brahman[154] is said to be the deity of the प्रस्ताव the hymn of the प्रस्तोतृ priest.[155] These meditations of Brahman are connected with the priestly or official duties of a priest. If the priest is a seeker of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra tells us that he should meditate on these parts of the Veda as Brahman, *only so long as he is performing official duties*, यावदाधिकारम्.[156]

5. Lastly the Upaniṣads mention certain meditations *which have nothing to do with Brahman*, but which are only concerned with some rites, e.g., the meditation of the उद्गीथ as the Sun;[157] the meditation upon the worlds as the five-fold Sāman.[158]

Out of these five types of meditations the last one has nothing to do with the Inquiry about Brahman (ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा Bra.Sū.I.1.1)

(150) For other काम्या उपासनाs of Brahman vide (b) of Note (5) on Bra.Sū. III.3.55.

(151) Chā.Upa.I.7.5-9.

(152) Bra.Sū.I.1.22.

(153) Chā.Upa.I 9.1-2.

(154) Bra.Sū.I.1.23.

(155) Chā.Upa.I.11.5.

(156) Vide (84) supra; also Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.32.

(157) अथाधिदैवतं य एवासौ तपति तमुद्गीथमुपासीत....(Chā.Upa.I.3.1). For other कर्माङ्ग उपासनाs vide Note 5 (d) on Bra.Sū.III.3.55. Also vide S'ā.bhā. on the same.

(158) लोकेषु पञ्चविधं सामोपासीत । (Chā.Upa.II.2.1).

and the Sūtrakāra, in our opinion, does not discuss it.[159] We have already stated that Bra.Sū.III.3.32 in our opinion gives the Sūtrakāra's view about the meditations of the fourth type, viz., meditations on Brahman as identified with some part of the Veda or some rites. We hold that the remaining three kinds of meditations are discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū. III.3. The काम्या उपासनाs of Brahman are mentioned in one Sūtra only, viz., Bra.Sū.III.3.60. The Sūtrakāra discusses them because they are the meditations on *Brahman*, though they are not means to Mokṣa. He says that a meditator who in this case seeks worldly or celestial prosperity may or may not combine these काम्य meditations, in accordance with his desired objects. This option is given instead of making a collection *only compulsory*, because these meditations *do not lead to the same result* as do the meditations on Brahman, a collection (उपसंहार–Bra.Sū-. III.3.5) of which is compulsory, or instead of making a collection *only voluntary*, because these काम्य meditations do not give the same fruit unlike the अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः of Brahman about which an option of choice is made obligatory as they all give the same fruit.[161] The meditations of the second type, viz., the meditations on *Brahman conceived as consisting of parts (or limbs)* are described in Bra.Sū.III.3.55–59 and 61-66, while meditations of the first type, viz., meditations on Brahman *conceived as one whole without parts or limbs* are treated in Bra.Sū.III.3.11–54. Our Interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3 shows that the sole aim of this Pāda (Bra.Sū.III.3) is to describe *only*

(159) Vide Note (6) on Bra.Sū.III.3.55 where we have shown that S'aṅkara is wrong in explaining अङ्ग as कर्माङ्ग instead of as ब्रह्मणः अङ्गानि.

(160) काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.60).

(161) पूर्वहेत्वभावात् in Bra.Sū.III.3.60 may be taken as the *absence* of "अर्थाभेद" which is given in Bra.Sū.III.3.5 as the reason for उपसंहार or compulsory collection in the case of meditations of the *first* type or as the absence of अविशिष्टफलत्व the reason for विकल्प or compulsory option of choice in the case of meditations of the second type. The first is taught in उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद् विधिशेषवत्समाने च (Bra.Sū.III.3.5) and the second is taught in विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात्। (Bra.-Sū.III.3.59).

these three types of meditations on Brahman. We have also given reasons to believe that the Sūtrakāra refers to his view about these three types of meditations on Brahman in a Sūtra of the first Adhyāya.[162]

The nature of the काम्य उपासना of Brahman has been already described above in detail. That उपासना is practised for the achievement of some desired object, worldly or heavenly. Unlike this उपासना both the निरङ्गा उपासनाs of Brahman and अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाs of Brahman aim at Mokṣa.

In the meditation of Brahman *not thought of as consisting of parts or limbs*, the meditator meditates on the various attributes of Brahman collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.I.1-3. The application of *all* these attributes to the meditation of either of the two aspects, अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, of Brahman has been already described *supra* on the strength of the SūtrasIII.3.11–15 and III.3.31–33 and III.3.37–42. Likewise the आत्मगृहीति method, the अपूर्वम् which results from that meditation, the option of choice, its inward practice (अन्तरा स्वात्मनः) are also given in Bra.Sū.III. 3.16–17, III.3.18–19, III.3.28–30 and III.3.34–36. As to the number of attributes to be used in the meditation on either aspect, the Sūtrakāra, as we have already noticed, says that it is not a rule that *all* the attributes should be meditated upon (Bra.Sū III.3.31–33), i.e., one may meditate upon *as many of them* as *possible* or upon *all* of them. All these details are given in Bra.Sū.III.3.11–54.

Then, in the Sūtras that follow this upto the end of the Pāda (Sūtras III.3.55–66) expect Sūtra III.3.60 the Sūtrakāra lays down the rules for the meditations on Brahman based upon its parts or limbs. As shown above, the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman can be best illustrated by the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of the वैश्वानर, as distinguished from the उपासना on the वैश्वानर *as an attribute of Brahman.* The

(162) Viz., in जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात्। (Bra.Sū. I.1.31). Cf. अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभाव :। (Bra.Sū.III.3.61).

अङ्गs of the वैश्वानर are the head, the eye, the breath, the body, the bladder, the feet, the chest, the hair on the body, the heart, the mind and the face.[163] It is not necessary to meditate on *all* these अङ्गs for one who likes to practise this particular अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना from among the various such meditations in which Brahman is conceived to be possessed of अङ्गs; but a meditation of a greater number (भूमन्) of these अङ्गs is superior to the same of a lesser number just as a sacrifice called क्रतु is superior to a sacrifice called यज्ञ; the Sūtrakāra says that the Chā.Upa. Śruti shows this superiority. According to an Opponent's view about the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना, a meditator should superimpose on the parts of Brahman (the sky, the Sun, etc.) the notions of the respective आश्रयs or objects seeking a substratum (the head, the eye, etc.).[164] Thus, the meditator is to conceive the Sky, the Sun, the Wind, the Ether, the Water, etc., as the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेह), the bladder (बस्ति), etc. The Opponent advances three arguments for his view. Firstly, in the उपनिषद् the teacher *teaches* (शिष्टि) the pupil that the particular object which the pupil so long thought to be Atman is only a *part* of the Atman; not only this, but the teacher also tells the pupil that the object of his meditation is a particular part of Atman. Thus, when प्राचीनशाल son of उपमन्यु tells अश्वपति that the former meditates upon the Sky as Atman, the latter tells him that the Sky is only the head of Atman.[165] Secondly, he refers to the *collective* statement (समाहार) where the very head, the very eye, etc., etc., of the वैश्वानर are declared to be the Sky, the Sun, etc., which each pupil has so far thought

(163) Cf. (143) supra. सुतेजाः, विश्वरूप, पृथग्वत्मार्त्मा, बहुलः, रयिः are explained as द्यौः (the sky), आदित्य (the Sun), the Wind, the Ether (आकाश), the Water (आपः) respectively in Chā.Upa.V.12-16.

(164) Vide Note (3) on Bra.Sū.III.3.57, viz., भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथाहि दर्शयति । Cf also अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः । (Bra,Sū.III.3.61)

(165) शिष्टेश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.3.62). "Because of the *teaching*". This seems to refer to मूर्धा त्वेष आत्मनः इति होवाच। मूर्धा ते व्यपतिष्यद्यन्मा नागमिष्य इति । (Chā.Upa.V.12.2). Similariy we have चक्षुष्टेतदात्मनः ।......... Chā.Upa.V.13.2); प्राणस्त्वेष आत्मनः ।......... (Chā.Upa.V.14.2), etc. etc. Vide Note (5) on Sūtra III.3.62.

to be the very Atman.[166] The last argument of the Opponent is the fact that some श्रुतिs mention *a common attribute* between the अङ्ग of Brahman and the respective आश्रय or object seeking a substratum.[167] This view of the Opponent, is however rejected by the Sūtrakāra because there *is no Śruti about the co-existence* of the part (e.g., the head, the eye, etc., of the वैश्वानर) and the object seeking a substratum (आश्रय, e.g., the Sky, the Sun).[168] Here the Sūtrakāra seems to us to contrast the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman with the निरङ्गा उपासना of Brahman. In the case of the latter, Brahman is said to be residing in the heart along with the soul of the meditator and so[169] Brahman is to be meditated upon as Atman in the heart of the meditator residing with the latter's soul. As contrasted with this, we have no Śruti that the head of the वैश्वानर and the Sky reside together. The Sūtrakāra also says that we find (दर्शन) several Śrutis about meditation on Brahman conceived as consisting of parts in which there are no objects seeking substrata corresponding to the parts.[170] This seems to refer to, e.g., the षोडशकला विद्या,[171] the उपकोशल विद्या[172] etc. Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra (सूत्रs III.3.65-66) in the case of अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman the various अङ्गs or parts are to be meditated upon as so many parts of Brahman whithout attributing to them the notion of the respective आश्रयs in each case.

We have given above some salient features of the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman as distingushed from the meditation on Brahman as a whole (or as not consisting of parts). Yet *two* very impor-

(166) समाहारात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.63). Vide Note (6) on the सूत्र.

(167) गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च। (Bra Sū.III.3.64). Vide Note (7) on the सूत्र. प्रज्ञता, प्रियता, सत्यता, अनन्तता, आनन्दता, and स्थितता are the common qualities of वाक and प्रज्ञा, प्राण and प्रिय, चक्षुः and सत्य, श्रोत्र and अनन्त, मनः and आनन्द, हृदय and स्थिति.

(168) न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः। (Bra Sū.III.3.65).

(169) Cf. ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे। (Kaṭha.Upa.III.1). Or rather, द्वा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। (S've.Upa.IV.6).

(170) दर्शनाच्च। (Bra.Sū.III.3.66).

(171) Chā.Upa.IV.5-9.

(172) Chā.Upa.IV.10-14.

tant points in which these two types of the meditations on Brahman differ from each other remain to be stated. These points are contained in सूत्रs III.3. 1-10 and सूत्रs III.3.55–56, 58 and 59. These सूत्रs are in our opinion some of the crucial सूत्रs on which a correct interpretation of the entire Brahmasūtra must ultimately depend. Their importance, like the importance of Bra.Sū.III.3.11 and III.3. 37-42 which reveal the scheme of the arrangement of the Śrutis selected for discussion in Bra.Sū.I. 1-3, cannot be overrated.

We have already stated that the Sūtrakāra explains his tenets of Brahman as the teaching of the Upaniṣads (i.e., the Vedantas, Bra.Sū.III.3.1) on the analogy of the tenets of Karman or Dharma as the teaching of the other parts of the Śruti recorded in the Jaiminisūtras. The identity of a Karman, e.g., the Agnihotra, is established in the Jai.Sū.[173] on the strength of the identity (अविशेष) of the Injunction (चोदना), Connection (संयोग), Form (रूप) and Name (आख्या) in the non-Vedanta Portion or the Karmakāṇḍa of the Śruti. On the same argument the author of the Brahmasūtra bases his view about the identity of Brahman in *all* the Vedantas or the Jñānakāṇḍa of the Śruti, i.e., in the Upaniṣads of *all* the Vedas.[174] It should be emphasised that "*sarva Vedanta*" in Bra.Sū.III.3.1 has a double implication, viz., (1) Brahman is the teaching of the *Vedantas* (lit. प्रत्यय- the cause of Brahman is *all* the Vedantas) only and not of the Karmakāṇḍa of the Śruti, and (2) Brahman is the teaching of *all* the Vedantas, i.e., the Upaniṣads, of all the Śākhās of all the Vedas. With this latter significance of "सर्व" in "सर्ववेदान्त" we should compare the expression "शाखान्तरेषु" in the Jai.Sū., where it means "in all the different Śākhās of all the Vedas."[175] An Opponent of the Sūtrakāra argues that the same Brahman is not taught in all the Upaniṣads (of all the शाखाs of all the Vedas) because the Injunction, etc., in all these शाखाs are *different* (भेद,

(173) जै. सू. II.4.8.
(174) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1).
(175)

Bra.Sū.III.3.2). The Sūtrakāra replies to this by saying that (1) If the Injunction (चोदना), etc., were the same *even in only one* शाखा (एकस्यामपि) of each Veda, he would conclude that the same Brahman is taught in all the Vedantas, i.e., in all the Upaniṣads of all the Śākhās of all the Vedas,[176] and (2) that the Śruti shows the same. This latter may be a reference to the Kaṭha Upa., which speaks of Brahman as 'that Syllable (पद) which all the Vedas declare'.[177] As contrasted with this rule about the meditation on Brahman not conceived as consisting of अङ्गs the meditations of Brahman conceived as consisting of अङ्गs (अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाः) in the opinion of an Opponent are to be restricted to all the शाखाs of each individual Veda only, and, therefore, are *not* to be received by the followers of the other three Vedas. This means that an अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman is to be known from only all the Vedantas of *all the* शाखाs *of one particular Veda only* and not of all the Vedas.[178] This view about the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना of Brahman corresponds to an Opponent's view on the निरङ्गा उपासना that Brahman is not the same in all the Vedantas because the Injunction, etc., in all the Vedantas differ (Bra.Sū.III.3.2). Thus, the Opponent in Bra.Sū.III.3.2 and III.3.55 is very probably the same. He did not like the idea and the doctrine of the unity of the teaching of *all* the Upaniṣads whether that unity pertains to Brahman not thought of as consisting of parts, or to Brahman conceived as consisting of parts. He is an isolationist Vedāntin, who did not believe in a Vedanta Darśana evolved from a systematization of the views of *all* the Upaniṣads. But the Sūtrakāra had the popular opinion in his favour. He argued that the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाs of

(176) भेदान्नेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.2). We have shown that एकस्याम् must mean एकास्यांशाखायाम् because we have शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् in Bra.Sū.III.3.55. Vide Note (6) on the Sūtra. We may here add that शाखान्तरेषु in Jai.Sū. also corroborates our interpretation of एकस्याम्.

(177) सेव वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति । (Kaṭha Upa.II.15).

(178) अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.55). Vide our interpretation in Part I.

Brahman could be included in the शाखाs of the Vedas other than those of the particular Veda in which they are found and there would be no objection to such a procedure because the Mantras etc., of the शाखाs of *one* Veda are found included in the Mantras of the शाखाs of the *other* Vedas. This refers to the fact that several Mantras are found common to the शाखाs of more than one Veda. Thus, the Siddhāntin succeeds in making the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना as well as the निरङ्गा उपासना of Brahman the common property of the followers of *all* the Vedas. So far the two उपासनाs resemble each other.

The second point about these two उपासनाs refers to the collection[179] of the attributes and of other information about the method of the meditation to be adopted in either case. This collection (उपसंहार) in the case of the meditation on Brahman not conceived of as consisting of parts was opposed by an Opponent with the help of शब्द, प्रकरण, and संज्ञा.[180] "शब्द" seems to us to refer to *Śrutis* which declare that one should know Brahman "thus" (एवम्), i.e., *as it is taught in the one particular Branch of a Veda.*[181] प्रकरणभेद refers to the fact that the context of each of the Vedantas or उपानिषद्s is different from that of the rest, though Brahman be taken as taught in *all* the Vedantas.[182] For these two reasons the Pūrvapakṣa argues that no Collection (उपसंहार) of the attributes should be made. One more reason for the same conclusion of the Opponent was that the *names* of Brahman (which is taught in all the Vedantas) differ.[183] Owing to the *various names* of Brahman in the various Upaniṣads, we should not collect the attributes, etc., useful for the meditation on

(179) Cf. उपसंहार in उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च । (Bra.Sū.III.3.5). Vide our Note on उपसंहार in the Sūtra.

(180) We have taken Sūtras III.3.5-9 as one Adhikaraṇa-Vide our interpretation of the same.

(181) एष उ एव वामनी रेष हि सर्वाणि वामानि नयति सर्वाणि वामानि नयति य एवं वेद । (Chā.Upa.IV.15.3). For other examples of this type of S'rutis, vide note (7) on Bra.Sū.III.3.6.

(182) न वा प्रकरणभेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.7).

(183) संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.8).

Brahman from the Vedantas, says the Opponent. In order to appreciate the force of this argument based upon the difference of 'names' (संज्ञाs) of Brahman, we must note that the word संज्ञा is here used *as a synonym of the* word आख्या in the famous Sūtra from the Jaiminisūtra,[184] on which the author of the Brahmasūtra depends for his doctrine of the identity of Brahman in *all* the Vedantas.[185] In the Jaiminisūtra the identity of a *karman*, e. g., the Agnihotra, is asserted by the Siddhāntin on the ground of the *identity of names* (आख्याऽविशेषात्) along with the identity of three other things (संयोग, रूप, and चोदना). Though the author of the Brahmasūtra refutes the first two arguments of the Opponent (Bra.Sū.III.3.6–7), he admits the validity of the Opponent's argument based upon *the difference in the names of Brahman*.[186] He holds that Brahman is taught under *two* different names, viz., "अव्यक्त" and "पुरुष," other names being only the synonyms of either of these two names; and that owing to these two different names of Brahman, we have *two aspects* of Brahman (not two different Brahmans) just as owing to the two different names of a serpent, viz., अहि and कुण्डल, we may look upon the serpent from two different stand-points, viz., the निराकार and the साकार.[187] But this admission of the Opponent's argument of संज्ञाs does not prevent the Siddhāntin from his doctrine of Collection.[188] This means that as the two names indicate two aspects of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra upholds the view of Collection and proceeds further with his task of the same. The case would have been different if the two names indicated two different Brahmans. Besides thus answering the three arguments of शब्द, प्रकरणभेद and संज्ञाभेद advanced by an Opponent against the Collection proposed by the Sūtrakāra, the latter gives one constructive ground of his

(184) संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याविशेषात् । (Jai.Sū.II.4.8).

(185) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1).

(186) संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.8). Vide our interpretation of तदुक्तम् in Notes on the सूत्र.

(187) Vide (32) supra.

(188) Vide our Notes on तदपि 'Even then' on सूत्र III.3.8.

own in Bra.Sū.III.3.9.[189] He says that "Because of the *omnipresence* of Brahman taught under any name out of the two different names, we should conclude that the two names indicate only two aspects of Brahman (अरूपवत् and रूपवत्) and would uphold the propriety of our doctrine of the Collection of the attributes, etc., of Brahman." There cannot be two omnipresent Realities in a School of Philosophy; nor can the Opponent argue that the अरूपवत् (अव्यक्त) is not omnipresent and that the Puruṣa (the रूपवत्) is the only omnipresent principle, because the Sūtrakāra has already proved the omnipresence of the Avyakta.[190] As there is a non-difference (complete identity) in all other respects, these two names (इमे द्वे संज्ञे–Bra.Sū.III.3.10) are to be regarded as different; i. e., the two aspects of Brahman implied by Its two names are not to be identified with each other.[191]

Thus, the Sūtrakāra conclusively proves his view of the collection of the attributes and other information about the two aspects of Brahman from all the Vedantas (or Upaniṣads). This is the procedure to be followed in the case of the meditation on Brahman not conceived as consisting of parts. But the same arguments[192] of शब्द, प्रकरणभेद and संज्ञाभेद are advanced by the Sūtrakāra himself to prove that the अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः of Brahman are each of them different (नाना) from all the rest and that therefore there can be no collection of attributes, etc., in their case. It is for this reason that the treatment of these अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः is so short in the Brahmasūtra, as compared with the treatment of the निरङ्गाः उपासनाः of Brahman dealt with in Bra.Sū.III.3.11-54.

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(189) व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.9).

(190) व्याप्ति in व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् (Bra.Sū.III.3.9) is very likely a reference to the सर्वगतत्वम् in Bra.Sū.III.2.37 (अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।) where in our opinion the omnipresence of the *Avyakta* is proved.

(191) सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे । (Bra.Sū.III.3.10).

(192) नाना शब्दादिभेदात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.58). We have shown that शब्दादि means शब्द, प्रकरणभेद and संज्ञाभेद already mentioned in Bra.Sū.III.3.6-8. Vide our Notes on the Sūtra.

The third point to be noticed here about these अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः is that the Sūtrakāra gives an *option of choice of one* from among all the various अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः of Brahman mentioned in the Upaniṣads, because all of them give the same fruit, viz., Mokṣa.[193] This clearly corresponds to the option of choise from the *two* aspects, अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, of Brahman given by the Sūtrakāra in the case of a meditation of Brahman not conceived as consisting of limbs or parts.[194] In this case also one of the arguments of the Sūtrakāra for the option given is that the Mokṣa can be achieved in either way.[195]

We have given above the details of the two forms of meditation on Brahman according as Brahman is or is not conceived as consisting of parts (अङ्गावबद्धा उपासना and निरङ्गा उपासना of Brahman). The third kind of meditation on Brahman, viz., the काम्या उपासना of Brahman has also been noticed. These *three* उपासनाS are the subject-matter of Bra.Sū.III.3. It is not the so-called "गुणोपसंहार" or "the reconciliation of the few texts on the same विद्या in the different Upaniṣads," as the traditional interpretation runs, that forms the topic of treatment in this Pāda of the Brahmasūtra. We have devoted one Chapter to the importance of this Pāda in order to show what jewels of information lie concealed in it.

An important piece of information about the meditation on Brahman is the meditation on the Syllable "Om", the Symbol of Brahman, which is, in our opinion, discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.III.3.25–27, in Bra.Sū.IV.1.4–5 and in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15.

An Opponent holds the view that the Praṇava, the Symbol of Brahman, is a *different principle* from Brahman Itself (अर्थभेद-Bra. Sū.III.3.25) and that, therefore, the act of *penetrating* (वेध), etc., mentioned in the Mu.Upa. with reference to the meditation

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(193) विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.59).

(194) छन्दत उभयाविरोधात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.28). This option is also referred to by the word विकल्पः in लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.44).

(195) गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः (Bra.Sū.III.3.29).

on the Praṇava should not be collected from the different Upaniṣads.[196] To explain this Pūrvapakṣa, we must remember that *ātmagṛhīti* is the method of meditation on Brahman Itself both in Its अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects.[197] In contrast with this the method of meditation on the Praṇava, the Symbol of Brahman, consists of Penetration (वेध), a bow, an arrow, and an aim. In Bra.Sū.IV.1.3–5, the Sūtrakāra says that a seeker of Brahman who has been carrying out the means of the knowledge of Brahman but has not as yet attained it, returns to the world *not once* before the attainment of the knowledge; and when he is thus reborn in this stage he looks upon Brahman as Atman,[198] but he does not look upon the Symbol of Brahman as Atman because the Symbol is not Atman, though Brahman is Atman.[199] In the Symbol of Brahman the reborn seeker has the notion of Brahman because of the excellence of the Symbol.[200] This, we believe, is a refernce to the method of the meditation on the Symbol "Om," just as आत्मगृहीति in Bra.Sū.III.3.16 and in Bra.Sū.IV.1.4[201] is a reference to the method of meditation on Brahman itself. The opponent argues that the method of meditation on 'Om' consisting of the bow (the Praṇava), the arrow (the individual soul), the aim (Brahman) and the act of penetrat-

(196) वेधाद्यर्थभेदात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.25). "अथभेदात्" in this Sūtra is to be contrasted with "अर्थाभेदात्" in उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च (Bra.Sū.III.3.5). This contrast also corroborates our interpretation of the Sūtra. Vide our Note on the Sūtra. We have taken Sūtra III.3 25 as a Pūrvapakṣa, and Sūtras III.3.26-27 as the Siddhānta.

As we have shown in our Notes, वेधादि refers to

प्रणवो धनुः शरो ह्यात्मा ब्रह्म तल्लक्ष्यमुच्यते ।
अप्रमत्तेन वेद्धव्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ Mu.Upa.II.2.4. Vide Note (1) on Bra.Sū.III.3.25.

(197) Vide (99) supra.

(198) आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.3).

(199) न प्रतीके न हि सः । (Bra Sū.IV.1.4) प्रतीक (the singular form) here refers to the प्रतीक of Brahman, viz , the Syllable Om.

(200) ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.5).

(201) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.16) and आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति । (Bra. Sū.IV.1.3).

ing the aim with the arrow should not be collected[202] from the various Vedantas for the purpose of the meditation on the Symbol 'Om' because the Syllable 'Om' is not the same principle as Brahman.[203] The Siddhāntin refutes this view of the Opponent[204] and says that "if the penetration, etc., are missing (not mentioned) in an Upaniṣad (हानौ), they should be collected from another Upaniṣad (e.g., the Muṇḍaka Upa.), because these penetration, bow, arrow and aim are *subsidiary* to the word उपायन 'a means' used for the Praṇava in the Praśna and the Kaṭha Upaniṣads." This reply of the Sūtrakāra gives the reason for 'collecting the penetratien, etc., where they are missing' and also a refutation of the Opponent's argument (अर्थभेदात्). The penetration, etc., वेधादि are not अर्थभेद (making a principle other than Brahman established from all the Vedantas) but they are *subsidiary* to the word "उपायन" 'a means' used for the Syllable in the Upaniṣads. The word "उपायन" here refers to आयतन and आलम्बन used in the Praśna and the Kaṭha Upaniṣads.[205] This उपसंहार of वेधादि is like the Collection of the items subsidiary to an Injunction (विधिशेष).[206] Moreover, according to the Pra. Upa., a seeker of absolution who chooses to meditate on the Praṇava for the purpose has nothing to achieve in the life hereafter because he is directly led by the Sāmans to Brahman "ब्रह्मलोक" after he leaves this body; therefore he must finish the whole process of his meditation in this word.[207] Thus it is

(202) We have to take अनुपसंहर्तव्यम् as understood in Bra.Sū.III.3 25. Vide Note (4) on the Sūtra.

(203) This is the sense of अर्थभेदात् in Sūtra III.3.25, which is to be contrasted with अर्थाभेदात् in उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च । (Bra Sū.III.3.5). Vide Note (3) on the Sūtra.

(204) Cf. तु in हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.26).

(205) तमोङ्कारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयंपरं (Pra Upa.V.7) and एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमेतदालम्बनंपरम् इति एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मलोके महीते । (Kaṭha Upa.II.17). Vide Nots (8) on Bra.Sū.III.3.26.

(206) कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत् in Bra.Sū.III.3.26 corresponds to विधिशेषवत् in Bra. Sū.III3.5 and तदुक्तम् in the former is a reference to the statement in the latter. Vide Notes (9) and (10) on Bra.III.3.26.

(207) सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् तथा ह्यन्ये (Bra. Sū.III.3.27) 'तथा ह्यन्ये' refers to Pra.Upa. V.7 and V.5. Vide Note (13) on the Sūtra.

necessary that all items about the meditation on the Praṇava be collected from all the Upaniṣads and be practised in this very life to get Mokṣa.

Thus, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to note that the meditation on the Praṇava, the Symbol of Brahman, leads to liberation just like the निरङ्गा and the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाs of Brahman, that the Praṇava उपासना is to be carried out as described in the Mu.Upa. (III.2.2-5), that in the meditation on the Symbol a seeker meditates on the Syllable 'Om' as Brahman and not as (his) Atman, and that this meditation directly leads to liberation because it leaves nothing to be achieved by the seeker in the next birth. This last point seems to us to have been referred to by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 where he says that the Conductor (आतिवाहिक) of the world of Lightning leads to their destination, viz., the Supreme Brahman, those who do not resort to the Symbol of Brahman, viz., Om[208] while those who resort to the Symbol *are led upwards* (उन्नीयते) by the सामन्s on their departure from the body.[209] The Śruti to which Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 refers shows that in the life hereafter the meditatior on the Praṇava *has not to cross* the worlds which the meditator on Brahman either as अरूपवत् or रूपवत् has to cross.[210] According to the Ācāryas the Sūtrakāra nowhere deals with the topic of meditation on the Praṇava; but we believe the topic is not neglected by the Sūtrakāra as shown above.

In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 20–22[211] the Sūtrakāra seems to us to consider with reference to Brahman the states of increment and

(208) अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायणः। in Bra.Sū.IV.4.15. Vide (48) supra. Vide also Notes (30) and (32) on the सूत्र.

(209) यथा पादोरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यते एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्त : सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं (Pra.Upa.V.5)

(210) तर्तव्य in सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् (Bra.Sū.III.3.27) may refer to the crossing of the worlds by the knower of Brahman described in Bra.Sū.IV.3. The meditator on the Praṇava has not to go through this procedure, because he is directly taken (नीयते) upwards by the सामन्s.

(211) वृद्धिऱ्हासभाक्त्वमन्तभावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.20). We have takenIII.3.20-21 as one Adhikaraṇa.

decrement (वृद्धि, ऱ्हास) two out of the six states of all existing things mentioned by Yāska in his Nirukta.[212]

The Sūtrakāra says that Brahman undergoes increment (वृद्धि) and decrement (ऱ्हास) by becoming concealed (अन्तर्भाव); it is so, because *both* increment and decrement of Brahman can be appropriately explained by this process, viz., by Brahman concealing Itself. As a second argument he refers to Chā.Upa.VII, the application of which he also explains in the subsequent सूत्र.[213]

A question may be asked why the Sūtrakāra mentions only these two states (वृद्धि and ऱ्हास) and not the other four also. The reply is that he does mention the third state, viz., the परिणाम the transformation of Brahman in Bra.Sū.I.4.26.[214] And as regards the first (जायते) and the second states (अस्ति) which according to Yāska follows the *birth* (जायते) and the last state (विनश्यति) it is self–evident that the Sūtrakāra cannot discuss them as referring to Brahman, since Brahman is unborn and eternal. Not only that these three states cannot affect Brahman but even परिणाम, वृद्धि, ऱ्हास of Brahman would be possible only in the light of the fact that Brahman is unborn and eternal.

As to परिणाम 'change' or 'transformation' of Brahman, which is unborn and eternal, the Sūtrakāra says that the परिणाम of Brahman is such that the effect (कृति) of Brahman is also Brahman Itself (आत्मन्). For this he depends upon the Śruti, e. g., the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.[215] What Brahman created is also Brahman Itself. Also in Chā.Upa.VII, the name, speech, mind, thoughts,

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(212) जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धते अपक्षीयते विनश्यति । (निरुक्त निघण्टु II.2).

(213) दर्शनाच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.2.21) and प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.22). We have shown that the विषयवाक्य of this सूत्र is the series of sentences like अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूयः इति नाम्नो वाव भूयोस्ति । (Cf. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं प्रतिषेधति...) The S'ruti denies that Brahman is only so much as the matter in hand). नाम्नो वाव भूयोऽस्ती ति तन्मे भगवान् ब्रवीतु । (Cf. ब्रवीति च भूयः), the whole series of Chā.Upa. VII.1.15. So, दर्शनात् (सूत्र 21) refers to आत्मत आविर्भावतिरोभावौ in the middle of Chā.Upa.VII.26.1.

(214) आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् । (Bra.Sū.I.4.26).

(215) तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत । (Tai.Upa.)

etc., are, all of them, said to be Brahman.[216] The Sūtrakāra has himself noticed that the effect of Brahman is identical with Brahman (तदनन्यत्वम्),[217] because the Chā.Upa. declares the effect to be a name which has a beginning only in speech[218] (वाचारम्भण).

It is in conformity with the above explanation of the transformation of Brahman that the Sūtrakāra seems to us to state the nature of वृद्धि and ह्रास, increment and decrement of Brahman. As Brahman is Itself both the Cause and the Effect, we have to think of the increment and decrement of Brahman even when we refer to the two states of the Effect of Brahman. According to the Sūtrakāra, these two states take place in Brahman by the Self-Concealment of Brahman (अन्तर्भावात्[219]). The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that everything in the world is an effect of Brahman and is Brahman Itself because the परिणाम of Brahman is Itself; and that *in these various effects of Brahman, Brahman exists in the state of different degrees of Self-concealment* so that when this concealment is to a lesser degree we may say that Brahman has undergone a state of वृद्धि development, evolution, increment (वृद्धिभाक्) and when this concealment is in a greater degree we may say that Brahman has undergone a state of ह्रास 'decay, involution, decrement' (ह्रासभाक्). The Sūtrakāra says that the concealment (अन्तर्भाव) explains both the development and decay (उभयसामञ्जस्य); this is possible if we conclude that a lesser degree of concealment would be called development and a greater degree of concealment would be regarded as decay.

To explain the doctrine with the examples to which the Sūtrakāra undoubtedly refers in Bra.Sū.III.2.22.[220] We have a series of नाम्, वाक्, मनः, सङ्कल्प, upto प्राण in Chā.Upa.VII in which each is

(216) E.g. in यो नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत छा. उ. VII.
(217) तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.II.1.14).
(218) वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् (Chā.Upa.VI).
(219) वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.20).
(220) प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.22).Vide (213) supra.

declared to be Brahman and each succeeding member of the series is stated to be भूयः 'further or more developed' than each preceding one. We may say that in this series the प्राण is Brahman (i.e., a transformation or modification of Brahman) in which Brahman is *least concealed*,[221] while नामन् is (a modification of) Brahman in which Brahman is *most concealed*. Thus, Brahman undergoes वृद्धि (in Its transformation as प्राण) and ह्रास (e.g., in Its transformation as नामन्) by becoming concealed (i.e., latent, अन्तर्भाव). If we take the example of आकाश, वायु, अग्नि, जल and पृथ्वी[222] we may say that आकाश is (an effect of) Brahman in which It is least concealed and पृथ्वी is (an effect of) Brahman in which It is most concealed. So, when there is a series in which Brahman is more developed (वृद्धिभाक्), e.g., in that of Chā.Upa.VII, Brahman is less concealed, and when there is a series in which Brahman is more degenerate (ह्रासभाक्), e.g., in the series of Tai.Upa.II.1 or Chā.Upa.VI.2 we must say that Brahman is more concealed.

It should be noted that the Śruti which is the विषयवाक्य of सूत्र III.2.21–22, viz., Chā.Upa.VII speaks of आविर्भाव and तिरोभाव (of all things, नामन्, वाक्, etc.), from Ātman. The Sūtrakāra while referring to this Śruti explains the same process by *only* the concealment (अन्तर्भाव) of Brahman.

We may here say that in Bra.Sū.II.3.53,[223] the Sūtrakāra seems to state that the individual soul is *only a likeness* of the Supreme Being (i.e., His likeness minus His Powers) not because the Śruti *teaches* so through the reflection of Brahman but because Brahman has *concealed* Itself (अन्तर्भावात्) and has become the soul. Again in another सूत्र[224] the Sūtrakāra explains how the *concealment* (of the real form) is the cause of the bondage of the soul. Thus, he seems to explain in Bra.Sū.III.2.21–22 the

(221) Cf. यथा च प्राणादि । (Bra.Sū.II.1.20), where प्राण is given as an example of the identity of Brahman the Cause with Its Effect which is also Brahman.

(222) Tai.Upa.II.1 and Chā.Upa.VI.2.

(223) प्रदेशादिचेन्नान्तर्भावात् (Bra.Sū.II.3.53). प्रदेश refers to a text, e.g., कठ उप० where the individual soul is said to be a reflection of Brahman.

(224) पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ । (Bra.Sū.III.2.5).

creation (जगत्) by the Self-concealment of Brahman, just as he explains the existence of the Jīva also in the same way. Before Śaṅkara, there was probably a commentary on the Bra.Sū. which held that the conscious Brahman became the cause of the world by *concealing* Its consciousness. Śaṅkara mentions this view and partly accepts it as an interpretation of Brahman's causality of the world.[225]

We have tried to expound the above doctrine of the Sūtrakāra by comparing it with the doctrine of transformation (परिणामवाद) of the Sāṁkhya and Vaiśesika Schools.[226] We humbly admit that it is difficult and dangerous to make these comparisions and perhaps even to explain the very details of the Sūtrakāra's own view. All that we feel sure about is that in the सूत्रs in question[227] the Sūtrakāra explains the two states, वृद्धि and ऱ्हास, with reference to Brahman as also with reference to Its effects which are also Brahman (आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्) and with reference to the effects of Brahman as described in Chā.Upa.VII. Probably in the days of the Sūtrakāra more importance was attached to the six states of Yāska, the author of the Nirukta, than in the later days. Even Caraka explains them with reference to all existing things.[228] Perhaps some School of Vedanta explained वृद्धि and ऱ्हास of Brahman by referring them to the waking and dreaming states which they believed as really affecting Brahman and it is to refute this School that the Sūtrakāra discusses these two states in a Pāda devoted to the discussion of the three states of waking, dreaming and deep-sleep with reference to the Jīva and Brahman.[229]

There are several minor points about Brahman, which we have noticed during our Interpretation of the Brahmasūtra. The Sūtrakāra *seems* to us to say that Mokṣa is to be obtained

(225) Vide शांकरभाष्य on ब्रह्मसूत्र II.1.4 and 6.
(226) Vide Notes (4) & (5a) on Bra.Sū.III.2.20.
(227) Bra.Sū.III.2.20-22.
(228) Cf. सर्वदा सर्वभावानां सामान्यं वृद्धिकारणम्। ऱ्हास हेतु......
(229) Vide ( ) infra.

from Brahman.[230] He also says that Brahman is Itself the fruit in the form of Mokṣa. In this view he differs from Jaimini who believed that the fruit is Dharma 'because the Śruti says so'. The Sūtrakāra seems to argue that Brahman is the fruit because Brahman is declared in the Śruti to be the cause of Dharma.[231] This difference seems to be the reason why Jaimini has written on Dharma and Bādarāyaṇa on Brahman. The Sūtrakāra also seems to believe in the Grace of God, to which he refers twice.[232] God shows His Grace particularly to a seeker of Brahman who gives up all actions which are means to Mokṣa and *submits himself humbly* to Him. And when the seeker of Brahman leaves his body after the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman he leaves it through the hundred-and-first artery being guided by the Grace of the Lord in his heart (हार्दानुगृहीतः). He seems to distinguish the fruit in the form of Mokṣa, attained by the knowledge of Brahman and actions helpful to that knowledge, from the fruit in the form of the Heaven (स्वर्ग) which is obtained by the performance of the ज्योतिष्टोम sacrifice. The distinction consists in the fact that there is no certainty about the time which will be necessary to get the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman while there is a rule (नियम) that the performer of the ज्योतिष्टोम sacrifice would get स्वर्ग after he departs from the body of this very birth.[233] This absence or rather impossibility of a rule about the attainment of the fruit in the form of Mokṣa makes it possible that a seeker of Mokṣa is reborn on this earth 'not once' before he ultimately attains the knowledge of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra seems to us to describe the state of such a reborn

(230) फलमतः उपपत्तेः। (Bra.Sū.III.2.38) and श्रुतत्वाच्च । (Bra.Sū III.2.39). फलम् seems to us to mean मुक्तिफलम् mentioned in Bra.Sū.III.4.52 (एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः। We take SūtrasIII.2.38-39 as one अधिकरण.

(231) धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव। (Bra.Sū.III.2.40) and पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् (Bra.-Sū.III.2.41). We have proposed to take these two सूत्रs as forming an independent अधिकरण and we think they discuss the nature of the Fruit. For हेतुव्यपदेश vide the विषयवाक्यम्.

(232) विशेषानुग्रहश्च। (Bra.Sū.III.4.38) and हार्दानुगृहीत : in Bra. Sū. IV.2.17.

(233) एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः। (Bra. Sū.III.4.52)

seeker in Bra.Sū.IV.1.1–12. When finally that knowledge is attained, the knower of Brahman leaves the body (उत्क्रान्ति) through the hundred-and-first artery under the Grace of Him Who resides in his heart, and unites with the rays of the Sun and is carried by the Vaidyuta Conductor to the Para and henceforth he always lives in non-separation (अविभाग) with Brahman after his original form becomes manifest on reaching Brahman. This is the state of Mokṣa.

We may here repeat that Brahman is both निराकार and साकार at the same time. The Sūtrakāra does not separate the प्रजापतिलोक as a कार्य of Brahman; rather he regards it as the साकार aspect of Brahman and as such the कारण or the Para Itself. This is the Sūtrakāra's difference from both Bādari and Jaimini who regarded the प्रजापतिलोक or the साकार aspect as a कार्य of Brahman. It is in the *non-separation* with such type of Brahman (Brahman of this double nature) that the released soul eternally lives.[234] Because this is the nature of Brahman which is the goal, the Sūtrakāra holds that the released soul *may* have a body or *may not* have it.[235] If Brahman were साकार only, the released soul *must* have a body, in his case, of course, a divine body, as in the System of Rāmānuja. If Brahman were निराकार only, he *must* have no body as in the System of Śaṅkara. But as the Sūtrakāra regards both these as aspects of the कारण or the Para Brahman, the released soul has also the option. In either case the released one enjoys objects of enjoyment in the company of Brahman, because even the निराकार aspect has certain attributes according to the Sūtrakāra. Inspite of this enjoyment the fault of being (a लोक), a world, like the world of the Wind, the Lightning, etc., does not entail upon Brahman.[236] The Mukta in this state of non-separation with Brahman is not subject to the limitations (प्रलय etc.)of this world, since he is far

(234) Cf. तथाहि स्थितिमाह । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.19).

(235) द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.12).

(236) जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.17).

remote from this world[237] and is not liable to change because a Śruti mentions his permanence[238] and the Śruti and the Smṛti show the same.[239] The only point of similarity between this state of the released one and a soul in bondage in this world is that of *enjoyment of objects.* Inspite of this similarity, the former is a permanent state while the latter is liable to change in the form of births and deaths (transmigration). He does not return to this world.

We may here add a few lines about the Sūtrakāra's conception of the individual soul so far as the problem of his identity with Brahman is concerned. In the Sūtras examined by us in Part I, there were two occasions[240] for a reference to this problem besides, of course, the discussion of the relation of the individual soul with Brahman after the achievement of Mokṣa to which we have referred above. While discussing the आत्मगृहीति method of meditation[241] an Opponent argues that the आत्मगृहीति method follows from "the grammatical sense (अन्वय) of the subsquent sentence" (उत्तरवाक्य–Bra.Sū.III.3.16).[242] This means that the Opponent here emphasises the identity of the soul of the seeker and Brahman. The Sūtrakāra, however, does not *seem to like* this stand-point and says that he bases his method of आत्मगृहीति rather on the emphatic statement of "One should meditate on Brahman as his own Self".[243] The Sūtrakāra believes in the आत्मगृहीति method not because there is an identity of the soul with Brahman but because the Śruti emphatically lays it down as the only method. Again, when the Sūtrakāra states that the meditation is to be practised *within*

(237) विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह। (Bra.Sū.IV.4.19).

(238) दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने। (Bra.Sū.IV.4.20).

(239) Cf. इमं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः। सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च। (Bha.Gī.XIV.2).

(240) Bra.Sū.III.3.16. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्। and इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.34-35).

(241) Vide (99) *supra.*

(242) तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति......अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद, यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम्। (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10).

(243) आत्मेत्येवोपासीत। Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7. अवधारण in अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात्॥ (Bra.-Sū.III.3.17) refers to एव in the S'ruti.

the meditator's Self (स्वात्मनः अन्तरा), an Opponent argues that 'this is so because otherwise the identity of the soul of the meditator with Brahman (as required by the आत्मग्रहीति method) would not be possible'.[244] The Sūtrakāra rejects this argument based upon the identity (अभेद) and says that the practice of *inward* meditation is in accordance with *another precept* than the one of the identity of the individual and universal souls.[245] In both these cases, the Opponent holds the view of the identity while the Sūtrakāra does not accept it but explains away the point in question on some other ground. We may here suggest that Śaṅkara does not find a discussion of this important problem (of the relation of ब्रह्मन् and जीव) in Bra.Sū.II.3.17–53 which is specially devoted to the nature of the soul, though he often enters into a discussion of the same in his भाष्य on several other सूत्रs, e.g., Bra.Sū.II.1.22.[246] We believe that the Sūtrakāra does not hold the view of the absolute identity of the two.[247]

In order to explain further the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman we should here state some of the views of the Opposition regarding this conception which we have noticed in the portion of the Brahmasūtra examined in Part I.

One important Pūrvapakṣa seeks to keep all the Śākhās of all the Vedas independent of one another. This Pūrvapakṣa is presented when the Sūtrakāra asserts his Siddhānta that *all* the Vedantas teach Brahman (Bra.Sū.III.3.1). The Pūrvapakṣa

(244) अन्यथाऽभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.36).

(245) This 'उपदेशान्तर' may be a reference to द्वासुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया, etc., (Mu. Upa.III.6.1), which mentions the presence of Brahman in the human heart without identifying the soul with Brahman, or to S've.Upa.I.15. Vide Note (9) on the Sūtra.

(246) अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् (Bra.Sū.II.1.22) Vide S'ā. *bhā*. on it, which begins with नन्वभेदनिर्देशोऽपि दर्शितः 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्येवं जातीयकः etc.

(247) पृथगुपदेशात् । (Bra.Sū.II.3.28) and the four Sūtras which follow it seem to us to discuss the Sūtrakāra's view on the question of the relation of जीव and ब्रह्मन्.

puts forth the argument that the reasons, by which the unity of a "rite" was proved in the Jaiminisūtra, are not present in the Upaniṣads. In other words, संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या are different in the different Upaniṣads. Unlike the author of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā Sūtra, Bādarāyaṇa seems to us to *make a concession to these Opponents* in so far as he says that if the संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या were the same in only one Śākhā of each of the Vedas, he would propose that all the Vedas (i.e., Upaniṣads of all the Vedas) teach Brahman.[248] The Sūtrakāra here seems to us to be conscious of the fact that all the Vedāntas do not teach the same form of Brahman. Thus, he quiets the Opposition Schools which were unwilling to accept a common Darśana, viz., the Vedanta Darśana. The Opposition here is not from the Sāṁkhya or any other School, but it is from the Vedanta Śākhās which had each of them certain followers not willing to join under a common philosophy. By "एकस्यामपि (शाखायाम्)", the Sūtrakāra makes these Opponents conscious of the fact that at least *one* Śākhā of a Veda teaches Brahman under the *same* संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या as at least one Śākhā of each of the other three Vedas. Even after admitting this *partial* unity of teaching (अर्थाभेद–Bra.Sū.III.3.5.) these Opponents opposed the Sūtrakāra's proposal for Collection (उपसंग्रह) of all information on 'the One Principle' taught in all the Upaniṣads. Their arguments, शब्द and प्रकरणभेद,[249] show that they wanted to stick to their respective Śākhās (Recensions of the Śruti text) even after they nominally admitted that the same Brahman was taught in all the Śākhās. The Sūtrakāra refutes these two arguments. But he admits the truth of a third argument of the opposition, viz., that the names (संज्ञाs) of the One Common Principle of all the Upaniṣads are different in the different Upaniṣads. We have shown that संज्ञा corresponds to आख्या in the corresponding Jaiminisūtra and refers to such words as अक्षर, अव्यक्त, आत्मन्, पुरुष, under which Brahman is taught in the various Upaniṣads. We can-

(248) भेदान्नेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.2).
(249) Vide (192) *supra*.

not say whether the Opponents regarded each of *these names* as denoting a principle different from the principles denoted by all other names. They had agreed to अर्थाभेद so far as only *one* Śākhā of each Veda was concerned (Bra.Sū.III.3.2). The Sūtrakāra admits that though the same principle is taught in all Vedas, there is a difference about the *names* of this principle, which (difference) is so important as not to allow उपसंहार "Collection of all information" about this principle from *all* the Śākhās. He seems to admit the significant difference of *two names* of Brahman, viz., अव्यक्त and पुरुष. This difference of the significance of the two names of Brahman amounts according to the Sūtrakāra to the admission of *two aspects* of Brahman, the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्, and so, he says that inspite of this kind of difference about Brahman, उपसंहार 'collection' should proceed on the basis of that difference, i.e., the information about the अरूपवत् aspect should be gathered and distinguished from the same about the रूपवत् aspect which also should be gathered on its own line. We have shown that this is actually worked out by the Sūtrakāra in the sequel. He admits the भेद 'difference' caused by these two different *names* of Brahman.[250] Thus, अक्षर, आत्मन्, etc., may each of them have a special significance but all of them denote 'Brahman' while the only essential denotative difference is whether a word signifies the अरूपवत् or the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman. From this stand-point only two names अव्यक्त and पुरुष are important. Otherwise all other names, अक्षर, आत्मन्, etc., are *common to* both these aspects,[251] and therefore, each of these words does not possess an esential importance about the nature or attributes of Brahman. Thus, the Sūtrakāra seems to have united *all* the different Śākhās of *all* the Vedas under a common philosophy of "One Principle with two Aspects." Here we have the Vedanta Darśana in the making.

We may add that without the उपसंहार Adhikaraṇa, the Sūtrakāra would have brought about a union of the Vedantins, in

(250) सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे । (Bra.Sū.III.3.10). इमे = इमे द्वे संज्ञे or आख्ये

(251) परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः (Bra.Sū.III.3.50).

which only one or more Śākhās of a Veda would have joined with one or more Śākhās of each of the other Vedas on the basis of common principle taught in their Vedanta Śruti. This would mean several Schools of Vedanta like the several Schools of Buddhism or the several Schools of Sāṁkhya and also of Yoga. Persons of different Śākhās of each Veda would have been members of each of these Schools. But there would have been no Vedanta Darśana claiming the adherence of *all* the Śākhās of *all* the Vedas in the absence of the *Upasaṁhāra* Adhikaraṇa.

Again, when the Sūtrakāra discusses the अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः of Brahman, he finds an Opposition which seeks to combine (all) the Śākhās of each Veda separately.[252] This Pūrvapakṣa would ultimately mean the same as the Pūrvapakṣa already noted *supra*, because when the Śākhās of a Veda differ only in a different Recension of the Vedic texts, their union would not mean much. There would be no union of all the Śākhās of all the Vedas. But the Sūtrakāra argues that several Mantras, etc., belong to all the Vedas, so the अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाs of one Veda may be regarded as the property of the other Vedas also for the purpose of meditation on Brahman.

As regards the meditation on the Praṇava, the different Śākhās of the various Vedas seem to have originally believed that the teaching about this meditation in each Śākhā was to be regarded as independent of the same in the other Śākhās of the Vedas. The Sūtrakāra insists on the Collection (उपसंहार) of the information on the Praṇava from *all* the Śākhās for the purpose of the practice of the meditation, because, he says, the Praṇava meditation is declared to be a *means* (उपायन-शब्द) in all the Śākhās. Thus, the Sūtrakāra removed the third belief separating each Śākhā from other Śākhās of the Vedas and brought about a union of all the Śākhās of all the Vedas.

There are three important Pūrvapakṣas about the nature of the relation of the two aspects of Brahman, which, as we have

(252) Cf. शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् in अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

seen, the Sūtrakāra considers to be *two aspects of the same status* either being able to lead to Mokṣa directly.

Firstly, we find the Pūrvapakṣa that since the Śrutis characterise the अरूपवत् as they do the रूपवत् and *vice versa*, a meditator on either aspect should collect attributes of both the aspects for his practice of meditation. He *should not drop* out of reverence for the Śruti the attributes of the aspect other than that on which he meditates.[253] This Pūrvapakṣa seems to us to imply that in fact Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् and in meditation on Brahman the attributes of both the aspects should be collected from *all* the Śrutis. The Sūtrakāra replies that only when an attribute of an aspect other than that on which one meditates presents itself in the Śruti about the aspect of one's choice, the meditator should not drop it out of regard for the Word of the Śruti.[254] He further says that there is no rule to decide what are exactly the attributes of each one of these two aspects which of course could be easily distinguished from each other; and that the result of this stand–point (तद्दृष्टेः फलम्) is that from the side of the Śruti there is *no objection to a separate or independent notion about each of the two aspects.*[255] To us it seems that the Opponent here did not accept this doctrine of a separate or independent notion for each aspect and therefore held that in meditation Brahman should be meditated upon as being अपुरुषविध and पुरुषविध and for this purpose the attributes of both the aspects should be collected from all the Śrutis since Śruti itself characterises the अरूपवत् as the रूपवत् and *vice versa*. The Pūrvapakṣa opposed the doctrine that 'each aspect could be independently an object of meditation' as held by the Sūtrakāra. According to the Opposition Brahman is *both* निराकार and साकार (or we may say, नराकार having a man-like form) and the same meditator is

(253) आदरादलोपः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.40).

(254) उपास्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.41).

(255) तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.42). For the reading of the Sūtra vide Note on the Sūtra.

to meditate on Brahman as being *both* at the same time. Thus, only *one* kind of meditation on Brahman is taught in the Upaniṣads, that one kind containing in it both the aspects.

Another noteworthy Pūrvapakṣa held that the Unmanifest (अव्यक्त, अरूपवत्) is the only aspect, and, therefore, Brahman should be always meditated upon as अरूपवत्. According to this Pūrvapakṣa what the Sūtrakāra calls the रूपवत् aspect is only a क्रिया, a projection on Brahman which is only अरूपवत्, like the mentations taught in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā.[256] He depended upon the प्रकरण and अतिदेश of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.[257] By maintaining that "the meditation on the पुरुष aspect" is really a projection (क्रिया) on the अरूपवत् Brahman, he denied that it was Vidyā, i. e., Brahmavidyā. The Sūtrakāra refuted this Opposition by pointing to the same text which says that the meditation on the Puruṣa is Brahmavidyā.[258] He says that though the रूपवत् aspect regarded as Brahmavidyā may appear to be inconsistent with the अरूवपत् aspect, in these matters the Śruti and Smṛti are *more powerful* as proofs of knowledge and therefore there is no self-contradiction involved in this doctrine.[259] He refers to his earlier statement (Vide the preceding Pūrvapakṣa) that in the Śruti itself we find that the meditation on the Puruṣa is not a क्रिया on the Unmanifest but an independent thought (प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्व) on Brahman, i. e., an independent aspect of Brahman.[260] The Opponent seems to have argued that the Puruṣa is liable to be regarded as a लोक an ordinary world, like the worlds of the Vāyu, the Lightning, etc., because the attainment of the Puruṣa involves an enjoyment of desired objects just as the attainment of other worlds (सामान्य). The Sūtrakāra replies that because we find the mention in the Śruti (उपलब्धि) of the Puruṣa as Brahmavidyā, there is no लोकापत्तिदोष

(256) प्रकरणात्स्यात् क्रिया मानसवत् (Bra.Sū.III.3.45).

(257) Vide Note on ब्र. सू. III.3.46 in Part I.

(258) येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम् । मु. उप. I.2.13.

(259) श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः ।' (Bra.Sū.III.3.49).

(260) अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.50).

entailing upon the Puruṣa aspect of Brahman.[261] Moreover, because the Puruṣa is called अक्षर or *vice versa*, it should not be supposed that Puruṣa is a क्रिया on the अरूपवत् Brahman; the Puruṣa may be called अक्षर or *vice versa* because the same terms are used for the Puruṣa, as for the अरूपवत् and frequency of use (भूयस्त्व) would decide the appliclation of a particular word to one of the two aspects.[262] Some of those who opposed the independent meditation on the Puruṣa aspect as the aspect of Brahman argued that the meditation on the Puruṣa was taught because the individual soul who is the seeker is encased in the body and so he could easily grasp it.[263] The Sūtrakāra replies that the individual soul is quite different from the body because he is not invariably present when the body is present; but the case is not always as it is found stated in the text-*(upalabdhi)*.[264]

As regards the Puruṣa being liable to the लाकापत्तिदोष,[265] it may be added that Bādari and Jaimini seem to have looked upon the Puruṣa as a *Kārya* of Brahman[266] and that they seem to have believed Puruṣa to be the Prajāpatiloka. Bādarāyaṇa does not mention the Prajāpatiloka in his list of the worlds and seems to have held that Prajāpatiloka is the Puruṣa and is an aspect of the Kāraṇa Itself and therefore not a world like the other worlds enumerated by him.

According to this Pūrvapakṣa Brahman has only an impersonal aspect, or in other words, *Brohman is only an impersonal Reality*, the personal aspect of the Siddhāntin being only *a (mental) projection* on the impersonal Brahman. A meditation on the impersonal Brahman as possessed of a personal form

(261) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.51).

(262) परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.52).

(263) एके आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.53).

(264) व्यतिरेक स्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.54).

(265) Vide Sūtra.III.3.51.

(266) कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.7).

(267) कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात्। (Bra.Sū..IV.3.10).

would only lead to the fruit in the form of the Prajāpatiloka and the seeker would get the further knowledge in that लोक and would attain absolute liberation along with the master of that Prajāpatiloka *on the end of that Kārya* [267] This method of *prajectional meditation* on the impersonal Brahman is not the highest stand-point but is a subsidiary form of meditation taught by way of concession to the people, who, being themselves encased in the body as they really are, are unable to grasp the अरूपवत् Brahman. We may say that this Pūrvapakṣa appears to us to come nearest to the similar doctrine of अपरा or exoteric Brahman in Śaṅkara's School of Vedanta. But here it is a Pūrvapakṣa. The Sūtrakāra holds that the teaching about the Puruṣa is as much a Brahmavidyā as that about the अरूपवत् Brahman and that therefore there are only two aspects of equal status of the same reality.

There is one more Pūrvapakṣa about the relation of the two aspects of Brahman. According to this Pūrvapakṣa the Purusa aspect is *higher* than the Avyakta or impersonal aspect or the Puruṣa is a higher Brahman than the Avyakta. This Pūrvapakṣa is mentioned in Bra.Sū.III.3. 26–30 and 31–37. This Pūrvapakṣa admits that the अरूपवत् (aspect) is the Avyakta,[268] and then it argues that *from* the Avyakta a seeker who knows the Avyakta proceeds to and unites with the Puruṣa who is *without an end* (अनन्त). [269] We have shown that this Opponent depended upon the Kaṭha Upaniṣad which says that the Puruṣa who is *higher than* the Avyakta is omnipresent (व्यापक),[270] and that अनन्त in the Sūtra (III.3.26) refers to "व्यापक" in that Śruti. The Sūtrakāra on this occasion has to prove the omnipresence (सर्वगतत्व)[271] of the Avyakta, a fact which would suggest that the Opponent in question holds the Avyakta which he regards as Brahman to be

(268) तदव्यक्तमाह हि। (Bra.Sū.III.2.23)
(269) अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम्। (Bra.Sū.III.2.26)
(270) अव्यक्तात्तु पुरुषः परो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च। कठ उप.VI.8.
(271) अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः (Bra.Sū.III.2.37).

'*not omnipresent*' or 'limited'. The same inference about this Pūrvapakṣa can be drawn from the Sūtrakāra's argument of omnipresence (व्याप्ति)[272] of both the aspects in reply to a Pūrvapakṣa's objection against the उपसंहार 'collection of all the information' proposed by the Sūtrakāra. The Sūtrakāra refutes this argument of the Opponent by saying that *avyakta* and *puruṣa* are only two *names* (व्यपदेश) of the same Brahman just as *ahi* and *kuṇḍala* are only two names of a serpent.[273] The Sūtrakāra also draws attention to the fact that according to the Kaṭha Upa. VI.9,[274] the form of the Puruṣa *cannot be seen with the eye* and, therefore, the Principle called Puruṣa is the same as the Unmanifest.[275] That the Opponent believed in the Puruṣa as a principle higher than the Avyakta is amply proved by Bra.Sū.III.2.31–36.[276] Even Saṅkara says that the Pūrvapakṣa proposes a principle higher than and other than the Avyakta which he (the Opponent) does accept as Brahman. We have shown that all the four reasons of the Pūrvapakṣa are taken from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.[277] The Avyakta is called a bridge (Kaṭha Upa.III.2), the measure of the Avyakta (अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः–Kaṭha Upa.IV.12–13) is mentioned, the relation of the individual soul with the Avyakta in the state of transmigration is mentioned (Kaṭha Upa.IV.5), and lastly the difference between the Avyakta and the Puruṣa (Kaṭha Upa. III.11) is also stated. Therefore, the ultimate reality is beyond *this* Avyakta. Again, we may note that the Pūrvapakṣa here argues that the Avyakta is *limited* (उन्मानव्यपदेश) and the Sūtrakāra gives an अतिदेश that by refuting this argument of the Opponent[278] the Sūtrakāra proves the *omnipresence* of the

(272) व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.9).
(273) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27).
(274) न संदृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् । (KaṭhaUpa.VI.9).
(275) प्रतिषेधाच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.2.30).
(276) परमतः सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.31).
(277) Vide (55–58) supra. Vide Note in Part I.
(278) In बुद्ध्यर्थः पादवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.33). Vide our Interpretation in Part I.

Avyakta.[279] The Pūrvapakṣa's argument of भेदव्यपदेश 'the statement of the difference between the Avyakta and the Puruṣa' is also noteworthy. There are several Śrutis including the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, which state this difference. We have collected them in our Notes on the Sūtra.[280] These Śrutis are very important for the history of the doctrine pertaining to the relation of the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. They mention the Puruṣa as a principle higher than the Avyakta or the अरूपवत्. The Sūtrakāra explains this difference to be like the difference between अहि and कुण्डल or प्रकाश and प्रकाशाश्रय.[281] Moreover, the Sūtrakāra clearly asserts that the Śrutis *deny a second Principle* along with Brahman.[282] This shows that the Opponent who asserted that the ultimate reality was a principle *beyond this* Avyakta (proved in Bra.Sū.III.2.23-30) meant that there were *two* final principles since he accepted the Avyakta as Brahman. So according to this Pūrvapakṣa there were *two* principles, the Avyakta and the Puruṣa; the Avyakta was Brahman though it was *limited* as compared with the Puruṣa which was the higher Brahman.

Let us try to trace the origin of the above three Pūrvapakṣas. It is clear that these Pūrvapakṣas do not proceed from the Sāṁkhya or any other School, but they all are Vedanta Pūrvapakṣas. The last Pūrvapakṣa seems to be based upon the statements in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. We find that the doctrine that the Puruṣa is higher than the Avyakta or that the personal Brahman is higher than the impersonal Brahman is common to the Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Taittirīya and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads.[283] So, the last Pūrvapakṣa represents an opposition from what Deussen calls the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads.[284]

(279) अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.37).

(280) In Part I.

(281) Vide Bra.Sū.III.2.27. Also प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.2.35).

(282) तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.36).

(283) Vide Notes on भेदव्यपदेश in Bra.Sū.III.2.31 in Part I.

(284) Vide Notes on ब्र. सू. III.2.23-31 in Part I.

The second Pūrvapakṣa which insisted that Brahman is only impersonal or अरूपवत् and tried to explain the Puruṣa as a projection (क्रिया) on the Impersonal Brahman, as a *loka*, 'the Prajapatiloka', 'the Kārya of Brahman', as a religious concession for the secondary type of recepients, etc., seems to us to be a view strictly following the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad or, roughly, what Deussen names the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads. The first Pūrvapakṣa which believed that a seeker of Mokṣa must meditate *on Brahman as both* रूपवत् *and* अरूपवत् *at the same time* would seem to be a view ready to admit the रूपवत् aspect of the Earliest Metrical Upaniṣads as an aspect of Brahman Itself, but not willing to regard it or the अरूपवत् as an independent or separate aspect of Brahman to be meditated upon independently of the other aspect as was held by the Sūtrakāra himself. So this first Pūrvapakṣa would appear to be an effort of compromise between the Older Prose Upaniṣads and the Earliest Metrical Upaniṣads but not going so far as the Sūtrakāra himself. It may be that the first Pūrvapakṣa is a view like the Pāñcarātra School of the Mahābhārata, which looks upon Brahman as both personal and impersonal to be meditated upon as such by each and every devotee or meditator.[285] Besides these Pūrvapakṣas there is another important Opposition proceeding from the side of the Smṛti like the Bhagavadgītā; we believe, it is this Pūrvapakṣa which is not refuted but explained away by the Sūtrakāra in the Smṛti Pāda. But this topic is outside the pale of the present work.[286]

We shall now mention an important Pūrvapakṣa which is in a way concerned with the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. According to this Opposition the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman is possible when Brahman is referred to as being in the state of deep-sleep and the रूपवत् is possible when Brahman is spoken of as being in the dreaming and waking states. Thus,

(285) Vide Akṣara : A Forgotten Chapter, by P. M. Modi.

(286) Vide the author's article on "Smṛti in the Brahmasūtra", Indian Historical Quarterly, 1936.

this Pūrvapakṣa explained the twofold, अरूपवत् and रूपवत् Śrutis about Brahman with reference to the states of Brahman, viz., the deep-sleep, the dreaming and the waking states The Sūtrakāra says that *both the kinds of Śrutis refer to* Brahman *in all* the three states.[287] The Opponent denies this by saying that "Brahman is different according to different states"; then the Sūtrakāra refers to a Śruti which *says* that Brahman is *not different* (अतद्वचनात्) with regard to each one of the states. On account of the word स्थान in Bra.Sū.III.2.11 and on account of other reasons, we have shown that the Pūrvapkṣa here depends upon the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad which seems to us to teach the doctrine of states (स्थानs) of Brahman which is अरूपवत् and रूपवत् (*ubhayaliṅga*) *according to* these states.[288] The Siddhānta on the other hand, seems to us to depend upon Chā.Upa.VIII.7-12, viz., the famous dialogue between Prajāpati and Indra whom Virocana accompanies in the first stage only, wherein it is shown that in each of the three states, waking, etc., the Supreme Being remains the same.[289] Moreover, the Sūtrakāra refers to the Śrutis which say that Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् at the same time, without any reference to any of its states.[290] Again, he denies that Brahman is influenced by the three states as regards its being अरूपवत् or रूपवत् by saying that Brahman is अरूपवत् *only* because the अरूपवत् is the chief (प्रधान) aspect of Brahman.[291] As Brahman is *only* अरूपवत् in the sense that It is chiefly so (तत्प्रधानत्वात्), there is no question of its being affected by the states. If Brahman were *chiefly* रूपवत् it would have been

(287) न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि। (Bra.Sū.III.2.11).

(288) Vide Note (4) on Bra.Sū.III.2.11.

(289) Cf. also एव उ एवैषु सर्वेष्वन्तेषु परिख्यायते। where अन्तेषु means 'in all the states,' अन्त being the same word as in "बुद्धान्त" or "जागरितान्त". Vide Note (9) on Bra.Sū.III.2.12 (भेदान्नेति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्।).

(290) अपि चैवमेके। (Bra.Sū.III.2.13).

Cf. सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम्। सर्वतः श्रुतिमल्लोके सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति॥ सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम्॥ (S've.Upa.III.16-17)

Also अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः। (S've. Upa.III.19).

(291) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्। (Bra. Sū.III.2.14).

influenced by the difference of the states. This seems to us to be the point emphasised in the Bra.Sū.III.2.14. In the next four Sūtras the Opponent tries to show that Brahman has got a natural रूप because It is of the *nature of Light*.[292] The Sūtrakāra says, "But, It is not of the nature of Light (न तथात्वम्) because It cannot be reflected, like the light in the water."[293] We have suggested that the statement of this Sūtra corresponds to that in Bra. Sū.II,3.46 where we are told, " The individual soul is like the light, etc., (i. e., of the nature of the light, etc.) but not so the Supreme One.[294] Also in Sū.III.2.27–29, the two aspects of Brahman are explained on the analogy of अहि and कुण्डल and also that of प्रकाश, and:प्रकाशाश्रय, but the Sūtrakāra shows his preference for the first analogy only. Here we have a clear indication that, according to the Opponent who held that Brahman is really affected by the three states and that we can therefore explain the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman with reference to the three different states, Brahman is *of the nature of* light while the Sūtrakāra only admits that It is *like* light but not of the nature of light.[295] We believe that in these Sūtras (III.2.11–20) the Opponent asserts that Brahman has really affecting states of waking, dreaming and deep-sleep, just as the individual soul

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(292) प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् (Bra.Sū.III.2.15). Brahman must be *arupavat* and also like light, i.e., of the nature of light, because otherwise It would be meaningless. आह च तन्मात्रम् (Bra.Sū.III.2.16). As we have shown तद् in तन्मात्रम् must stand for प्रकाश in the preceding Sūtra and तन्मात्रम् must mean प्रकाशमात्रम्. दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते (Bra.Sū.III.2.17) and अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् (Bra.Sū.III:2.-18) give references to S′rutis which, according to the Pūrvapaksa, say that Brahman is of the nature of light.

(293) अम्बुवदग्रहणात् तु न तथात्वम् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.19). As we have shown in our Notes, this is a Siddhanta Sūtra. Sūtra III.2 20 begins a new Adhikaraṇa.

(294) प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः । (Bra.Sū.II.3.46).

(295) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27).
प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.28).
पूर्ववद्वा । (Bra.Sū.III.2.29).

These similes are again referred to in प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.2.35-Our reading. Vide Notes).

Vide also our interpretation of प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् । (Bra.Sū. III.2.25).

which is like प्रकाश and has real states as proved in Bra.Sū.III.2.1-10), while the Siddhāntin denies the same by proving that Brahman is unaffected by any states, or in other words, Brahman remains the same in *all the three states.* The Pūrvapakṣa seems to depend upon the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad while the Siddhānta relies upon the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

Equally noteworthy are two Pūrvapakṣas, one holding that the entire Veda, particularly the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and the Khila literature, should be interpreted in the light of the Upaniṣads and the other believing that the knowledge of Brahman is subsidiary to the *Karma* of the Karmakāṇḍa. The first Pūrvapakṣa is discussed in Bra.Sū.III.3.20–24, while the second in Bra.Sū.III.4.1–17 and also in 18–26. When the Sūtrakāra proves that in the Vedanta School there is an *Apūrva* as in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā, an Opponent argues that this *Apūrva* should be taken as understood also in non-Upaniṣadic Śruti texts because these are closely connected with the Upaniṣads.[296] The Sūtrakāra emphasises the distinction between the two Branches (Jñānakāṇḍa and Karmakāṇḍa) of the Śruti and says that he does not include in his lists of the attributes of Brahman the two attributes of संम्भृति and द्युव्याप्ति though the Rāṇāyanīya Khila mentions them with reference to the अरूपवत् Brahman, *because they are mentioned in a work which is not an Upaniṣad.*[297] For this and other reasons[298] the Sūtrakāra considers the two Sciences of the Veda as independent of each other so far as their principle teaching is concerned. But the Opponent wanted to interpret the Karmakāṇḍa in the light of the Upaniṣads. In the second Pūrvapakṣa Jaimini wants to make the knowledge of Brahman subsidiary to the Karman and also the same Opponent argues that the knowledge of Brahman is of the nature of reflection (परामर्श) and of the nature of mere praise (स्तुतिमात्रम्–Bra.Sū.III.4.21), and lastly that the episodes of the Upaniṣads are meant for the

(296) संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.20).
(297) संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.23).
(298) Vide our interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3.24.

purpose of पारिप्लव (Bra.Sū.III.4.23). The Sūtrakāra, on the other hand, holds that the Upaniṣads give the knowledge of Brahman which is something to be performed (अनुष्ठेय) and subject to an Injunction (विधि – Bra.Sū.III.4.19–20) and that the unanimity of the two Sciences of the Śruti lies in this very fact that the teaching of either is *subsidiary to a* विधि, though in the case of the विधि of the Jñānakāṇḍa there is no necessity of the sacrificial fire, fuel, etc.[299] All these Sūtras (III.4.1–26) seem to imply that according to Jaimini the Uttarakāṇḍa, i.e., the Upaniṣads were to be interpreted as subsidiary to the Pūrvakāṇḍa. The Sūtrakāra holds that Brahman is subsidiary to a विधि, just as Dharma, and thus there is a harmony (एकवाक्यता) between the two Sciences.

We may note that we have a Pūrvapakṣa arguing the complete identity of the soul with Paramātman, as we have already seen. The Sūtrakāra rejects it. It is also remarkable that the Sūtrakāra believes that the negative attributes अनणु, अऱ्हस्वम्, अदीर्घम्, etc., are not useful in meditation on either aspect of Brahman and yet we have no Pūrvapakṣa against such a view. It is very well known that Śaṅkara particularly emphasises these attributes and proposes that all positive attributes imply of Brahman the absence of the negations of those positive attributes.

Besides these, there is a Pūrvapakṣa, which says that the senses and the vital airs of a knower of Brahman do not leave this body in order to reach (to go to) Brahman. The Sūtrakāra holds the contrary view.[300] There is a Pūrvapakṣa from the Smārta Vedanta School that a Brahmajñānin dying in the Southern Course of the Sun does not reach Brahman (neu.); but the Sūtrakāra rejects it as Smārta (Bra.Sū.IV.2.21).

We have noticed the above Pūrvapakṣas to explain the Sūtrakāra's Doctrine by comparing it with those of his Opponents. It is not unlikely that some of these Pūrvapakṣas are only

(299) अत एवं चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा । (Bra.Sū.III.4.25). Vide also our interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.4.26.

(300) प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.12).

imaginary and presented by the Sūtrakāra to expound his own views, the purpose with which we have stated them above. But from what we have seen above there seems to be great probability that Bādarāyaṇa's main work was that of constructing a Vedanta Darśana by presenting a System acceptable to the followers of *all the Upaniṣads*, i.e., of the Upaniṣads of *all* the Śākhās of *all* the Vedas. He seems to have been a thinker of a balanced mind. He did not insist that the *entire* Veda taught only the Sacrifice or only Brahman. While Jaimini seems to have held that Dharma was the only Precept of the whole Veda, Bādarāyaṇa believed that Brahman was the Usufruction (फलम्) because Brahman is declared to be the cause of Dharma, the Inspirer and Master of Dharma.[301] This belief seems to have inspired Bādarāyaṇa to offer a thesis about Brahman as the only goal of the Upaniṣads. He carefully avoided a conflict with Jaimini's School by insisting that Brahman was to be known only from the Upaniṣads and rejecting the view that the Pūrvakāṇḍa was to be interpreted in the light of the Upaniṣads. Thus, his view seems to be above the two extremes, one of Jaimini himself and the other of a staunch Vedantin who is not less staunch than that staunch Karmakāṇḍin. Again, in interpreting the Upaniṣads he adopted the well established method of Jaimini and improved upon it where necessary, as when he says that even if in *one* Śākhā of *each* Veda the चोदना, etc., of Brahman are the same, he would conclude that Brahman is the topic of *all* the Vedantas. This shows that he was not a blind follower of the method of Jaimini. He used his own intelligence in applying that method to the Upaniṣads. The fact that Bādarāyaṇa rejects a Pūrvapakṣa not accepting the Puruṣa as an aspect of Brahman, shows that in accepting the *Arūpavat* conception of Brahman and in so far siding with the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads he was not blind to the special contribution of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, viz., the superpersonal conception of Brahman.

(301) पूर्व तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्। (Bra.Sū.III.2.41).

(By holding that "Brahman is *only* अरूपवत् because It is *chiefly* अरूपवत्" he has accepted the निराकार Brahmavāda of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads, e. g., the बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् and at the same time he has *modified* it in the light of the later Śrauta Vedanta of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. His other arguments for the superiority of the अरूपवत् to the रूपवत् aspect, e. g., the latter being dependent on the former (Bra.Sū.I.4.3) and the अरूपवत् being mentioned in a majority of the S'rutis, show his regard for the Oldest S'rauta Vedanta. But inspite of admitting the superiority of the अरूपवत् aspect, he sticks to his view about the option of choice from either of the two aspects on the ground that each of them independently gives direct Mokṣa; and this proves his respect for the minor Upaniṣads). That he rejects the Opposition believing in the superiority of the Pūruṣa to the Avyakta and argues that the Upaniṣads 'deny a second Reality,' he *gives a death blow to the dualistic tendency* of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā and saves the Vedanta Darśana once for all from becoming another Sāṁkhya (or Dualistic) School with *two* conscious Principles, one निराकार and the other साकार. (We may here add a line about our view regarding the स्मृतिपाद (Bra.Sū.II.1) in which the Sūtrakāra seems to us to reject the प्रकृति (the Matter) of the Gītā. His main objection against the Gītā is "How can the spiritual Brahman be associated with the material प्रकृति?" We believe, by his *peculiar attitude* towards the Bhagavadgītā, which is neither that of rejection nor of blind acceptance, the Sūtrakāra has saved the Vedanta School from being a semi-material Spiritualism.) Moreover, he has tried to be logical as far as possible since an appeal to the word of the Śruti is generally a *second* argument with him.[302] Only in the case of an *open conflict* between rational argument and the Revealed Scripture, he has to say that "For a believer in the Scripture, the express word of the text is the foundation of his belief and more im-

(302) Cf. (I) फलमतः उपपत्तेः। (Bra.Sū.III 2.38) and श्रुतत्वाच्च। (Bra.Sū.III.2.39).
(2) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात्। (Bra.Sū.III.3.1) and two more Sūtras are followed by दर्शयति च। (Bra.Sū.III.3.4.)

portant than a rational argument." But when such circumstances do not arise, he is a free thinker and does not hesitate to reject such Śruti texts as appear illogical with his System and to accept only such as are favourable to the same. Thus, he rejects the प्रियशिरस्त्वादि Śruti because it implies difference of the degrees of bliss within Brahman Itself, and the माण्डूक्य उपनिषद् because the latter believes in the waking and the other states really affecting Brahman. (As we have seen, he rejects an interpretation of the कठ उप० offering a dualistic doctrine.) Since he rejects even these Śrutis, it would be no wonder if he is found to reject or to interpret in his own way Smṛti like the Gītā, whenever the latter is in conflict with his System drawn from the Śruti. He has done this when he rejects the view of the Bhagavadgītā which holds that the knower of Brahman returns to this world if he dies during the southern course of the Sun. He says that this rule applies only to the Yogins and that it is only a Smārta rule, not a Śrauta one. (We have elsewhere shown that the Smṛti Pāda (Bra.Sū.II.1) *gives the Sūtrakāra's own interpretation*, rather than rejection, of those doctrines of the Bhagavadgītā which he finds inconsistent with the views of the Upaniṣads and which he does not accept in their apparent sense. It is due to this boldness on the part of the Sūtrakāra of accepting literally a Śruti though it may be inconsistent with प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान and of rejecting a Śruti if it be contradictory to his own System of Vedanta, that while reading his work we are saved from the intellectual jugglery of words which we often find in the commentaries of the Ācāryas who try to effect a compromise even when the three Prasthānas are in open conflict with one another. An example of this is supplied to us by Śaṅkara's effort to interpret Bha.Gī.VIII.22-27 as referring to the conductor-deities though it clearly speaks of time-deities as the Sūtrakāra distinctly states. On the whole, the Sūtrakāra is a bold, tactful, straightforward interpreter of the Scripture and a great saviour of the Vedanta School, who saved it on the one hand from being divided into so many sects and on the other, from being plunged into dualistic philosophy.

CHAPTER. 2.

ACTION AS HELP TO KNOWLEDGE IN ACHIEVING MOKṢA.

In Bra.Sū.III.3.44–54 it is shown by the Sūtrakāra that the knowledege of the Avyakta as well as that of the Puruṣa is Vidyā.[1] The Muḍṇaka Upaniṣad declares that the knowledge by which the well-known Akṣara is attained is the higher Vidyā as compared with the knowledge of the Sacrifice obtained from the Vedic Saṁhitās.[2] The same Upaniṣad also says that the knowledge of the Puruṣa is *also* Brahmavidyā.[3] As we have shown the whole of Brahmasūtra III.3 iṣ devoted to a detailed account of this two-fold Vidyā of Akṣara (or Avyakta) and Puruṣa.

The Śruti declares that the above knowledge of Brahman is the means to 'the goal of human life' (पुरुषार्थ). "By the Vidyā one attains to the Immortal."[4] "By the Vidyā one gets the Immortal."[5] This was the view of Bādarāyaṇa.

The earlier part of the Śruti (the Pūrvakāṇḍa) teaches 'Karman' or the Ritualism as a means to 'the goal of human life' पुरूषार्थ. This was the view of Jaimini.

Besides the Knowledge of Brahman and the Karman, the Upaniṣads teach several other means for the attainment of

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(1) विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.47).

(2) द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये इति ह स्म यद्ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च ॥४॥
तत्रापरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति ।
अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । (Mụ.Upa.I.1.5).

(3) Cf...तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्पर पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥८॥ which is followed by तेषामेवैतां ब्रह्मविद्यां वदेत् । (Mu.Upa.III.2.10).

(4) विद्यया विन्दतेऽमृतम् । (Kena Upa.II.12).

(5) विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते । (ई उ.11).

Brahman, e.g., penance 'तपस्',[6] faith 'श्रद्धा',[7] truth 'सत्य',[8] eternal celibacy,[9] नैष्ठिक ब्रह्मचर्य, selection by the Supreme Being 'वरण',[10] or the Grace of God 'देवप्रसाद',[11] control over one's mind 'शम', control over one's senses 'दम', etc.,[12] contemplation 'ध्यान', or 'योग'[13] learnedness 'पाण्डित्य', strength or childlike simplicity 'बाल्य', and silence 'मौन' etc.,[14] and several other means.

It must be here noted that though penance, faith, truth, etc, etc., are stated in the respective Śrutis referred to *supra*, as direct means to the *attainment* of Atman, they are also often described in the Upaniṣads as direct means to the *knowledge* of Brahman, which (alone) is the really direct means to the attainment of Atman.

"The Brāhmaṇas *wish to know* this well-known Atman by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by devotion, by penance, by fasting.[15] In this Śruti the Ritualism (lit. the sacrifice),

(6) तद्य इत्थं विदुः। ये चेमेऽरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसंभवन्ति। (Chā.Upa.V.10.1).
तपः श्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्त्यरण्ये। (Mu.Upa.I.2.11).
तान् ह स ऋषिरुवाच भूयएव तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण श्रद्धया संवत्स्यथ... (Pra.Upa.I.2).
सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा... (Mu.Upa.III.1.5).

(7) Vide (6) above for (Chā.Upa.V.10.1), (Mu.Upa.I.2.11), (Pra.Upa. I. 2).

(8) ये चामी अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासते। (Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15).
सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा। (Mu.Upa.III.1.5).

(9) सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा सम्यग्ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम्। (Mu.Upa.III.1.5).

(10) यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम्। (Mu.Upa.III.2.3).

(11) तपःप्रभावाद्देवप्रसादाच्च ब्रह्म ह श्वेताश्वतरोऽथ विद्वान्।
अत्याश्रमिभ्यः परमं पवित्रं प्रोवाच सम्यगृषिसंघजुष्टम्॥ (Sve.Upa.VI.21).

(12) Vide (38) infra (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23).
तपःश्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्त्यरण्ये शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्षचर्यां चरन्तः। (Mu.Upa.I.2.11).

(13) ततस्तु तं पश्यते निष्कलं ध्यायमानः। (Mu.Upa.III.1.8).
यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह।
बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टति तामाहुः परमां गतिम्॥ (Kaṭha.Upa.VI.10-11).
तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम्।
अप्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ॥

(14) तस्माद् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद् बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः। (Bṛ.Upa.III.5.1).

(15) तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन। (Bṛ.Up.IV.4.22).

penance, etc. are said to be means to the knowledge of Brahman. Again in some Śrutis the penance (तपस्) is declared to be a means to the knowledge of Brahman.[16] But, in the case of other means like the control of the mind and the senses (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23), silence, etc., (Bṛ.Up.III.5.1) there is no definite statement as to their not being direct means to the goal of human life. Thus, both these types of texts require to be explained with reference to the Sūtrakāra's own view that the knowledge of Brahman is the means to Mokṣa as stated in Bra.Sū.III.3.

Moreover, what should a seeker of Brahman do with regard to the duties of his own order of life (आश्रमकर्मन्) and his own professional duties mentioned in the Śruti? And should a seeker give up the worldly duties (आधिकारिककर्मन्) even if he is not an ascetic?

The question arising from the above-mentioned Śrutis and Smṛtis seem to us to have been answered by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.III.4.

One very important point which is made clear at the very beginning of this Pāda (Bra.Sū.III.4.1-2) is that both Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini agreed to take *all means other than jñāna* (the knowledge of Brahman) and *karman* (the Vedic sacrifice) to be of secondary importance.[17] Thus, truth, penance, donation, celibacy, the duties of the order of life and of the castes, etc., etc., are all of them subsidiary to the knowledge of Brahman according to Bādarāyaṇa and to the Vedic sacrifice according to Jaimini. It is also clear that Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini differed only as to the comparative importance of ज्ञान and कर्मन् only. In the opinion of the former ज्ञान was supreme and in that of the latter कर्मन्. Bādarāyaṇa argues according to the teaching of the Śruti that the ज्ञान of Brahman is more important अधिक than कर्मन्.

(16) तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व । तपो ब्रह्मेति ॥ (Tai.Upa.III.2 1).
एवमात्मात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ सत्येनैनं तपसा योऽनुपश्यति । (S've.Upa.I.15).

(17) This is the sense of शेषत्वात्पुरूषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः (Bra.Sū.III.4.2). 'अन्य' referes to truth, penance, etc., as we have shown, and शेष shows that these means are *subsidiary*.

Aṅgiras taught the same view to Śaunaka (Mu.Upa.I.1–2) as did also Sanatkumāra to Nārada (Chā.Upa.VII.)[18] As the Śruti expressly declares that the aim of human life can be achieved by the means of the Brahmavidyā, as Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini could agree that all means other than ज्ञान and कर्मन् were of a subordinate nature, and again as the Śruti teaches ज्ञान of Brahman as superior to कर्मन् (the Vedic sacrifice), Bādarāyaṇa holds that liberation can be obtained chiefly by means of the Vidyā or the knowledge of Brahman.

Both Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini differ from Śaṅkara who holds that *only* the knowledge of Brahman is the means to liberation. According to Bādarāyaṅa the Vidyā is the chief means and *Karman* is subsidiary to it, and according to Jaimini *Karman* is the primary means and the Vidyā is subordinate to it; thus, both of them are ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयवादिन्s, i.e., they believe that a *combination* of knowledge and action is the means to 'the aim of life.' Śaṅkara is केवलविद्यावादिन्, i.e., he holds that *jñāna* alone is the means for Mokṣa; and he tries his best to interpret Bādarāyaṇa's view stated in Bra.Sū.III.4 as that of a केवलविद्यावादिन्.[19]

In our opinion, we have a discussion about the nature of this *Jñāna* in Sūtras III.4. 18–26, which, as we have shown in our Notes, forms the second Adhikaraṇa of the Pāda. Jaimini holds (1) that the knowledge of Brahman or Atman is of the nature of 'a reflection' or 'contemplation' (or thought) and (2) that regarding this knowledge there is no Injunction which, if ever it were there, would make the achievement of this knowledge a performance, because the Śruti denies any कर्मन् to be the means to liberation which (कर्मन्) alone can be an object of

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(18) अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् । Bra.Sū.III.4.8. "अधिकोपदेश" seems to us to refer to Mu.Upa.I.1-2, Chā.Upa.VII, where a contrast between the teaching of the Pūrvakāṇda and that of the Uttarkāṇda is presented.

(19) In our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.4 in Part I we have given our reasons for our belief that S'aṅkara has tried to foist his own view about the utility of *Jñāna* alone for Mokṣa on the Sūtrakāra who, as a matter of fact, differed from S'aṅkara.

Injunction. "Having well considered the worlds that are achieved through actions (sacrifices), a Brāhmaṇa should get disgusted with these actions. That which is not made (i.e., 'the unmade Brahman or Brahma-world' as in Chā.Upa.VIII.13) cannot be achieved by what is made".[20] Bādarāyaṇa's reply to the first part of Jaimini's view is that the knowledge of Brahman is 'something to be performed' like an act (अनुष्ठेय) because the Śruti declares the similarity of nature of both *jñāna* and *karman* in as much as we read : "Those who have the above knowledge and, who, in the forest, *devote themselves* (उपासते) to faith, penance, etc." and "Now, those who, in the village *devote themselves* (उपासते) to the sacrifice, works of public utility, religious gifts, etc." [21] Because both the paths are, thus, mentioned by the same verb "उपासते" (devote themselves to), both knowledge and actions are 'objects to be performed' (अनुष्ठेय). Also, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Kaṭha Upa. I) declares this similarity of the knowledge of Brahman with the sacrifice; and Kaṭha Upa.V.1 says "Having performed (अनुष्ठाय) the meditation on Him Who resides in the city with eleven doors, which belongs to the One who is unborn and of straightforward mind, one does not lament any more and being free from the body becomes free from transmigration.[22] Also, in Tai.Upa.II.5.1 the meditation on Brahman is said to be the same as the performance of a sacrifice, because there we are told that "One performs the sacrifice of knowledge and one performs also the rites. All gods meditate on the Supreme Brahman which is knowledge. If one knows Brahman which is knowledge and if one does not neglect it, he having abandoned the sins in his body, attains all objects of desire.[23] Also, in Chā.Upa.III.14

(20) परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन । (Mu.Upa.I.2.12)
न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा । (Mu.Upa.III.1.8).

(21) Vide (6) supra for Chā.Upa.V.10.
अथ य इमे ग्रामे इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते Chā.Upa.V.10.3.

(22) पुरमेकादशद्वारमजस्यावक्रचेतसः ।
अनुष्ठाय न शोचति विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते ॥ (Katha.Upa.V.1).

(23) विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते ॥ कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च ॥ विज्ञानं देवाः सर्वे ॥ ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते ॥ विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद् वेद ॥ तस्माच्चेन् न प्रमाद्यति ॥ शरीरे पाप्मनो हित्वा ॥ सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुत इति ॥ (Tai.Upa.II.5.1).

the meditation on Brahman is said to be *the performance of a sacrifice.*[24] Thus, the Śruti mentions a similarity between the knowledge of Brahman and the performance of a sacrifice and therefore one may say that the knowledge of Brahman *is an act to be preformed.* To the other part of Jaimini's view that the knowledge of Brahman is not laid down by an Injunction, Bādarāyaṇa replies by saying that "*Rather, there is* an Injunction about knowing Brahman, just as *there is* an Injunction about remembering the Text." Here Bādarāyaṇa refers to such Śrutis as "The Atman should be seen, should be heard, should be reasoned about and should be meditated upon."[25] "One need not try to know the sense of speech; one shold know the speaker."[26] This Injunction asking one to know Brahman is *like* the Injunction asking one to learn (lit. *to remember*) the Veda.[26a]

Jaimini may raise an objection to the above view of Bādarāyaṇa by saying that the Upaniṣad portion of the Śruti was not required (in so far as the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa portion was self-sufficient), but since it is taken up as Śruti we may regard the Śruti texts of Upaniṣads as an Eulogy (स्तुति) of Brahman or God,[27] or as intended for the purpose of पारिप्लव (recitation, at the sacrifices, of the stories about ancient well-known persons).[28] This is how Jaimini would explain the unity of purpose of the two Kāṇḍas or Portions of the Śruti. To these objections

(24) स क्रतुं कुर्वीत । Chā.Upa.III.14.1.

(25) आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । Bṛ.Upa.IV.5.6. Cf. also Chā.Upa.VIII.1.1 and VIII.7.1.

(26) न वाचं विजिज्ञासीत वक्तारं विद्यात् । Kaū.Upa.III.8.

(26a) विधिर्वा धारणवत् । ब्र० सू० III.4.20. The Injunction to remember the Veda is "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः ।"

(27) Bra.Sū.IV.3.11 (परं जैमिनि र्मुख्यत्वात्) shows that Jaimini believed in Brahman, and as विधि in the preceding Sūtra (Bra.Sū.III.4.20) refers to the Injunction about Brahman, we conclude that स्तुति in Sūtra 21 refers to the Eulogy of Brahman. Vide Notes on Bra.Sū.III.4.21 in Part I.

(28) The fact that S'aṅkara takes Sūtras 23-24 as referring to the Vedanta texts in general, proves that the same is the topic of Sūtras 18-26 which should be taken as forming one Adhikaraṇa.

Bādarāyaṇa replies that (1) the Vedanta or उपनिषत् काण्ड of the Śruti cannot be taken as mere Eulogy of Brahman because (a) that part of the Veda is something which has 'not preceded before' (apūrva)[29] and (b) because of the Śruti that Brahman (really) *is* (what it is taught to be meditated upon as).[30] Nor are the Vedānta texts meant for the purpose of पारिप्लव because (a) the पारिप्लव texts are distinguished from other texts. Moreover, because the knowledge of Brahman is an act laid down by an Injunction, we can construe the unity of the two Kāṇḍas or Sections of the Veda in so far as *both* the Kāṇḍas *teach action*, and, again, as it is the act in the form of the knowledge of Brahman, which the latter Kāṇḍa lays down by an Injunction, it is that the performance of '*that act of knowing*' taught in that Kāṇḍa does not require the sacred fire, the fuel, etc., which are required in the performance of the acts laid down in the earlier Kāṇḍa.[31] And all requirements[32] of the act of knowing Brahman, arising from Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22,[33] are like the Horse described in Bṛ.Upa. I.1,[34] i.e., all these requirements referring to the sacrifice, etc., are allegorical just as the Horse described in Bṛ.Upa.I.1, is to be allegorically understood. The seeker of the knowledge of Brahman *is not required to perform* the sacrifice *physically*, though one who knows Brahman *may perform* the Sacrifice in its material form also.[35]

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(29) The contrast between the Upaniṣad Kāṇḍa and the Pūrva Kāṇḍa of the Veda, e.g., that stated in Mu. Upa. I.1, Chā.Upa. VII.1, seems to be referred to here.

(30) भावशब्दाच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.22).

(31) अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा । (Bra.Sū.III.4.25). S'aṅkara connects Sūtra 25 with Sūtra 1. This also proves our view that Sūtras 18-25 form one Adhikaraṇa and discuss the nature of the Vidyā or the knowledge of Brahman.

(32) सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.26).

(33) तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसा नाशकेन । In this S'ruti the यज्ञ, etc., are laid down as means to the knowledge of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra explains the nature of this यज्ञ in the above Sūtra (III.4.26).

(34) उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य शिरः ॥ सूर्यश्चक्षुर्वातः प्राणो व्यात्तमग्नि वैश्वानरः संवत्सरः आत्माश्वस्य मेध्यस्य ॥ etc. (Bṛ.Upa.I.1.1-2).

(35) Cf. अनुमति in स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा । (Bra Sū.III.4.14).

Having discussed as above the nature of the act of knowing Brahman and incidentally the relation between the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda, the Sūtrakāra now proceeds to state in Sū.27–39,[36] which *karmans* (duties) the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman must compulsorily perform.[37] In the same group of Sūtras the Sūtrakāra includes also the discussion of two minor points which pertain to the same topic, viz., (1) whether the Scriptural permission to a seeker of Mokṣa to eat the food from all persons whatsoever is consistent with the rule of control over mind (शम) and senses (दम), etc., laid down for him[38] and (2) whether a seeker of Brahman must go through *all* the stages of life in due order.

In the opinion of the Sūtrakāra an aspirant must under any circumstances do two sets of actions, viz., (1) the Sacrifice etc., mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 and (2) the duties of the seeker's own order.[39]

The Sūtrakāra discusses the consistency of the Sacrifice, etc., mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 as a means to the knowledge of Brahman with the control over mind and senses, etc., mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23 also as a means to the same. He says that "Though a seeker may be possessed of control over the mind, etc., *even then*, as that injunction is subordinate to the one in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 which lays down the sacrifice, donation, etc., as a means to the knowledge of Brahman, the sacrifice, etc. must be compulsorily performed by a seeker." According to the Sūtrakāra the injunction about शमदमादि is subsidiary to that about यज्ञादि.[40] Therefore, even if a seeker be possessed of शमदमादि, he must perform the sacrifice, give donation and practise penance,

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(36) On the ground of the presence of च in Sūtras 28, 32 and 36 we have proposed in our Notes to take all these Sūtras (27-36) as forming *one* Adhikaraṇa. Vide Part I.

(37) Cf. सर्वथाऽपि in सर्वथाऽपि च त एव । Bra.Sū.III.4.34.

(38) तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23.

(39) Vide Note (37) supra.

(40) This is the sense of तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया in शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.27.)

which are means to the knowledges of Brahman. Control over mind, etc., and sacrifice, etc. are both means to the knowledge of Brahman, but the former is, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, prescribed in the Śruti as a part (अङ्ग) of the latter, the prescription meaning that a seeker should perform sacrifice, donation and penance with 'control over his mind' and other qualities. Therefore, the possession of शम, etc., is in no way a higher stage than the performance of the sacrifice, etc., and consequently the possession of शमादि does not earn for the seeker exemption from the duty of performing the sacrifice, etc.

The duties of one's own order of life are laid down with regard to a seeker of Mokṣa in Chā.Upa.II.21.1.[41] That Śruti, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, means that " One who belongs to any order of life gets immortality if he is 'well established in Brahman,' i.e., "if he knows Brahman properly." This text lays down for a seeker of Brahman the duties of his order of life, and thus admits a man of any order of life to the search after Mokṣa or immortality. The duties of one's order are not laid down here as to be performed for getting the knowledge of Brahman, but they are are laid down for each particular order by the Dharmaśāstras or the Śrutis on which these works depend[42] and again, in Chā.Up.II.23.1 a member of any order is admitted to the search after immortality. Thus, it is that the duties of one's own order are te be performed by a seeker, unlike a non-seeker,[43] *as a help co-operating with the knowledge of*

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(41) विहित्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । (Bra.Sū.III.4.27).
त्रयेा धर्मस्कन्धाः यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमस्तप एव द्वितीयो ब्रह्मचार्याचार्यकुलवासी तृतीयोऽत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन् सर्व एते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति। (Chā.Upa.II.23.1).

(42) विहित्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । (Bra.Sū.III4.32). Here विहितत्व refers to the injunctions prescribing the duties of an order for one who belongs to that order, apart from the question of his being a mumukṣu or not. It may also refer to यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् ।

(43) For a non-seeker, the duties of one's order are meant for avoiding the sins of omission (प्रत्यवाय); for a seeker, they are सहकारिन् to ज्ञान in achieving Mokṣa. The Sūtrakāra seems to add सहकारित्वेन (Sūtra III.4.33) to suggest that the seeker performs the duties of his respective order as ज्ञानसहकारिन्, not as प्रत्यवाय निवारक.

Brahman in the achievement of the common aim, viz., liberation.[44]

In any case a seeker must perform these two types of duties because of the two Śruti-texts, viz., Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 and Chā. Upa.II.23.1.[45]

Before summarising the Sūtrakāra's discussion of the two minor points indicated above, we shall take up the discussion of other actions co-operating with knowledge, which in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, a seeker should perform. These are mentioned in Bra.Sū.III.4.47–50.

In Sūtra 47, the Sūtrakāra makes a general rule that the Injunction about *other helping actions* than those already mentioned[46] is to be understood as *optional* or *voluntary* and that it forms the *third* set of actions (Cf. ते एव in Sūtra III.4.34).[47] As to which these *other* helping actions are, we learn that अध्ययन is one of them. The Sūtrakāra says, "Just as the Śruti asks one who has studied the Veda (अध्ययनवत्) to perform the sacrifice (अग्निहोत्र, etc., Sūtra III.4.6,12), but that does not mean that one who has not studied it should not perform it; similarly, an aspirant after Mokṣa may or may not carry out the *study* or *repetition* of the Veda.[48] This study of the Veda is mentioned as a helping action in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 (वेदानुवचन). In this *third* group of helping actions the Sūtrakāra includes also some other

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(44) Cf. also अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.16).

(45) सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् । Bra.Sū.III.4.34. 'त एव' means 'ते एव द्वे कर्मणी,' not ते एवाग्निहोत्रादयो धर्माः ।

(46) सहकार्यन्तरविधिः in Bra.Sū.III.4.47 means helping actions other than those mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22, (the sacrifice, etc.), and in Chā.Upa. II.23.1, (the duties of one's order of life) and discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.III.4.26 and 32 respectively.

(47) Vide पक्षेण and तृतीयम् in Bra.Sū.III.4.47.

(48) This is the sense of तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् in Bra.Sū.III.4.47.

duties, e.g., silence.[49] Among other duties of this class would be faith,[50] celibacy,[51] truthfulness[52] and others.

The above option about the performance and practice of this third group of helping actions, is not allowed to a householder for whom they are obligatory according to the Sūtrakāra in addition[53] to the other two types of actions which are compulsory for seekers of Mokṣa of *all* stages of life. His reasons for imposing these additional duties upon a seeker of the householder's order of life are two viz., (1) the householder's *entireness* i.e. the fact that the householder has several fecilities such as materials and money which the other orders do not possess[54] and (2) that other actions like मौन, ब्रह्मचर्य, etc. are such as can be and should be practised by a seeker belonging only to the order of the householder. We may here add that before Śaṅkara there was a Vedanta School holding that "the householder would alone get Mokṣa by a combination of the knowledge of Brahman with duties prescribed in the Śruti and Smṛti, while the followers of the other three orders could attain the same by the knowledge of Brahman combined with the Smārta duties only.[55]

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(49) 'Silence' (मौनम्) means that the aspirant *should not exhibit* his Knowledge before others, as would be evident from the general sense of the entire S'ruti, viz., तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्। बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्य अथ मुनिः। अमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः। Bṛ.Upa.III.5.1. This S'ruti is discussed in Bra.Sū.III.4.49-50.

(50) श्रद्धा mentioned in (1) तद्य इत्थं विदुः। ये चेमेऽरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते। (Chā.Upa. V.10.1), (2) ये चामी अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासते। (Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15) and (3) तान् ह स ऋषिरुवाच भूय एव तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण श्रद्धया संवत्स्यथ...... । (Pra.Upa.I.2).

(51) ब्रह्मचर्य in (1) सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा सम्यग् ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम्। (Mu.Upa. III.1.5), and (2) Vide (3) in Note (50) above.

(52) सत्य in (1) तस्यै (उपनिषदे) तपो दमः कर्मेति प्रतिष्ठा वेदाः सर्वाङ्गानि सत्यमायतनम्। (Kena Upa. 33) and (2) सत्येनैनं तपसा योऽनुपश्यति। (S've.Upa.I.15), Vide also (51) above.

(53) Vide Notes on उपसंहार in कृत्स्नभावात् तु गृहिणोपसंहारः (Bra.Sū.III.4.48).

(54) Vide कृत्स्नभावात् in the above Sūtra.

(55) Cf. केचित्तु श्रौतैः स्मार्तैश्च गृहस्थस्यैव समुच्चयो मोक्षायोर्ध्वरेतसां तु स्मार्तकर्ममात्रसमुच्चिताज्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति। (S'ā.bhāṣya on Bha.Gī.III.1).

In addition to all the three sets of actions, a householder aspiring for Mokṣa, may do worldly duties also (ऐहिकमुअपि) not as "actions co-operating with the knowledge in the achievement of Mokṣa," but, rather, they are allowed to be done only in his case in order that the works which that aspirant has begun may not be obstructed.[56] In the Upaniṣads we find that the seekers of Mokṣa belonging to the householder's stage of life continue their worldly duties in order that the affairs already begun may continue unobstructed.[57]

One of the minor topics discussed in this Pāda of the Brahmasūtras is, as we have already stated, with respect to the rule of control over mind and senses, etc., which a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman is asked to acquire in order to qualify himself for that knowledge.[58] The rule of शम, दम, etc., is not in conflict with the Śruti which allows a seeker of Mokṣa to eat *all* food, just as it is not in conflict with the Injunction asking the seeker to perform sacrifice, to give donation and to practise penance as explained in Sūtra III.4.27. The apparent conflict in the latter case is, as we have seen, solved by understanding the Injunction about शम, दम, etc., as *subsidiary* to the Śruti about sacrifice. donation and penance. The former conflict rises from the statement in several Śrutis saying that " For one who knows the Supreme Brahman, there is nothing which is not his food[59] " These Śrutis seem to allow a seeker of Mokṣa to eat *all* kinds of food, and, would, therefore, appear to exempt the seeker from the rules about food, etc., for the ordinary man, and, may be looked upon as inconsistent with the rule of शमदमादि laid down for the seeker by Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23. The Sūtrakāra

(56) ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.51).

(57) This teaching is somewhat similar to that of the Gītā as regards "disinterested actions" and the Sūtra (III.4.51) may refer to the example of Janaka in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

(58) This minor topic is discussed in Sūtras III.4.28-31, which, in our opinion, is a part of the single Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras 27-39.

(59) Some of these are quoted by S'aṅkara, e.g., न ह वा एवंविदि किञ्चनानन्नं भवति । (Chā.Upa.V.2.1).

says that scriptural permission does not give any more freedom to the seeker than that given to an ordinary man, because this freedom is to be availed of *only at the time of danger to life in absence of food*. This is shown by the example of Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa, by the fact that such freedom under such circumstances is not inconsistent with the rule of शमदमादि (अबाध–Sūtra III. 4.28), and by the authority of Smṛtis like that of Manu.[60] For this very reason the Śrutis in question should be interpreted to refer to a case where the seeker has to partake of any kind of food *reluctantly*.[61] Thus, the seeker may be possessed of शमदमादि, yet he cannot violate the rules of conduct as regards food, etc., just as he cannot give up the sacrifice, donation, and penance (Sūtra 27).

The second minor point stressed by the Sūtrakāra deals with the option of suppression or supercession (*abhibhava*) of the two kinds of duties, (1) the sacrifice, donation and penance, and (2) the duties of the seeker's order of life, allowed by the Scripture to a seeker of liberation. The Sūtrakāra clearly says that only those two kinds of duties are the duties which a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman *must in any case perform*, because there are direct statements of Śruti about those two (उभयलिङ्ग), [63] and because the Śruti gives examples of seekers of Brahman in whose case those two kinds of duties are not overpowered or suppressed even after the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

But it cannot be argued that the above is the only way sanctioned by the Scripture,[64] because *also without* those two

(60) Cf. तद्दर्शनात् (Bra.Sū.III.4.28), अबाधात् (Bra.Sū.III.4.29) and अपि च स्मर्यते (Bra.Sū.III.4.30).

(61) शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे। (Bra.Sū III.4.31). This Sūtra seems to refer to काम in न वा अजीविष्यमिमानखादन् कामो म उदपानम्। (Chā. Upa.I.10.4).

(62) In Sūtras III.4.34-39 which should be taken as forming one Adhikaraṇa.

(63)सर्वथाऽपि त एवोभयलिङ्गात्। (Bra.Sū.III.4.34). The S'rutis are Bṛ. Upa. IV.-4.22 and Chā.Upa.II.23.1. Vide above foot-notes (33) and (41).

(64) This is the import of तु in अन्तरा चापितु तद् दृष्टेः। (Bra.Sū.III.4.36)

kinds of actions[65] one can seek and get the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, a seeker may give up the duties of the sacrifice, penance, etc., and also those of his order of life, with the purpose of solely devoting himself to his aim. This can be proved by the help of the Śruti and Smṛti. Penance and actions (of sacrifice as well as of one's order of life) are declared to be not the means useful for the search after Atman in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad[66] which is contrary to Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 and Chā.Upa.-II.23.1. Moreover, the latter part of the same Śruti which lays down the sacrifice, donation and penance as means of knowing Brahman, declares that ascetics wishing 'to get the Atman as their world' renounce the world. It cites the example of 'ancient wise persons who did not wish to have progeny, saying, 'What should we do with progeny–we, who consider this Atman as ur world here' and it says that they having withdrawn their mind from desire for sons, desire for wealth, and desire for worlds, live the life of begging alms.' [67] According to this Śruti one can get the knowledge of Brahman without performing the duties of the order of a householder; so that from the stage of celibacy a seeker can directly pass over to the stage of asceticism. Also the Smṛti like the Bhagavadgītā says, "O most heroic of the descendants of Kuru, it is not possible for anybody else but you to see Me in this form in this human world either by the Vedas, sacrifices and their study or by donation, by actions (of one's order or by severe

(65) Vide अपि and अन्तरा in the above Sūtra.

(66) न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा । (Mu.Upa.III.1.8) नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन । यमेवैष वृणुतेतने लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ॥ ३ ॥ नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यो न च प्रमादात्तपसो वाप्यलिङ्गात्। एतैरुपायैर्यतते यस्तु विद्वांस्तस्यैष आत्मा विशते ब्रह्मधाम ॥ ४ ॥ (Mu.Upa.III.2.3–4). Contrast this with तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22).

(67) एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति, एतद्ध स्म वैतत्पूर्वे विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्माऽयं लोक इति ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति...(Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22).

austerities.[68] God shows His special Grace to those who resort to this path of Renunciation of *all* actions and seek to know Him. " But I can be known, seen and realized in the right sense in this (macrocosmic) form *by undivided devotion.*"[69] " Abandoning all duties submtt yourself to me alone. I shall free you from all sins; do not lament."[70] "This Ātman can be attained by him alone whom He selects. To him this Atman reveals His own form."[71] According to these Śrutis and Smṛtis a seeker may give up all duties in order to worship the Lord *with one-minded devotion* and the Lord in return shows His special Grace to him. The Sūtrakāra mentions this alternative also.[72]

The Sūtrakāra says that out of the two Paths of *performing* one's duties as help to the knowledge of Brahman and of *renouncing* all duties, it is the former which is better (ज्यायस्), because the S'ruti gives examples of persons in whose life the performance of duties was not superceded by the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman (Bra.Sū.III.4.35) and because we have an express statement about the *superiority* of the former path, e.g., " One who finds his delight in Atman and who is pleased in Atman and *does all his duties* is the best of all the knowers of Brahman."[73] and also " Doing one's duties is better than not doing them."[74]

(68) न वेदयज्ञाध्ययनैर्न दानैर्न च क्रियाभिर्न तपोभिरुग्रैः।
एवंरुपः शक्य अहं नृलोके द्रष्टुं त्वदन्येन कुरुप्रवीर ॥ ४८ ॥

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नाहं वेदैर्न तपसा न दानेन न चेज्यया ।
शक्य एवंविधो द्रष्टुं दृष्टवानसि मां यथा ॥ ६३ ॥ (Bha.Gī.XI.48,53)

(69) भक्त्या त्वनन्यया शक्य अहमेवंविधोऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन प्रवेष्टुं च परंतप ॥ (Bha.Gī.XI.54).

(70) सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज ।
अहं त्वा सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः ॥ (Bha.Gī.XVIII.66).

(71) Vide (66) above.

(72) विशेषानुग्रहश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.38).

(73) Cf. वरिष्ठः in आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः । (Mu.Upa.III.1.4).

(74) Cf. ज्यायः in अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.39) with the same word in कर्म ज्यायो ह्यकर्मणः । (Bha.Gī.III.8).

We may here briefly state the Sūtrakāra's view regarding the three Paths of Knowledge, Action and Devotion. He seems to look upon the knowledge as the only principal means of liberation, the aim of human life (Bra.Sū.III.4.1) He, therefore, does not consider Action or Devotion in the capacity of the principal means of Mokṣa, with Knowledge as its help. Rather, in his opinion, Action or Devotion can serve only as a help to Knowledge which alone can lead to Mokṣa. He does not use the word *bhakti* which is the usual expression for Devotion, but he mentions the option of the renunciation of all actions (as a help to Knowledge) and says that in this option regarding "help" to Knowledge the Lord shows His special Grace to the seeker. From this we infer that this option consists of Knowledge *plus* Devotion as help to Knowledge. Out of the two Paths of (a) Knowledge *plus* Action as a help to Knowledge and (b) Knowledge without Action (or, in other words Knowledge with Devotion as a help), the Sūtrakāra prefers the former (Sūtra III.4.39).

We may also note that Jaimini differed from Bādarāyaṇa on the above point (Bra.Sū.III.4.2). He regarded Action as the principal means to Mokṣa and Knowledge as subsidiary to Action just as penance (तपस्), donation, etc., which are subsidiary means according to Bādarāyaṇa also.[75]

Though, as shown above, the Sūtrakāra probably regarded *bhakti* as a means of secondary importance only, it is not unlikely that the *upāsanā* of Brahman through which the knowledge of Brahman was achieved partook of the nature of devotion. But about this we cannot offer any positive proof. Our only proof for the doctrine of *bhakti* in the Brahmasūtra is the occurrence of the "Grace" (*anugraha*) twice in the work.[76]

In the option, that we have mentioned above, of the supercession of the two sets of duties we have the sanction of the Scripture to allow a seeker of liberation to jump to the stage of

(75) Vide Note (17) above.
(76) विशेषानुग्रहश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.38) and the word हार्दानुगृहीत in Bra.Sū.IV.2.17.

asceticism from that of celibacy (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22). It is in connection with this sanction that the two minor topics are discussed in the Brahmasūtra, viz., (1) whether a seeker of liberation who has renounced the duties can resume them or not (Bra.Sū.III.4.40–42) and (2) what actions a seeker of liberation who is outside (बहि:) the order of asceticism is allowed to do (Bra. Sū.III.4.43–46). We shall now describe the first of these.

Having described in the preceding Adhikaraṇa (Sūtras III.4. 34–39) the renunciation of actions, i.e., asceticism, the Sūtrakāra says that a seeker of liberation, who becomes an ascetic for the purpose, cannot become a non-ascetic (i.e. a householder or a bachelor). Thus, one can jump over an order or orders of life but no regress is allowed to an aspirant. On this Jaimini agreed with Bādarāyaṇa. Their arguments for their view were that the *rule* was only for going to a subsequent order of life, that one who has become an ascetic, is henceforth *unlike* what he was in the past and that an ascetic *has not got* things which would allow him to revert to an earlier order.[77] A seeker of liberation who has become an ascetic cannot also do the duties of his profession or office, [78] because he can have no association with those duties on account of the Smṛti text referring to the moral fall of an ascetic if he does such duties.[79] But, the followers of one Branch of the Sāma-veda hold a different view. They believe that the *direct* professional or official duties and *also* indirect official duties exist in the case of (or may be performed by) a seeker even though he may have become an ascetic.[80] This rule should be understood to be *like the rule of*

(77) तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमातद्रूपाभावेभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.III.4 40).

(78) E. g., A Brahmin seeker who has become an ascetic cannot do the priestly duties or duties of a regular teacher, etc.

(79) न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात् । Bra.Sū.III.4.41. Also Manu VI.58. अभिपूजित लाभांस्तु जुगुप्सेत सर्वशः । अभिपूजितलाभैश्च यतिर्मुक्तोऽपि बध्यते ॥

(80) उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.42). उप in this Sūtra refers to उप in उपोपविवेश in the story of Uṣasti (Chā.Upa.I.10-11; तत्रोद्गातॄन् आस्तावे स्तोष्यमाणानुपोपविवेश......; Chā.Upa.I.10.8). उपपूर्वम् in the Sūtra means उपपूर्वम् आधिकारिकं कर्म, and अपि means 'the inclusion' of the direct आधिकारिक कर्म. Vide our Notes on the Sūtra.

eating; i. e., this kind. of performance of direct and indirect official duties can be allowed to an ascetic–seeker of liberation only when he is *in danger of losing his life* if he does not earn his livelihood by such means, just as the eating of any kind of food is allowed under the same circumstances, as was already explained above on the strength of the illustration of Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa (Bra.Sū.III.4.28; Chā Upa.I.10). Though Uṣasti was not an ascetic, his example shows what even an ascetic should do or is allowed to do when his life is in the danger of being lost. The purpose of the story of Uṣasti, as understood by the Sūtrakāra, is to describe 'the duties in adversity' (आपद्धर्म) for all seekers of liberation. In short, a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman cannot revert to the stage of a householder after having once become an ascetic, but he may do the duties of his profession or office (which are his caste duties), only if it is inevitable for him to do them for the sake of continuing his life.

But a seeker who is *outside* the Order of Renunciation[81] may do both the direct and also indirect official or caste duties. The mere fact of being a seeker of liberation does not forbid him from doing his caste duties by which he is to earn his livelihood if he be a householder. The Smṛti, e.g., the Bhagavadgītā, asks a householder seeking liberation to perform his own caste duties; or, rather, we may say that the Bhagavadgītā requires a seeker of liberation to remain *outside* the order of asceticism and to do his own caste duties. The seeker of liberation need not be an ascetic; he may be a householder. In the Upaniṣads also we find examples of Janaka and others who were seekers of liberation and yet continued the performance of their official or caste duties. The practice of these duties so far as an aspirant is concerned is for the maintenance of the householder–seeker;

(81) This is the sense of बहि: in बहिस्तूभयथा स्मृतेराचाराच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.43). We believe, बहि: is here used in contrast to तद्भूतस्य in Sū.III.4.40 and उभयथा in the same Sūtra seems to stand for आधिकारिक कर्म and उपपूर्व आधिकारिक कर्म (Vide our Notes on the Sūtra).

it is not by way of help to the knowledge of Brahman in the achievement of Mokṣa. The religious reward of the official (or priestly and other) duties goes to his master and, therefore, *a seeker* may do his official duties if he is not an ascetic.[82] This was the view of Ātreya. A Brāhmaṇa householder seeking liberation should do only priestly duties at a sacrifice (and not the duty of teaching, which is also his caste duty) because his services *can be bought* only so far as priestly duties are concerned.[83] A Brāhmaṇa seeker is not to do teaching duties though he be a householder, because those duties cannot be bought from him, since the Scripture asks him to do them without selling them. This view was propounded by Auḍulomi who supported his opinion by the contractual nature of priestly duties and by quoting Śruti texts according to which householders seeking liberation did only priestly duties on behalf of others. Thus, Bādarāyaṇa believes that a seeker of any caste can do his caste duties as long as he is a householder; Ātreya believes that he can do those duties only on behalf of a master who employs him and not on his own initiative; while Auḍulomi allows a Brāhmaṇa householder seeking liberation to do direct and indirect priestly duties only because that is the one case in which there is the possibility of the householder–seeker *being employed* by a master. In short, Bādarāyaṇa and other teachers of Vedanta allow a seeker of liberation to belong to the householder's order of life but only make certain restrictions to the effect that he must do no duties which may give *him* a religious reward in his next life and thus hinder the realization of his goal. We may compare this view with that in the Bhagavadgītā, which asks a householder-seeker to do all his duties without any desire for the fruits of those duties, without any attachment to their rewards.[84]

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(82) स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.44).

(83) आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रीयते । (Bra.Sū.III.4.45).

(84) Cf. e. g, कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥ (Bha.Gí.II.47).

The fruit of liberation which is to be achieved through the knowledge of Brahman helped by the practice of certain actions as described in the third Adhyāya may not *definitely* (i.e. at a definite time) follow the prformance of these actions, unlike the fruit of heaven which is declared in the Śruti to follow the performance of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. One reason for this is the fact that these actions are only *help* to the knowledge of Brahman, which is the principal means of Mokṣa.[85] This conclusion is also to be drawn from the fact that the Śruti makes definite mention of persons who remain for many lives in the stage or state of aspirants (मुमुक्षुs) trying to attain the knowledge of Bråhman and at the same time doing the duties of their respective orders of life, which are helps to that knowledge. "Seekers of libertion who have well decided the aim by the knowledge of the Vedantas, who are ascetics because they have adopted the path of renunciation and whose mind is purified, become released and completely immortal in the world of Brahman (neu.) *at the time of the end of the Para*" (Mu.Upa.III.2.6). For a very long time these remain in the stage of seekers because they do not get emancipation till then. This would mean that a seeker may be born and reborn on this earth many a time before he attains the realization of Brahman, which entitles him to Mokṣa after exhausting his *prārabdha karmans* in his *last* birth on this earth. This also shows that the real knowledge is not achieved immediately on the fall of the body in which he begins to devote himself to an effort to achieve the same. It is this circumstance which makes the teacher of the doctrine of Atman possible in this world because he teaches. the doctrine after having well understood that 'Brahman is his own Self' (Bra.Sū.IV.1.3). The state of those seekers who are in the stage of carrying out all the means of knowing Brahman and have not yet got the knowledge, is described in Bra.Sū.IV.1.1–12.

(85) This seems to us to be the sense of एवम् in एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.51).

CHAPTER 3.

BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN.

The Third Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra is called 'the Chapter of the Means' (साधनाध्याय) and it is thereby distinguished from the fourth Adhyāya which bears the name of 'the Chapter of the Fruit' (फलाध्याय). The knowledge of Brahman is the means of achieving the aim of human life and it is described in Bra.Sū. III.3.[1] The actions which are subsidiary to that knowledge in the achievement of liberation have been mentioned in Bra.Sū. III.4. After thus finishing the Means of Mokṣa, the Sūtrakāra tells us that there is no certainty as to the time of achieving the fruit in the form of liberation,[2] because we find persons who are in 'the state of the means (तदवस्थावधृतेः)', i. e., in the stage of the practice of the Means. This is the closing statement of the Chapter of the Means. The *goal to be reached by* the Means, the knowledge of Brahman, is mentioned in Bra.Sū.IV.1.13.[3] It would not, therefore, be improper to infer that Bra.Sū.IV.1.1-12 describes the state (अवस्था) mentioned by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū.III.4.52.[4]

This state is the state of the *Practice* of the Means. The means have been *known* from the Chapter of the Means. The theoretical knowledge of the means belongs to the state of study and is followed by the state of the Practice of those means

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(1) Vide our Interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3 in Part I. अतः in पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दादिति बादरायणः (Bra.Sū.III.4.1) refers to this ज्ञान. See Part I.

(2) एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृते स्तदवस्थावधृतेः। Bra.Sū.III.4.52. Vide our Interpretation in Part I.

(3) Note तदधिगमे in तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोर श्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् ॥ Bra.Sū.IV.1.13.

(4) Vide (2) supra.

(Bra.Sū.IV.I.1-12) which alone can lead to the attainment of the knowledge (Bra.Sū.IV.1.12). How long this period of Practice will last in the case of each seeker is not certin (Bra.Sū.III.4.55). This is the difference between the Sacrifice and the Knowledge. One who seeks the Heaven performs the Sacrifice in a certain limited period and is sure of the achievement of the Heaven at the end of that birth. But the case of one who seeks Brahman is different. He is not sure how long he should "perform" (Cf. अनुष्ठेयम् in Bra.Sū.III.4.19) the means of achieving Brahman and whether he would attain Brahman at the end of this birth or after many births.[5] The seeker of Brahman generally *returns to this world not once*[5a] before he attains his aim. The Sruti teaches this and the Smṛti too does the same. "Perfected by many births he in course of time attains the Supreme Goal".[6]

In these births, the seeker has not to learn any new means for his goal, but he *practises* what he has already theoretically learnt and also *preaches* the same. This is a period of Practice and Preaching. He had learnt to meditate on Brahman as his Self.[7] Now, he *approaches* Brahman as his Self and *helps others in the realization* of the same.[8] He was told[9] that the Syllable 'Om' was the bow and his own Self was the arrow; now, he is born with the notion that the Symbol 'Om' is Brahman (not his Self; though Brahman is his Self) because that Symbol possesses a unique position.[10] Again while choosing to meditate on Brahman as consisting of parts, he was taught to have the notions of the

(5) Vide मुक्तिफलानियम in Bra.Sū.III.4.52. Vide (2) supra.

(5a) See असकृत in आवृत्ति रसकृदुपदेशात्। Bra.Sū.IV.1.1.

(6) अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम्। Bha.Gí.VI.45.

(7) आत्मगृहीति रितरवदुत्तरात्। Bra.Sū.III.3.16 प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम्। Bra.Sū.III.3.43. Vide Interpretation in Part I. See P. 17 of Chapter I.

(8) आत्मेतितूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयान्ति च। Bra.Sū.IV.1.3.

(9) वेधाद्यर्थभेदात्॥ हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् ब्र० सू० III.3.25-26. Vide P. 55 of Chapter I.

(10) न प्रतिके नहि सः। and ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात्॥ Bra.Sū.IV.1.4-5. See Part I.

respective *āśrayas* (viz., the eyes, the head, etc.,) in the Sun, the Fire, the Earth, i.e., the parts of Brahman,[11] or rather he *was asked to look upon* all the parts as only parts of Brahman.[12] Now, in the state of an advanced student as it were, he *believes* the Sun, the Fire, etc., to be the eyes and other limbs of the body of Brahman.[13] In short, he looks upon the world as Brahman and upon Brahman as his own Self and gives the same precept to the world.

His only action is that of *sitting* because no other action is *possible* of him.[14] Formerly, when a beginner he used to keep sitting in order to learn meditation; now, he is always in meditation which has become his habit, and therefore he *keeps sitting*. He is found *sitting* because he aims at preserving the steadiness of his senses and seeks to remain unagitated by the constituents of Nature. "He remains sitting like one who is without any interest of his own, he is not agitated by the constituents of the Prakṛti, he definitely knows that only the constituents act and react upon one another, and thereby he remains *inactive*".[15] The Smṛti, rather than Śruti, gives the picture of this seeker of the knowledge of Brahman in an advanced stage which is called 'the Brāhmī Sthitiḥ' and 'having attained which there is no possibility of the seeker being bewildered any more.[16] As all places are equal to him (अविशेष), he resides wherever he can concentrate his mind (यत्रैकाग्रता).[17]

The above Practice and Preaching and the state of sitting and actionlessness the seeker continues till he departs from this world (आप्रायणात्), because we have in the Upaniṣad the example

(11) अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः । Bra.Sū.III.3.61.
(12) न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः। Bra.Sū.III.65. See P. 48 of Chapter I. Vide Part I.
(13) आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः । Bra.Sū.IV.1.6.
(14) आसीनः संभवात् । Bra.Sū.IV.1.7 ध्यानाच्च । IV.1.8. अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य । IV.1.9.
(15) उदासीवदासीनो गुणैर्यो न विचाल्यते ।
गुणा वर्तन्त इत्येव योऽवतिष्ठति नेंगते ॥ Bha.Gī.XIV.23. Also Bra.Sū.II.61-72.
(16) एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति । (Bha.Gī.II.72A)
(17) यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात्। (Bra.Sū.IV.1.11).

of a meditator on the Syllable OM asked in the Śruti to continue his meditation even 'till the end of his Departure'.[18] "Remaining in this Brāhma state even at the time of the end (of this body) he attains absolution in Brahman".[19]

Thus, we believe that the "तदवस्था" 'the state of the advanced seeker' referred to in the last Sūtra[20] of the third Adhyāya is decribed in Sūtra IV.I.1–12. The theoretical knowledge is followed by the practice and preaching of the same and by actionlessness due to intense absorption into meditation and a desire to keep himself unpurturbed by the senses till the end of his departure from the body. The Sūtrakāra admits that this stage precedes the attainment of the knowledge,[21] but as no new means of the knowledge of Brahman is to be learnt in this state, he gives it a place in the Chapter of the Goal. And he is right because the state nearing the Goal (साध्य or फल) is more like that of the goal (साध्य or फल) than that of the means (साधन).

The stage of the Practice of the means is followed by the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman and by what we would call *the stage of sinlessness.* According to the Sūtrakāra, on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman the seeker becomes "*free from the contact*" (अश्लेष) with 'succeeding' (उत्तर) sins, while the sins which "precede" (पूर्व) the knowledge and have not yet begun to give their result (अनारब्धकार्य पूर्व पाप) are *destroyed* (विनाश) by that knowledge.[21a] But none of the religious good deeds are so destroyed by *jñāna*.[22] The knower of Brahman becomes *free from the contact* (असंश्लेष) with the good deeds (इतर)

(18) आप्रायणात् तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् । Bra.Sū.IV.1.12).
प्रायणान्तमोङ्कारमभिध्यायीत । (Pra.Upa.V.1).

(19) स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छति ॥ (Bha.Gī.II.72.B).

(20) Vide supra तदवस्थावधृति may refer to वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्वाः । मु. उप. III.2.6.

(21) तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् । Bra.Sū.IV.1.13.

(21a) Vide supra अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः । Bra.Sū. IV.1.15.

(22) See इतर in इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषःपाते तु (Bra.Sū.IV.1.14).

only on the fall of the body (पाते). This shows that according to the Sūtrakāra, in the case of the knower of Brahman the sins become impossible on his getting the knowledge but the *good deeds become impossible only on his departure from the body.* Even *after* the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, he continues doing good deeds (religious merits) and these *help* him in the attainment of the goal of the knowledge of Brahman. By saying that freedom from sins takes place on ज्ञानाधिगम but the freedom from good deeds takes place on देहपात, the Sūtrakāra emphasises the continuation of good deeds by, and their necessity even to, the knower of Brahman who is yet to be liberated. The knowledge of Brahman is not consistent with sins, but is surely not inconsistent with good deeds, according to the Sūtrakāra. Only the actual realization of emancipation which follows the departure (from the body) of the knower of Brahman makes religious good deeds impossible. Union with Brahman is the only stage when a soul is no longer in the need of religious good deeds, or, we may say, is 'above religion.'

The Sūtrakāra does not mention the *destruction* of the 'preceding' good deeds.[23] In Bra.Sū.III.4.32–33,[24] he says that the duties of the orders, like the *agnihotra*, etc., become helpful (सहकारिन्) to the knowledge of Brahman in the achievement of Mokṣa, because they are laid down for this purpose in Chā.Upa. II.23.1.[25] Similarly, in the case of religious deeds like यज्ञ, दान, तपस्, which are *different from the duties of the orders*, he has said that they should be unfailingly done since there is an Injunction prescribing them for the purpose of the knowledge of Brahman in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22.[26] In consistency with this, the

(23) Note "विनाश" in Bra.Sū.IV.1.13 and only असंश्लेष in Bra.Sū.IV.1.14. Vide Part I.

(24) विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । Bra.Sū.III.4.32. सहकारित्वेन च । Bra.Sū.III.4.33.

(25) Vide (41) in Chapter 2.

(26) शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात् तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् । Bra.Sū.III.4.27. For Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22, vide (38) of Chapter 2.

Sūtrakāra says that the religious good deeds like *agnihotra* which are the duties of the *āśramas* and other religious good deeds like *yajña*, *dāna*, *tapas* mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22, are not destroyed but become useful to the knower of Brahman in achieving the goal of the knowledge of Brahman.[27] He means that (i) the religious good deeds done *with the intention* of making them *a help* to the knowledge before and after the attainment of knowledge and (ii) also the good deeds done without such an intention before the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, which have not begun to give their result, become useful in achieving Mokṣa, the goal of the knowledge of Brahman. 'Whatever religious deed is done with the knowledge peculiar to the sacrifice,[28] with faith, with the secret meaning of the sacrifice, produces a better, more powerful effect.[29] This Śruti applies to both (i) the duties of *āśramas* and (ii) also the religious deeds other than those duties.[30] It also applies, according to the Sūtrakāra, to (iii) deeds done *before* the attainment of the knowledge, with or without the intention of making them a help to that knowledge and which are अनारब्ध कार्य.

Union with Brahman does not take place before the destruction or rather exhaustion (क्षपण) of those good and bad deeds which have begun to give their fruit (आरब्धकार्य) and this destruction is possible only after the knower of Brahman undergoes the experience of their fruit.[31] This means that according to the Sūtrakāra there is nothing like emancipation–in–this–life. This conclusion follows also from several other views of the Sūtrakāra. He says that on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman

(27) अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् । Bra.Sū.IV.1.16.

(28) यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपानिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरम् । Chā.Upa.

(29) यदेव विद्ययेति हि । Bra.Sū.IV.1.18. This सूत्र refers to the श्रुति mentioned in (28) above.

(30) उभयोः यदेव विद्ययेतिहि । Bra.Sū.IV.1.18. We have transferred उभयोः from सूत्र 17 to सूत्र 18. Vide Notes in Part I.

(31) भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते । Bra. Sū.IV.1.19.

the seeker becomes free from all sins, but not from religious good deeds, the freedom from which is obtained only on *the fall of the body.*[32] According to the Sūtrakāra the duties of the orders and the other religious duties become help to the knowledge of Brahman in achieving Mokṣa and should be done even after that knowledge is attained. Moreover, the "union" with Brahman which is referred to in Bra.Sū.IV.4.1[33] takes place after leaving the body (*utkrānti*) and finishing the journey over the Path of gods and is described therefore in Bra.Sū.IV.4.1.[34] *Mukti* in this life, if we may say so, *consists*, according to the Sūtrakāra, *in sinlessness* (which does not imply freedom from religious good deeds), which follows the achievement of the knowledge of Brahman. Śaṅkara tries to get his tenet of absolution–in–this–life (जीवन्मुक्ति) from the Sūtras by making unwarranted additions to Sūtra IV.1.14 and wrong interpretation of *pāte* in that Sūtra.[35]

We may very briefly note here some other points also where Śaṅkarācārya and the Sūtrakāra hold different views. According to the latter, religious deeds both in the shape of the duties of आश्रमs and others become a help to the knowledge,[36] but that help is of the nature of co–operation (सहकार) with knowledge so that the religious acts *also work for Mokṣa* which is the result of the knowledge. [37] But Śaṅkara holds that the religious acts do not *directly* become a means to Mokṣa. [38] Both of them agree as against Jaimini in holding that religious actions cannot,

(32) Vide पाते तु in इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु । Bra.Sū.IV.1.14.

(33) Vide संपद्य in Bra.Sū.IV.4.1.

(34) Vide "संपद्य" in संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् । Bra.Sū.IV.4.1.

(35) Vide our interpretation of Bra.Sū.IV.1.14 in Part I. Note (12) on PP. 336-337.

(36) विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि and सहकारित्वेन च । Bra.Sū.III.4.32-33. Also vide Bra.Sū.III.4.26-27, Chap. 2 and also their interpretation in Part I.

(37) Note सहकारित्वेन in Bra.Sū.III.4.33 and also सहाकार्यन्तरविधि in Bra.Sū. III.4.7. PP. 91-92 of Chapter 2. Vide PP. 336-37 of Part I.

(38) Vide Note (28) on P. 274 of Part I.

independently of the knowledge of Brahman, achieve Mokṣa and that knowledge never works subordinately to relgious acts for the said purpose.[39] The nature of the co-operation of actions mentioned in Bra.Sū. III.4.33 seems to us to be explained by '*tatkāryāya eva*' 'for the same effect as that of the konwledge' in Bra.Sū.IV.1.16.

Another important relevant question already raised by Śaṅkara in this connection is whether according to the Sūtrakāra the individual soul is really an agent or not. The problem is directly dealt with in Bra.Sū.II.3.33-40 and as we understand the Sūtrakāra, he holds the soul to be an agent and the Lord to be the giver of the result of his actian.[40] Therefore, whatever information about the nature of the soul's actions we may gather from Bra.Sū.IV.1.13–19 is only *indirect* as compared with the same gathered from Bra.Sū.II.3.33–40. We think that the Sūtrakāra deals with the question of the disposal of the actions of a knower of Brahman on the basis that the soul is *a real agent* as stated by him in Bra.Sū.II.3.33–40. According to the theory of Ignorance, all actions good and bad should be destroyed on the rise of the *knowledge* of Brahman; but the Sūtrakāra unlike Śaṅkara holds that only the sins are destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, while the good deeds *continue their contact with the soul after the attainment of the knowledge* till the fall of the body.[41] Moreover, all bad deeds are not destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman because the आरब्धकार्य actions cannot be *destroyed* by that knowledge, but can be *exhausted* only by the soul experiencing their fruit. The freedom from conctact with the *succeeding* sins seems to mean that the knower of Brahman does not hence do any sins (Bra.Sū.-IV.1.13) ; and the freedom from contact with *the succeeding and the preceding* good deeds (which are not destroyed) does

(39) Vide our inferprefation of शेषत्वात् in Bra.Sū.III.4.2; PP. 243-244.

(40) Vide Appendix on Bra.Sū.II.3.

(41) See (22) above.

not mean that the knower gives up doing good deeds but it means that his good deeds, past and future, instead of giving him the usual fruits of those good deeds in the form of atonement of the sin of omission, the attainment of the heaven, etc., *help him for the very aim of the knowledge of Brahman*, i. e., for Mokṣa.[42] The fact that the Sūtrakāra asks the seeker to do the duties of the orders and also other duties prescribed for the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman in Chā.Upa.II.23.1 and Bṛ.Upa.IV.-4.22,[43] and gives an option regarding other actions only to the ascetic but makes them compulsory for the householder seeker,[44] also, proves that he regards the *activity* of the soul as completely *real.*

In the light of the above information from the Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara's explanation of अश्लेष 'freedom from contact' as either अनभिसम्बन्ध 'absence of association' or non-recognition of one's being an agent[45] and that of 'विनाश' 'destruction' as 'the burning of the action through the knowledge of the naturally actionless Self'[46] and also his addition of "विनाश" in the same sense to Bra.Sū.IV.1.14[47] as also his interpretation of "*pate tu*" in the latter Sūtra[48] are hardly in accordance with the Sūtrakāra's view. In the case of sins "अश्लेष" means that, he does not do them though he is an agent (and, in the light of the Śruti,[49] if he does them they do not bind him), and in the case of good deeds "अश्लेष" means that the natural result of these becomes impossible for him, but instead, they become useful to him for achieving Mokṣa.[50] The Sūtrakāra does not seem to us to have intended

(42) अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् । Bra.Sū.IV.4.16.
(43) Vide Notes (41) and (38) in Chapter 2.
(44) कृत्स्नभावा-तु गृहिणोपसंहारः । Bra.Sū.III.4.48.
(45) Vide शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra.Sū.IV.1.13.
(46) Vide (45) above.
(47) Vide Note (I2) on PP.336–337 in Part I.
(48) Vide Note (12) on P.337 of Part I.
(49) यथा पुष्करपलाशे आपो न श्लिष्यन्त एवमेवंविदि पापं कर्म नश्लिष्यते । (Cha. Upa.IV.14.3).
(50) Vide (42) above.

a double meaning of Sūtra IV.1.13,[51] one applicable to the lower knowledge (अपरा or सगुणा विद्या) and the other to the higher knowledge (परा or निर्गुणा विद्या). The विनाश of sins takes place by the knowledge of Brahman, but not by प्रायश्चित्तादि actions in the case of the सगुणा Vidyā as Śaṅkara says, or in the case of the Brahmavidyā without any distinction of परा and अपरा Vidyā as a predecessor of Śaṅkara is quoted by the latter to have held.[52] The विनाश of sins takes place in the case of अनारब्ध कार्य sins; but फलोपभोग is the only course for the destruction of the आरब्ध कार्य sins (and good deeds). Śaṅkara's explanation of the आरब्धकार्य actions by the illustrations of the wheel of the potter and the knowledge of two moons and his final argument about the same[53] may be taken as explaining his own doctrine, dut the Sūtrakāra does not say anything like these illustrations, nor does he like to remain quiet on the question.

For the above reasons we believe that the Sūtrakāra holds the individual soul *to be a real agent* and that *his actions are real.*

A point of less importance than those discussed by us above is that raised by Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on Bra.Sū.IV.1.17. He says that this Sūtra discusses the question of transference of good and bad deeds of the knower of Brahman to his favourites and to those in his disfavour respectively, mentioned in Śrutis like Kau.Upa.I.4 (See also Śā.*bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.3.26). Śaṅkarācārya believes that the Sūtrakāra admits this thoery of transference in the case of certain good actions (viz., those other than the compulsory duties of the orders) in Sūtra IV.1.17. To us it seems that this Sūtra has nothing to do with that theory or that Śruti. We believe that "तत्कार्याय एव" from Sūtra 16 is implied in Sūtra 17 according to the context and that "अपि" in Sūtra 17 means that in addition to the duties of the "आश्रम" other religious

(51) Vide शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra.Sū.IV.1.13.
(52) See शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra. Sū.IV.1.13.
(53) Vide शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra.Sū.IV.1.15.

duties like sacrifice, donation, penance, mentioned in Bṛ.Upa. IV.4.22 also become useful to the seeker in achieving liberation. According to the Sūtrakāra the past sins are destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman and the past good deeds, both those of orders and others, done for the purpose of helping the knowledge of Brahman or not, are transformed into acts helping the knowledge of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman destroys the past sins and transforms the past good deeds done even *without* an intention of using them for the achievement of absolution into good deeds done with such an intention. Thus, the Sūtrakāra does not believe in the transference of the sins and good deeds to the haters and the well-wishers of the knower of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra either rejects the Śruti about the transference or would interpret it (Kau.Upa.I.4) in a secondary way.

CHAPTER 4.

DEPARTURE OF THE SEEKER FROM THE BODY.

"The knower of Brahman exhausts his प्रारब्ध कर्मन्s by experiencing their result and then he *unites* ("संपद्यते"). This is the last Sūtra of Bra.Sū.IV.1 and it is immediately followed by a Sūtra about the *union* (संपत्ति) of the sense of speech with the mind (Bra.Sū.IV.2.1), which undoubtedly discusses the Śruti: अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ् मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् (Chā.Upa. VI.15.2). This Śruti is immediately preceded by the Śruti: तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये (Chā.Upa.VI.14.2), and this Śruti *is said to be* the विषयवाक्य of the Sūtra which immediately precedes Bra.Sū.IV.2.1. Thus, both the Śrutis which form the विषयवाक्यs and both the Sūtras which discuss them (Bra.Sū.IV.1.19 and IV.2.1) seem to use or imply 'संपद्यते' 'unites', in the sense of the *union* of the senses with the mind, etc., etc. The first Pāda of of the fourth Adhyāya ends with the description of the कर्मक्षय 'exhaustion of the actions' of the knower of Brahman and the second Pāda deals with the *next* stage, viz., the departure of the subtle body and the soul of the knower of Brahman from the gross body. If, संपद्यते (*unites*) in Bra.Sū.IV.1.19 meant "ब्रह्म संपद्यते" (*unites* with Brahman), that Pāda should have immediately been followed by the fourth Pāda which begins with संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् ('After union with Brahman the real nature of the released soul becomes manifest, because of the word "स्वेन" – Bra.Sū.IV.4.1). But this is not the case. Moreover, Bra.Sū.IV.1.19 does not contain a reference to any Śruti. Thus, there seems to be a close connection of 'संपद्यते' in Sūtra IV.1.19 with 'संपद्यते' implied in Br.Sū.IV.2.1. So, according to the Sūtrakāra, it seems that the *departure* from the body dealt with in Bra.Sū.IV.2 and the *journey* on the Path of the gods dealt with in Bra.Sū.IV.3 are

to be taken as two steps *intervening between* कर्मक्षय 'the exhaustion of actions', and ब्रह्मसंपत्ति 'the union with the Supreme Light.'

For the above reasons, the distinction which Śaṅkara makes between Bra.Sū.IV.1.13–19 which according to him deal with the Esoteric Lore and Bra.Sū.IV.2.1–11 which he interprets as describing the Ignorance and the Exoteric Lore does not seem to us to have been meant by the Sūtrakāra.

The departure of the subtle body and the soul (उत्क्रान्ति) from the gross body takes place in the case of *both* the knower of Brahman and the non-knower (अनात्मविद् – Bra.Sū.III.1.7). The latter is described in Bra.Sū.III.1 and the former in Bra.Sū.IV.2.

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja believe that the उत्क्रान्ति described in Bra.Sū.IV.2 is the departure of the ignorant and also the one who knows Brahman.

That the *departure* described in Bra.Sū.III.1.1–7 is that of one who does not know the Atman is clear from the fact that the Sūtrakāra interprets इष्टादिकारिन् 'the performer of sacrifices and works of public charity' in the sense of 'one who does not know Atman'.[1] In the first five Sūtras of Bra.Sū.III.1 it has been established that there is a subtle body[2] and that it *accompanies* the soul who *does not know* the Atman (Bra.Sū.III.1.1,3,4) to the next world. In the case of his उत्क्रान्ति the subtle elements, the senses and the breath along with the soul leave the gross body but there is no *process of the orderly union* (संपत्ति) of these with one another as in the case of the follower of the Path of the gods (Bra.Sū.IV.2.1–6). On the end of the religious merit the अनात्मविद् returns to this world with 'अनुशय';[3] such is not the case with the soul on the Path of gods, though the latter may

(1) अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः । भाक्तं वानात्मवित्त्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति । (Bra.Sū III.1.6-7).

(2) त्र्यात्मकत्वात् तु भूयस्त्वात् । प्राणगतेश्च । (Bra.Sū.III.1.2-3).

(3) कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान् दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवं च । (Bra.Sū.III.1.8).

The Commentators explain 'अनुशय' as 'residue of religious actions' but should the word not have its usual sense of 'repentence' ?

have to return again and again to this world for further knowledge till he gets immortality.[4] In the case of the अनात्मविद् the return journey is not exactly like his outward journey to 'heaven',[5] while the follower of the Path of gods seems to return from his place in the same way in which he went there. The अनात्मविद् on his way back to this world resorts to rice, barley, hurbs, etc., which are already occupied by other souls, but though the seeker of Brahman returns till he perfects himself and gets immortality, he is not said to resort to rice, etc., like the अनात्मविद्.

The seeker on the Path of gods is different from an अनात्मविद्; he is on the Path of the knowledge of Atman. His departure from the body is an orderly phenomenon. In his case the senses of knowledge unite with the mind and the sense of speech is the *last*[6] one to do so; so that all the other senses unite with the mind before the sense of speech. The mind unites with the breath, the breath with the soul, and this last with the subtle elements. This regular order of the uniting agents forming the subtle body is absent in the departure of the अनात्मविद्. This process of union upto that of the soul with the subtle elements takes place *from the time that one resorts to the Path of gods*[7] and also after the attainment of immortality.[8] But there is a

(4) Cf. अमृतत्वमनुपोष्य in समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.7). सृति is the देवयानमार्ग. Attainment of absolnte Immortality is the highest stage or step of the देवयानमार्ग.

(5) कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान् दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवं च । (Bra.Sū.III.1.8).

(6) वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च । अत एव सर्वाण्यनु । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.1-2).

(7) Cf. आसृत्युपक्रमात् in Bra.Sū.IV.2.7.

(8) Cf. अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य in Bra.Sū.IV.2.7.

The arguments proving the departure *also* after the attainment are given in Bra.Sū.IV.2.8-14 and these Sūtras together with Sūtra IV.2.7 form one Adhikaraṇa, They are as follows:—(1) The union of the senses, the mind, etc. which takes place after one begins the Path of gods till after the attainment of immortality is called "संसार"; (2) the senses, the mind, the breath, the soul, the subtle elements form the subtle body which is not destroyed by the destruction of the gross body and to which the animal heat belongs; (3) the negation (प्रतिषेध in नास्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति) is the denial of the departure of the प्राणs from the soul; (4) the Smṛti also supports the departure.

further step in the union (संपत्ति), which takes place only when the soul *finally departs from the body for* the attainment of immortality, viz., the union of the elements (with which the soul has united) *with the Supreme Being in the heart* (Bra.Sū.IV.2.15). After this last step in the union the soul helped by the Para in the heart, comes out of the gross body through the hundred and first artery and is carried by the rays of the Sun, etc., to the Supreme One (Bra.Sū.IV.2.17-18).

Thus, in the process of the departure (उत्क्रान्ति) of the soul who takes to the Path of gods leading ultimately to the knowledge of Brahman, we may distinguish between two stages of development : (1) the first which begins after the soul gives up the Path of the Pitṛs and resorts to the Path of gods and which lasts till the soul has not attained immortality, and the second stage when the seeker *ultimately departs* from the gross body to join the rays of the Sun, etc., and immediately attains immortality. The former is dealt with in Bra.Sū.IV.2.1-6 and the latter in Bra.Sū.IV.2.15-21, while the Sūtras IV.2.7-14 deal with the refutation of the view that in the case of one who attains immortality the senses and the breath do not depart from the gross body.

Having thus briefly stated conclusions arrived at by our way of interpreting Bra.Sū.IV. 2 we may be allowed to say a few words as to where and why we differ from S'aṅkara's doctrine as based upon his interpretation of the same.

The first important point of difference is that regarding the distinction which Śaṅkara makes in this Pāda among the Sūtras, viz., 1. those which deal with one who does not know Atman, 2. those which treat of one who follows the Exoteric Lore and 3. those which deal with one who has possessed the Esoteric Lore. According to Śaṅkara :—

1. Sūtras 1-6 deal with the उत्क्रान्ति which is common to both the ignorant and the knower of the lower Vidyā.[9]

(9) समाना चैषोत्क्रान्तिर्वाङ्मनसीत्याद्या विद्वदविदुषो रासृत्युपक्रमाद्भवितुमर्हति । S'ā.bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.IV.1·7.

(2) Sūtras 8–11 state that the union of the subtle elements with the Supreme One is only partial, not complete.

(3) Sūtras 12–14 state and refute the Opponent's view that the senses and the breath of the knower of absolute Brahman depart from the gross body, the Pūrvapakṣa being given in Sūtra 12, and the Siddhānta in Sūtras 13–14.

(4) Sūtra 15 says that the senses, etc. of the knower of absolute Brahman dissolve (प्रलीयन्ते) in the Supreme Being.

(5) Sūtra 16 says that this dissolution is absolute, not partial as in the case of one who is ignorant and one who has pursued the Aparā Vidyā (Contrast Sūtras 1–7).

(6) Sūtras 12–16 give a digression about the Parā Vidyā; but Sūtra 17 rebegins the topic of the Aparā Vidyā and the same is continued till the end of the Pāda (Sūtras 17–21).

Thus, according to Śaṅkara, the whole Pāda mainly deals with the Aparā Vidyā, Sūtras 1–11 dealing with what is common to the Aparā Vidyā and Avidyā, Sūtras 12–16 with the Parā Vidyā by way of a digression and Sūtras 17–21 resuming the topic of the Aparā Vidyā.

We have already stated above that Sūtra IV.1.19 (भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते) is to be connected with Sūtra IV.4.1. (संपद्याविर्भावः) *only through* Bra.Sū.IV.2 and 3 which describe the intermediate stages of gradual orderly departure (उत्क्रान्ति) and the journey on the Path of gods which leads to "ब्रह्मसंपत्ति" immediately followed by the *Mukti*.[10] The Second Pāda of Adhyāya IV discusses the *union* (संपत्ति) *taking place during* the उत्क्रान्ति, viz., the one mentioned in Sūtra IV.1.19,[11] in Chā.Upa.VI.14.2[12] and in Cha. Upa.VI.15[13] which is referred to in Sūtra IV.2.1–15. Thus, the first Sūtra of Adhyāya IV.2 *continues the topic* of the last Sūtra

(10) मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.2).
(11) भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते । Bra.Sū.IV.1.19.
(12) तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्षेऽथ संपत्स्ये । Chā.Upa.VI.14.2.
(13) तस्य यावन्न वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायां तावज्जानाति ।

of Adhyāya IV.1 and, therefore it is not true to say that Sūtra IV.1.19 deals with the Parā Vidyā and Sūtra IV.2.1 with the AparāVidyā. It may be also added here that Bra.Sū.IV.4.1 deals with the संपत्ति which *takes place at the end of* the journey on the Path of gods, and which is mentioned in Chā.Upa.VIII. 12.[14] The departure from the body (शरीरात् समुत्थान) referred to in this Chā.Upa. Śruti is described in Bra.Sū.IV.2. Thus it is not the Aparā Vidyā, but the only Vidyā, as the Sūtrakāra has understood it, that is dealt with in Bra.Sū.IV.2, though this latter may be regarded as the Aparā Vidyā according to Śaṅkara's System, *independently* of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtra.

Secondly, the view of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja that the उत्क्रान्ति described in Bra.Sū.IV.2 is *common* to the sage and to the ignorant is also wrong. We have already shown that there is a marked difference between the departure of the अनात्मविद् which is described in Bra.Sū.III.1.1-7 and that of the आत्मविद् described in Bra.Sū. IV.2. Śaṅkara's statement is based upon a wrong interpretation of 'समान' and 'अमृतत्वम्' in Bra.Sū.IV.2.7,[15] which only says that the 'उत्क्रान्ति' described so far is *the same* from the time that one begins the Path of gods and *until the attainment* of immortality; and, thus, it does not at all refer to the ignorant.

Śaṅkara's other statement that the Pāda distinguishes between the Aparā Vidyā and the Parā Vidyā is founded upon a wrong interpretation of Bra.Sū.IV.2.12-16. We have shown in our Interpretation (Part I, PP.) that Sūtras 8-14 are closely connected wito Sūtra 7 and that all of them jointly make an Adhikaraṇa establishing that the subtle body by its very nature must leave the gross body along with the soul when the latter attains immortality, because otherwise it cannot be destroyed or dissolved (since it cannot be destroyed by the destruction of the gross body),[16] and because the प्राणs of the knower of Brahman

(14) एवमेवैष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते ।
(15) समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.7).
(16) नोपमर्देनातः । Bra.Sū.IV.2.10.

do not depart *from the soul* but they depart *from the body along with the soul* of the sage knowing Brahman.[17] Another argument of Śaṅkara that Sūtras 15–16 deal with the Parā Vidyā of his School is also wrong because Sūtra 15 deals with the union of the elements (Sūtras 5–6) with the Para *in the heart*[18] and the same topic is further continued in Sūtra IV.2.17. The Śruti mentioned by Śaṅkara under Sūtra IV.2.15 refers to the gross body from which the subtle body is distinguished in Sūtras IV.2.8–11. The अविभाग in Sūtra 16 is not the absolute dissolution of the subtle body of the knower of Brahman but it explains the meaning of the संपत्ति in Chā.Upa.VI.15.2.[19] This also shows that Śaṅkara is not justified in interpreting वाक् as the *function* of speech instead of the sense of speech itself, मनस् as the function of the mind instead of the mind itself. In fact, all the senses, the breath, the soul and the subtle elements unite together and depart from the body through the hundred-and-first artery and at the end of the journey of the Path of gods (देवयान) unite with the Supreme Light.[20] Therefore, the Sūtrakāra does not seem to us to mention the difference between the Parā and the Aparā Vidyās of Śaṅkara.

To sum up the above points briefly :—

(1) The *last* Sūtra of the *first* Pāda of the fourth Adhyāya is closely connected with the *first* Sūtra of the *second* Pāda of the same Adhyāya. Thus, both the Pādas describe what the Sūtrakāra understands to be the Vidyā, there being no distinction of the Aparā Vidyā and the Parā Vidyā in his System.

(2) A kind of उत्क्रान्ति takes place in the case of both the *Ātmavid* and the *Anātmavid.* The former again is twofold so

(17) This is the sense of प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात् । स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् । (Bra.Sū.IV.2. 12-13. Since न अस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति the ambiguous reading in the काण्व recension is, according to the Sūtrākāra, to be interpreted in the light of 'न तस्मात्प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति' the clear reading of the माध्यान्दिन recension.

(18) Cf. तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् in Chā.Upa.VI.15.2.

(19) वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्।

(20) Bra.Sū. IV. 4.1. संपद्याविर्भावः ।

far as there is one more step in the union (*sampatti*) after one reaches a stage when immortality is to be immediately attained, than before that stage. The departure of the *Anātmavid* is described in Bra.Sū.III.1 and that of the *seeker* on the Path of gods before and after the immediate attainment of immortality is described in Bra.Sū.IV.2. Thus, Bra.Sū.IV.2 does not describe the उत्क्रान्ति of the *Anātmavid*.

(3) Sūtras IV.2.7–14 say nothing about the *Anātmavid* and show that there is उत्क्रान्ति of the knower of Brahman. Sūtras 12–14 pertain to the Vidyā as the Sūtrakāra understands it, not to the Parā Vidyā of Śaṅkara.

(4) The departure of the ignorant is different from that of the sage who knows Atman.

(5) The gross body of the knower of Brahman as well as that of the ignorant returns to nature, but the subtle body of both accompanies them. The latter is destroyed only in the former case after the knower of Brahman reaches his goal at the end of his journey on the Devayāna.

(6) The union (संपत्ति) of the senses, the mind, the breath, the soul, the subtle elements, including the संपत्ति of the subtle elements with the Supreme One *in the heart* is of the nature of 'non-separation' अविभाग (or अपृथग्भाव as Rāmānuja says). It is not the संपत्ति of the वृत्तिs or functions of the senses, etc., nor is the संपत्ति "absolute merging".

(7) The one who leaves the body through the hundred-and-first artery is the knower of *Brahman*, not a follower of the Aparā Vidyā.

(8) In Bra.Sū.IV.2.18-21 the Sūtrakāra criticises a Smṛti view like that of the Bhagavadgītā VIII.23–27. He understands that Smṛti as referring to "*yogins who know Brahman*," not to the followers of सांख्य (Bha.Gī.VIII.24) and निष्कामकर्मयोग (Bha.Gī.VIII.25) as understood by Śaṅkarācārya.

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(20) संपद्याविर्भाव: स्वेन शब्दात् । Bra.Sū.IV.4.1.

CHAPTER 5.

JOURNEY OF THE BRAHMAJNANIN ON THE DEVAYANA PATH

The journey of the knower of Brahman on the Path of gods is the subject of Bra.Sū.IV.3. On departing[1] from the gross body the knower of Brahman begins the journey at the end of which he *reaches* Brahman[2].

On leaving the body the knower of Brahman *follows the rays* of the Sun. These rays are the *first* station on the Path of gods.[3] Among the S'rutis[4] which describe the Path of gods by which the knower of Brahman starts on his 'journey to Brahman'[5] the Śrutis beginning with the rays[6] are very well known. To the Arcis (आर्चिस्) and other stations mentioned in this list we are to add two, viz., (1) Vāyu,[7] and (2) Varuṇa.[8] The former is to be inserted between Saṁvatsara and Āditya and the latter (Varuṇa) is to be added to the Lightning.[9] Thus, we

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(1) This departure (उत्क्रान्ति) is dealt with in Bra.Sū.IV.2.

(2) संपद्य in संपद्याविर्भावः । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.1) means "having reached Brahman."

(3) रश्म्यनुसारी । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.18)

(4) Cf. आदि in अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.1).

(5) (a) अथ यदु चैवास्मिच्छव्यं कुर्वन्ति यदि च नार्चिषमेवाभि संभवन्त्यर्चिषोऽहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान्षडुदङ्ङेति मासाꣳस्तान्मासेभ्यः संवत्सरꣳ......(Chā.Upa.IV.15.5).

(b) तद्य इत्थं विदुः ये चे मेऽरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चिषमभिसंभवन्त्यर्चिषोऽहरह्न आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान्षडुदङ्ङे तिमासाꣳस्तान् ॥१॥ मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं (Chā.Upa.V.10.1-2) संवत्सरादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवयानः पन्थाः (Chā.Upa.V.10.1-2).

(c) यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति । (Bṛ. Upa.V.10.1.)

(d) ये चामी अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासतेतेऽर्चिषाभिसं भवन्ति । अर्चिषोऽहः......(Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15).

(e) स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमापद्याग्निलोकमागच्छति स वायुलोकं स वरुण लेाकम्......Kau.Upa.1.3.

(6) Vide (a), (b) and (d) of (5) above respectively for (Cha.Upa.IV.15.5-1), (Chā.Upa.V.10.1-2), and (Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15.)

(7) (Bṛ.Upa.V.10) यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रेति स वायुमागच्छंति ।

(8) (Kau. Upa.1.3). स देवयानं पन्थानमासाद्याग्नि लोकमागच्छति ।

(9) (Bra.Sū.IV.3.2-3). —वायुमब्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् । and तडितोऽधि वरुणः संबन्धात् ।

get the following list:-- (1) the Rays (अर्चिस्), (2) the Day, (3) the Bright Half of the Month, (4) the Six Months of the Sun's Northern Course, (5) the Year, (6) the Wind, (7) the Sun, (8) the Moon; (9) the Lightning, (10) the Varuṇa and (11) 'Brahman' (neu.) which may be called 'ब्रह्मलोक'.

Saṅkara has suggested that to these we should add *three* more viz., (1) the world of gods (देवलोक) after the Year and before the world of the Wind,[10] and (2-3) (the world of) the Indra and (the world of) the Prajāpati *after* (that of) the Varuṇa (and before Brahman or ब्रह्मलोक).[11] We believe that the Sūtrakāra himself notices *those worlds which he wanted to add* to the well-known Chāndogya Śruti. Thus, he adds two only. This would suggest that he does not agree to take other stations mentioned in other Śrutis. In Bṛ.Upa.III.6.1 we have अन्तरिक्ष लोक, गान्धर्व लोक and नक्षत्र लोक which are not mentioned in the Śruti *beginning the Path of gods with Rays*; and the Sūtrakāra does not make mention of them at all, just as we find no Sūtra about 'the Indra' and 'the Prajāpati' after Sūtra IV.3.3. "The Indra" and Prajāpati" are found mentioned in the same Bṛ.Upa. Passage and in Kau. Upa.1.3. We suggest that the Sūtrakāra identifies these three worlds (Devaloka, Indraloka and Prajāpatiloka with one or the other of the worlds mentioned in the आर्चिरादि Sruti of the Chā.Upa. He may have identified the Devaloka with the world of the Moon[12] or he may have dropped it altogether thinking that the knower of Brahman need not go to the world of gods or that the whole path being a path of gods there was no particular world to be specially called "देवलोक." As regards "Indra," he seems to have altogether dropped it also for similar reasons. But with respect to the Prajāpatiloka the controvercy between Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa seems to us to show

(10) Vide S'ā. bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.IV.3.2.

(11) Vide S'ā. bhyāṣa on Bra.Sū. IV.3.3.

(12) Cf. एष सोमो राजा तद्देवानामन्नं तं देवा भक्षयन्ति । (Cha.Upa.V.10.4).

that he neither drops it altogether nor does he accept it as a लोक or a world in the usual sense.[13] Several other Srutis[14] mention worlds like पितृलोक, etc. Sankara himself identifies अग्निलोक in Kau. Upa.I.3. with आर्चि.[15] For these reasons we think, the suggestion of Sankara to include the देवलोक, the इन्द्रलोक and the प्रजापतिलोक in the list of stations on the Path of gods is not in agreement with the view of these Sūtras.

We have so far used the word 'station' for the Rays, etc. above. But it is not the exact meaning of these words. Nor is the word 'लोक' literally applicable to them, though the Srutis use the expressions आदित्यलोक, वायुलोक, and वरुणलोक.[16] The Sūtrakāra has already stated[17] that the Rays, the Six Months, etc. have nothing to do with the different periods of time so far as the Srauta Path of gods was concerned. The Sūtrakāra makes this point clearer and says that the Rays, the Day, etc. are conductors (आतिवाहिकाः) because a Sruti states that the Rays of the Sun act as conductors,[19] and because if we take the Rays, etc. as periods of time or even as time-deities or worlds of enjoyment, they and also the knowers of Brahman would be thrown into bewilderment (there being none to guide either of them).[20] Thus, we conclude that the Rays, etc. are conductors of the knower of Brahman. Each one of the Rays, the Day, etc. is a conductor.

Out of all these conductors, it is the conductor "of the world of the Lightning" who takes the knower of Brahman from that world to his destination. The Sruti tells us that 'a superhuman conductor[21] in the world of the Lightning leads the knower of Brahman to Brahman.' Thus, one and the same conductor

(13) Vide (40) infra.
(14) E. g., Bṛ.Upa.1.5.16 and Tai.Upa.II.8.
(15) Vide S'ā. bhāṣya on Brā.Sū.IV.3.2.
(16) In Kau.Upa.I.3.
(17) In Bra-Sū.IV.2.19—21.
(19) आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात्। Bra.Sū.IV.3 4.
(20) उभयव्यामोहात्तत्सिद्धेः। Bra.Sū.IV.3.5.
(21) Chā.Upa.IV.15.5-6 and V.10.2.

from the world of the Lightning carries them up to their destination.[22]

The last topic in Bra.Sū.IV.3.7–16 is "Where does the conductor take knowers of Brahman ?" The Śrutis beginning with the Rays say that the conductor leads them to Brahman or to ब्रह्मलोक.[23] What is exactly the meaning of 'ब्रह्मन्' or 'ब्रह्मलोक'? Sūtras IV.3.7-16 deal with this question though Sūtras 15-16 refer to a different topic according to Śaṅkara. In these Sūtras three different views about the destination of the Brahmajñānin's journey are given, viz., those of Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

The problem of this destination is discussed on the ground of the limitation of the *capacity of the conductor* to lead the knower of Brahman. "*How far can the conductor go*" ? Bādari holds that the conductor can go only upto a world which is *an effect* of Brahman. He cannot go beyond it. Therefore, the knower of Brahman can be carried by the conductor only upto a world which is an effect. [24] Bṛ.Upa.III.6.1 and Kau.Upa.I.3 distinguish between this effect–world and the cause or the Para, though this distinction is not found in the Chā. Upaniṣad.[25] The Bṛ.Upa. Śruti *distinguishes* the Effect (कार्य) as प्रजापतिलोकाः and the Para as Brahmalokāḥ which it calls अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता "the Deity beyond which no question should be raised." Similarly, the Kau.Upa. Śruti *distinguishes* between the same under the same names of Prajāpatiloka and Brahmaloka. [26] *On the ground of this distinction*, Bādari argues that the conductor leads the knower of Brahman only up to the Effect (Bra.Sū.IV.3.8), though this

(22) वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः । Bra.Sū.IV.3.6.

(23) स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति । (Chā.Upa.IV.I5.5,) and ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति । (Bṛ.Upa.-VI.2.15).

(24) कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.7). "अस्य" means 'of this conductor, not 'कार्यस्य' as S'aṅkara says, and "गति" means "going", not गन्तव्यता.

(25) विशेषितत्वाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.8).

(26) (a) कस्मिन्नु खलु प्रजापतिलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ब्रह्मलोकेषु गार्गीति कस्मिन्नु खलु ब्रह्मलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति स होवाच गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीर्मा ते मूर्धा व्यपप्तदनतिप्रश्न्यां वै देवतामतिपृच्छसि गार्गि......। (Bṛ.Upa.III.6.1).

(b) स एतं देवयानं पन्थानमासाद्य......स प्रजापतिलोकं स ब्रह्मलोकं......। (Kau.Upa.I.3).

distinction is not found in the अचिरादि Śruti, e. g., Chā.Upa.IV. 15.5. If it be asked, 'How would you explain the Chā.Upa. Śruti ? ", Bādari replies, " It does not mean that the conductor leads the knower of Brahman upto the Para, but in that Śruti the Prajāpatiloka is meant by (the Para) Brahman, because the former is spatially very *near* the latter, just as according to the Sūtrakāra this world is very *remote* from Brahman.[27] An express statement like the one found in Mu.Upa.III.2.6 shows that the knowers of Brahman (whom the conductor carries upto the प्रजापतिलोक) *go further than that in company of the governor of that loka*' when that *loka* comes to an end.[28] And there is a Smṛti text, viz., "All of them who have achieved the aim of their life *enter* the Supreme Abode in company of Brahman (Hiraṇyagarbha) at the end of the Para when the dissolution of the Universe is at hand.[29] Thus, in addition to the three arguments, viz., (1) the capacity of the conductor to go upto the Kārya, (2) the mention of the distinction between the Kārya and the Para in some Śrutis, and (3) the explanation of the word 'Brahman' occurring in the Chā.Upa.Śruti as Kāryaloka (Bra.Sū.IV.3.7-9), Śruti and Smṛti can be quoted in support of the view that the conductor leads the knower of Brahman upto the Kārya, the Prajāpatiloka (Bra.Sū.IV.3.10-11).

Jaimini holds that the conductor leads the knower of Brahman upto the Para, because the Para is the *chief aspect* of Brahman,[30]

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(27) सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः (Bra.Sū.IV.3.9). " सामीप्यात् " 'spatially near.' Cf. असन्निहितत्वात् "very remote" in जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.17)

(28) कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.10). This Sūtra seems to us to refer to

वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥ Mu.Upa.III.2.6.

"ब्रह्मलोकाः" are *beyond* 'प्रजापतिलोकाः' according to Bṛ.Upa.

(29) Vide S'ā. bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.IV.3.11.

(30) The word 'मुख्य' in the Sūtra stands for 'प्रधान' in Sūtras III.2.11, and III.3.12, and also in Sū.III.3.43, where we have proposed to read प्रधान in place of the traditional reading प्रदान. Vide our Notes on these Sūtras.

but the Kārya is not the chief aspect,[31] and because Śrutis[32] show that he reaches the Para.[33] Moreover, it is not that the knower of Brahman has simply aimed at knowing (and reaching) the Kārya.[34]

Bādarāyana, however, believes that the conductor *leads* only *those* meditators on Brahman, *who do not resort to the Symbol* 'Om' for their meditation on Brahman.[35] In the case of the meditators who resort to the Symbol 'Om'; there is *no need of a conductor* because they are carried to their destination by the Sāmans.[36] Now, according to Bādarāyaṇa the aspirants who meditate on Brahman without resorting to its Symbol are of two types; (1) those who meditate on the Pradhāna or the formless (अरूपवत् aspect of) Brahman, and those who meditate on the Puruṣa (the रूपवत् aspect).[37] Therefore, there is no conflict in both the cases, i. e., beetween the view of Bādari and that of Jaimini.[38] And, again, either type of meditators has made a specific thought that 'he is going to be born unto that Brahman after having departed from this world', as stated in Chā.Upa. III.14.4.[39] While accepting the views of both Bādari and

(31) परं जैमिनि र्मुख्यत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.12).

(32) E. g. ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् । (Tai.Upa.II.1).

(33) (Bra.Sū.IV.3.13.) दर्शनाच्च ।

(34) न च कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसंधिः । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.14.)

(35) अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.15).

(36) यःपुनरेतत् त्रिमात्रेणोमित्ये तेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि सूर्ये संपन्नः ॥ यथा पादोरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुज्यते एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामाभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकम् । (Pra.Upa.V.5). It is interesting to note how the S'ruti (स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति) is interpreted by Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Bādari emphasises the fact that it is the *Conductor* who leads the knower of Brahman (and, therefore, he can lead them upto the Kārya), Jaimini emphasises that it is "*Brahman*" *the Para* to which the conductor leads and, lastly, Bādarāyaṇa stresses the fact that " एनान् " means " अप्रतीकालम्बनान्. "

(37) Vide Chapter 1 and our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.2.14 for these two aspects, as taught by the Sūtrakāra.

(38) " उभयथाऽदोषात् " in Sūtra IV.3.15. Vide Note (35) above.

(39) " एनामितः प्रेत्याभिसंभविताऽस्मि । "

Jaimini, the Sūtrakāra explains what he thinks to be the exact *difference between the two aspects of* Brahman because it is on this point that he does not fully agree with either Bādari or Jaimini. For proving this difference he appears to depend upon Pra.Upa.V.2–5 to which he seems to refer in Bra.Sū.IV.3.16.

We have shown that the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of this Śruti is given by him in Bra.Sū.I.3.13 and it is further discussed by him in Bra.Sū.III.3.39.[40] In the light of these Sūtras, the Sūtrakāra understands जीवघन and पर in Pra.Upa. V.5 as two aspects of Brahman, which are *identical.* (Bra.Sū.I.3.13), but which may be understood as *separate* according to the seeker's wish (Bra.Sū.III.3.39).[41] This alternate optional identity and a differentiation between there two aspects of Brahman suggest to us the opinion of the Sūtrakāra about the *distinction* between them. He believes that the two are not numerically two, though they are not necessarily one and the same; at least for the purpose of meditation they need not be regarded as identical. Now, in so far as the two are *different*, both Bādari and Jaimini are correct and acceptable to the Sūtrakāra because the conductor is required to take both the types of meditafors of Bsahman to their Destination (the particular aspect of the Para) and insofar as the two are *identical*, Bādarāyaṇa modifies the view of Bādari and Jaimini regarding what these latter call the difference of कार्य and पर because Bādarāyaṇa takes both the the aspects as aspects of the Para only, of the Cause only, and therefore, nothing less than the Cause Itself.

Now, we shall give further arguments in support of what we have said above regarding the main point on which Bādarāyaṇa differs from Bādari and Jaimini, viz., the nature ef the *kārya* or the Prajāpatiloka. According to Bādarāyaṇa the world of

(40) Vide our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.39.

(41) The Sūtrakāra takes जीवघन as the *Pradhāna* or the *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman and the Puruṣa (in जीवघनात्परात् परं पुरिशयंपुरुषमीक्षते। Pra.Upa.V.5) as the *rūpavat* aspect. The same may be respectively called the *para* and the *apara* aspects also;

Brahman (masc.) or Prajāpati is not a Kārya, but it is only a personal or रूपवत् (or साकार) aspect of the Para, the other aspect of which is the अरूपवत् (or निराकार) one. Jaimini and Bādari distinguished these two साकार and निराकार aspects respectively as Kārya and Para which may be called Kāraṇa, but Bādarāyaṇa takes both of them as Kāraṇa-aspects, i.e., as two aspects of the Para Itself. It is in agreement with this that *he drops the mention of the Prajāpatiloka* in his list of the stations on the Path of gods (Bra.Sū.IV.3.3). That he would not admit it as a *loka* at all, is clear from the fact that he denies that the Puruṣa aspect of the Para is "*subject to the fault of being regarded as a loka*" (लोकापत्ति), *though there is something common* between the Puruṣa aspect (the Prajāpatiloka) and an ordinary *loka.* [42] Moreover, this साकार aspect in his School is on an equal level with the निराकार aspect, both being equally powerful means for the direct attainment of absolute liberation, so much so that an option of choice between the two is given to the seeker in Bra. Sū.III.3.11–54.[43] The two are only *two different names* of the Para and the difference in the method of meditation on the two is due to those *names.*[44] The difference between these अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects is not more than that between the serpent and the coil of a serpent.[45] Bādarāyaṇa would, therefore, not regard the Puruṣa aspect which may be called Brahman (masc.) or Prajāpati aspect as a *loka* or *Kārya* of Brahman. For this reason, it may be here pointed out that Śaṅkara's suggestion

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(42) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धे र्मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापात्तिः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.51). Vide our interpretation of that Sūtra.

(43) Cf. छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.28) and गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथाहि विरोधः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.29).

(44) Cf. संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.8) and सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे । (Bra.Sū.III.3.10).

(45) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वाहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27) which is referred to in Sū.III.3.8.

to add "Prajāpati-*loka*" after Varuṇa and Indra[46] does not appear to be consistent with the Sūtrakāra's view about it.

As a result of this difference between these three thinkers, we find that Bādari and Jaimini quote or refer to Śrutis like Bṛ.Upa.III.6.1 and Kau.Upa.I.3 in order to prove their view about the difference between the Kārya and the Para (Bra. Sū.IV.3.8) and Bādari even explains the Chā.Upa.Śruti beginning with the rays (*arciḥ*), by giving a secondary sense to the word Brahman in Chā.Upa.IV.15.6 and V.10.2. Bādari had the real support of Bṛ.Upa.III.6.1 which places Brahmaloka[47] *higher than* the Prajāpatiloka and says that the former is the 'अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता'. This phraseology seems to have induced Bādari and Jaimini to interpret the difference between the Kārya and the Para in their own way. But, Bādarāyaṇa, who mainly depends upon Chā.Upa.and other अर्चिरादि Śrutis and also upon many other similar Śrutis like Pra.Upa.V.2-5 (Sūtra IV.3.16) and Kaṭha Upa.III.10–11 does not accept their view but says that both of them are really the aspects of the Para Itself. And he further says that because the Para has these two aspects, the Destination to which the conductors carry the knowers of either aspect is nothing less than Brahman Itself, which is both निराकार and साकार in *all* the states (Bra.Sū.III.2.11). For this reason, he accepts the view of *both* Bādari and Jaimini inasmuch as the conductor is required to conduct such knowers of Brahman, but he corrects Bādari by saying that the Prajāpatiloka is not a Kārya but the Para Itself and Jimini by saying that besides what Jaimini calls the Para, there is another aspect of the Para, viz., the साकार or Puruṣa aspect to which also a conductor is required to lead the

(46) वरुणादधीन्द्रप्रजापती स्थानान्तराभावात्पाठसामर्थ्याच्च। आगन्तुकत्वादपि वरुणादीनामन्त एव निवेशो वैशेषिकस्थानाभावाद्विद्युच्चान्त्यार्चिरादौ वर्त्मनि। (S'ā. bhāṣya on Bra. Sū.IV.3.3)

(47) 'ब्रह्मलोक' in Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15 also should mean 'अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता', i. e., the highest principle called Brahman.

Brahmajñānin and consequently Bādari's view is not inconsistent with his (Jaimini's) own view.

Though these three authorities differ regarding the nature of the two aspects of Brahman, all of them agree that the attainment of the Para only is the state of liberation. Bādari holds that the conductor leads the knower of Brahman upto the world of Prajāpati, but thereafter the knower proceeds to and reaches (i. e. attains) Brahman, which is in Bādari's view higher than this Prajāptiloka, in company of the Prajāpati on the dissolution of the Prajāpatiloka (Bra.Sū IV.3.10-11). Jaimini believes that the conductor himself leads the knower of Brahman upto the Para (Bra.Sū.IV.3.12-14). This also shows that in the opinion of all the three "*going* to the Para" is a necessary prerequisite of liberation. Thus, none of them exactly believed in what Śaṅkara calls liberation-by-stages (क्रममुक्ति)[48] and liberation-in-this-life (जविन्मुक्ति). No view about the जीवन्मुक्ति is mentioned even by way of a Pūrvapakṣa by Bādarāyaṇa in Bra.Sū. IV.1.13-19. If Bādari had ever believed in जविन्मुक्ति, as he should have, in case he believed that the Para was no goal to be reached by *going to* it, his view about it would have been recorded by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.IV.1.13-19. But we find no mention of it therein.[49] Moreover, according to Bādari the knower of Brahman *first* goes to the Kārya because the conductor is *not capable of going further* than Kārya. It is not that the knower lacks some knowledge of Brahman and gets it by staying in the world of the Prajāpati. He has to wait in the Kārya

(48) It would appear that Bādari upholds क्रममुक्ति but it is entirely different from that propounded by S'aṅkara, because Bādari believes that from the Prajapatiloka the knower of Brahman *has to go* further in the company of the Prajāpati, to Brahman.

(49) S'aṅkara brings in the idea of जविन्मुक्ति in Sūtra IV.1.14 by the unjustifiable addition of विनाश to असंश्लेष and of 'विदुषः मुक्तिः अवश्यंभाविनी' to पाते in that Sūtra.

because none could take him directly to the Para. Thus, Bādari does not believe in any kind of क्रममुक्ति.

Śaṅkara's view that Bādari believes in the impossibility of Brahman being achieved by the knower of Brahman *going* to It, is founded upon *his* (i.e. Śaṅkara's) own interpretation of अस्य and गतिः in Bra.Sū.IV.3.7 as कार्यस्य ब्रह्मणः and गन्तव्यता respectively. But, we believe that अस्य in the light of the context refers to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक mentioned in Bra.Sū.IV.3.6, and गति is 'going' i. e., 'the act of going', not the possibility of being reached (गन्तव्यता) by the goer's going to it. Moreover, his main arguments viz., (1) ब्रह्मणः सर्वगतत्व 'the omni-presence of Brahman' and (2) ब्रह्मणः प्रत्यगात्मत्व 'Brahman Itself being the inner soul of the seeker,' are not given by Bādari; nor do we find their refutation in the Sūtras containing Jaimini's reply to Bādari. These arguments of Śaṅkara are refuted from the standpoint of a supposed opponent by Śaṅkara himself in his Com. on Bra. Sū.IV.3.14. Moreover, Bādari seems to argue that the Prajāpatiloka is *near* Brahmaloka or Brahman and thus gives a *spatial view* about Brahman, as would appear not only from सामीप्यात् in Sūtra IV.3 9 but also from the phrase 'अतःपरम्' in Sū.-IV.3.10 and अ-सन्निहितत्वात् in Bra.Sū.IV4.17. But Śaṅkara interprets "सामीप्य" in a secondary sense. In order to prove that Bādari believes in *liberation-by-stages* Śaṅkara says that *according to Bādari* those whom the conductor takes upto the Kārya get the right knowledge of Brahman in that Kārya itself.,[50] but from the context Bādari seems to believe that those whom the conductor leads to the Kārya have already attained the perfect knowledge on this earth. The Śruti[51] to which Bādari seems to refer under Sūtra IV.3.10 appears to favour this conclusion.[52]

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(50) Vide तत्रैवोत्पन्नदर्शनाः सन्त.......in S'ā.bhā. on Bra.Sū.IV3.10.

(51) वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥ (Mu.Upa. III.2.7.)

(52) Cf. the view in later Vedanta that all released souls go to the Īśvara and get absolute liberation only *after* the whole universe is released.

To us it appears that the Adhikaraṇa consisting of Bra.Sū.IV. 3.7-16 is not meant to discuss whether *going* to the '*Para*' is possible or whether only the 'Kārya' can be reached by going. The Sūtrakāra intends to discuss upto what station or *loka the conductor can lead* the knower of Brahman, and if he cannot accompany him to the Para who can lead him finally to his Destination. While stating the stations on the Path of gods, the Sūtrakāra mentions the worlds of Vidyut and Varuṇa and we believe, the discussion about the Prajapatiloka and Brahmaloka is undertaken in Sū.IV.3.7–16 in the light of *the function*[53] *and capacity of the conductor* mentioned in Sūtra IV.3 6. Sū.IV.3.15 also seems to confirm our view because 'नयति' in that Sūtra[54] refers to the conductor and Bādarāyaṇa gives his own opinion that the conductor carries the meditators of of (both the aspects of) Brahman other than those who resort to the Symbol and that, therefore, he carries them to the Para. In his opinion the Śruti and the Smṛti about the knowers of Brahman being accompanied by Brahmān (masc.) or the governor of the Prajāpatiloka deal with the fate of those also *who belong to the circle of officers*,[55] and have nothing to do with those who know Brahman in this life on this earth. Thus, we are led to conclude that the topic of this last Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras IV.3, 7–16 is different from what Śaṅkara and some other commentators take it to be.

Lastly, Śaṅkara's Pāṭha according to which Sūtras 7-14 and Sūtras 15–16 of this Pāda form two different Adhikaraṇas has, as he says, the support of a predecessor of his,[56] but according

(53) अस्य in Bra.Sū.IV.3.7 (कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः) standing for the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक.

(54) अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयति इति बादरायणः। (Bra.Sū.IV.3.15).

(55) Cf. आधिकारिकमण्डलस्थ in प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः। (Bra.Sū.IV.4 18).

(56) Cf. केचित्पुनः "पूर्वाणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्त्युत्तराणि सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि" इत्येतां व्यवस्थामनुरुध्यमानाः परविषया एव गतिश्रुतिः प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति, तदनुपपन्नम्...। (S'ā.bhā). on Bra.Sū.IV.3.14). This shows that according to this predecessor of S'aṅkara the Adhikaraṇa ended with Sūtra 14.

to our interpretation it would appear that even Śaṅkara's predecessor was not in the possession of a correct Pāṭha. That Sūtra IV.3.15 should be a modification of what the Sūtrakāra has said in Sūtra III.3.31 and that Sūtra IV.3.16 deals with the kāmya (काम्य) meditations on particular Symbols of Brahman, seems to us to be impossible on the ground of the context of the Pāda and of the propriety of the subject-matter in this Adhyāya. Rāmānuja takes all these Sūtras as forming *one* Adhikaraṇa. This is quite consistent with other portions of the Sūtras, where Bādarāyaṇa's view is given by the express mention of his name. On a comparison of the present Sūtras with Bra.Sū.IV.4 10–14, IV.4.5-7, etc., we find that this is the case only when the Sūtrakāra gives his own view *after* discussing the view or views of other teachers.

If, thus, our suggestion about grouping all these Sūtras (7–16) into *one* Adhikaraṇa be correct, the view of Bādarāyaṇa would naturally be the Siddhānta and consequently Śaṅkara's view that the doctrine of Bādari is intended to be the Siddhanta here will be found untenable. As he himself says, the general rule is that in each case the preceding Sūtras are the aphorisms of the Pūrvapakṣa and the succeeding ones those of the Siddhanta. The same rule was followed by Śaṅkara's predecessor and is followed by his successors. And if, as we have shown, Sūtra IV.3.7 deas with the question about the capacity of the conductor to carry the Brahmajñānin to his Destination, it would not be proper to insist upou taking Sūtras IV.3.7-11 as the Sūtras of the Siddhanta.

CHAPTER 6

STATE OF UNION WITH BRAHMAN

After those actions, which have 'begun to give their fruit', have been exhausted by the individual soul experiencing their results,[1] the knower of Brahman leaves the body,[2] and after finishing the journey on the Path of gods[3] *reaches* Brahman.[4] The union with Bramhan is preceded by the exhaustion of the *prārabdha karmans* , (2) the Depature and (3) the Journey of the knower of Brahman.

This "*union* with Brahman" is not described in definite words in the several Śruitis. Sometimes it is campared with the merging of flowing rivers into the ocean, having given up their names and forms.[5] This may give the impression that the union with Brahman is absolute and that after the union the *individuality* of the uniting soul making it a soul disappears. To remove such a doubt, the Sūtrakāra says that after union with Brahman the *original form* of the soul becomes manifest. He would like to interpret the Śrutis about the union of the liberated soul with Brahman in the light of Chā.Upa.VIII.12.3. The union (संपत्ति) is really '*reaching*' (उपसंपत्ति) as stated in Chā.Upa.VIII.12.3, not absolute merging, because after union the *soul's own nature* becomes manifest.[6]

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(1) Cf. अनारब्धकार्यें एव तु पुर्वे तदवधेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.15) and भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते । (Bra. Sū.IV.1.19).

(2) His departure from the body is the topic of Bra.Sū.IV.2.

(3) This journey is explained with all its stations in Bra.Sū.IV.3.

(4) Cf. संपद्य in संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.1).

(5) यथाःनद्य. स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छान्ति नामरूपे विहाय । तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥ (Mu.Upa.III 2.8).

(6) एवमेवैष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते । (Chā.Upa.VIII.12.3).

This 'becoming manifest' does not mean that the liberated soul *acquires* any new form or quality, because the Śruti (Chā. Upa. VIII.12.3) says that the form which becomes manifest is the soul's *own* form. The soul has the essence of the qualities of Brahman;[7] and that essence remains latent during the soul's bondage but becomes manifest in this liberation, just as *manliness* (पुंस्त्व) which is concealed in a child becomes manifest in a youth.[8] It was concealed on account of the desire of Brahman to become many or on account of the individual soul's contact with the body.[9]

This same original own form of the soul becomes manifest also in the deep sleep state when the soul lies in the (हिता) arteries,[10] because then the soul is separated from the contact with the body. But that manifestation is temporary, while the one in the state of liberation is permanent.

The soul whose 'own form' thus becomes manifest is 'the released one' (मुक्त).[11] This, it may be remarked, is in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra the only मुक्त, there being no other मुक्त like the क्रममुक्त, 'the one released gradually' or the सद्योमुक्त "the one released at once", of the Śaṅkara School because nowhere else in the Brahmasūtra do we find any other type of मुक्त. In Bra. Sū. III.4.52 this मुक्ति was called the fruit (फल) of the knowledge of Brahman. In Bra. Sū. I.3.2 we are told that the Puruṣa in Mu. Upa. III.2.8 is the One to be *reached* (उपसृप्य) by the released.[12] There is no

(7) Cf. सारवत्त्व in तद्गुणसारवत्त्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् । (Bra. Sū. II.3.29). We suggest that Sūtras II.3.28-32 discuss the relation of the individual soul and the Universal Soul. The Siddhānta is that the two are not absolutely identical.

(8) पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् । (Bra. Sū. II.3.31). Cf. also Bra. Sū. I.3.19.

(9) पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ । देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि । Bra. Sū. I.3.19.

(10) तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च । (Bra. Sū. III.2.7). Cf. also Bra. Sū. IV.4.16.

(11) मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् । (Bra. *Sū*. IV. 4.2).

(12) तथा विद्वान् नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् । (Mu. Up. III.2.8).

Sūtra treating of the state of the released other than Bra.Sū. IV.4 2.

It is *only the soul* [13] of the released, that becomes manifest, because the Śruti [14] describing the मुक्त clearly says that the physical body disappears in that state. The released one who appears in his own original nature after reaching Brahman appears without the subtle body which accompanied him during his journey on the Path of gods.[15]

Before the manifestation of the real nature of the soul, i. e., in the state of *bondage*, the soul is ' separated ' (विभक्त) from Brhaman, but in liberation he is ' not–separated ' (अविभक्त) from It. This non-separation[16] (अविभाग) is the state of मुक्ति, as described in the Śruti.[17] This 'non-separation' is, therefore, a state of union between Brahman and the soul, so that the two are in that state *no more numerically two*. 'There is no second principle separate from it, which the liberated may see.' It is the original state of 'one' which means 'without a second'.[18]

Thus, the menifestation of the soul (only), in its own original nature, in non-separation from Brahman is the state of liberation (Bra.Sū.IV.4.1–4). 'Manifestation in non–separation' means that there is no 'merging' of the soul into Brahman.

The next question is, 'What is the nature of the original form of the soul ? ' There are two views on this. In accordance with Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.4, Jaimini holds that the soul's own nature is that *of Brahman* (ब्राह्म) and he becomes manifest in the ब्राह्म

(13) आत्मा प्रकरणात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.3).

(14) मघवन्मर्त्यं वा इदं॰ शरीरमात्तं मृत्युना तदस्यामृतस्याशरीरस्यात्मनोऽधिष्ठानमात्तो वै सशरीर: प्रियाप्रियाभ्यां, न वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्त्यशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः । अशरीरो वायुरभ्रं......। एनम्........ (Chā.Upa.VIII.12.1–3). This is the प्रकरण referred to in Bra.Sū.IV.4.3.

(15) Vide 13 above.

(16) अविभागेन द्रष्टत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.4).

(17) Cf. न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत् । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.23-32).

(18) एकमेवाद्वितयिम् । (Chā.Upa.VI.2.1).

nature[19] while Auḍulomi's opinion[20] which is based on other Śrutis is that the original form of the soul is 'mere consciousness' (चिति तन्मात्र, विज्ञान) and that is the nature of the re-manifest released soul. The Sūtrakāra says that both these views are in agreement with the Śruti because we find both of them mentioned in the Śruti and originally the soul was 'consciousness pure and simple'.[21]

In the state of liberation the soul is described in the Upaniṣads as enjoying various objects of desire.[22] So the Sūtrakāra discusses the question, 'How does the liberated soul get these objects of enjoyment?' We are not to suppose[23] that these objects of desire are present in the Brahmaloka, as they are in the heaven or that the released soul has to *depend upon* some one else to get those objects. By the force of mere *will* he gets them. He has to desire to get an object and the object appears before him, as stated in Chā.Upa.VIII.2.10.[24] The Śrutis which speak of the liberated soul as 'sovereign' "स्वराट्" 'having no other Lord than himself'[25] do not mean that he is the master of the world or that he can create or destroy the world etc., rather they

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(19) ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः। (Bra.Sū.IV.4.5).

Cf. तद्यथा पेशस्कारी पेशसो मात्रामुपादायान्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं तनुते एवमेवायमात्मेदं शरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयित्वाऽन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते पित्र्यं वा गान्धर्वं वा दैवं वा प्राजापत्यं वा ब्राह्मं वान्येषां वा भूतानाम्। (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.4) Out of all these the ब्राह्म form is the one with which the released soul becomes manifest.

(20) चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मक त्वादित्यौडुलेामिः। (Bra.Sū.IV.4.6).

(21) We may suggest that "brāhma" would mean that soul is conscious and blissful (आनन्द) while चितितन्मात्र seems to mean that the soul is "consciousness" *only*.

(22) Cf.स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन्रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा। Cha.Upa.VIII.12.3.

(23) Cf. स वा एष एतेन दैवेन चक्षुषा मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते ॥६॥ य एते ब्रह्मलोके तं वा एतं देवा आत्मानमुपासते तस्मात्तेषां सर्वे च लोका आत्ताः सर्वे च कामाः।......। (Chā.Upa.VIII.12.5-6).

(24) यं यमन्तमभिकामो भवति यं कामं कामयते सोऽस्य संकल्पादेव समुत्तिष्ठति तेन संपन्नो महीयते। (ChāUpa.VIII.2.10).

(25) स स्वराड् भवति। (ChāUpa.VII.25.2). And अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः। (Bra.Sū.IV.4.9).

only mean that for his own enjoyment he has not to depend upon even Brahman. In bondage the soul *does actions*, but the result of the actions depends upon Brahman[26] because the action itself is unable to give him its result. In liberation *only his will* brings forth the objects of his desire (Bra.Sū.IV.4.8–9).

Though the Physical body which the soul carries while in 'bondage' disappears in the state of liberation inasmuch as *only* the soul becomes manifest in the latter state, it does not mean that he cannot have a new body suitable to his remanifest, natural state. Depending upon the different texts of the Upaniṣads Bādari argued that the released soul had no body, and Jaimini that he had not one only but as many bodies as he liked.[27] Bādarāyaṇa'[28] as usual with him, admits both the possibilities because there are Śrutis of both the kinds, viz., those which say that the released one has no body[29] and those which mean that he may have as many bodies as he would like,[30] since such a view would be in accordance with the example of the Dwadaśāha Sacrifice having a double nature because of two-fold Śrutis and since the *enjoyment* of desired objects in liberation would be possible in both the cases, as in dream in case he has no body, as in the waking state if he has a body.[31]

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(26) परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः । (Bra.Sū.II.3.41). We think, the Sutra means "परात्तु फलम्" and contradicts a view that the फल can be had from the प्रकृति or from the कर्मन्.

(27) अभावं बादरि राह ह्येवम् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.10).
भावं जैमिनि विकल्पामननात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.11).

(28) द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः । (Bṛ.Sū IV.4.12).

(29) Vide (14) above. And तद्यथाऽहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीर ;" शेतेऽथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव......। (Bra.Upa.IV.47).

(30) स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति पञ्चधा सप्तधा नवधा चैव पुनश्चैकादशधा स्मृतः शतं च दश चैकश्च सहस्राणि च विंशतिः । (Chā.Upa.VII.26.2).

(31) तन्वभावे संध्यवदुपपत्तेः । (Bra Sū.IV.4.13). And भावे च जाग्रद्वत् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.14).

In accordance with several Śrutis[32] the Sūtrakāra holds that the released soul has the quality of *pervasion* (आवेश), but this pervasion is *like that of a lamp* pervading the place where it is placed. The pervasion of the soul in liberation is like his pervasion in the deep-sleep state,[33] and therefore also the pervasion is like that of a lamp. This view of the Sūtrakāra with regard to the state of liberation is consistent with his statement about the nature of the soul that the individual soul possesses the essence (सार) of the qualities of Brahman and that this nature of the soul becomes manifest in the state of liberation.[34] Thus, the soul has the substance (सार) of the quality of omnipresence of Brahman.

The revealed or remanifest form of the soul is devoid of the operations or dealings of the world. Thus, in accordance with Chā.Upa.VIII.7.1 that form is "without sins, without old age, without death, without sorrow, without hunger, without thirst....'[35] We may also add that as stated in Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.22, in the state of liberation there is no relationship of parents and children, no distinction of castes, criminals, gods etc. etc.[36] Again, the form of the मुक्त is *far remote* from the world, so it is free from worldly dealings and operations (जगद्व्यापार). If it be argued that certain Śrutis like Mu.Upa.III.2.6[38] mention expressly the end of the Para and, therefore, the released souls also, who are there, would

(32) संप्राप्यैनमृषयो ज्ञानतृप्ताः कृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशान्ताः ।
ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्तात्मानः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति । (Mu.Upa.III.2.5)
And तदक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु सोम्य स सर्वतः सर्वमेवाविशान्ति । प्र० उप० IV.11.

(33) स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.16).

(34) तद्गुणसारवत्त्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् । (Bra.Sū.II.3.29).
And पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् । (Bra.Sū.II.3.31).

(35) य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः... । Chā. Upa.VIII.7.1.

(36) अत्र पिता अपिता भवति माताऽमाता लोका अलोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदा अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाऽभ्रूणहा चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः...... । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.22).

(37) जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.17).

(38) वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे । (Mu Upa.III.2.6).

be liable to death, the Sūtrakāra replies that such texts deal with those who belong to the group of officers in the Brahmaloka, i.e., the world of the Para and not with the released souls who are there.[39] Also Śrutis[40] mention the *continuance* of the liberated in the Brahmaloka; and this shows that the form of the liberated is not subject to any change.[41] Other Śrutis and Smṛtis[42] also state that the liberated are free from birth and death. As already stated,[43] the objects of desire arise *from mere desire* of the liberated. The Śruti says that the only point of similarity between the life in this world and the life of a released soul is that of enjoyment *only*.[44] There is no action, but there is enjoyment. In other words, there is भोक्तृत्व without कर्तृत्व. As the released one does no actions, he is free from birth and death. His revealed form is not subject to the operations of the world.

The released one in his remanifest form does not return to this world. The Sūtrakāra has already stated the departure of the knower of Brahman from this world[45] and his journey on the Path of gods.[46] Consistently with this, he now says that the released soul does not return from the world of the Para. The Sūtrakāra mentions the return to this world of one who does not know Atman;[47] but there is no such return in the case of an Atmajña.

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(39) प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.18).

(40) ते तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु परा परावतो वसन्ति । (Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15).
तस्मिन् वसत्ति शाश्वतीः समाः । (Bṛ.Upa.V.10.1.).
न च पुनरावर्तते । (Chā.Upa.VIII.15.1).

(41) विकरावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.17).

(42) इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च । (Bha.Gī.XIV.2).

(43) In संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.8).

(44) भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.21).

(45) In Bra.Sū.IV.2.

(46) In Bra.Sū.IV.3.

(47) In Bra.Sū.III.1.7-8 and II.2.19-20 and IV.1.1.

CHAPTER 7

SUTRAKARA'S INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN UPANISADS

The difference regarding the interpretation of the chief Upaniṣads between the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara seems to be not less important than the doctrinal difference between them. In Part I of our work the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of various Śrutis from the Upaniṣads has been given and supported by what seem to us to be the Sūtrakāra's own arguments; and occasionally we have also pointed out how he differs from Śaṅkara. Here we collect some of the more important of these passages and briefly state the position of the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara regarding their interpretation.

The most important feature of the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman is the fact that according to him we have to distinguish between the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् rather than between the निर्गुण and सगुण aspects of Brahman. Accordingly, he seems to point out the Śrutis about these aspects. In an Appendix we have given the Śrutis, which form the विषयवाक्यs of Bra.Sū.I. 1–3. On the strength of our interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3.11 and 39 we may state here that the Śrutis discussed in Brahmasūtra I.1 are to be explained according to the Sūtrakāra as dealing only with the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman. These Śrutis are Tai.Upa.III.6 and II.5, Chā.Upa.I.7.1–5, I.9.1, I.11.4–5, III. 13.1.7, and Kau.Upa.III.1.3.

Similarly, the Sūtrakāra *prefers to take* the following Śrutis as dealing with the रूपवत् aspect and discusses them in Bra. Sū. I.2:–Chā.Upa.III.14.1–2, Kaṭha Upa.II.24, and III.1, Chā.Upa. IV.15.1, Bṛ.Upa.III.7.1–2,Mu.Upa.I.1. 5-6,Chā.Upa.V.11.1–6.

This same kind of *preference* he shows in the interpretation of the following Śrutis and discusses them in Bra.Sū.I.3:–Mū.

Upa.II.2.5, Chā.Upa.VII.23–24, Bṛ.Upa.III.8.7–8, Pra.Upa.V.2 and 5, Chā.Upa.VIII.1.1, Mu.Upa.II.2.10, Kaṭha Upa.IV.13, Kaṭha Upa.VI.2, Chā.Upa.VIII.12 and 14, and Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.7.

According to the Sūtrakāra, we have to distinguish between the Śrutis dealing with the अरूपवत् aspect and the Śrutis dealing with the रूपवत् aspect, but not with the निर्गुण and सगुण aspects, because in his opinion *both* the aspects of Brahman have their own peculiar गुणs and therefore there is no aspect of Brahman absolutely without गुणs. We have above said that the Sūtrakāra *prefers* to explain certain Śrutis (those discussed in Bra Sū.I.2 and 3) as dealing with the रूपवत्. This means that he *would not object* to taking these Śrutis as pertaining to the अरूपवत्. This would be clear from a fact about the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of Śrutis, which we are just going to mention, viz., the fact of the interchange of attributes of these two aspects in the Śrutis themselves.

One of the most important points about the meaning of the ब्रह्म-Śrutis of the Upaniṣads emphasised by the Sūtrakāra is that in those Śrutis we have *an interchange of the attributes of the arūpavat or the Pradhāna aspect of Brahman and of the rūpavat or the Puruṣa aspect.*[1] He seems to say, "Take any Śruti about Brahman, and you will find the truth of this assertion."[2] On the strength of this fact of interchange of attributes of the two aspects, the Sūtrakāra makes three important statements, viz., (1) the attributes, सत्यसङ्कल्प and others, and the other group of attributes द्युभ्वाद्यायतन and others,collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.I.2 and I.3 respectively may, at the desire of a seeker, be taken in the meditation of the Pradhāna aspect of Brahman,[3] (2) it is not meant by the Sūtrakāra that in any meditation on Brahman (either on the Pradhāna or the Puruṣa aspect), the

(1) व्यतिहारो विंशिषन्ति हितरवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.37).

(2) सैव हि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.38).

(3) सत्यादय: कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्य: । (Br.Sū.III.39). See Part I.

attributes of both these aspects be collected by the meditator; all he means is that a meditator on a particular aspect should not drop such attributes of the other aspect as occur in the Śruti or Śrutis from which he gathers the attributes of that particular aspect;[4] and (3) that there is no rule which would help us in deciding which are the peculiar attributes of either of these two aspects; and the result of this view-point is that the Śruti *does not object to making separate thought about* each of the two aspects.[5]

From this statement about 'the interchange', we know that the Sūtrakāra has discussed in Bra.Sū.I.2 such Śrutis as expressly mention the Pradhāna aspect, but which the Sūtrakāra interprets as dealing with the Puruṣa, because they characterise the Pradhāna with the attributes of the Puruṣa and that in Bra.Sū.I.3 he has considered those Śrutis which profess to describe the Puruṣa and which the Sūtrakāra also takes as such but which characterise the Puruṣa with the characterstics of the Pradhāna. In the former Pāda, the Sūtrakāra emphasises the mention of the *attributes* of the Puruṣa and in the latter the express mention of *the very term* Puruṣa.[6] In the first Pāda he discusses only those Śrutis which mention the Pradhāna or the Arūpavat aspect in express terms. In Bra.Sū.III.3.11 he says that आनन्द and other attributes collected by him in Bra.Sū.I.1 are to be used in the meditation on the Prādhana.

From the interchange of the attributes and from the option regarding their use in the meditation,[7] we can safely conclude

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.40-41. Vide our Interpretation.

(5) अनियमः सर्वासामविरोधः शब्दानुमानाभ्याम् ॥ (Bra.Sū.III.3.31).

(6) We admit that this suggestion of ours regarding the scheme of the arrangement of the विषयवाक्यs in Bra.Sū.I.2-3 cannot be said to be finally proved till we can show it by working out an interpretation of those Pādas. But this we cannot do in this work. We refer the reader to our Paper on the subject in the Bombay University Journal Vol. IV, Part III. In this work we draw our conclusions chiefly from Bra.Sū.III.3. See Appendix I also.

(7) Vide (1)-(3) supra.

that the Śrutis discussed in Bra.Sū.I.2–3 should not be interpreted as describing only the Pradhāna or only the Puruṣa. In fact, they describe both the aspects of Brahman. But Śaṅkara does not hold this view. In his opinion some of these Śrutis describe *only* the निर्गुण Brahman and some only the सगुण Brahman.

According to the Śāṅkara School Bra.Sū.I.2 and I.3 deal respectively with the उपास्य or सगुण Brahman and the *jneya* or निर्गुण Brahman.[8] That the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara differ regarding the interpretation of these Śrutis is also clear if we compare Śaṅkara's commentary on the Śrutis which form the विषयवाक्यs of Bra.Sū.I.2–3, as written by Śaṅkara under the various Sūtras with the same in the respective Upaniṣads.[9] We find several cases where a Śruti interpreted by Śaṅkara in his भाष्य on the respective Upaniṣad as dealing with the निर्गुण Brahman has got to be interpreted by him as dealing with the सगुण aspect when that Śruti is a विषयवाक्य of some Sūtra in Brahmasūtra I.2–3. Even the fact that the Sūtrākara emphasises the guṇas or धर्मs of the supreme Being in his interpretation of several Śrutis which are according to Śaṅkara निर्गुणपरा, brings out the difference between these two Ācāryas as regards the interpretation of these Śrutis.[10] Moreover, Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Upaniṣads has several occasions to explain a term describing the impersonal aspect, e.g., Brahman, as Hiraṇyagarbha and a term describing the personal aspect, e.g,, Puruṣa, as Brahman.[11] All these interpretational inconsistencies of Śaṅkara would dis-

(8) Vide S'aṅkara's remarks on Bra.Sū.I.2.1 and the remarks of the Bhāmatīkāra, the author of the Ratnaprabhā, and Anandagiri in their introductions to शा. भा. on Bra.Sū.I.3. Regarding this and the views of Rāmānuja and Vallabha on the same, see the author's Paper on the Scheme of Brahmasūtra I.1-3 : A Reapproachment, Journal of the University of Bombay Vol. IV. Part III, PP. 112-120.

(9) Illustrations of the result of this comparison have been given in our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.37-39 and need not be repeated here.

(10) Vide Bra.Sū.I.2.21, I.3.10.

(11) Vide शाङ्करभाष्य on श्रुतिs with the words ब्रह्म or अक्षर and पुरुष.

appear if the Sūtrakāra's view about *the interchange of attributes* of the two aspects in the Śruti be properly appreciated.

About the interpretation of the S'rutis the Sūtrakāra holds that the रूपवत् aspect has terms (or names) in common with the Para, i.e., the अरूपवत् aspect and that the particular application of a term to either of the two aspects must depend upon the frequency of use.[12] Thus, Brahman, Puruṣa, Atman, Akṣara, Avyakta, etc., are all of them terms common to the Puruṣa and to the Pradhāna.[13] This would also mean that from the mere occurrence of one of these terms in a Śruti we cannot say whether that Sruti deals with the अरूपवत् aspect or with the रूपवत् aspect. The Sūtrakāra holds the theory of *the interchange of attributes* in Śrutis and would therefore say that each Śruti may be interpreted as pertaining to both the aspects.

In this connection we may here note that on the above two theories of interpretation, viz., (1) the interchange of attributes of the two aspects in the Śrutis and (2) the common terminology of the two aspects, the Sūtrakāra bases his doctrine that the meditation on either aspect practised independently of the other aspect leads to the same result, viz., Mokṣa.[14] And, therefore, he gives an option of choice from the two aspects.[15]

From among all the terms of the Supreme Being used in the Upaniṣads, the Sūtrakāra seems to make *two classes of terms* or rather he seems to regard *two terms* as definitely fixed for the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects respectively. These terms are अव्यक्त[16] and पुरुष. On the basis of the difference of these two terms he

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(12) परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.52).

(13) Vide Note (37) on the Sūtra.

(14) तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेःपृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.42).
and अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्चत दुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.50).

(15) छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.28).
and लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः । in Bra.Sū.III.3.44.

(16) तदव्यक्तमाह हि । (Bra.Sū.III.2.23).

accepts a Pūrvapakṣa view to regard the two ideas or aspects of Brahman as different from each other.[17] In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā the difference of sarcifices is admitted on the ground of the difference of names (ākhyās). The Sūtrakāra follows that rule in the matter of the independence of the two aspects of Brahman[18].

One very important remark of the Sūtrakāra about the topic of the Śrutis of the various Upaniṣads is that the अरूपवत् aspect is described *in a majority of* Śrutis.[19] Thus, we can conclude that the Puruṣa aspect is dealt with by a minority of Śrutis. The truth of this remark can be admitted by a student of the Upaniṣads without, of course, making a calculation of the Śrutis dealing with either aspect.

We may also mention here another view of the Sūtrakāra which he seems to us to give about the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda. According to him the Pūrvakāṇḍa often gives the attributes of the अरूपवत् aspect but it *never* mentions the other attributes of Brahman such as are found in the Puruṣavidyā of the Upaniṣads.[20] He refers to the Khila of the Rāṇāyanīya Śākhā of the Sāmaveda, a Śruti of which mentions संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति which are two attributes of the अरूपवत् aspect.[21] This absence of the attributes of the Puruṣa in the Pūrvakāṇḍa is *one* of the reasons why the Sūtrakāra looks upon the two Kāṇḍas as dealing with the two independent topics, viz., Dharma and Brahman, and does not wish to interpret the Pūrvakāṇḍa in the light of the Upaniṣads.

The Sūtrakāra admits that in the Śrutis about the Prajāpatiloka as well as about Brahman the persons going to that 'loka' or Brahman are described as *experiencing an enjoyment* of their desired objects.[22] This enjoyment of desired objects is

(17) संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.8).
(18) सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे । (Bra.Sū.III.3.10).
(19) Vide (15) supra.
(20) पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.24).
(21) संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.23).
(22) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापत्तिः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.51) and भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.21).

common to the Prajāpatiloka and Brahman on the one hand and to the other worlds including our world and the worlds of the deities on the other hand.[23] But even inspite of this the Sūtrakāra does not accept the view (of Opponents like Bādari and Jaimini) that the Prajāpatiloka is an *ordinary* लोक. Bādari and Jaimini hold that the Prajāpatiloka is a कार्य of Brahman[24] and, therefore, they seem to have believed that the Prajāpatiloka is a world like the ordinary worlds. It is noteworthy that the Sūtrakāra denies the fault of लोकापत्ति entailing on the Prajāpatiloka. And, again, Śaṅkara says that there is no भोग or experience of enjoyment in the absolute liberation, but the Sūtrakāra (along with Bādari and Jaimini) seems to believe that in the Para the Muktas enjoy their desired objects;[25] but inspite of this enjoyment the state and the form of the Muktas are devoid of the creation and destruction, the two out of the three functions of our world.[26] The difference between Śaṅkara's interpretation of the word 'Prajāpatiloka' where it occurs in the Śrutis and that of the Sūtrakāra can also be known from the fact that Śaṅkara proposes to add the Prajāpatiloka to the worlds mentioned by the Sūtrakāra,[27] though the Sūtrakāra seems to have dropped its mention in the list of the worlds *purposely*. The latter takes the Prajāpatiloka as an aspect, here the personal aspect, of the Kāraṇa itself, whose other aspect is the impersonal one.[28] Thus, the Sūtrakāra would not take "Prajāpatiloka" as an ordinary लोक.

In Bra.Sū.III.2.13, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to give his interpretation of the S'rutis which describe Brahman as having a

(23) This is the sense of सामान्य in Bra.Sū.III.3.51 and भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.21).

(24) कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.7). We have shown that Jaimini also believed in the Prajāpatiloka.

(25) तन्वभावे संध्यवदुपपत्तेः । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.13); भावे जाग्रद्वत् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.14).

(26) जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् । (Bra.Sū.IV.4.17) and भोगमात्र......(Bra.Sū.IV.4.21). see (Bra.Sū.IV.4.19).

(27) Vide S'aṅkara's bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.IV.3.3.

(28) Vide our Notes on विशेषं च दर्शयति । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.16).

double nature (उभयलिङ्ग) or what may be called *cogita oppositorum.*[29] According to the Sūtrakāra such Śrutis mean that the *same* Brahman is *at the same time arūpavat* and also the *rūpavat.* Thus, अपाणिपादम् means that the Supreme Being is अरूपवत् because hands and feet which refer to a form, viz, the पुरुष रूप, are denied of Brahman here, while जवन: and गृहीता respectively affirm feet and hands of Brahman and thus assert Its form (रूप). We may add that according to Śaṅkara these Śrutis describe the निर्गुण and सगुण aspects of Brahman of which the निर्गुण is absolutely real while सगुण is only relatively real; according to Rāmānuja they deny all despikable or censurable qualities of Brahman and affirm all meritorious characteristics in Brahman; while in the opinion of Vallabha the negation refers to all worldly (प्राकृत) attributes and the affirmation to all divine (दिव्य) qualities, thus according to him these Śrutis mean that Brahman has no feet and hands such as we have but It has divine feet and hands. The Sūtrakāra interprets such texts as proving that Brahman is both पुरुषविध and अपुरुषविध *at the same time.*

The Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the Śrutis describing Brahman as having a two-fold mutually contradictory nature, if correct as explained by us above, gives us a clue to his explanation of the Śrutis which describe Brahman *only negatively* (नेति, नेति) and those which do it *only positively.* The Sūtrakāra seems to take the former type of Śrutis as *denying only* and latter a *affirming only* the (पुरुष) रूप of Brahman and not as treating with the impossibility or possibility of certain or all गुण in Brahman. In fact, accordiag to the Sūtrakara, they have nothing to do with the गुणs of Brahman except the one गुण viz., रूप 'form'. The Śrutis[30] which deny that there is a second reality besides Brahman are interpreted by Śaṅkara as denying not only a second principle similar or dissimilar to Brahman but also the possibility of any distinction like that of parts and the whole or attributes and the possessor

(29) अपि चैवमेके । Bra.Sū.III.2.13. Vide Pt. I for the श्रुतिs.

(30) Vide, e. g., शाङ्करभाष्य on तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य: । (Bra. Sū.II.1.14).

of attributes *within* Brahman Itself. The Sūtrakāra however makes use of such Śrutis in refuting a Pūrvapakṣa arguing that the Unmanifest or अव्यक्त Brahman is lower and the Puruṣa is higher Brahman, and thus apparently believing in two principles called Brahman both being conscious and eternal.[31] Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra these Śrutis deny only a second principle and do not deny the possibility of स्वगतभेद in Brahman.

It is very difficult to interpret the Mu.Upa. Śruti in which we read of 'अक्षरम् पुरुषम्' because it seems to be the only Śruti in the accepted Upaniṣads, placing अक्षर and पुरुष in the same grammatical connection.[32] An Opponent interprets this to mean that one should know the Akṣara as पुरुष i.e., the conception of पुरुष is a mental projection (क्रिया मानसवत्) on the अक्षर.[33] But the Sūtrakāra referring to the same Upaniṣad[34] proves that the knowledge of the Puruṣa is ब्रह्मविद्या just as that of the Akṣara.[35] Thus, the Sūtrakāra would explain 'अक्षरं पुरुषम्' as proving that Brahman is at the same time अरूपवत् (अक्षरम्) and also रूपवत् (पुरुषम्).[36] Śaṅkara cannot explain this Śruti by referring पुरुष to its conventional sense of 'anthropomorphic form'; the only way for him is to give the word an etymological sense of 'पूर्ण मनेन इदं सर्वम्.'

If it be asked "How the same Brahman be possessed of two mutually contradictory aspects each of which would give the same result, viz., Mokṣa ?", the Sūtrakāra replies (1) that because we find (उपलब्धि) such a Brahman in the Upaniṣads, this principle is quite reasonable (उपपन्न) on the analogy of an ordinary example like the same destination being reached by persons approaching

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(31) परमतःसेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः। (Bra.Sū.III.2.31).
and तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्। (Bra.Sū.III.2.36).

(32) येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्। Mu.Upa.I.2.13.

(33) प्रकरणात्स्यात् क्रिया मानसवत् (Bra.Sū.III.3.45).

(34) The Sūtrakāra seems to emphasise पुरुष and ब्रह्मविद्या also in Mu. Upa. I.2.13. Vide (32) supra.

(35) विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् (Bra.Sū.III.3.47).
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद् विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम्। (Mu.Upa.III.2.8) and दर्शनाच्च। (Bra.Sū.III.3.48).

(36) Vide Sūtras I.2.21-23 which deal with the same S'rutis.

it from two opposite directions,[37] and (2) that as Śruti and Smṛti are 'more powerful' than Preception and Inference, there is no contradiction in such a doctrine about Brahman.[38] Thus, it is finally by an appeal *to the word* of the Scripture that the Sūtrakāra can explain the propriety of the two mutually contradictory aspects *of equal status* in his interpretation of the Upaniṣads. In order to explain their propriety and reasonableness the Sūtrakāra has not adopted the method of lowering one of the two aspects; as seems to have been done by an Opponent who believed that the Puruṣa is higher than the Avyakta, a view which we shall soon discuss, or as has been, in later times, done by Śaṅkara who holds that the अरूपवत् is absolutely real while the रूपवत् is relatively so. Either of these two procedures may be justified by the demand of rationalism but such a method would be hostile to the belief in the *equal authority* of *all* the Srutis, because both these procedures would make one set of Srutis literally true and the other true in a secondary sense only.

We take up another point of interpretational difference between these two Ācaryas. There is a great difference between them in the interpretation of those Śrutis in which the Puruṣa is said to be higher than the Unmanifest or the Immutable (अव्यक्त or अक्षर).[39]

The Sūtrakāra says that the Brahman is "Avyakta because the Śruti says so",[40] and in the same Adhikaraṇa he refutes a Pūrvapakṣa according to which "From this Avyakta a seeker is united with the Endless because such is the Śruti",[41] by saying that 'Because Brahman has two names, viz., अव्यक्त and पुरुष, Brahman is like अहि the serpent and like कुण्डल the coil of the

(37) उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेर्लोकवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.30).

(38) श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.49).

(39) महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः । (Kaṭha Upa.III.11) and
दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः......अक्षरात्परतः परः । (Mu.Upa.II.1.2).

(40) तदव्यक्त माह हि । (Bra.Sū.III.2.23).

(41) अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.26).

serpent,[42] and because in the case of the Puruṣa there is a negation, viz., that His रूप is invisible to the eye.[43] Immediately after this Adhikaraṇa he takes up for discussion another Pūrvapakṣa which argues that there is a second principle higher than this Avyakta and refutes it in five Sūtras.[44] Lastly in an अतिदेश the Sūtrakāra establishes that the Avyakta is सर्वगत 'omnipresent'.[45]

We have pointed out in course of our interpretation of the Sūtras referred to above that these Sūtras refer to the famous परापर ladder of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad[46] and that a Pūrvapakṣa based upon these Kaṭha S'rūtis is here refuted by the Sūtrakara. According to the Sūtrakāra the Avyakta is the highest principle; It is the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman. So in the series of Kaṭha Upa.III.10 and VI.8, we have to take according to the Sūtrakāra the Avyakta as the अरूपवत् Brahman. In Kaṭha Upa.VI.8 we read that the Puruṣa is omnipresent and that He is *higher than* the Avyakta. So a Pūrvapakṣin argues that from the Unmanifest a meditator unites with the व्यापक or अनन्त, the Endless, viz., the Puruṣa.[47] The Sūtrakāra says that अव्यक्त and पुरुष are *two names* of Brahman and therefore Brahman is अरूपवत् like अहि and रूपवत् like कुण्डल;[48] he also draws attention to the fact that in Kaṭha Upa.VI.9 we are told that the रूप of the Puruṣa is not visible to the eye;[49] this shows that the Puruṣa is not different from the Avyakta or that the Puruṣa is another name of the Avyakta.

(42) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27).
(43) पूर्ववद्वा । (Bra.Sū.III.2.29).
(44) Viz., Bra.Sū.III.2.33-36.
(45) अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.37).
(46) Kaṭha Upa.III.10-11 and VI.8-9.
(47) अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम् । Bra.Sū.III.2.26.
अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च ।
यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरमृतत्त्वं च गच्छति ॥ (Kaṭha Upa.VI.8).
(48) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27).
(49) प्रतिषेधाच्च । Bra.Sū.III.2.30. This refers to
न संदृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् । Kaṭha VI. 9.

There are many Śrutis particularly in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads in which a principle *higher than* the अरूपवत् or Avyakta is mentioned; and Kaṭha Upa.III.11 and VI.8 is one of them. Another Śruti of that type is Mu.Upa.II.1.1–2[50]. Bhagavadgītā VIII.19–22,[51] also places the Puruṣa higher than the Avyakta. Here we are concerned with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad Śruti. The Sūtrakāra having taken the Avyakta as the ultimate principle called Brahman, the followers of the Kaṭha Śākhā argue that the Puruṣa is higher than the Avyakta.[52] We have explained how the arguments of सेतुव्यपदेश, उन्मानव्यपदेश, संबन्धव्यपदेश and भेदव्यपदेश are based upon the Kaṭha Upaniṣad itself. Thus, सेतुव्यपदेश refers to the fact that in Kaṭha Upa.III.2[53] the Avyakta or the impersonal aspect of Brahman is called a bridge. The उन्मानव्यपदेश seems to us to be a reference to the description of the Avyakta as argued by the Opponent, as अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुष in Kaṭha Upa. IV.12-13,[54] distinct from the व्यापक पुरुष of Kaṭha Upa.VI.9. The third argument is based upon the fact argued by the Opponent that the individual soul seems to be already connected *with the*

(50) तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद्विस्फुल्लिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः ।
तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापियन्ति ॥ १ ॥
दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः ।
अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः ॥ Mu.Upa.II.1.1.2.

(51) अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्त स्तमाहुः परमां गतिम् ।
यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद् धाम परमं मम ॥
पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ।
यस्यान्तःस्थानि भूतानि येन सर्वमिदं ततम् ॥ (Bha.Gī.VIII.21-22).

Here the पुरुष is higher than (परः) the अव्यक्त अक्षर. Vide the present author's Akṣara: A Forgotten Chapter.

(52) परमतःसेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.31).

(53) यःसेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् ।
अभयं तितीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतश्शकेमहि ॥ (KaṭhaUpa.III.2).

(54) अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते । एतद्वैतत् ॥
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्वः एतद्वैतत् ॥ Katha. Upa.IV.12-13.

Avyakta according to Kaṭha Upa.IV.4[55] and that therefore the Reality with which he expects to be connected must be higher than this Avyakta. The भेदव्यपदेश meant by the Pūrvapakṣa would be very probably the भेद of पर and अपर, the अव्यक्त Brahman mentioned by the Sūtrakāra[56] being the latter.[57]

The Sūtrakāra having greater regard for the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads seems to have refuted the view of the followers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Smṛti. He explains away the arguments of सेतु, उन्मान and संबन्ध from the stand-point of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads which was an historically correct stand-point; and he refutes the argument of भेद 'difference' between the Avyakta and the Puruṣa by referring to the same argument as he gives in Bra.Sū.III.2.27–30 in reply to similar objection from an Opponent, viz., the analogies of प्रकाश and its आश्रय or अहि and कुण्डल.[58] By the word अनन्त which was used for व्यापक in Kaṭha Upa.VI.8,[59] it was implied that the Avyakta is not omnipresent, but the Puruṣa only is omnipresent (व्यापक); so by an अतिदेश the Sūtrakāra also proves that the Avyakta is omnipresent.[60] Thus, it seems to be clear that the Sūtrakāra interprets the Avyakta in such S'rutis as Kaṭha Upa. as the final principle and the Puruṣa as another "name" of that final principle[61]. The same argument of 'omnipresence' is once again used for the same purpose of denying two ultimate omnipresent principles in Bra.Sū.III.3.10[62].

(55) स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ (Kaṭha Upa.IV.4).

(56) तदव्यक्तमाह हि । (Bra.Sū.III.2 23).

(57) For a detailed explanation of these four arguments based upon the text of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad itself, vide our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.2.31.

(58) Bra.Sū.III.2.32-36 above. Vide our interpretation of these Sūtras in Part I.

(59) Vide Notes on Sūtra III 2.26.

(60) अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः । (Bra.Sū III.2.37).

(61) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.27).

(62) व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.10).

In the Sūtras of Bra.Sū. III.2 discussed above we have a Pūrvapakṣa asserting that the Avyakta is Brahman but that there is also another principle *higher than* that Avyakta. Besides this, there is also another group of Sūtras I.4.1–7 which discusses a Pūrvapkṣa that the Avyakta in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is the Ānumānika[63], a principle based upon अनुमान (i. e., a Smṛti like the Bhagavadgīta ?) of the Sāṁkhyas[64]. The Sūtrakāra says that the explanation (गृहीति) of the Avyakta is mentioned in the Allegory of the Chariot[65]. If we look to that allegory we find that the Supreme Abode which is the Terminus of the Journey seems to have been taken by the Sūtrakāra as the principle called अव्यक्त [66]. The Sūtrakāra also draws attention to the Kaṭha Śruti in which the principle "*higher than the Mahat*" *is* said to be Brahman and the Avyakta is said to be *higher than the Mahat* in Kaṭha Upa.III.11; so, the Sūtrakāra says that this Śruti *shows* [68] that the Avyakta is Brahman, 'the knowledge of which brings release from the world'. But as Brahman has two aspects–the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्, the Sūtrakāra says that the Avyakta is the अरूपवत् or, in other words, सूक्ष्म aspect of Brahman, because the अरूपवत् or सूक्ष्म which cannot be seen, being without रूप or form, can be *fittingly* called "अव्यक्त" [69]. As to why the Puruṣa is placed higher than the Avyakta, the Sūtrakāra says that the Puruṣa is placed higher than the Avyakta, the अरूपवत् Brahman, because the Puruṣa, the रूपवत् aspect, is dependent upon the Avyakta, the अरूपवत् or सूक्ष्म aspect, just as the अर्थाः or objects of sense which

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(63) आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च । (Bra.Sū I.4.1).

(64) See Appendix

(65) शरीररूपक=रथरूपक, because the body is allegorically the chariot.

(66) Cf. अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्त स्तमाहुः परमां गतिम् ।
यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम ॥ (Bha.Gī. VIII.20-21) Here also अव्यक्त is declared to be the Supreme Abode of the Lord.

(67) अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत्। अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते Kaṭha Upa.III.15.

(68) दर्शयति च । in the above Sūtra.

(69) सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.1.4.2) In this Sūtra सूक्ष्मम् means अरूपवत्.

are dependent upon the senses for their perception are placed *above* the senses in Kaṭha Upa.III.10a[70]. As the Puruṣa or the रूपवत् aspect is said to be dependent on the Avyakta just like अर्थाः or objects which are dependent upon the senses, we should conclude that the Avyakta is the सूक्ष्म or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, but not the Avykata of the Sāṁkhyas. Also the Avyakta is not the Sāṁkhya principle because in this Kaṭha Upaniaṣad passage the Avyakta or the अरूपवत् is *not the topic to be known.* If on the strength of Kaṭha Upa.III.15, the Opponent argues that the Avyakta is here taught as a principle *to be known* for absolution like the Sāṁkhya principle in the Sāṁkhya works; the Sūtrakāra replies that the प्राज्ञ or the Puruṣa is here the object of knowledge rather than the अव्यक्त because the context shows that only the प्राज्ञ or पुरुष is intended to be taught in this passage.[72] In Bra.Sū.I.2.11 the Sūtrakāra has shown that one of these "two in the heart" is the Puruṣa.[73] In Bra.Sū.II.3.29 the Sūtrakāra says that the प्राज्ञ or the Puruṣa, the personal aspect, is called "अक्षर", 'ब्रह्मन्' "आत्मन्" (i. e., the impersonal aspect) in several Śrutis because it possesses the substance of attributes of the Avyakta or the *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman.[74] We may say that the *question* of Naciketas in Kaṭha Upa.II.14,[75] though a question about the प्राज्ञ or the पुरुष, who is different (अन्यत्र) from धर्म, कृत, भूत, i. e., the created world and also from अधर्म (धर्मरहित), अकृत भव्य, i. e., the Avyakta Brahman, *is in fact one question*

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(70) तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 3). अर्थवत् is a reference to "इन्द्रियेभ्यः पराः ह्यर्थाः" in Kaṭha Upa.III.10 a.

(71) ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च। (Bra.Sū.I.4.4).

(72) वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात्। (Bra.Sū.I.4.5).

(73) गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात्। (Bra.Sū.I.2.11).

(74) Cf. प्राज्ञवत् in तद्गुणसारवत्त्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्। (Bra.Sū.II.3.19).

(75) अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात्।
अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यासि तद्वद ॥ (Kaṭha Upa.II.14). We believe, धर्म, कृत and भूत mean the created world, अधर्म or धर्मरहित, अकृत and भव्य mean अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् and the one other than these two is the Puruṣa about whom the Questiou is asked to Yama. "नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन" shows that अकृत is Brahman.

about three, viz., the created world, the Avyakta or the अरूपवत् Brahman and the Puruṣa or the रूपवत् Brahman. Similarly, we may say that Kaṭha Upa.III.10–11 is a reply *mentioning* the created world (beginning with senses and ending with the Mahat), the Avyakta or the अरूपवत् aspect, and the Puruṣa or the रूपवत् aspect.[77] Thus, it is only in a secondary sense that the Avyakta is included in the question and in the reply here. The principal topic is the Puruṣa (Bra.Sū.I.4.5–7). And as this Puruṣa, the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman, is here said to be dependent upon the Avyakta in accordance with the analogy of the objects of sense (अर्थाः which are here said to be *higher* than the senses because they are *dependent* on the senses), the Sūtrakāra concludes that the Avyakta is the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, on which the रूपवत् or the Puruṣa aspect depends.

From the above interpretation of Bra.Sū.I.4.1–7 we gather that according to the Sūtrakāra the Avyakta is the अरूपवत् or सूक्ष्म aspect of Brahman and that the Puruṣa, the personal aspect, is said to be higher than the Avyakta because the Puruṣa is the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman and depends upon the Avyakta or the अरूपवत्.

Thus, the information about the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of Kaṭha Upa.III.10–11 and VI.8–9, derived from Bra.Sū.III.2 is quite consistent with the same derived from Bra.Sū.I.4.1–7.

Śaṅkara differs from the Sūtrakāra as regards the interpretation of this Kaṭha Upa. Śruti and brings in his theory about the हिरण्यगर्भ by interpreting the Avyakta as हिरण्यगर्भ and the Puruṣa as the निर्गुण Brahman, though 'पुरुष' is not a proper term for the निर्गुण one. This interpretation of Śaṅkara makes a vast difference in the philosophical doctrine about the nature of Brahman, particularly the रूपवत् or साकार Brahman.

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(76) त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च । S'aṅkara explains the Sūtra as if it read "त्रय एव चैवमुपन्यासाः प्रश्नाश्च ।"

(77) Cf. उपन्यासः in त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च । (Bra.Sū.I.4.6).

For the above reason, we believe that the Sūtrakāra takes अव्यक्त and पुरुष as respectively the निराकार and साकार aspects of Brahman. It is also noteworthy for the *original* interpretation of the कठ उपानिषद् *itself* that originally the Puruṣa was regarded as *really higher* than the Avyakta, both being Brahman. The Pūrvapakṣas given by the Sūtrakāra prove this.

An important point about the meditation on Brahman leading to the achievement of Mokṣa in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra seems to us to be presented by him in Bra.Sū.III.3. He seems to interpret the Srutis which mention such meditations as dealing *with three different kinds of meditations.*[78] Some Srutis describe the meditation on Brahman not conceived as consisting of parts, while others present the same based upon the parts of Brahman. An example of the latter is the meditation on the वैश्वानर Atman[79] or the meditation known as the उपकोशलविद्या.[80] The former type of meditation is again two-fold according as one meditates on the अरूपवत् aspect or the Pradhāna and on the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman or the Puruṣa. The latter can be illustrated by the meditation on the Puruṣa in Mu.Upa.II.1. 2–3,[81] while the former by, e.g., the meditation on आनन्द as Brahman.[82] We have already given full details of these and we may not deal with them here once again except only to show how the Sūtrakāra seems to divide the Srutis according to these three kinds of उपासनाs.[83]

Besides these *three* types of meditations the Sūtrakāra seems to explain the Upaniṣads as dealing with two more, which,

(78) जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात् । (Bra.Sū.I.1.31).

(79) तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा संदेहो बहुलो बस्तिरेव रयिः पृथिव्येव पादौ । (Chā.Upa.V.18.2).

(80) (Chā.Upa.IV.10-14).

(81) Vide (143) Supra on P. 42.

(82) आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । (Tai.Upa.III.6).

(83) They are discussed in Bra.Sū.III.3.10-54 (अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects) and Bra.Sū.III.3.55-66 (अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः)

however, do not lead to Mokṣa. One of them is a voluntary or काम्य meditation, an example of which would be the meditation on नामन् as Brahman.[84] The other is a meditation concerned with some ritual or some text of the ritual.[85]

Thus, a Śruti in which a meditation on Brahman is mentioned would belong to one of the above classes. This seems to us to be the Sūtrakāra's stand–point of interpreting the Śrutis dealing with the उपासनाs of Brahman.

In Bra.Sū.III.2.1–8, the Sūtrakāra says that the dreaming state does not explain the bondage of the individual soul because the creation in that state is "only jugglery" (Bra.Sū.III.2.1–4). According to the Sūtrakāra, we cannot explain the Śrutis about the individual soul's transmigration and release from it by referring to the different states of the soul, but rather the transmigration and its reverse are due to the fact that soul's real nature has been hidden or concealed on account of *the thought of the Supreme One (to become many)*. Or, as an alternative, we may say that the bondage of the soul is due to the contact of the soul with the body (not due to any of the three states of the soul) and that the absence of that contact (not the absence of bondage) takes place when the soul is in the *hitā* (हिता) arteries and in the Supreme Soul; and, therefore when the soul comes to the waking state (which means union with the body), he does so from this Supreme Soul (Bra.Sū.III.2.6–8). Thus, the soul is affected really, not by the three states but by his contact with the body or rather by the thought of the Supreme One, which led to the concealment of the soul's real nature and consequently his bondage and freedom.

Having thus refuted the view that the three states affect the soul and explain his bondage and freedom, the Sūtrakāra simi-

(84) A series of such meditations is given in Chā.Upa.VII. Vide Note 5 (b) on Bra.Sū.III.3.55.

(85) E.g., Chā.Upa.I.11.5 where Brahman is identified with deity of प्रस्ताव. Vide our interpretation of यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3-32).

larly refutes the view that also *the same three states explain the application of the two-fold Śrutis* (about the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects) to the Supreme One, because these two-fold Śrutis are applicable to Brahman in *all* the states.[86] He does not deny the states but he denies that they affect the Para. If it be argued that there is difference in Brahman caused by the different states, the Sūtrakāra says that there is a *Śruti* expressly stating that the Para is *without any change in each of the three states.*[87] The Sūtrakāra probably refers to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* in which Prajāpati explains to Indra how the individual soul and Brahman with which the individual soul is identical remain changeless *in each of the three states.*[88] Other arguments also are given by the Sūtrakāra to prove that the Supreme Being is is unaffected by the states and that therefore Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् in *all the three states* (सर्वत्र in Sūtra III.2.11), viz., (1) the followers of a certain Branch of the Veda declare that Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् in all the states, (2) that Brahman is only अरूपवत् because it is mainly so, and (3) that the Para is not of the nature of Light though it can be compred with light.[89] It is also stated by the Sūtrakāra that the change of Brahman in the form of Brahman being subject to increment and decrement is due to the self-concealment of Brahman and therefore it cannot be explained as taking place due to the three states of Brahman.[90] Thus the three states do not affact the Supreme Soul *as well as* the individual soul.

It seems to us that in the above Sūtras, the Sūtrakāra is refuting a Pūrvapakṣa based upon *such a text as the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.* The Sūtrakāra understands this Śruti as taking the

(86) न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि । (Bra.Sū.III.2.11).

(87) न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् । Vide our Notes on the Sūtra. (Bra.Sū.III.2.12).

(88) (Chā.Upa.VIII.7.11). Vide also Bra.Sū.I.3.14-21-viz., the दहराधिकरण.

(89) Bra.Sū.III.2.13-19. Vide our Interpretation in Part I.

(90) Bra.Sū.III.2.20-22.

dreaming world as really created by the individual soul himself (as said in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad) and as explaining the soul's bondage and freedom from it as connected with his different states. Similarly,[91] the Sūtrakāra also believes the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad to be explaining the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् Srutis of Brahman with reference to the different states (स्थानs) of Brahman. He rejects these explanations of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. He shows that transmigration and Mokṣa of the soul are due to the desire of the Supreme Being (to be many ?) or that the bodage is due to the contact of the soul with the body and freedom from it takes place when the soul is in the हिता arteries or in the Supreme Atman. He also proves that the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् texts about the Supreme Being are not to be explained as referring to the different states (स्थानs) of the Para, but thay describe Brahman in *all* the states (सर्वत्र) and that Brahman is the same (i.e., two-fold) in *all* the states according to *the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*[92]

It should be noted that the Sūtrakāra seems to differ from the interpretation of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and that he holds that that Upaniṣad does not agree with the teaching of Chā.Upa.VIII.7-12. He thinks that the states of the soul and the Supreme One are real, but that the creation in the case of only the dreaming state of the individual soul is unreal or "jugglery". The Sūtrakāra unlike Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara does not think that these states are due to Avidyā or Māyā.

One more Śruti on which the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara seem to have differed is Chā.Upa.VII.26.1, which seems to be discussed in Bra.Sū.III.2.20-22. According to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, the different states offer an explanation of the *change* in Brahman. The Sūtrakāra holds that Brahman is *the same*, it is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, *in all the states* (Bra.Sū.III.2.11), so he seems to offer

(91) This is the sense of अपि in न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयालिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि । (Bra.Sū.III.2.11.)

(92) प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् । in Bra.Sū.III.2.12 refers to Chā.Upa.VIII.9-10-11.

in Bra.Sū.III.2.20–22 an explanation of the change possible of Brahman, just as he offers an explanation of the bondage and its reverse in the case of the individual soul in Bra.Sū.III.2.5–8, because he does not accept the view that they (bondage and its reverse) are to be explained by the different states of the soul.

We have shown that increment (वृद्धि) and decrement (ह्रास) of Brahman discussed in these Sūtras are two out of the six states of an entity mentioned by Yāska. The Sūtrakāra has explained the transformation (परिणाम) of Brahman as a change in which the effect of Brahman is Brahman Itself.[93] So, he explains the वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman in harmony with this kind of परिणाम of Brahman.

The increment and decrement in Brahman are due to the concealment of the attributes of Brahman. Only by this theory we can explain properly and consitently both these states of Brahman. He seems to support this अन्तर्भाव 'concealment' by reference to Chā.Upa.VII.26.1.[94] In support of this explanation of the Śruti (Chā.Upa. VII.26.1) the Sūtrakara seems to refer to Chā.Upa.VII.1.14.[95] The Śruti refers to the whole creation. Sanatkumāra at every stage "denies that Brahman is only *as much as the item under discussion*," and then "says that Brahman is higher or larger than that.[96] The Sūtrakāra seems to hold that in नामन् there is a greater degree of concealment of Brahman than in वाक् and so on. So, the concealment of Brahman explains the creation. The greater the decrement of Brahman in its effect which is also Brahman, the greater its

(93) आत्मकृते : परिणामात्। (Bra.Sū.I.4.25).

(94) आत्मत: अविर्भावतिरोभावौ । (Chā.Upa.VII.26.1)

(95) Particularly to the series of the repeated sentence
"अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूय इति नाम्नो वाव भूयोऽस्तीति तन्मे भगवान् ब्रवीत्विति ।
वाग्वै नाम्नो भूयसी ।"
"आत्मतः आविर्भावतिरोभावौ refers to the आविर्भाव-तिरोभावौ of मन : अन्नम्, आप :, तेजः आकाशः, प्राण:, etc., etc., Cf. also आत्मत: इदं सर्वम् (Chā.Upa.VII.26.1). So the Śruti refers to the whole creation.

(96) Cf. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति । in Bra.Sū.III.2.22 and ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः in the same Sūtra.

concealment in it, and the greater the increment of Brahman in its effect which is also Brahman, the less its concealment in it.[97]

The above explanation of Bra.Sū.III.2.20–22 is suggested to us on the supposition that Sūtra 22 refers to Chā.Upa.VII.1–14, 26. Śaṅkara does not take that Śruti as the one referred to in these Sūtras, nor does he explain the words "आविर्भावतिरोभावौ" (in the Śruti) in his भाष्य on the Upaniṣad. We feel that here was an occasion for the Sūtrakāra to explain his theory of causation or creation from Brahman because he denies that any change in Brahman can be explained by the different states of Brahman. Before Śaṅkara there was a commentary on the Sūtras, which explained the Sūtras as teaching the view that the creation took place by the concealment (अविभावन) and its reverse (विभावन) of the attributes of Brahman.[98]

In the case of Tai.Upa.II.5,[99] the Sūtrakāra holds that these are really the attributes *of Brahman* according to the text of the Śruti; but as these (प्रियशिरस्त्वादि) imply a change of degrees in the bliss of Brahman and, as there is no change as a matter of fact, these attributes should be dropped in the meditation on the अरूपवत् Brahman.[100] This Sūtra also shows that Bra.Sū.-I.1.12[101] takes the आनन्दमय Śruti as dealing with Brahman or Atman. But, as is very well known, Śaṅkara differs from the Sūtrakāra and takes that Tai.Upa. passage as dealing with his theory of the five *sheaths* of the soul, and Tai.Upa.II.5 as referring to the आनन्दमयकोश. We think that in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.12 Śaṅkara clearly states that he differs from the

(97) For a detailed explanation of the Sūtras vide Part I.

(98) Vide Note (7, P.28) on Bra.Sū.III.2.20 in Part I, also शां.भा. on ब्र.सू.II.1.4.

(99) तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः। मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः। प्रमोद उत्तरः पक्षः। आनन्द आत्मा। ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा। (Tai.Upa.II.5).

(100) प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे। (Bra.Sū.III.3.12).

(101) आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्। (Bra.Sū.I.1.12).

Sūtrakāra and he admits that he has differed from the Sūtrakāra on this point in his interpretation of Bra.Sū.I.1.12.

In the case of the verbal or participal forms like उपासीत, वेद, द्रष्टव्यः etc, occurring in the Upaniṣads, the Sūtrakāra holds that these have the primary sense, viz., that of laying down an Injunction in the case of the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. Śaṅkara, however, does not believe that his निर्गुण Brahman can ever be a subject of Injunction. So, he interprets the Śrutis with उपासीत, वेद, etc., as referring to what he calls सगुण Brahman or if he is forced to take a Śruti as dealing with निर्गुण Brahman, he changes the sense of उपासीत, वेद, etc. so as to suit the view that Brahman as the knower himself cannot be an object of knowledge. As we have shown elsewhere, (Chapter 1, P. 35) the Sūtrakāra explains the whole process of the knowledge of Brahman, on the lines of the explanation of *karman* or *Dharma* in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā.

The Sruti which clearly says that the vital airs of a knower of Brahman *do not depart from* his body[103] and which Śaṅkara interprets in the same sense, is explained by the Sūtrakāra in a different way. The Sūtrakāra argues that in the Mādhyandina Śākhā the same Śruti is read differently[104] and that in that Śākhā it is clearly stated that the vital airs and senses do not depart *from* the individual soul of the Brahmajñānin but that they depart *with* him. Thus, he does not agree with Śaṅkara in the interpretation of this text (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.6). We may add that perhaps it would have been better if the Sūtrakāra had given an option in the matter of the departure of the *prāṇas* from the body of the knower of Brahman. But his attitude in this matter shows that like the Ācāryas the

(102) Cf. चोदना in सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1).

(103) न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.6)

(104) स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.13) refers to न तस्मात्प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति । which is the reading in the Mādhyadina S'ākhā in place of न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति of the Kāṇva S'ākhā.

Sūtrakāra also is sometimes inclined towards one particular Śruti. His interpretation of the Bṛ.Upa.Śruti seems to have been influenced by his preference for the view of the Chā.Upa.-Śruti,[105] which he discusses in detail in Bra.Sū.IV.2.1–17. An option about the departure of the *prāṇas* would have reconciled both the Bṛ.Upa. and the Chā.Upa.texts without forcing an an interpretation on Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.6.

We would now only briefly notice several Śrutis and state the points that the Sūtrakāra seems to us to emphasise therein.

Chā.Upa.II.23.1 does not lay down the आश्रमs in general and does not serve as a foundation for the Smṛtis which deal with the आश्रमs in detail, but it lays down the आश्रमs to which a seeker of Brahman may belong. Thus, its purpose is to say that a seeker of Brahman may belong to any one of the four आश्रमs.[106] Śaṅkara also quotes a predecessor of his, who interpreted the Śruti in question as, we think, the Sūtrakāra has done.

The Sūtrakāra seems to regard the शमदमादि Śruti in Bṛ.Upa.-IV.4.22–23,[107] as a विधि, subsidiary to the यज्ञादि Śruti which is also a विधि; the result of this construction is that according to the Sūtrakāra a seeker of Brahman must perform the sacrifice, etc., even though he may be possessed of शम 'control of mind', etc. Śaṅkara holds quite the contrary view.[108]

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(105) अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् (Chā.Upa.IV.8.6) and शतं चैका च हृदयस्य नाड्यस्तासां मूर्धानमभिनिःसृतैका। तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृतत्वमेति विश्वङ्ङन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति।

(106) अथ त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धा यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमस्तप एव द्वितीयो ब्रह्मचार्याचार्यकुलवासी तृतीयोऽत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन् सर्व एते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति। (Chā.Upa.II.23.1).

Vide विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि। (Bra.Sū.III.4.32). Vide S'aṅkara's interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.4.18 and also of the S'ruti in the *Bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣad.

(107) ......तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन...॥२२॥ ......तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति ॥२३॥

(108) शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम्। (Bra.Sū.III.4.27). Vide S'ā. *bhāṣya* on the same.

In the Śruti mentioned above, the Sūtrakāra takes the यज्ञ, दान, तपस् as laid down for a seeker of Brahman.[109] The Sūtrakāra says that in the performance of these यज्ञ, दान, तपस् the seeker of Brahman does not require the ordinary sacrificial fire, fuel, etc., but all his requirements resulting from the यज्ञादि Śruti are of the nature of the Horse described in Bṛ.Upa.I.1. This explains both the यज्ञादि Śruti (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22) and also Bṛ.Upa.I.1.[110]

The Sūtrakāra seems to explain the significance of the preposition "उप" in 'उपोपविवेश" in Chā.Upa. I.10.8.[111] In Bra.-Sū.III.4.42,[112] he seems to say that for a seeker of Brahman who is an ascetic the *secondary performance* (उपपूर्वं भावम्) of priestly duties may be allowed; the case is like that of *eating* all food or food from all persons in the time of the danger of losing one's life out of hunger as stated in Bra.Sū.III.4.28. So, 'उपोपविवेश" means that Uṣasti only guided the priests or supervised them, but did not perform the actual duties of a priest.

There are certain Śrutis which say that a priest may perform priestly duties and transfer the reward of the performance to his master from whom he receives a fee. Such Śrutis are found even in the Upaniṣads. The Sūtrakāra makes use of these texts to show that a seeker of Brahman who is outside the order of asceticism may perform both the official and semi-official priestly duties.[113]

Besides the यज्ञादि (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22) and आश्रम (Chā.Up.II.23.1) duties, the Upaniṣads mention several other duties, 'सत्य', 'ब्रह्मचर्य'

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(109) सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.26).

(110) अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा । (Bra.Sū.III.4.25) सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.26) उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य शिरः ॥ सूर्यश्चक्षु र्वातः प्राणो व्यात्तमग्निः etc. etc. (Bṛ.Upa.I.1)

(111) तत्रोद्गातॄनास्तावे स्तोष्यमाणानुपोपविवेश स ह प्रस्तोतारमुवाच । (Chā.Upa.I.10.8).

(112) उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.42). Vide our interpretation of this Sūtra in Part I. It refers to *ādhikārika* (official, priestly duties) and *upādhikārika* (secondary priestly duties).

(113) बहिस्तूभयथा स्मृतेराचाराच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.43). स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.44). Vide also the S'rutis (Bṛ Upa.I.3.28) and the Sūtras that follow.

'मौन', etc., etc., as help to the knowledge of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra makes these voluntary for the seekers of Brahman belonging to orders others than that of a house-holder for whom they are in his opinion compulsory.[114]

The silence (मौन) prescribed in Bṛ.Upa.III.5.1 is compulsory for a householder who seeks Brahman and it means that this seeker should not make a show of his knowledge before the public.[115]

The Sūtrakāra seems to interpret Chā.Upa.I.1.10 as meaning that both the obligatory duties like अग्निहोत्र and the voluntary duties like the काम्य sacrifices may be done by a seeker of Brahman as a help to the knowledge of Brahman in the achievement of Mokṣa.[116] According to Śaṅkara this Śruti proves that as अग्निहोत्रादि performed *with* the mystical or allegorical knowledge of the same is *more powerful*, the same performed *without* that knowledge is *powerful*, i.e., it does produce its reward; the sacrificer does not stand in absolute need of knowing the allegorical significance.[117]

Śaṅkara emphasises the attributes of the Akṣara,[118] i.e., the negative attributes of Brahman, so much so that all the positive

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(114) सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.47) and कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.48) and also मौनादिवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.49).

(115) अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.50).
तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद्बाल्यं च पाडित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं चमौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः । (Bṛa.Upa.III.5.1).

(116) उभयोर्यदेव विद्ययेति हि । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.18). Vide our interpretation in Part I.

(117) Vide S'āṅkara *bhāṣya* on the above Sūtra.

(118) अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावभ्यां तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.33). Also vide Bra.Sū.III.3.13-15. The thoughts on the Akṣara are अनणु, अन्हस्वम्, अदीर्घम्, etc. etc.

attributes wherever they occur are to be interpreted negatively; thus, सत्य in Tai.Upa.I.1 would mean 'devoid of unreality'. The Sūtrakāra thinks that these attributes are *not useful in meditation* and should not be therefore collected in meditation on Brahman.

According to the Sūtrakāra the meditation on Brahman is of the shape of 'I am Brahman' (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि). The text laying down this method is Bṛ.Upa.I.3.7–10, and particuarly Bṛ.Upa.1.3.7.[119] This meditation is not based upon the identity of the individual soul and Brahman but only on the definite statement of Bṛ.Upa. I.3.7.[120] The result of this meditation is not the realization of one's Self as Brahman, but the realization of one's Self *as all*, as described in Bṛ.Upa.I.3.10.[121] This result is, moreover, Apūrva 'not already mentioned in the earlier Kāṇḍa of the Veda'.[122]

The Śrutis which describe Brahman as 'being of a limited size' and thus residing in the human heart with the individual soul[123] show that the meditation 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' is to be practised within one's own self.

According to Bādarāyaṇa, the Śruti clearly says that ज्ञान is superior to कर्मन्.[124]

We have already stated that the Śrutis with उपासीत, वेद, द्रष्टव्यः, are, according to the Sūtrakāra, all Vidhis *laying down* the knowledge of Brahman. Here the Sūtrakāra opposes the view

(119) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.16).
आत्मेत्येवोपासीत । (Bṛ.Upa.I.3.7).
(120) अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.17).
(121) य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति । (Bṛ.Upa.I.3.10).
Vāmadeva realized himself as "अहं मनुरभव ॅ सूर्य श्चेति ।"
(122) Also कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.18).
(123) इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.34-35).
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्ये आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ॥ (Kaṭha.Upa.IV.13).
Also अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च । (Bra.Sū.I.2.7), and हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.I.3.25).
(124) अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.8).

of Jaimini. He quotes in his favour that Sruti which refers to the equality or comparison of ज्ञान and कर्मन्.[125] The Upaniṣadic episodes are neither *stuti* nor are they meant for the rite called पारिप्लव. Here the Sūtrakāra differs not only from Jaimini but also from Śaṅkara who also takes these episodes in a secondary sense.

The Sūtrakāra seems to emphasise the fact that the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda are independent of each other so far as their individual teaching is concerned.[126] For this reason, he would not insist on interpreting the Upaniṣads in a secondary sense, i. e., as subsidiary to the Karmakāṇḍa or on explaining the Púrvakāṇḍa as subsidiary to the Upaniṣads. Thus, he differs both from Jaimini and from Śaṅkara. He bases his view upon Śrutis like (1) Mu.Upa.I.I which describes both the Kāṇḍas as Vidyās though the Pūrvakāṇḍa is said to be the lower Vidyā and (2) Chā.Upa.VII where Nārada tells Sanatkumāra that he knows all the Pūrvakāṇḍa and still he *laments* and therefore he wants to know Atman in order to be free from sorrow. In the opinion of the Sūtrakāra the Śruti itself differentiates between the subject-matters of the two Kāṇḍas.[127]

According to none of the Ācāryas we have any Sūtras in the Brahmasūtra emphasising the meditation on the Praṇava as Brahman, to the description of which almost every Upaniṣad devotes some part of it. We have shown that the Sūtrakāra pays special attention to the meditation on the Praṇava, the symbol of Brahman. In this connection he seems to attach more importance to Mu.Upa.II. 2.3-4,[128] than to similar

(125) अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः । Bra.Sū.III.4.19.

(126) Vide our interpretation of तथा चैकवाक्यतोपानिबन्धात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.24); न वा विशेषात् । (Bra. SūIII. 3.21) and दर्शयति च । (Bra.Sū.III.3.22)

(127) Cf. Bra. Sū. III. 3.22 above.

(128) वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् । Bra. Sū. III. 3.25), and हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् । Bra.Sū.III. 2.26) and सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्तथाह्यन्ये । (Bra.Sū.III.3.27) वेधादि refers to the following Mu. Upa. S'rutis :—

धनुर्गृहीत्वौपनिषदं महास्त्रं शरं ह्युपासानिशितं संधयीत ।
आयम्य तद्भावगतेन चेतसा लक्ष्यं तदेवाक्षरं सोम्य विद्धि ॥
प्रणवो धनुःशरो ह्यात्मा ब्रह्म तल्लक्ष्यमुच्यते ।
अप्रमत्तेन वेद्धव्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 3—4).

Śrutis in the Kaṭha and other Upaniṣads. He seems to say that penetration, etc. (वेधादि) mentioned in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad *should be presumed* in other Upaniṣads where they are not found (हानि), because they are subsidiary to the word "resort" or "means" (उपायन) used in other Upaniṣads for the Praṇava as a means to liberation.[129] He argues thatfor a meditator on the Praṇava there is *nothing to be crossed* (or achieved) in the life hereafter and says that "The followers of one Branch of the Veda say so." This seems to us to be a reference to Pra. Upa. V. 5, according to which a meditator on the Praṇava consisting of three parts and conceived *as only one syllable with parts* is conducted by the Sāmans to Brahman Itself, unlike a meditator on Brahman Itself who after departure at the end of the birth in which he achieves the knowledge of Brahman *crosses* Rays of the Sun, and other stations till he reaches the Vaidyuta world from where he is conducted by a Vaidyuta Conductor to Brahman Itself. For this type of meditator on Brahman there is a possibility of reaching perfection at some of these worlds; but there is no such possibility of further development for one who chooses to meditate on the Praṇava for Mokṣa. Therefore, the complete meditation on the Syllable Om should be fully practised in this very world. The Sūtrakāra also emphasises in another connection the above fact of the meditator on Om being conducted by the Sàmans.[130] He also notices that the meditation on the Praṇava assumes the form of " Om Brahma " unlike the meditation on Brahman Itself which is practised in the form " अहं ब्रह्मास्मि ".[131]

We have already stated above that the Conductor from the world of Lightning carries or leads the knower of Brahman to

(129) Vide Note (8, P. 131) on Bra.Sū.III.3.26.

(130) अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायणः... । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.15).

This Sūtra refers to the following S'ruti about the meditation on the Praṇava, the symbol of Brahman (pratīka) :-

स सामभिर्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकम् (Pra.Upa.V.5).

(131) न प्रतीके न हि सः । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.4).

ब्रह्मद्रष्टिरुत्कर्षात् । (Bra Sū.IV·1·5).

Brahman Itself. The Sūtrakāra establishes this conclusion after discussing the *capacity* of the Vaidyuta Ātivāhika *to go* to the Supreme Brahman with reference to two Pūrvapakṣas of Bādari and Jaimini on the same point. Thus, the Sūtrakāra interprets Chā.Upa.IV.15.5[132] in the literal sense, while S'aṅkara takes the Śruti as dealing with the attainment of the world of Brahmān or Prajāpati.

For the interpretation of Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.2 [133] we gather the information that both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa explained the Vidyā in this Śruti as Brahmavidyâ, but while the former held the view that the Vidyā was subsidiary to Karman in producing a new body for the seeker of Brahman after he departs from the body in which he got the knowledge of Brahman, the latter seems to have believed that the Vidyā, i. e., the knowledge of Brahman, produces a new body for the knower of Brahman and and the Karman produces a new body for one who is not a knower of Brahman but longs to get one of the worlds mentioned in Bṛ. Upa.IV.4.4.[134] Unlike both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara explained the Vidyā as not the Brahmavidyā, but as some lore within the sphere of transmigration (at most a *Saguna* Vidyā ?).

Regarding the Śrutis and Smṛtis which state that Brahman is only Light or which compare Brahman with luminaries, the Sūtrakāra clearly says that Brahman is *like* Light but not of the nature of Light.[135]

There are several other Śrutis discussed by the Sūtrakāra in the interpretation of which Śaṅkara seems to differ from him. We have noticed them in Part 1.

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(132) स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति । (Chā.Upa.IV.15.5) Vide Notes (2, 4) on Bra.Sū.IV.3.7.

(133) तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.2).

(134) एवमेवायमात्मेदꣳ शरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयित्वाऽन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते पित्र्यं वा गान्धर्वं वा दैवं वा प्राजापत्यं वा ब्राह्मं वा ऽन्येषां वा भूतानाम् । (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.4). Cf. Bra.Sū.III.4.11.

(135) तेज एव । Vide Notes on Bra.Sū.III.2.I9.

We may also say that the Sūtrakāra undoubtedly makes certain remarks about Smṛti. Thus, referring to Bha. Gī. III. 24-25 he says that these Smṛti verses refer to time-deties [138] and that *a knower of (the highest) Brahman* is here declared to be returning to this world without reaching Brahman if he would depart from this world *during the southern course of the Sun*, while he would attain Brahman only if he departed during his northern course. The Sūtrakāra adds that these two Paths *are mentioned in the Smṛti* (not in Śruti) and that too only for the Yogins. Thus, *he seems to discard them as not being Śrauta.* Śaṅkara however seeks to interpret these deities as the Conductors of the Brahmavid who knows only the limited Brahman and thus Śaṅkara tries to reconcile the Smṛti with the Śruti.[139]

In this connection it is noteworthy that all such expressions as स्मार्तम्, स्मृतम्, स्मरन्ति, etc. in the Brahmasūtra including also the entire Smṛti Pāda (Bra. Sū. II. 1.) are in our opinon indicative of the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of certain Smṛti texts, mostly verses from the Bhagavadgītā and the Mahābhārata. We do not think that the Sūtrakāra uses the word Smṛti for the atheistic Sāṁkhya School. Particularly in the Smṛti Pāda we have the the Sūtrakāra's explanations of such doctrines of the Bhagavadgītā as he thinks are not literally agreeable with his interpretation of the Śruti, chiefly the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣads. We have also throughout in the Brahmasūtra many Pūrvapakṣas, which seem to us to proceed from a Smārta Vedanta School (based upon the Gītā) and which seem to seek support from the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, but the Sūtrakāra refutes these Pūrvapakṣas, taking his stand on the Oldest Prose Upanṣads. For want of space.

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(136) योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते । Bra.Sū.IV.2.21.

(137) अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् । (Bra. Sū. III.2.19 and also 18, 28).

(138) धूमो रात्रिस्तथा कृष्णः षण्मासा दक्षिणायनम् ।
तत्र चान्द्रमसं ज्योतिर्योगी प्राप्य निवर्तते ॥ (Bra. Gī. VIII. 25).
योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते । (Bra. Sū. IV 2.21.)

(139) Vide S'aṅkara's remarks on Bra. Sū. IV 2.21.

we have to postpone our statement about the Sūtrakara's Interpretation of certain Smṛtis to a future occasion.

Among the Upaniṣads the Sūtrakāra seems to honour most respectfully the Chā. Upa. and then the Bṛ. Upa. and his interpretation of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads is inspired by his reverence for those two oldest Upaniṣads. To give an example, we have shown above how the Sūtrakāra interprets Kaṭha Upa. III.10–11 in harmony with the doctrine of Brahman in the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣads or how he seems to give up the literal sense of BṛUpa.IV.4.6 (न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति) in favour of the Chā.Upa. VIII.3.4, while Śaṅkara prefers the Bṛ.Upa. (न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति) to the Chā.Upa. (अस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य). We have too amply noticed the Sūtrakāra's preference for certain Upaniṣads elsewhere in this work and also in Part I to need any repetition here.

CHAPTER 8

THE SUTRAKARA AND SANKARACARYA.

Apart from the interpretational difference leading to doctrinal difference between the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara in the matter of the interpretation of the Upaniṣads and between Śaṅkara and ourselves in that of the Brahmasūtra, we may say here a few words by way of a comparison of the Systems of Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara.

As this book is being placed before scholars with a view to the preparation of *another work covering the entire Brahmasūtra* and going deeper into the various problems raised herein, it is not quite safe at this stage to explain the Sūtrakāra's System by comparing it with any other System, e.g., that of Śaṅkara, except only on a few very prominent points, which even can be only tentatively discussed here.

With the Sūtrakara, as also with Śaṅkara, the most important problem is that about the two aspects of Brahman. According to Śaṅkara these two aspects are निर्गुण and सगुण respectively; while the Sūtrakāra describes them as अरूपवत् and रूपवत्. Thus, with Śaṅkara one aspect is absolutely without any attributes, while according to the Sūtrakāra one aspect has no form (रूप, the figure of a पुरुष) but yet it has attributes (विशेषणs) as well as the other aspect, there being no (aspect of) Brahman altogether without attributes.[1] The Sūtrakāra understands Brahman as a Reality which is *at the same time* अरूपवत् and रूपवत्.[2] He seems to distinguish between (a) Śrutis which describe the अरूपवत् and (b) Śrutis which describe the रूपवत् and thus he distinguishes between the attributes of the अरूपवत् and those of the रूपवत् aspect of

(1) विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.37).

(2) न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयालिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि । (Bra.Sū.III.3.11)

Brahman. The गुणs of Brahman referred to in Bra.Sū.I.1 are those of the अरूपवत्, viz., आनन्द and others,[3] while those collected by him in Bra.Sū.I.2 and 3 belong to the रूपवत्. Thus, प्रशासन 'ruling' is an attribute of the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman. He has collected these attributes under the two lists of सत्यादयः and आयतनादयः.[4] Inspite of this distinction about the attributes of the two aspects, the Śrutis in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra characterise the अरूपवत् with the attributes of the रूपवत् and *vice versa*.[5] In the opinion of the Sūtrakāra it is not possible to fix the attributes of either of the two aspects.[6] So, ultimately, the only distinction we can definitely make between the two aspects is that of the possession or the absence of पुरुष रूप according as the aspect is रूपवत् or अरूपवत्.

Again, according to Śaṅkara, one aspect (the निर्गुण one) is higher while the other (सगुण) is lower. The Sūtrakāra also takes one aspect (the अरूपवत्) as the chief one (प्रधान or मुख्य),[7] but Brahman is अरूपवत् not in the sense that It is *exclusively* अरूपवत्; but It is अरूपवत् only in the sense that it is *chiefly* अरूपवत्.[8] Therefore, according to the Sūtrakāra Brahman is *at the same time* रूपवत् also. Again, Bādarāyaṇa regards the अरूपवत् as the more important aspect of the two in the sense that the रूपवत् aspect *depends upon* the अरूपवत्.[9] This dependence can be illustrated by the example of the coil (कुण्डल) of a serpent which has a रूप dependent upon the serpent (अहि) which is a term used for the serpent without reference to any form of the serpent,[10] or by the example

(3) Vide Note (73) in Chapter 1.

(4) Vide Notes (9, 10) on Bra.Sū.III.3.39.

(5) विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3).

(6) तन्निर्धारणानियमः । (Bra.Sū.III.342).

(7) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.14). आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य । (Bra.Sū.III.3.11). प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.353). पंर जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.3).

(8) This is the sense of एव in अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.14).

(9) तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् । (Bra.Sū.I.4.3).

(10) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वाहिकुण्डलवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.227).

of the *āśrayas* of light, e.g., the solar orb (i.e., the Sun), the lamp, etc. which *has a form* (circular, vertical, etc.) being dependent upon and distinguished from the light itself.[11] On a third occasion the Sūtrakāra says that the अरूपवत् aspect is 'more powerful' (बलीयस्) because It is mentioned in a majority of Śrutis.[12] But inspite of this superiority of the अरूपवत् the Sūtrakāra does not hold that the meditation on the अरूपवत् gives a better result than that on the रूपवत्. It is here that he differs from Śaṅkara. He clearly gives an option of choice between the two aspects of equal status as re. the result and says that either of the two gives the same result, viz., Mokṣa.[13] He mentions this option twice.[14] No rational explanation can be given about this option for which, of course, he refers to the text of the Śruti and to *loka* (worldly experience) as the authority.[15] In the case of Śaṅkara's System the सगुण may be regarded as a step to the निर्गुण but with the Sūtrakāra the रूपवत् is on an equal status with the अरूपवत् both being *Kāraṇa* aspects. The fact that the same attributes or characteristics are applied by the Śruti to each of these aspects, as stated above, and the impossibility of making a sharp distinction between the attributes of the two, proves in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra this option making each aspect an independent aspect of Brahman.[16]

According to Śaṅkara, the सगुण is Brahman (Mas.) or Prajāpati and the reward of meditation on it is the attainment of the Prajāpatiloka. The Sūtrakāra does not mention this *loka* in the list of the worlds in Bra.Sū.IV.3, but it is Śaṅkara who proposes

(11) प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा । (Bra.Sū.III.2).

(12) लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.44).

(13) गतेरथवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथाहि विरोध : । (Bra Sū.III.3.29).

(14) छन्दत उभयाविरोधात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.28) and तदपि पूर्वविकल्प : । (Bra.Sū.III.3.44-45)

(15) श्रुत्यादिबलयिस्त्वाच्च न बाधः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.49) and also उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेः लोकवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.30).

(16) तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रातिबन्धः फलम् । अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद् दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

to add the worlds of Indra and Prajāpati after that of Varuṇa.[17] We have shown that this proposal of Śaṅkara is based upon a misunderstanding of Bra.Sū.IV.3.7–15. We believe that the Sūtrakāra does not take the Prajāpatiloka as *Kārya* of Brahman but, depending upon Pra.Upa.V.5, he says that the रूपवत् (which is in his case the Prajāpatiloka) and the अरूपवत् are each of them *the Kāraṇa Brahman Itself.*[18] In another place, the Sūtrakāra clearly says that the पुरुष aspect, i. e., the रूपवत् aspect is not liable to the fault of being (considered) a "लोक", a world, like the heaven,[19] etc. Lastly, according to Śaṅkara, the recipient (अधिकारिन्) of the सगुण aspect is a seeker of a lower qualification while the best अधिकारिन् is able to know and meditate on the निर्गुण Itself. The Sūtrakāra seems to refute a view like this when he says that 'the Puruṣa aspect is taught not because the individual soul, being encased in a body, can comprehend the Puruṣa more easily than he can the अरूपवत्, since the individual soul does not necessarily exist when the body exsists'.[20] In all these respects there is a vast difference between the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara regarding the relation between the two aspects of the Reality in the System of each of them.

Again, in the System of Śaṅkara the higher Brahman is above all kinds of Vedic Injunctions, while according to the Sūtrakāra, Brahman which has two aspects is subject to an Injunction.[21] The Sūtrakāra bases his doctrine of the identity of Brahman in all the Upaniṣads on the fact that the Injunction, etc., about Brahman are the same in all of them. Moreover, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to regard the knowledge of Brahman as something (i. e., an act) to be performed (अनुष्ठेय) and about which the Veda

(17) Vide S'āṅkara *bhāsya* on Bra.Sū.IV.3.3.

(18) विशेषं च दर्शयति । (Bra.Sū.IV.3.15).

(19) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.51)

(20) एके आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.53) व्यतिरेकः तद्भावाभावित्वाद् न तूपलब्धिवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.54).

(21) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.1). Vide S'āṅkara *bhāṣya* on the same.

lays down a विधि.[22] According to Bādarāyaṇa the unanimity of of the teaching of the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda, in fact, lies in this that both the Kaṇḍas teach something (Dharma or Brahman) which is the topic of a विधि or चोदना.[23]

With Śaṅkara the negative attributes (the *neti neti* texts) describe the higher or निर्गुण Brahman and the Śrutis mentioning these negative attributes are in his opinion the most important ones. We have shown that the Sūtrakāra drops these negative qualifications of the Akṣara altogether from meditation because they are not useful for that purpose.[24] He twice mentions this uselessness of the thoughts on the Akṣar [25] and we find that there is no Pūrvapakṣa even raised against the Sūtrakara's view.

In the System of Śaṅkara, Brahman being somehow associated with Māyā creates the creation. The Sūtrakāra does not seem to mention Māyā at all. In our opinion, the Sūtrakāra takes Brahman alone as the cause of the creation beginning with the Ether.[26] He emphasises the आत्मकृति as the transformation (परिणाम). "There is a change but the effect (कृति) is also Brahman Itself." In consistency with a change of this nature, he explains with reference to Brahman two more states, viz., वृद्धि 'increment' and ह्रास 'decrement' out of the six states mentioned by Yāska. These take place in the effects of Brahman which are also Brahman, by the self-concealment of Brahman.[27] Thus, in the System of the Sūtrakāra, no influence like that of Māyā, from any outside principle or no influence of any internal power except the will of Brahman to conceal Itself is responsible for these

(22) अनुष्ठेयमिति बादरायण: साम्यश्रुतेः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.19) and विधिर्वा धारणवत् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.20).

(23) तथा चैकवाक्यतोपनिबन्धात् (Bra.Sū.III.4.24)

(24) आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.14).

(25) Bra.Sū.III.3.13-15 and III.3.33.

(26) Bra.Sū.II.3.1.

(27) वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.20).

two states of the effects of Brahman (Is Māyā the same as the will of Brahman ?).

With the Sūtrakāra, as with Śaṅkara, the method of the meditation on Brahman is the आत्मगृहीति-method. The meditator contemplates on Brahman with the notion 'I am Brahman.[28] But according to Śaṅkara the reason of this notion is the fact that Brahman Itself is the inner soul, the Jīva in its real nature. The Sūtrakāra seems to refute such a view about the reason of the आत्मगृहीति–method, when he says that this method is prescribed, not because of the grammatical construction (अन्वय) of the Śruti,[29] but rather because the Śruti makes a definite statement about the method, viz., आत्मेत्येवोपासीत.[30] Again, the result (कार्य) of this method is not the realization of the individual soul as absolutely identical with Brahman as it is the case in Śaṅkara's School; but the Sūtrakāra seems to look upon 'the all–becoming' (सर्वभवन) as the कार्य mentioned in the same Śruti,[31] which he says is the (अपूर्वम्) 'the Extraordinary Principle' resulting from the meditation.[32] Thus, the result of the meditation as "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" is the *realization* by the meditator *that he has been everything*, Manu, and the Sun, etc., as was the experience of Vāmadeva,[33] and not that 'whatever is, is nothing but Brahman.'

The above form of meditation 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' is to be practised within the meditator's self both according to Śaṅkara and the Sūtrakāra.[34] But in Śaṅkāra's philosophy this inward practice is prescribed because Brahman is the प्रत्यगात्मन् 'the inner self' of

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(28) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.16), which refers to Bṛ.Upa. I.4.10. Also प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.43).

(29) The *anvaya* of अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्यासावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद...... । (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10).

(30) The Sūtrakāra emphasises एव in this sentence, Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7.

(31) य एवं वेद ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति । Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10.

(32) कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.18.)

(33) तद्वैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति । (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10)

(34) इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः । (Bra.Sū.III.3.34-35).

man and because this identity of Brahman and the individual soul is to be realized. The Sūtrakāra however seems to refute such a view,[35-36] because according to him the inward meditation is due to the fact that the Śruti declares Brahman to be residing in the human heart and yet to be not identical with the individual soul.[37]

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman is the giver of the fruits of our everyday actions and perhaps in his System Brahman cannot be looked upon as the giver of the fruit in the form of Mokṣa, but the Sūtrakāra is clear about his opinion in this matter.[38]

We have shown that according to the Sūtrakāra a union (संपत्ति) of the senses, the mind, the vital airs, the soul and the subtle elements takes place in the case of a seeker of Brahman ever since he begins the search of Brahman which he carries out on the Path (सृति) of the gods (देवयान) *as long as* he does not get Immortality.[39] But when he attains Immortality and departs from the body for the last time (never to be reborn here once again), the union (संपत्ति) of all these ending with that of the subtle elements *in the Para* residing in the heart takes place.[40] This union is of the nature of non-separation.[41] And the whole group leaves the body being helped by the Para residing in the heart through the hundred-and-first artery.[42] He joins the Rays of the Sun and, travelling on the Path of gods, he comes to the world of Lighting from where this knower of Brahman is con-

(35) अन्यथाऽभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न...... । (Bra.Sū.III.3.36).

(36) Cf. इयदामननात् in Bra.Sū.III.3.34-35.

(37) Cf. उपदेशान्तरवत् in Bra.Sū.III.3.36 which seems to refer to such a S'ruti as द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया......

(38) फलमत: उपपत्तेः । (Bra.Sū.III.2.38).

(39) समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य । Bra.Sū.IV.2.7.

(40) तानि परे तथा ह्याह । Bra.Sū IV.2.15.

(41) अविभागो वचनात् । (Bra.Sū.IV.2.16)

(42) Cf. हार्दानुगृहीतः शताधिकया in (Bra Sū.IV.2.17.)

ducted to his Destination, the Para, by the Vaidyuta Ātivāhika. All this is quite unlike Śaṅkara's doctrine on the same questions.

As regards the state of Mokṣa the Sūtrakāra seems to hold that the fruit in the form of Mokṣa is the attainment of Brahman Itself,[43] but as we have seen this state is attained by the knower of Brahman *reaching* Brahman. As Brahman is at the same time रूपवत् and अरूपवत् the Mukta Atman may have a body or may not have it, says the Sūtrakāra. In either case he is able to experience a *divine enjoyment*,[44] the presence of which, as we have seen above, does not make the attainment of Brahman the same as the attainment of a world (लोक) however high it may be. Since this enjoyment is the *only* point of similarity between a world (लोक) and Brahman, there is complete difference in all other respects between ब्रह्मलोक or ब्रह्मप्राप्ति and all the worlds of gods. The Mukta Atman resides in this *union* with Brahman which is of the nature of *non-separation* from Brahman.[45] He lives in this state eternally; this state of liberation is not affected by creation and dissolution which do affect our world;[46] the Śruti describes the स्थिति, continuation or permanence, but not the creation (सृष्टि) and dissolution (प्रलय), of of the state of the Mukta.[47] Thus, the Sūtrakāra's doctrine of the state of liberation is also different from that of Śaṅkara. In the former the liberated soul continues its individuality and experiences a state of enjoyment; in the latter it merges into Brahman.

There are some other points of difference between Śaṅkara and the Sūtrakāra which we have noticed in their proper places in Part I. Both hold that ज्ञान is not subsidiary to कर्मन् as a

(43) पूर्वं तु बादरायणः हेतुव्यपदेशात् । (Bra.Sū.III.2.41)

(44) Bra.Sū.IV.4.10—12, 21.

(45) अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् । Bra.Sū.IV.4.4.

(46) जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्...... Bra.Sū.IV.4.17).

(47) तथा हि स्थितिमाह । (Bra.Sū.IV.419).

means to Mokṣa,[48] but they differ as to the place of कर्मन् in the attainment of Mokṣa. According to the Sūtrakāra two kinds of कर्मन्s must be done by a seeker of Brahman *as a help to the knowledge of Brahman in achieving Mokṣa.*[50] The first kind of such helping actions are the sacrifice, donation and penance[51] and the Sūtrakāra insists that they must be done by a seeker even though the seeker may be possessed of the mental peace (शम), self-control (दम), etc. [52] But as we have shown (in Part I) Śaṅkara gives such an interpretation to the Sūtra in questien that he concludes that a seeker may not perform the sacrifice, etc., but he must perform (how?) the शम, दम, etc., since they are laid down as means to the knowledge of Brahman. Apart from the difference in the interpretation of the Sūtra, we make this note here only to show where the two Ācāryas differ doctrinally. The other group of actions to be done as a help to ज्ञान by a seeker according to the Sūtrakāra is the group of आश्रम कर्मन्s, the duties of one's own order of life, e. g., अग्निहोत्र, etc.[53] Śaṅkara clearly says that these actions do not help or cooperate with the knowledge of Brahman in the achievement of Mokṣa but they are *means only to the appearance or rise of the knowledge* which alone brings Mokṣa.[54] Perhaps, the

(48) अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवम्......। (Bra.Sū.III.3.8)

(49) सर्वथाऽपि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् । (Bra.Sū,III.4.34)

(50) सहकारित्वेन च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.33) and अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् । Bra.Sū.IV.I.16.

(51) These are prescribed in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22.

(52) तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतास्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति । (Bṛ.Upa. IV.4.23), and शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.33).

(53) विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । (Bra Sū.III.4.32) and सहकारित्वेन च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.33).

(54) न चेदं विद्यासहकारित्ववचनमाश्रमकर्मणां प्रयाजादिवद्विद्याफलविषयं मन्तव्यम् । अविधिलक्षणत्वाद्विद्यायाः । असाध्यत्वाच्च विद्याफलस्य । ......तस्मादुत्पत्तिसाधनत्व एवैषां सहकारित्ववाचो युक्तिः । (S'ā.bhāṣya on Bra Sū.III.4.33). And also ननु अनारभ्यो मोक्षः कथमस्य कर्मकार्यत्वमुच्यते । नैष दोषः ! आरादुपकारकत्वात् कर्मणः । ज्ञानस्यैव हि प्रापकं सत्कर्म प्रणाड्या मोक्षकारणमित्युपचर्यते । (S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.1.16).

Sūtrakāra holds that even the voluntary (काम्य) duties help the knowledge in the attainment of Mokṣa.[55] The Sūtrakāra's attitude about these good deeds as a help to Mokṣa is clear from the fact that while the Sūtrakāra holds that *only on the fall of the body* a seeker who has already attained the knowledge of Brahman is freed from the contact with good deeds[65] and that therefore there is no destruction (विनाश) of good deeds on the rise of the knowledge; Śaṅkara by unjustifiable additions to the words of the Sūtra in question tries to being out of it his view that on the attainment of the knowledge the good deeds (at least the past ones) of a ज्ञानिन् are destroyed. The absence of contact (असंश्लेष in Bra.Sū.IV.1.14) only means that they do not give him their ordinary reward, viz., the heaven or any other object of desire after his depature from this world. Thus, the Sūtrakāra seems to mean that the good deeds done by a ज्ञानिन् before the attainment of the ज्ञान and continued to be done by him even after its attainment, help (i. e., co-operate with) the knowledge in the achievement of its goal, but do not give the ज्ञानिन् the usual reward. He appears to ask even the ज्ञानिन् to continue to do the good deeds (both compulsory and voluntary) as a help to his ज्ञान *till he departs* from the body.[57] In Śaṅkara's System there is no scope for these good deeds being performed till the end of the body even after the attainment of the knowledge, because according to him the knowledge means the knowledge that the soul is no agent.[58] Saṅkara takes special care to show that in Bra.Sū.IV.-1.16[59] the Sūtrakāra mentions the good deeds which the ज्ञानिन् has already done before the attainment of the knowledge, as being converted into a help to the knowledge, and that the Sūtrakāra does not say that the good deeds which a ज्ञानिन् does

(55) Vide our Interpretation of अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषाम् । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.17).

(56) इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु । (Bra.Sū.IV.1.14).

(57) इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु । (Bra.Sū.IV.I.14).

(58) Vide S'āṅkara *bhāsya* on Bra.Sū.IV.1.14 and also on IV.1.16.

(59) अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū IV.1.16)

after the attainment of knowledge help the knowledge in getting a common goal.[60] This rather makes one believe that the Sūtrakāra actually prescribes the good deeds even after ज्ञानप्राप्ति.

The above discussion also shows that according to the Sūtrakāra there is no liberation in this life (जीवन्मुक्ति) as there is in Śaṅkara's System.[61] According to the Sūtrakāra the most perfect state to be attained on this earth is that of complete sinlessness.

Though the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara agree that the knowledge is not dependent upon the कर्मन् for the achievement of Mokṣa, they differ as regards the nature of the knowledge just as they differ about the nature of the help that कर्मन् renders to the knowledge. The Sūtrakāra takes the ज्ञान as something to be performed (अनुष्ठेय) and as the subject of an Injunction;[62] but Śaṅkara does not take the knowledge of Brahman as laid down by a विधि.[63]

In the opinion of the Sūtrakāra a seeker of Mokṣa may belong to any of the four orders of life, though he may take to the ascetic order even from the order of religious studentship.[64] He says that a seeker of Brahman who is outside the order of asceticism may do the duties of his caste because the Smṛti asks him to do them and because there is a practice of doing them among the seekers of Mokṣa in the Upaniṣads.[65] The actions thus done by a seeker do not bind him because their reward goes to his master. Particularly, a Brāhmaṇa

(60) अत एव चातिक्रान्तविषयमेतत्कार्यैकत्वाभिधानम् । नहि ब्रह्मविद आगाम्यग्निहोत्रादि संभवति ।............(S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.1.16).

(61) The *JīvanMukti* is not described also in Bra.Sū.III.4.41, though S'aṅkara takes ऐहिक in that Sūtra as ऐहिकमपि विद्याजन्म भवति । Vide our interpretation.

(62) अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.19) and विधिर्वा धारणवत् । (Bra.Sū.fII.4.20).

(63) अविधिलक्षणत्वाच्च विद्यायाः । (S'aṅkara *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.33).

(64) विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । (Bra.Sū.III.4.32). Vide our interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.4.36-39.

(65) बहिस्तूभयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च । (Bra.Sū.III.4.43.)

seeker who is a householder may do his priestly duties because these can be "sold" to a master. A householder-seeker has also to do by way of help to the knowledge other deeds over and above the two sets of works noticed above.[66] He has to collect (उपसंहार) all the duties prescribed by the Upaniṣads as a help to the knowledge for the attainment of Mokṣa, because he does not lack those conveniences which a student, a hermit or an ascetic who is a seeker cannot possess.[67] Again, a householder trying to get the knowledge of Brahman *may do even worldly duties only in order that the works he has already begun may not be obstructed.*[68] They do not help the attainment of मोक्ष. Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra a seeker of liberation may be a member of *any one* of the four orders of life. But, as is well known, Śaṅkara insists on his belonging only to the ascetic order.

We have given above most of the points of agreement and difference between the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara, that we come across in Bra.Sū.III.2.11–IV., the portion of the text which is discussed in Part I. They show that between the two Ācāryas there is essential difference about the nature of Brahman, the creation, the individual soul, the knowledge of Brahman, the utility of the good deeds in the attainment of Mokṣa and the अधिकारिन् of Mokṣa. Both of them differ also about the nature of the relation of the ज्ञानकाण्ड and कर्मकाण्ड of the Veda. Śaṅkara does not believe that धर्मजिज्ञासा is the immediate prerequisite of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. He almost seems to hold that the कर्मकाण्ड *has no independent goal* to achieve and that the goal of the ज्ञानकाण्ड is in no way concerned with a विधि of the Veda just as the Dharma, the goal of the कर्मकाण्ड is. Thus, according to Śaṅkara there is no

(66) Vide Notes on PP. 92-93supra.

(67) कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः । (Bra.Sū.III.4.48)

(68) ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.51)

(69) तथा चैकवाक्यतोपनिबन्धात् । (Bra.Sū.III.4.24).

possibility of a unanimity of sense (एकवाक्यता) of the two Kāṇḍas. But, the Sūtrakāra holds that the goals of both the Kāṇḍas are *laid down by the* respective (यजेत, जिज्ञासीत) Vidhis and that both have their respective *Apūrvas* (अपूर्वs) and in this way there is an esential एकवाक्यता 'unanimity of sense and purpose' of the two Kāṇḍas so that they could belong to the same Scripture, viz., Śruti or Veda.

We should repeat that the present work is being submitted to scholars only as a part of a proposed interpretation of the entire Brahmasūtra and is so far incomplete both in its extent and the finality of its conclusions which are liable to be revised on a future study, and that therefore, the comparative statement about the Systems of the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara presented here may be read with caution and need not be hastily accepted.

CHAPTER 9.

IMPORTANCE OF BRAHMASUTRA III. 3.

The third Pāda of the third Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra is of supreme importance for the interpretation of the entire work of Bādarāyaṇa. It is this Pāda, which holds the key of the Sūtrakāra's scheme of arranging the Śrutis for discussion in the first three Pādas of the first Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra. This is our view about Bra.Sū.III.3. The traditional view, however, presents this Pāda as the least important portion of the work.

We give here the traditional view about the contents of Bra.Sū.III.3 :—

"The first and second Pādas though belonging to the Sādhanādhyāya or the chapter dealing with the means of attaining Mokṣa, really deal with the nature and attributes of Brahman and the nature of the transmigration. It is with the *third* Pāda that the consideration of the meditations or congnitions leading to the attainment of Brahman really begins.

"We know, that in the different Upaniṣads, belonging to the different Vedas or belonging to the different Śākhās of the same Veda, meditations or congnitions (विद्याः) of the Brahman are described, sometimes under the same name, but with some differences of detail. Thus, for instance, the so-called शाण्डिल्यविद्या which is met with in Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14, is found again in an abridged form in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad V.6 and again in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X.6.3. All these three passages enjoin a meditation on the Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as for instance, मनोमयत्व, भारूपत्व, etc.) while others are peculiar to each separate passage, प्राणशरीरत्व and सत्यसंकल्पत्व, for instance, being mentioned in the Chāndogya and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, but not in the Bṛhadāraṇ-

yaka Upa., which on its part specifies सर्ववशित्व, not referred to in the two other texts. Now, the question is whether all these meditations are one and the same or they are different. In the case of ritual or of the sacrifices, the different descriptions of a sacrifice bearing one name, found in different passages, do not present any such diffculty; *for, acts may be performed in different fashions, according to circumstances; since they are all sādhya* (to be accomplished), and each one may follow the practice taught in his own Śākhā to the exclusion of the rest. *But with cognitions the case is different.* The object of these cognitions is the Brahman, which is one, eternal, and unchangeable in character; it is something सिद्ध (accomplished) as opposed to कर्मन् which is साध्य; and so the cognitions also must be one without difference. If, however, there are different cognitions, *only one of them can be true*, because it is faithful to its object; *while the rest should be false, it being imposible that one and the same object can be cognised in more than one way.* It is this question then with which this entire pāda deals: whether the cognitions of the Brahman, which form the subject of the different Vedānta texts, are separate cognitions or not. The question, *though appearing rather trivial and of no philosophic importance to us*, is however, very important for the practical follower of the Vedānta doctrine; inasmuch as, if the cognitions are separate, *he will have to practise so many different meditations*, whereas, if they are all one, only one meditation would suffice.

" All the commentators agree in a general way in holding that such is the subject matter of this pāda. Vallabha more particulary connects the question with different forms of the Bhagavat, i. e., His incarnations (अवतारs), and asks whether the particulars connected with the incarnation of the Fish, for instance, are to be combined with those of the Dwarf incarnation and so on; and decides that the different forms may be combined *according to the Avatāra, which a devotee worhips in particular.* Madhva also is of accord with the rest........... ".

We have given a long quotation from one of the latest books[1] on the subject-matter of the Bra.Sū.III.3 according to the tradition. Our intention is to show to the reader in necessary details what the Ācāryas have to say about the contents of this Pāda.

We must admit that we are not convinced of the truth of the arguments advanced regarding the necessity and utility of the discussion of Śrutis, which deal with the same Vidyā and occur in different parts of the Śruti, in a book like the Brahmasūtra, particularly in the *Sādhanādhyāya.* And we belive that, though modern scholars assert that such a discussion of such Śrutis was of supreme importance to a practical Vedāntin; ultimately, they agree with us in our judgement about the traditional interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3. Dr. Ghate himself writes: "Now, coming to the Sūtrakāra's point of view, we cannot easily explain why he should take pains and devote one entire Pāda to the treatment of something connected with the *saguṇa* Brahman, which is not after all to him the highest verity."[2]

Why should a reconciliation of the Śrutis supposed to be separately teaching the same विद्या occur in the Sādhanādhyāya, and not in the Avirodhādhyāya (i. e. Bra.Sū.II) of which such a reconciliation is the sole object ? Why should a reconciliation of different Śruti texts dealing with the same विद्या be important and why should a reconciliation of different Śrutis dealing with the same कर्मन् be unimportant ? The Hindu tradition rather shows that the latter was considered to be very important. The Jaiminisūtra devotes as many as twenty-six Sūtras to such a discussion of कर्मन् (Jai.Sū.II.4.8-33). That which involves *action* is undoubtedly more important than that which involves *cognition* or *meditation*, even though the fruit of the latter be much higher than that of the former. Therefore, कर्मन् or a sacrifice would be more importont, from the stand-point of its practice,

(1) V. S. Gate, The Vedanta, PP.133-135.
(2) Dr. Ghate, The Vedanta, P.136.

than the knowledge of Brahman. We may again ask, " After having once decided in Bra.Sū.I that the several Śrutis individually deal with the same topic viz., Brahman, where is the necessity of again raising a question whether the topic of two or more Śrutis is the same or not ?." When the various topics of the Sūtras are said to be Brahman and not the Jīva or the jaḍa, all Śrutis dealing with one and the same topic must be taken as discussed. This is the sense of Bra.Sū.I.4.28. The difference of detail only would never make the topic different. The mere fact that the attributes of a particular topic are different in different Śrutis would not make the topic different in different Śrutis, unless the attributes are mutually exclusive or contradictory. For the same reason a superficial difference between two or more Śrutis would not make one Śruti true and the other Śruti or Śrutis false, because after all they all are Śrutis. Nor would such a difference make different विद्याs and force a practical Vedāntin to practise so many different meditations. Where is the proof that a particular follower of the Vedanta doctrine must not follow at least for the purpose of meditation on a particular विद्या the precept of his own particular Branch only and must go to all the Branches ? If the Scripture, accepted as valid and discussed in Bra.Sū.I, does not contain the Śrutis about the Avatāras, why should the Sādhanādhāya base its conclusions on entirely other Upaniṣads than those referred to in Bra.Sū.I ? Moreover, what possibly would be the School of Indian Philosophy, to which an Opponent urging that the attributes of one of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa should be added to the attributes of the other during the worship of the latter Avatāra, may belong ? We humbly submit our view that there was no possibility of such subjects coming up for discussion before the Sūtrakāra in the Sādhanādhyāya at least.

Moreover, let us see for a moment how a great Ācārya like Śaṅkara whom we choose here as a representative of the Commentators, performs the task he undertakes in this Pāda (Bra.Sū.III.3). We here collect only the most apparent remarks made by Śaṅkara himself in his own commentary on Bra.Sū.III.3,

requesting the reader to refer to our Notes (in Part I) and to our Chapter 10 (in this work) for a number of other discrepancies in Śaṅkara's *bhaṣya* on this Pāda making it impossible for us to accept it as an interpretation of the Sūtras in question.

Thus, (1) In Bra.Sū.III.3.1 Śaṅkara says that in Sūtra III.2 the real nature of the निर्गुण Brahman which is an object of knowledge has been described, while the discussion in Bra.Sū.III.3 refers to the सगुण Brahman.[3]

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3. 5 Śaṅkara says that Sūtra 5 is an aphorism stating the aim (प्रयोजनसूत्र) and that the details of that Sūtra are given in Sūtra 10 and in those that follow it. Thus, Sūtras 6–9 are a digression according to Śaṅkara.[4]

(3) Śaṅkara explains Sūtras 16–17 at first as referring to a passage of Aitareya Upaniṣad I and then as dealing with Bṛ.-Upa.IV.3–4 and Chā.Upa.VI.2–8. Thus, he is not sure of the विषयवाक्य of these two Sūtras.

(4) In Bra.Sū.III.3.26, Śaṅkara says that this Sūtra is a digression to show the collection of 'secondary praise' (स्तुति–उपसंहार), while the chief topic of the Pāda is the discussion of the collection of the attributes of Brahman (गुणोपसंहार). Moreover, Śaṅkara gives *two* interpretations of this Sūtra.[5]

(5) In Bra.Sū.III.3.30 Śaṅkara tells us that the topic of Sūtras III.3.29–30 will be more minutely explained *once again*[6]

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(3) व्याख्यातं विज्ञेयस्य ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वम् ।.... ननु विज्ञेयं ब्रह्म पूर्वापरादिभेदरहितमेकरसं सैन्धवघनवदवधारितं तत्र कुतो विज्ञानभेदाभेदचिन्तावतारः ।... सगुणब्रह्मविषया प्राणादिविषया चेयं भेदाभेदाचिन्तेत्यदोषः । शाङ्करभाष्य on Bra.Sū.III.3.1.

(4) अस्यैव प्रयोजनसूत्रस्य प्रपञ्चः सर्वाभेदादित्यारभ्य भविष्यति । S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra-Sū.III.3.5.

(5) अपरा योजना—आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । वाजसनेयके कतम आत्मेति योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिःपुरुषः (बृ. उ. ४।३।७)......।

(6) तस्माद्गुणोपसंहारविचारप्रसङ्गेन स्तुत्युपसंहारप्रदर्शनार्थमिदं सूत्रम् ।

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अथवा एतास्वेव विधूननश्रुतिष्वेतेन सूत्रेणैतच्चिन्तायितव्यम् किमनेन विधूननवचनेन सुकृतदुष्कृतयोर्हानमभिधीयते किं वाऽर्थान्तरमिति । S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū. III.3.26.

in Adhyāya IV. How can the Fruit be discussed along with the Means ?

(6) According to Śaṅkara the topic of Bra.Sū.III.3.31 is resumed for further discussion in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15.[7]

(7) Śaṅkara finds the context of Bra.Sū.III.3.33 in Sūtra III.3.11 because according to him the latter describes the positive attributes of Brahman while the former deals with Its Negative attributes.[8]

(8) In Bra.Sū III.3.34, Śaṅkara discusses Mu.Upa.III.1.1 and says that the problem is discussed in detail under Bra.Sū I.2.11.[9]

(9) In Bra.Sū.III.3.35, Śaṅkara gives *two* explanations of भूतग्रामवत्.

(10) Under Sūtra III.3.39, Śaṅkara discusses Chā.Upa.VIII.1 and Bṛ.Upa.IV.3 and finds that the former text deals with the सगुण Brahman only while the latter deals chiefly with the निर्गुण So, he says that the collection of the attributes taught in this Sūtra is not meant for उपासना (because Bṛ.Upa.IV.3 deals with the ज्ञेय Brahman), but for showing the special prowess of the conditioned Brahman which is the only topic of Chā.Upa.VIII. 1 and of which some attributes like वशित्व are incidentally mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.3[10]

(11) According to Śaṅkara Sūtra III.3.48 repeats the argument of Sūtra III.3.44.[11]

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(7) भूयश्चैनं विभागं चतुर्थाध्याये निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः । Ibid on Bra.Sū.III.3.30. Vide Sā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū IV.3.15:—किं तावत्प्राप्तं सर्वेषामेषां विदुषामन्यत्र परस्माद्ब्राह्मणो गतिः स्यात् । तथाहि— ‘ अनियमः सर्वासाम् ’— (ब्र० सू० ३ । ३ । ३१) इत्यत्राविशेषेणैवैषां विद्यान्तरेष्ववतारिता (गतिः) इति ।

(8) तथा च ‘आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य’ ब० सू० (३ । ३ । ११) इत्यत्र व्याख्यातम् । तत्र विधिरूपाणि विशेषणाणि चिन्तितानीह प्रतिषेधरूपाणीति विशेषः । Sā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.33.

(9) गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि (ब्र० सू० १ । २ । ११) इत्यत्र चैतत्प्रपञ्चितम् । तस्मान्नास्ति वेद्यभेदस्तस्माच्च विद्यैकत्वम् ।

(10) गुणवतस्तु ब्रह्मण एकत्वाद्विभूतिप्रदर्शनायाय गुणोपसंहारः सूत्रितो नोपासनायेति द्रष्टव्यम् । S'ā.*bhā*. on Bra.Sū.III.3.39.

(11) दृश्यते चैषां स्वातन्त्र्ये लिङ्गम् । तत्पुरस्ताद्दर्शितम् ‘लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् (ब्र. सू. ३।३।४४) इत्यत्र ।

(12) Under Sūtra III.3.53, Śaṅkara discusses the question of the soul being not identical with the body. He knows that this question ought to have been discussed at the very *beginning of the Science* of the Vedānta Sūtras, because it is this soul who undergoes transmigration and realizes freedom from the same, which is the goal of this Science. He is not able to account for this discussion so late in the Brahmasūtra as in Sūtra III.3.53.[12]

(13) Under Sūtra III.3.58, Śaṅkara says that the rule established in this Sūtra must be taken as having preceded even the very first Sūtra of Bra.Sū.III 3.[13]

(14) We may also note that under two Sūtras, Śaṅkara says that he has rejected the view of his predecessor.[14]

We believe that the above fourteen Notes made by Śaṅkara himself on his commentary on this Pāda consisting of 66 Sūtras supply ample proof for doubting the correctness of his interpretation of the same.

Besides these, there are several other reasons leading to the same conclusion, e. g., (I) the गुणोपसंहार taught in Sūtra 5 is taken as granted in Sūtras 1 and 2, (2) the restriction of, or the change in, the sense of several words, e. g., सर्वं in Sūtra 1 is interpreted as 'some' (not as *all*), (3) the connection of Sūtra 12 with Sūtra I.1.12-19 is overlooked by Śaṅkara, (4) the unjustifiable separation of the words of one and the same Sūtra, e. g., that of आध्यानाय and प्रयोजनाभावात् in Sūtra 14, (5) the unlikeliness of several Pūrvapakṣas,

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(12) ननु शास्त्रप्रमुखे एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम्। सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता नं तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति। इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरःसरं प्रतिष्ठापितम्।

S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.3.53. Cf. also समाप्ता प्रासङ्गिकी कथा, संप्रति तु प्रकृतामेवानुवर्तामहे। S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.3.55.

(13) स्थिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्।

S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.58.

(14) Vide S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.3.38 and III.3.57.

e. g., in Sūtra 14, 16, 40-41, etc., (6) the impossibility of several topics being discussed in the Brahmasūtra, e. g., the meditation on water as the dress of the food in Sūtra 18, the Upaniṣadic texts about rituals in Sūtras 25, 42-52, 55-56, 61-66, (7) the overlapping of the subjects of discussion in the *Sādhana* Adhyāya and the other Adhyāyas, e. g., in Sūtras 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, which ought to be and are actually discussed in the *Phala* Adhyāya; in Sūtras 14, 34, etc. which are actually discussed in the *Samanvaya* Adhyāya.

The above is the list of drawbacks or blemishes of Śaṅkara's commentary such as a critical eye would often easily discover in his *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtras, but we submit that they preponderate in this particular Pāda.

There are several other similar defects (in शाङ्कर भाष्य on ब्र. सू. III.3) which are of a more critical nature and for which no commentator should be blamed. We enumerate here only a few of them because we have explained in our Notes (in Part I) how these and many other defects can be easily made out by a critical student. (1) The word 'वेदान्त' in Sūtra I should mean exclusion of Mantra, Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka. (2) एकस्याम् in Sūtra 2 should refer to शाखायाम् because we have शाखासु in Sūtra 55. (3) भेदात् in Sūtra 2 should mean चोदनादिभेदात् because of the context. (4) With समाने in Sūtras 5 and 19 we should take वेदान्ते as understood. (5) तद् उक्तम् in Sūtras 8, 33, 43, 50 should undoubtedly refer to some Sūtras in the Brahmasūtra only, and not to some other works. (6) पुरुषविद्या in Sūtra 24 should refer to the Lore of the Puruṣa or the Personal Brahman. Cf. पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते in Bra.Sū. I.2.26. (7) वेधादि should refer to the *act of piercing* with an arrow in Mu.Upa.II 2.[15] (8) उभय in Sūtra 28 should mean the Personal Aspect and the Impersonal Aspect of Brahman. (9) सर्वासाम् in Sūtra 31 should mean सर्वासां धियाम्.

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(15) प्रणवो धनुः शर आत्मा ब्रह्म तल्लक्ष्यमुच्यते ।
अप्रमत्तेन वेद्धव्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ मु. उप. II.2.4.

(10) इतरवत् in Sū.37 should refer to either of the Personal and the Impersonal Aspects of Brahman and विशिंषन्ति should have श्रुतय: for its subject. (11) शब्दादि in Sūtra 58 should mean शब्द, प्रकरणभेद and संज्ञा in Sūtras 6, 7 and 8 of this Pāda. (12) अङ्गेषु in Sūtra 61 should refer to the conception of Brahman as possessed of limbs, e. g., that of the Vaiśvānara in Chā.Upa.V.18.2.

Besides this lack of a critical standpoint, which has easily lead the Ācaryas to unknowingly commit mistakes in these respects, it seems to us that they were also unlucky in two other ways. Firstly, they had no exact text of the Sūtras; and, secondly, the tradition about the meaning of these Sūtras was already lost in their days. Both these things are true about the whole text of the Brahmasūtra; but it is specially so as regards Bra.Sū.III.3 which undoubtedly contains certain crucial Sūtras of the greatest importance for the interpretation of the work.

As regards the text and its reconstruction we are going to suggest definite rules in a subsequent Chapter. Here we would content ovrselves with a few remarks only. By a critical study we have come to the conclusion that as a rule we should have no new Adhikaraṇa beginning with a Sūtra having *ca* (च) in it. If this conclusion be correct, we shall have to regroup the Adhikaraṇas accordingly. Thus, unlike Śaṅkara, we should have no fresh Adhikaraṇas with Sūtras 9, 19, 23, 24. The application of this and several other rules would reduce the number of Adhikaraṇas in Sūtra III.3 from 36, which is the number according to Śaṅkara, to only 18. But the most important point about this Pāda regarding the textual criticism is that about *certain readings which, we believe, have been lost* during the long oral traditional handing over of the text from one genration to another. The most important of these are the following :—

(1) Sūtras 34 and 35 (of Śaṅkara's पाठ) must have been originally only *one* Sūtra, viz., इयदामननाद् अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत् स्वात्मन:

(2) Sūtra 38 should be "सैव हि" and 'सत्यादय:" which is a part of

it according to Śaṅkara should be transferred to Sūtra 39. Moreover, कामादीतरत्र should be कामादितरत्र so that we have two words, viz., कामाद् and इतरत्र instead of कामादि and इतरत्र.

(3) According to (2), Sūtra 39 would read as सत्यादयः कामाद् इतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः.

(4) Sūtra 42 has a traditiolal reading, viz., पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः where the correct reading, ought to have been पृथग् ध्यप्रतिबन्धः ; so that we have the words पृथक्, धी and अप्रतिबन्धः Thus, we have proposed to read धी in place of धि (or हि) because we believe that प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्व in Sūtra 50 is a reference to पृथग्धी in Sūtra 42 as proposed by us (Vide our Notes on these Sūtras in Part I).

(5) प्रदानवत् is Sūtra 43 should be प्रधानवत्. Cf. प्रधान in Sūtra 11 and in Bra.Sū.III.2.14 (Vide our arguments in Notes on Sūtra 43).

(6) पूर्वविकल्पः in Sūtra 45 should be transferred to Sūtra 44 and added to 'तद् अपि".

Perhaps, the number (five) of these proposed changes in the readings may be argued as a sufficient proof *against* the interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3, which we have there suggested. We can only request our readers to go through the arguments that we have given in our Notes on those Sūtras *for* these proposed readings, before they form any opinion about them.

We believe that particularly in this Pāda we have certain crucial Sūtras. Sūtra 11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य) and Sūtra 39 (as proposed to be read by us, viz., as सत्यादयः कामाद् इतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः) are the most important Sūtras. We have already given ample evidence to show that आनन्दादयः, सत्यादयः and आयतनादयः in these two Sūtras refer respectively to the attributes of Brahman collected and the Śrutis discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Pāda 1, Pāda 2, and Pāda 3 of Adhyāya I. Here we would not repeat the arguments but would only say that आनन्द is a clear reference to आनन्दाद् ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते" the विषयवाक्य of Bra.Sū.I.1.2, सत्य in सत्यादयः to सत्यसंङ्कल्प in the विषयवाक्य of Bra.Sū.I.2.1, and आयतन in आयतनादि to द्युभ्वाद्यायतन in Bra.Sū.I.3.1. *In this discovery of the identification*

of these three lists of attributes we have the key to the original meaning of and to the scheme of the distribution of Śrutis for discussion into the first three Pādas of the first Adhyāya. From this stand-point the entire Adhikaraṇa (Sūtras 37-42) becomes a crucial Adhikaraṇa. From Adhyāya I, Pādas 1-3 and from Bra.Sū.III.2 we know that according to the Sūtrakāra Brahman has two aspects, one Personal (called the Puruṣa) and the other Impersonal (called the Avyakta). But from these Sūtras (III.3.-37-42) we know that according to the Sūtrakāra the various Śrutis distinguish the Personal as the Impersonal aspect and *vice versa* and therefore (a) an interchange (व्यतिहार) of attributes of either is allowed in meditation on either, (b) the attributes enumerated and the Śrutis discussed in Bra.Sū.I.2 and explained by the Sūtrakāra there as dealing with Personal Aspect or the Puruṣa may be utilized *at the desire* of the meditator for the purpose of meditation on the Impersonal (कामाद् इतरत्र), and (c) the attributes enumerated and the Śrutis explained by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū. I.3 as treating of the Puruṣa may be optionally used in meditation on that Impersonal One (तत्र च). The result of this stand-point is that one can meditate on the Personal Aspect of Brahman as independent of the Impersonal One and *vice versa* (Sūtra III. 3. 42, also Sūtra III. 3. 50).

Another equally crucial Adhikaraṇa is that consisting of Sūtras 43-54. From that Adhikaraṇa we learn that according to the Sūtrakāra Brahman may be optionally meditated upon as the Puruṣa or as the Avyakta and that the meditation on the Puruṣa is not a mentation performed on Brahman which may be supposed by the Opponent to be only an Impersonal Reality, but rather it is Brahmavidyā as doubtlessly as the meditation on the Impersonal Aspect (Sūtra 47).

One more point proving that the original tradition of the doctrine of the Brahmasūtra (particularly in Bra.Sū.III.3) was already lost in the days of Śaṅkara is noted above but we would like to repeat it briefly here. "तद् उक्तम्" '*it has been stated*' occurs

in as many as *five* Sūtras in this Pāda. We give here a list to show how it is interpreted by the different Ācāryas :—

Sūtra No.	Śaṅkara	Rāmānuja	Vallabha	Our Suggestion.
(1) Sūtra 8	Bra.Sū.III.3.7	Chā.Upa.I	Bra.Sū.III.3.7.	Bra.Sū.III.2.27.
(2) Sūtra 26	Jai.Sū.X.8.15	Jai.Sū.X.8.15.	Bra.Sū.II.3	Bra.Sū.III.3.5
(3) Sūtra 33	Jai.Sū.III.3.8	Jai.Sū.III.3.8	Bhāgavata Pu.II.9.10	Bra.Sū.III.3.13
(4) Sūtra 43	Jai.Sū. संकर्षण Section.	Jai.Sū. संकर्षण Section	Mu. Upa. III.2.3	Bra.Sū.III.3.16
(5) Sūtra 50	Jai.Sū. IX.4.7.	Jai.Sū. III.5.21	Bhā.Pu. IX.4.63	Bra.Sū.III.3.42.

It would be seen that in all these cases of "तद् उक्तम्" Sūtras, the Ācāryas trace the reference to whatever book they like, while we trace every reference to the very Brahmasūtra itself.[16] We abstain from reproducing our arguments and repeating our interpretation of these Sūtras here, because they are fully given by us in their proper places in Part I.

Now we would briefly indicate the result of our reconstruction of the meaning of Bra.Sū.III.3, based upon our critical study of the same. We shall also state very briefly the topic of each Adhikaraṇa according to Śaṅkara. (For a detailed account of Śaṅkara's interpretation of this Pāda of Bra.Sū.III, vide PP. LXVI–LXXV of the Introduction of Thibaut's Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, S.B.E., Vol. XXXIV, which also contains a summary of Rāmānuja's interpretation of the same.)

Adhikaraṇa I (Bra.Sū.III.3.1–4) establishes the Proposition that the knowledge of Brahman is to be had from all the Vedāntas. It is to be had neither from only some Vedāntas, nor

(16) There are about four more "तद् उक्तम्" Sūtras and we have shown that they also refer to the Brahmasūtra only. Vide Notes on the BrahmasūtraIII. 3.8,26,33,43,50. Vide also our Paper 'The problem of the "तद् उक्तम्" Sūtras in the Brahmasūtras', in Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIII, 1937,PP.514-520.

from Śruti texts *other than the Vedāntas.* In spite of this rule, it is not necessary to give up one's *Svādhyāya* rule, because the *Svādhyāya* being meant for the followers of one particular Branch one is religiously entitled to the text in vogue in one's Branch only (Sūtra 3). Thus, the rule that one should day by day recite his *Svādhyāya* is not in conflict with the Proposition that the knowledge of Brahman is to be had from *all* the Vedānta texts. Again, to establish this Proposition it is sufficient that संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या about Brahman are the same even in only *one* Branch of each Veda, because even then the Sūtrakāra would conclude that 'the knowledge of Brahman is to be had from the Vedāntas of *all* the Vedas' (Sūtra 2). Thus, it is allowable that one Upaniṣad of one Veda may teach the Personal Aspect (or the Puruṣa) while another Upaniṣad of the same Veda may teach the Impersonal One; still, one can say, that all the Upaniṣads of all the Vedas teach Brahman.

According to Śaṅkara, Sūtras 1–4 prove that there is unity of knowledge in the *saguṇa* Vidyās and hence there is no contradiction in the Vedanta texts of the same *saguṇa* Vidyā.

In Adhikaraṇa II (Sūtras 5-9), the Sūtrakāra establishes a rule that a meditator on Brahman should collect the attributes of, and other information about, Brahman from *all* the Vedāntas or Upaniṣads, because they *all* teach the same topic, viz., Brahman. The only restriction is that the Vedānta text must be *similar*, i. e., the meditator on the Puruṣa should collect attributes from the Vedāntas describing only the Puruṣa and those on the Avyakta should do the same from the Vedānta texts describing only the Impersonal Aspect (Sūtra 5). The Śrutis which declare that one should know Brahman *thus*, e. g., एवंविच्छान्तो दान्त......... ...आत्मानं पश्यति (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23), or the fact that each Vedānta or Upaniṣadic text is in a different context, does not go against the above rule of Collection of Attributes from all similar Vedāntas. Also the various names of Brahman like पुरुष, अव्यक्त, आत्मन्, ब्रह्मन्, अक्षर, शुक्र, etc. etc., do not matter, because we have admitted a

two-fold classification of names, viz., the names of the Personal Aspect and the names of the Impersonal Aspect and these two Aspects are regarded to be independent of each other for the purpose of meditation (Sūtra 8); moreover, as Brahman under all these names is declared to be all-pervading, it is only proper that these names should not mean different principles because there can be *only one* all-pervading principle (Sū. 9 .

According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 5 states that as a result of the unity of knowledge the collection of the various विज्ञानs is necessary. Sūtras 6–8 discuss the question of the differences about the प्राण–संवाद in Chā.Upa.I.3 and Bṛ.Upa.I.3. Sūtra 9 deals with the relation between Om and *Udgītha* in Chā.Upa.I.1.1.

In Adhikaraṇa III (Sūtra 10), the Sūtrakāra says that as there is no difference in all (other) respects like "शब्द", "प्रकरण", "संज्ञा" (Sūtras 6–8), these two संज्ञाs (इमे संज्ञे) or rather these two aspects (the Puruṣa and the Avyakta, proved in Sūtra III 2) having two different classes of names should be regarded as *different* from each other.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 10, the parallel passages, Bṛ.Upa.VI.1.14, Chā.Upa.V.1.13, Kau. Upa.II.14 about the प्राणसंवाद, are to be conbined.

We may here add that the subsequent portion (Sūtras 11–66) of Bra.Sū.III.3 is concerned with describing the method of meditation and actually collecting, from the recognised Upaniṣads, for the propose of meditation, the information on various points pertaing to the meditation on Brahman. With this aim, the Sūtrakāra seems to have distinguished between the meditations (उपासा:, cf. उपासा in Bra.Sū.I.1.31) on Brahman which lead to the achievement of some *desired* worldly or other-worldly objects, like the meditation on the नामन् as Brahman (Chā.Upa. VII.1.5), and those which lead to the attainment of Mokṣa. The former are stated in Sūtra 60 and the latter in Sūtras 11–56. The latter type of meditations are again of *two* kinds, viz.,

(1) those in which Brahman is conceived of as One Reality *without any parts* and (2) others in which Brahman is thought of as consisting of parts, e. g., the meditation on the Vaiśvānara when He is thought of as having a head, eyes, breath, body, bladder, feet, etc. (Chā.Upa.V.18.2). These last meditations in which one fixes his meditation on the limbs or parts of Brahman (अङ्गावबद्धा : उपासा:) are described in Sūtra III. 3. 55 and those that follow. Therefore, we conclude that Sūtras 11-54 describe the meditation on Brahman not thought of as constituted of limbs or conceived of as *one entire entity*. Here also we find that throughout the Sūtras (11-54) the Sūtrakāra narrates the method of meditation on the *two* aspects of Brahman, viz., the Avyakta and the Puruṣa adding occasionally some remarks wherever necessary to distinguish between these two aspects. This seems to us be the back-ground on which Sūtras 11-66 are based.

In Adhikaraṇa IV (Sūtras 11-15) we are told that आनन्द and other attributes mentioned in Bra.Sū.I.1.2-31 belong to the impersonal or the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, which is the predominent (प्रधान, Vide Sūtra III.2. 14) aspect. Attributes like प्रियशिरस्त्व (including ब्रह्मपुच्छत्व mentioned in Tai.Upa.II.5, and other attributes like अनणु, अन्हस्व, अदीर्घ, etc. which have the same common meaning (अर्थसामान्य) are also to be dropped. These latter are to be dropped also because they are not useful for meditation on Brahman (as अरूपवत्) and because the word आत्मन् is used as the one qualified by the attributes अनणु, अन्हस्व, etc. (Sūtras 14 and 15.)

According to Śaṅkara Sūtras 11–13 decide that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attributes of 'having joy for its head' mentioned in the Tai.Upa.) are confined to special meditations. Sūtras 14 15 state that in Kaṭha Upa.III. 10–11 it is not intended to teach that each member of the series of principles is higher than the preceding one, but the passage aims at teaching the Puruṣa only as the highest of all.

Adhikaraṇa V (Sūtras 16-17) seem to refer to Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7-10 and establishes a rule about the method in which the impersonal aspect is to be conceived of or understood (गृहीति) during meditation. It is to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditator (आत्मगृहीति, cf. Bra.Sū.IV.1.3), just as also the other (i e., the personal) aspect, because in the succeeding sentences, we read, "He who meditates on "अन्या देवता," i. e., with the conception 'He is another, I am another' (अन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मि), never knows Him" (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10). A Vedāntin Opponent seems to have argued that the आत्मगृहीति method resulted from the grammatical construction of the Śruti in question (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7-10). The Sūtrakāra does not accept this argument (perhaps because he does not accept the identity of the individual soul with Brahman as taught in "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7), because he says that the आत्मगृहीति method may be the result of the definite statement (अवधारण) viz., आत्मेत्येवोपासीत (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7).

In Adhikaraṇa VI (Sūtras 18-24) the Sūtrakāra seems to refer to the *effect* (कार्य) of the meditation according to the आत्मगृहीति method, viz., 'He becomes *all* this (स इदं सर्वं भवति)', mentioned (आख्या) in the same Śruti (Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10). The mention of this effect of the meditation proves that there is an *Apūrva* (अपूर्व) or Invisible Result arising from the meditation (Sūtra 18). This *Apūrva* (अपूर्व) stated in Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10 should be taken as understood in other similar (i. e., *Vedānta*) texts, because, in these texts the topic is the same (Sūtra 19). In Sūtra 20, a Pūrvapakṣa argues that this Invisible Result should be taken as understood in other i. e. *dissimilar* Śruti texts, like the Mantra, the Brāhmaṇa and the Araṇyaka because all these (similar and dissimilar) texts are connected with one another. The Sūtrakāra does not accept this view because there is an insurmountable gulf of difference between the Vedāntas or Upaniṣads and the other Śruti texts (Sūtra 21) and because Śrutis like Mu.Upa.I.1.4–5, Chā.Upa.VII.4, etc., show this difference. The Muṇḍaka Upa. calls the Mantra, Brāhmaṇa, etc., *aparā vidyā* (अपरा विद्या) the

Lower Science and the Vedānta Śruti *parā vidyā* (परा विद्या) the Higher Lore, while in the Chā.Upa. Nārada laments that though he knows the Mantra, etc., he does not know Ātman (Sūtra 22). The texts which are other than Vedānta do sometimes mention attributes of the impersonal aspect of Brahman, e. g., the Rāṇāyanīya Khila of the Sāmaveda mentions *saṁbhṛti* (संभृति) and *dyuvyāpti* (द्युव्याप्ति) both being attributes of Brahman. But the Sūtrakāra has not included them in his collection of attributes of Brahman, because of the distinction between the Vedānta Śrutis and other Śrutis (Sūtra 23). One more reason for giving this treatment to the Pūrvakāṇḍa of the Veda is that that Kāṇḍa does not mention *other attributes* such as are mentioned in the Doctrine of the Puruṣa (the personal aspect of Brahman) in the Upaniṣads (Sūtra 24). Thus, the Sūtrakāra makes a sharp distinction between the teaching of the Pūrva Kāṇḍa and the Uttara Kāṇḍa.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 18, Chā.Upa.V.2 and Bṛ.Upa.VI.1, discuss a minor point connected with the प्राणसंवाद. These Śrutis lay down वासोविज्ञान, not आचमन. According to Sūtra 19, the Śāṇḍilyavidyā of Śatapatha Brā.X.6.3 is to be combined with Bṛ.Upa.V.6. Sūtras 20-22 decide that in Bṛ.Upa.-V.5. अहर् and अहम् are to be held as belonging to separate Vidyās. Similarly Sūtra 23 concludes that the विभूतिs in the Rāṇāyanīya Khilas and Chā.Upa.III.14 are not to be combined with each other because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of Vidyās. According to Sūtra 24, as in the preceding Sūtras, the पुरुष यज्ञ of the Tāṇḍins and Paiṅgins on the one hand and the same of the Taittirīyakas on the other are to be held apart.

Adhikaraṇa VII (Sūtras 25-27) deals with the meditation on the Praṇava. In Sūtra 25 a Vedāntin Opponent argues that the penetration (वेध), etc., mentioned in Mu.Upa.II.2.2-4 should not be collected by the followers of other Branches because the topic of that text is different from the topic in any other Vedānta

text. The Sūtrakāra rejects this view (तु) and says that if they are missing in a Vedānta text, they should be received by the followers of such (incomplete) text from the Mu.Upa., as (1) *the Penetration*, etc., are subsidiary to the meditation on Brahman because the Praṇava is called उपायन "a means" just as कुश grass, etc., is subsidiary to a sacrifice (Sūtra 26) and (2) as there is nothing to be achieved by a seeker after he begins his journey to Brahman as stated in Praśna Upa.V.5 according to which a meditator on the Praṇava, on leaving this world, goes to the Akṣara which is a mass of life and which is शान्त, अजर, अमृत, अभय (Sūtra 27, Pra.Upa.V.7). Thus, the Sūtrakāra discusses the meditation on the Praṇava as a symbol of the impersonal aspect of Brahman.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 25, various passages of the nature of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas though occurring at the beginning of certain Upaniṣads have nothing to do with Brahmavidyā, but are connected with sacrificial acts. Sūtra 26 says that Chā.Upa.VIII.13, Mu.Upa.III.1.3, etc. are to be enlarged with the help of Kau.Upa.I.4, which says that the good and evil deeds of one who knows Brahman pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased. Sūtra 27 is to be connected with Sūtra 28 as forming the same Adhikaraṇa (XVI).

In Adhikaraṇa VIII (Sūtras 28–30) the meditator is given an option of choice about the aspect of Brahman because both the personal and the impersonal aspects are not inconsistent (with each other, Sūtra 28), because the Liberation will be achieved by accepting either of the two (Sūtra 29) and because we find in the Scripture itself a principle, viz., Brahman, having the nature of being attained in either way, just as it is found in the case of several things in the world (Sūtra 30).

According to Śaṅkara's interpretation Sūtras 27–28 decide that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds of a Brahmajñānin, takes place at the moment of the soul's departure from

the body. Sūtras 29–30 show that the देवयान is tenable only in the सगुण विद्याs.

In Adhikaraṇa IX (Sūtras 31–33) the Sūtrakāra seems to us to discuss the question as to how many attributes are necessary for the purpose of meditation on Brahman. There is no rule that *all* the attributes (सर्वासां धियाम्) of either aspect, collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū.I.1–3 are required, but there is no inconsistency of all of them with Śruti and Smṛti (Sūtra 31). There are several attributes of Brahman connected with the official duties at a sacrifice like those mentioned in the episode of Uṣasti (Chā.Upa.I.7.5–9, I.9.1–2, I.11.4–5). The meditation on these आधिकारिक attributes should be continued (अवस्थिति) as long as a seeker (मुमुक्षु) attends his duties at a sacrifice (Sūtra 32). But the attributes of अक्षर are to be confined to their respective Śrutis on account of the sameness of their purpose and because the individual soul *is* what those attributes imply (Sūtra 33, Vide Sūtras 13–15 *supra*).

According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 31 says that the देवयान is followed by those who are acquainted with the सगुण विद्याs of Brahman. Śaṅkara refers to the difference of सत्यम् (Bṛ.Upa.VI.2.15) and तपस् (Chā.Upa.V.10.1) in the Pañcāgnividyā. Sūtra 32 decides that though the true knowledge of Brahman is generally immediately followed by release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices. According to Sūtra 33 the passages about the *Akṣaram* (e.g.Bṛ.Upa.III.8.8, Mu.Upa. I.1.6 teach negative attributes which are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.

In Adhikaraṇa X (Sūtras 34–36) the Sūtrakāra tells us that Brahman is to be meditated upon as present within one's own self because Brahman is stated to be 'of this much size' for this very purpose of meditation (Sūtras 34–35. Vide Sūtras I.2.7 and I.3.21). A Vedāntin Opponent argues that this inward meditation is the result of the identity of the soul and Brahman. The

Sūtrakāra rejects this view and says that the inward meditation is like the one suggested in other Śrutis about inward realization, e. g., Śve. Upa. I.15, Kaṭha Upa.IV.1 (Sūtra 36).

According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 34 says that ऋतं पिबन्तौ (KaṭhaUpa. III.1) and द्वा सुपर्णा (Mu.Upa.III.1) constitute one Vidyā only. Sūtras 35–36 decide that the two passages, Bṛ. Upa.III.4 and III.5, constitute one Vidyā only.

Adhikaraṇa XI (Sūtras 37–42) is a crucial Adhikaraṇa. We have proposed a correction of the text of the Sūtras as already noted by us above. The Sūtrakāra here allows an interchange of attributes for meditation on either aspect of Brahman because, he says, the Śrutis themselves characterise in the same manner one aspect of Brahman as they do the other aspect (Sūtra 37). Even one and the same Śruti describes the Puruṣa in the terms of the Avyakta and *vice versa* (Sūtra 38).

Sūtra 39, as explained above, reveals the Sūtrakāra's scheme of arrangement of Śrutis for discussion in Bra. Sū.I.1–3 and, we may add here, that at the same time it throws further light on the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of those Śrutis. Though the Sūtrakāra distinguishes between the two aspects of Brahman for the purpose of meditation, he would never say that the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū.I.2–3 relate *only* to the Puruṣa or *only* to the Avyakta.

A Vedāntin Opponent seems to argue that no attributes of Brahman (even those of the aspect other than that on which a seeker meditates) should be dropped because of the respect for the Śruti (Sūtra 40). The Sūtrakāra says that when an attribute (of an aspect other than the one on which a seeker meditates) presents itself in a Śruti it should not be dropped out of respect for the word of the Śruti (Sūtra 41). According to the Sūtrakāra there is no rule for fixing the attributes as belonging to only one of the two aspects (तन्निर्धारणानियमः) The result of this stand-point is that there is no objection from the side of the Śruti to taking

each of the two aspects of Brahman as a separate or independent aspect (Sūtra 42).

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 37 the passage Aita. Āra.II.2.4.6 constitutes not one but two meditations. Sūtra 38 decides that the *Vidyā* of the True One contained in Bṛ.Upa. V.4 and V.5 (not in Bṛ.Upa.V.4.5 and Cha.Upa.I.6.7) is one only. In Sutra 39, we are told that Chā. Upa.VIII.1.1-5 and Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22 cannot constitute one Vidyā. The Adhikaraṇa (XXVI) consisting of Sūtras 40–41 treats of a minor question concerning the rituals of the Vaiśvānaravidyā of Chā. Upa.V.11–24. Sūtra 42 shows that those meditations (e.g., in Chā.Upa.I.1.1) which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of the sacrificial actions, are not te be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.

In Adhikarana XII (Sūtras 43-54) the Sūtrakāra gives us the method of meditation on the Puruṣa. In Sūtra 43 he refers to Sūtra 16 above and says that the Puruṣa is to be meditated upon as being identical with the Self of the meditator (*ātmagṛhīti*).

Sūtras 44–54 form a crucial group in which the Sūtrakāra upholds his option given to the meditator to choose either of the two aspects of Brahman for meditation. He says that a majority of Śrutis mention the Pradhāna or the impersonal aspect and therefore that aspect is more predominent. But, the Sutrakāra asserts, "inspite of this predominence, the option of choice already stated in Sūtras 28–30 stands (Sūtra 44)."

In Sūtras 45-50 we have a discussion, which is, we believe, based upon the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. A Vedāntin Opponent opposes the above option by saying that the meditation on the Puruṣa may be regarded as activity of projection, on the impersonal Brahman, of the पुरुष-idea, like a mentation. The Opponent's arguments are that according to the context (प्रकरण, Sū.III.3.45) the Mu.Upa. proceeds to describe Brahman as being only an impersonal principle (Sūtra 45) and that we have

an अतिदेश (in Mū.Upa.I.2.13–येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यम्) which says that one knows the Akṣara, the impersonal Brahman as the Puruṣa, the personal One (Sūtra 46). The Sūtrakāra emphatically asserts that the meditation on the Puruṣa is nothing else but Prescience (Vidyā) because of the definite statement (निर्धारण, Sūtra 47) which says that the Lore by which one knows *akṣara puruṣa* (the Akṣara to be the Puruṣa, as the Opponent says) is Brahmavidyā (Mu.Upa.I.2.13) and Mu.Upa.III.2.10 calls the knowledge of the Puruṣa "Vidyā." The Sūtrakāra further says that there is no irreconcilability of the personal aspect with the impersonal aspect because the Sruti and the Smṛti which teach both these as equally important aspects of Brahman, are more authentic means of knowledge than the Preception and the Inference (Sūtra 49). The Śūtrakāra adds that on the ground of अनुबन्ध (peculiar usage of words, vide Sūtra 52), etc., the Puruṣa is found to have the separateness of a second aspect (प्रज्ञान्तर-पृथक्त्ववत् to be a second independent aspect) of Brahman. He refers to Sūtra 42 (पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः).

In Sūtra 51, the Sūtrakāra seems to deny the charge of the Puruṣa being liable to be considered a लोक, a world, though he does admit that there is some common characteristic between the attainment of the Puruṣa and that of a world (viz., the enjoyment of all desired objects).[17]

In Sūtra 52, the Sūtrakāra says that the same words are used for the Puruṣa as for the Avyakta, but the *application* of some particular word to either of the two (अनुबन्धः) depends upon the frequency of use.

In Sūtras 53-54, the Sūtrakāra seems to refute the view of some Vedāntins who hold that the meditation on the Puruṣa or the personal aspect is taught in the Scripture because the individual soul is in the body (Sūtra 53) and therefore can easily understand the personal aspect (Cf. Bha.Gī.XII). The Sūtra-

(17) Cf. the fact that the Sūtrakāra does not mention the प्रजापतिलोक in the list of worlds in Bra.Sū.IV.2.

kāra on the contrary emphasises the fact that the soul is quite different from the body (व्यतिरेक) because the soul is not present always while the body is present (तद्भाव-अभावितत्वात्). The existence of the soul does not depend upon the body, as it is implied in the statement found by the Opponent in the Scripture, i. e., the Smṛti (न तु उपलब्धिवत्).

According to Śaṅkara's explanation of Sūtra 43, in Bṛ.Upa.I. 5.21-23 and Chā.Upa.IV.3 Vāyu and Prāṇa are not to be identified, but to be held apart.

According to Śāṅkara *bhāṣya* on Sū.44-52 the fire-alters made of mind (मनश्चित्), etc., mentioned in the Agnirahasya (Śatapatha Brā.X.5) do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action, but they are merely subjects of meditation. The Adhikaraṇa (XXX) consisting of Sūtras 53-54 treats, in the way of a digression, of the question whether to the individual soul an existence independent of the body can be assigned or not (as the Materialists maintain).

In Adhikaraṇa XIII (Sūtras 55-56) the Sūtrakāra introduces a discussion about the meditations on Brahman thought of as consisting of parts or limbs, e. g., the meditation on the parts of the Vaiśvānara (Chā.Upa.V.18.2). An Opponent (a Vedāntin separatist) seems to hold the view that these meditations are not to be adopted by the followers of a different Veda, because they are taught in the Branches of each Veda (so that the other Vedas have nothing to do with them).

The Sūtrakāra rejects this view and says that there is no inconsistency involved in the adoption of such meditations in other Vedas than the one in the Branch of which they are taught, just as there is no inconsistency in the adoption of the same Mantra, etc., in different Vedas.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtras 55-56, meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice (e. g. in Chā.Upa.I.1.1, II.2.1, Aitareya Āra.II.1.2.1, Śata.-Brā.X.5.4.1) are valid not only for that Śākhā in which the meditation is actually met with, but for all Śākhās.

In Adhikaraṇa XIV (Sūtra 57) the Sūtrakāra says that out of the many limbs of a particular meditation of the above type in which one meditates on the limbs of Brahman, the meditation on a majority of the limbs is better (than that on a minority of the same) just as a *kratu* is better (than a Yajña ?) and this is shown in the Śruti.

According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 57 decides that the Vaiśvānara Agni of Chā.Upa.V.11–24 is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in its single parts.

In Adhikaraṇa XV (Sūtra 58) the Sūtrakāra says that the meditations of Brahman as constituted by limbs or parts, e. g., that on the Vaiśvānara, the Ṣoḍaṣakala Brahman, the Saṁvarga Vidyā, etc., are each of them different from the rest because the शब्द, the प्रकरण and the संज्ञा (Vide Sūtras 6-8) of each of these meditations are different from the same of the rest.

Śaṅkara's interpretation of Sūtra 58 shows that those meditations which refer to one subject, but are distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus, the *Daharavidyā*, Śāṇḍilyavidyā, etc., remain separate.

In Adhikaraṇa XVI (Sūtra 59) the Sūtrakāra says that out of all these meditations a meditator should choose whatever meditation he likes, because thay all give the same fruit, viz., Mokṣa.

According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 59 shows that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.

In Adhikaraṇa XVII (Sūtra 60) the Sūtrakāra says that the *kāmya* meditations on Brahman may or may not be collected together according to the maditator's desire (for the various objects), because each of them gives a different fruit from the rest.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 60, those meditations on the other hand, which refer to special wishes, may be cumulated or optionally employed according to the meditator's choice.

In Adhikaraṇa XVIII (Sūtras 61-66) the Sūtrakāra solves one more problem about the meditations in which a meditator meditates on the limbs of Brahman. An Opponent says that a meditator should have the respective notion on the respective limb, e. g., he should meditate on the Sky as the head, the Sun as the eye, etc. of the Vaiśvānara (Sūtras 61-64). The Sūtrakāra rejects this view on the ground of the absence of Śruti stating that the head and the Sky or the eye and the Sun, etc., exist together and because we find in the Śrutis that the conceptions of these limbs differ in different Śrutis (Sūtra 66).

The last Adhikaraṇa (XXXVI) of Śaṅkara consisting of Sūtras (61-66) extends the conclusion of Sūtra 60 to the meditations connected with constituent elements of sacrifice such as the *udgītha*.

We have above given a summary of the contents of each of the Adhikaraṇas of Bra.Sū.III.3 as we interpret the Pāda along with a briefer one of the same according to Śaṅkara's interpretation. Perhaps, a table giving side by side our interpretation of each Sūtra separately and those of at least the more important among the Ācāryas, viz., Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Vallabha, would have better served for a comparative look at them. But this was not possible since it would have immensely added to the volume of the work. We also feel that such a presentation, though undoubtedly helpful to the scholar, is not absolutely necessary, because, as Dr. Ghate points out, "All the commentators agree in a general way in holding that such (like that of Śaṅkara) is the subject matter of this Pāda".[18] So far as the general contents of the Pāda according to the traditional inter-

(18) Dr. Ghate's The Vedanta, P. 135.

pretation are concerned, Śaṅkara would serve as a model, though, as Thibaut says, occasionally Rāmānuja's interpretation (or that of any other Ācārya) may "seem to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sūtra".[19]

Without being arrogant or even proud we may be allowed to explain our view that inspite of the absence of any direct support from tradition, the interpretation of this Pāda, that has suggested itself to us in the course of our intensive study of the Sūtras, with the help of the principal Upaniṣads and the Sūtras themselves, seems to us to reveal the Sūtrakāra as giving us in this Pāda a series of links of his doctrine one after the other as we proceed from one Adhikaraṇa to the next successively till we reach the last one. There is no such line of consistent, connected, and consecutive ideas in the interpretation of this Pāda preserved or offered to us by any of the Ācāryas. If we are correct in our judgment, this succession of thoughts itself would be a point in favour of the interpretation of this Pāda that we happen to discover and that is being offered here to the reader, though it may be, (and it has really been,) that some part of the details of any particular Sūtra may have to be dropped in future on finding a still better explanation for the same.

The connected series of the links in the chain of thoughts, which can be already seen from the summary of the contents of Bra.Sū.III.3 as interpreted by us, some parts of the very contents and the difficulties that the Ācāryas have themselves found in explaining this Pāda in their own way — all this shows that Bra.Sū.III.3 is more important than any other Pāda of any Adhyāya of the work and it is the key to the interpretation of Bra.Sū.I.1–3 and to that of several Upaniṣadic Śrutis. It was the traditional interpretation only that led Dr. Ghate to think: 'As the majority of the Adhikaraṇas treat of nothing but special cases to which the decisions given in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on Bra.

(19) Vide Thibaut's remarks on Rāmānuja's interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3.9, P. lxviii of Introduction, Vol. xxxiv, S.B.E.

Sū.III.3.1–13 are to be applied and as they are of no importance for the question[20] before us, it is not necessary to review their contents in detail, as we have done with the preceding Pādas.'[21] It was the same reason that made Thibaut give his opinion about the Pāda, that "To the devout Vedāntin the question (of *upasaṁhāra* as understood by tne commentators) is not a purely theoretical one but of immediate practical interest".[22] We think that the Pāda is very important not only to the devout Vedāntin, but also to such students of the Vedānta as we are. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say that the third Pāda of Bra.Sū. III has its importance for the history of the Indian philosophy because it tells us very clearly how one of the most important problems of philosophy, viz., the relation of the personal and impersonal aspects of the final Principle, was understood in the days of the Sūtrakāra with reference to the Upaniṣads and thus it helps us in appreciating the interpretation that must have once been given to them.

Among the other portions of the Brahmasūtra interpreted here Bra.Sū.III.2.11-41 comes next in importance to Bra.Sū.III.3. Bra.Sū.III.4 as interpreted by us reveals also its importance on two questions: (1)The nature of the ज्ञान of Brahman, which Jaimini regards as mere reflection (परामर्श) while Bādarāyaṇa as 'something to be performed' (अनुष्ठेय) or even 'laid down' (विधि – Bra.Sū.III.4. 19–20) and (2) the actions or duties (कर्मन्s) that a seeker of Brahman (मुमुक्षु) must do and the part which these actions (कर्मन्s) play along with ज्ञान in the achivement of Mokṣa which, according to the Sūtrakāra, is the *common* goal of both *karman* and *jñāna* though the former only help the latter.

In connection with the question of the comparative importance of the several Pādas of the Brahmasūtra, we may add that

(20) The question is what are the philosophical thoughts of the Sūtrakāra and his Commentators.

(21) The Vedanta, P. 137.

(22) Thibaut, S. B. E, vol XXXIV, P. lxvii.

Bra.Sū.II.1 (called Smṛtipāda) is also very important. We believe that "स्मृति" in स्मृत्यधिकरण does not mean सांख्य as the Ācāryas have understood it, but it means स्मृति, as distinguished from श्रुति discussed in Bra.Sū.I. So, the स्मृतिपाद, in our opinion, gives the views of Bādarāyaṇa on topics of the स्मृति particularly the *Gītā*, not accepted and also not rejected, by him, but rather interpreted by him to suit his own *Śrauta VedāntaSchool* (Cf. व्याख्याताः in Bra.Sū.II.1.12; व्याख्याताः can only mean 'explained; not 'refuted'). As we have not included a detailed interpretation of the (स्मृतिपाद) in the present work, we would abstain from writing here anything more about the importance of the Smṛtipāda[23] (Vide Appendix).

Thus, there are several portions of the Brahmasūtras, important for the history of the Indian philosophy and of all these Bra.Sū.III.3 seems to us to be the most important. The Pāda is traditionally called गुणोपसंहार पाद and the word गुण is traditionally understood to refer to the so-called qualities of Brahman given in the several विद्याs of the Upaniṣads. However, from the contents of the Pāda as discussed by us we are led to think that the word "गुण" in this case is used in the Mímāṁsaka sense[24] of a secondary element or 'a subsidiary part' and '*upasamhāra*' in Sūtra III. 3.5 (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद् विधिशेषवत्) would mean 'a collection' or 'gathering together' of all the subsidiary parts of the knowledge of Brahman. The word "विधिशेष" in this Sūtra can be quoted in support of our meaning of गुण in "गुणोपसंहार". It is this collection (उपसंहार) which gives its immense importance to the Pāda.

(23) We have given in a nutshell a summary of the arguments for our conclusion that the Smṛtipāda gives the Sūtrakāra's view about several tenets of the Bhagavadgītā, in a Paper: Meaning of "Smṛti" in the Brahmasūtra, in the Indian Historical Quartely, 1936. A detailed interpretation of all the Sūtras of the Pāda is ready with us waiting for the Press.

(24) See particularly the use of the word गुण in Jai. Sū. II. 3.

CHAPTER 10.

TRADITIONAL METHOD OF INTERPRETATION : SANKARA'S METHOD.

In a succeeding chapter we have made several suggestions for the correct interpretation of the Brahmasūtra. These suggestions occurred to us while examining the method of interpretation of the Commentators of the Brahmasūtra. In our opinion, all Commentators have generally followed the same method. Here we propose to point out some of the chief defects underlying this method as illustrated by Śaṅkara's commentary.

These defects in the case of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* can be classified under several divisions, viz., (1) defects which involve a wrong conception of the division of the chief topics of the Brahmasūtra, (2) defects which result in a double interpretation of a Śruti or a Smṛti; (3) defects which are due to a wrong conception of the विषयवाक्यs of the Sūtras; (4) defects which are the results of taking too much liberty with the Sūtras; (5) defects due to wrong splitting up of the words of a Sūtra; and (6) defects due to not assigning the correct sense to a word in a Sūtra; etc. etc.

The chief topic of the Brahmasūtra can be only Brahman. By the very nature of the Inquiry (जिज्ञासा) undertaken by the Brahmasūtra, it is not very likely that the Sūtrakāra would discuss topics not directly connected with his undertaking, such as the atonement of a lifelong celibate breaking his vow,[1] the four stages of life (आश्रमा;),[2] etc., etc., which would be properly discussed in a Smṛti, the lores of rituals (कर्माङ्ग विद्या) which lead to the enrichment of the fruit of the Sacrifice (कर्मसमृद्धि), and several other topics which could find a proper place in a work

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(1) Cf. यदि नैष्ठिको ब्रह्मचारी प्रमादादवकीर्येत किं तस्य "ब्रह्मचार्यवकीर्णी नैर्ऋतं गर्दभमालभेद् ' इत्येतत्प्रायश्चित्तं स्यादुत नेति । Vide S'ā.bhā. on Bra.Sū.III.4,41-42.

(2) Cf. अनुष्ठेयमाश्रमान्तरं बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते । वेदे श्रवणात् । etc. etc. Vide S'ā. *bhāśya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.19.

on the Sacrifices.[3] Again, if the Sūtrakāra at all wanted to discuss such topics, he would have given them in *one and the same* Pāda or Adhikaraṇa in his book. Moreover, if he accepted the two aspects of Brahman (सगुण and निर्गुण) taught by Śaṅkara, he would have very probably divided his discussion into two definite separate places or at least in some regular order, so as to make it easy for the reader to understand his meaning and explanation of these two aspects, wherever he would have chosen to state them in his book. A commentator should not assert, at his will, that a few Sūtras in one Pāda deal with the Para Brahman, while others in the same Pāda deal with the Apara Brahman, unless he gives sufficient reasons for such a sudden change of topics. Again, if certain Sūtras in one Pāda (Bra.Sū. II.3.33-42) deal with the कर्तृत्व and कर्मन्s of the individual soul, it is not likely that *the giver* of the fruit of these actions will be discussed in another group of Sūtras in a different Adhyāya, (Bra.Sū.III.2.38-41).[4] It is not possible that the Sūtrakāra will discuss one and the same topic in two different places, once in brief and again in detail; much less possible is it that one and the same subject should be the topic in both the *Sādhanādhyāya* and the *Phalādhyāya*, since the same subject cannot be *Sādhana* and *Phala*.[5]

We shall, first of all, examine how Śaṅkara shows that particular Sūtras deal with the Ignorance (अविद्या), the Relative Knowledge (अपराविद्या), and the Absolute Knowledge (पराविद्या).

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(3) Vide S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.55.

(4) Vide our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.2.38.

(5) Cf. भूयश्चैनं विभागं चतुर्थाध्याये निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः ।
S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.30.

(5) Cf. येन ब्रह्मणा सुषुप्त्यादिषु जीव उपाध्युपशमात्संपद्यते तस्येदानीं स्वरूपं श्रुतिवशेन निर्धार्यते । S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. S.III.2.11.

Also, तस्माद्ब्रह्मणो रूपप्रपञ्चं प्रतिषेधति परिशिनष्टि ब्रह्मेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । S'ā.*bhaṣyā* on Bra. Su.III.2.22. यदेतन्निरस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म निर्धारितमस्मात्परमन्यत्तत्त्वमस्ति नास्तीति श्रुतिविप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः । S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.2-31.

According to Śaṅkara, Bra.Sū.III.2.11–37 deal with the Supreme Brahman,[6] while Bra.Sū.III.2 38-41 deal with Brahman in the state of relative reality when It divides Itself as the Ruler and the ruled.[7] In our interpretation of this latter group of Sūtras (III.2.38–41) we have explained why we believe it to be possible that they relate to Brahman as the giver of the Mokṣa ('फल' in Bra.Sū.III.2.38–39) and as the Mokṣa itself (in Bra.Sū. III.2.40–41). We may here add that the word 'फल' occurring in a chapter about साधन, which precedes a chapter about फल, should mean 'मुक्तिफल'. The word मुक्तिफल itself occurs in Bra.Sū.III.4.52 which is the last Sūtra of the *Sādhanādhyāya*. Moreover, the nature of the individual soul, and along with it the nature of his actions (कर्मन्s), have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.II 3.17-53, (particulary Bra.Sū.II 3.33–40 . There is no reason why the Sūtrakāra, who does not regard the section of the nature of the soul as a part of the साधन, should not discuss the fruit of the soul's actions[8] in same place where he discusses the कर्तृत्व of the soul (in Bra.Sū. II.3). We believe that the question of the giver of the fruit of the soul's actions is discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.II.3. 41–42.[9] For these reasons, we believe, the Sūtrakāra does not discuss व्यवहार in Bra.Sū.III.2.38-41.

Bra.Sū.III.3 seems to have been taken by Śaṅkara as dealing with the meditations on the सगुण Brahman and with certain विद्याs, e.g. प्राणादिविद्या ; the meditations on the सगुण Brahman are again three-fold—those which give their fruit in this world (दृष्टफलानि), those which give their fruit in other worlds (अदृष्टफलानि) and

(7) Cf. तस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिक्यामीशित्रीशितव्यविभागावस्थायामयमन्य : स्वभावो वर्ण्यते। S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III 2.38.

(8) Cf. यदेतदिष्टानिष्टव्यामिश्रलक्षणं कर्मफलं ससारगोचरं त्रिविधं प्रसिद्धं जन्तूनां किमेतत्कर्मणो भवत्याहोस्विदीश्वरादिति भवति विचारणा। S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.2.38.

(9) With कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षा in Bra.Sū.II.3.42 cf. विचित्रकार्यानुपपत्यादयोऽपि दोषा: कृतप्रत्नापेक्षत्वादीश्वरस्य न प्रसज्यन्ते। S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.2.41. Sūtra II.3.41 means 'परात् तु फलम्.'

those which lead the seeker to liberation-by-stages (क्रममुक्तिफलानि)[10]. This is Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3.1.

We give below a short statement of the subject of each Sūtra of Bra.Sū.III.3 to show how Śaṅkara construes the same as dealing with *Parā Vidyā*, *Aparā Vidyā* and *A-vidyā* :—

Sūtras 1–4	A Proposition about various अपरा विद्याs.
Sūtra 5.	A प्रयोजन Sūtra.
Sūtras 6–8	प्राणविद्या or उद्गीथविद्या, i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtra 9	Discussion of उद्गीथ, which means औद्गात्र, duties of an उद्गातृ, i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtra 10	Discussion of " प्राणसंवाद " Sruti; अविद्या.
Sūtras 11–13	Parā Vidyā or Aparā Vidyā ?
Sūtras 14–15	(Discussion about the परत्व of Puruṣa in Katha Upa. III. 10–11), i. e., पराविद्या.
Sūtras 16–17	(आत्मन् in Ai. Upa. I.2 means परमात्मन्) अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 18	(Discussion of आचमन and अपां वासःकल्पन) अविद्या.
Sūtra 19	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtras 20–22	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 23	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 24	(पुरुषः यज्ञः कल्पितः) कर्माङ्ग विद्या i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtra 25	Relation between कर्माङ्गs and अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 26	(Dispōsal of the good and bad deeds of the Knower of Brahman–परा विद्या.
Sūtras 27–28	पर्यङ्क विद्या, i. e., अपरा विद्या.
Sūtras 29–30	देवयानः पन्थाः, i. e., अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 31	सगुणा विद्याs leading to worldy prosperity (अभ्युदय-फला), i. e., अविद्या.

(10) Vide S'aṅkara's commentary on Bra.Sū.III.3.1, viz.,
व्याख्यातं विज्ञेयस्य ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वम् |.........ननु विज्ञेयं ब्रह्म पूर्वापरादिभेदरहितमेकरसं सैन्धवघनवदवधारितं तत्र कुतो विज्ञानभेदाभेदचिन्तावतार : |.........नाप्यस्य चोदनाद्यविशेषादभेद उच्यते | ब्रह्मविज्ञानस्याचोदनालक्षणत्वात् | :.........तदुच्यते सगुणब्रह्मविषया प्राणादिविषया चेयं विज्ञानभेदाभेदचिन्तेत्यदोषः। अत्र हि कर्मवदुउपासनानां भेदाभेदौ संभवतः कर्मवदेव चोपासनानि दृष्टफलान्यदृष्टफलानि चोच्यन्ते। क्रममुक्तिफलानि कानिचित्सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण | तेष्वेषा चिन्ता संभवति |

Sūtra 32	(Whether there is a fresh body of the knower after the present body)-अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 33	(अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः) परा विद्या
Sūtra 34	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtras 35-36	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 37	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 38	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 39	A curious combination[11] of सगुणा ब्रह्म-विद्या (of Chā. Upa. VIII.1.6) and निर्गुण Brahman (of Bṛ. Upa. IV.3). How is this combination possible ?
Sūtras 40–41	प्राणाग्निहोत्र. कर्माङ्ग विद्या, i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtra 42	कर्माङ्ग विद्या.
Sūtra 43	A question about प्राण, the Breath, अविद्या ?
Sūtras 44–52	कर्माङ्गविद्या (मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः), i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtras 53–54	(देहव्यातिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सद्भावः), i. e., अविद्या (?)
Sūtras 55–56	उद्गीथादिकर्मावबद्धाः प्रत्ययाः–अविद्या.
Sūtra 57	वैश्वानर विद्या, i. e., अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 58	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 59	अपरा विद्या.
Sūtra 60	अपरा विद्या (because we have here काम्याः विद्याः)
Sūtras 61–66	कर्माङ्गविद्याः, i. e., अविद्या.

It is likely that in the case of *some* of the above Sūtras, scholars may differ as to whether they deal with अपरा विद्या or अविद्या and we have ourselves expressed our hesitation in assigning to a few of them such a classification. But such a difference of opinion would hardly be sufficient to disprove a general conclusion to be arrived at on the basis of our classification. According to the above classification, about *seven* Sūtras deal with *Parā Vidyā* (Sūtras 11–13, 14, 15, 26, 33), *twentysix* with *Aparā Vidyā* (Sūtras 1–4, 16–17, 19, 20–22, 23, 25, 27–28, 29–30, 32,

(11) S'aṅkara's reply, " गुणवतस्तु ब्रह्मण एकत्वाद्विभूतिप्रदर्शनाय अयं गुणोपसंहारः सूत्रितो नोपासनायेति द्रष्टव्यम् ," is hardly satisfactory. See our Notes on the same.

34, 35-36, 37, 38, 57, 58, 59, 60), *thirtyone* with *Avidyā* (Sūtras 6-8, 9, 10, 18, 24, 31, 40-41, 42, 43, 44-52, 53-54, 55-56, 61-66), *one* Sūtra deals with the aim of the Pāda (Sūtra 5, प्रयोजन Sūtra), and *S*ūtra 39 is a curious mixture of *Parā Vidyā* and *Aparā Vidyā*, out of a total number of *sixtysix* Sūtras. In our opinion, no scheme can be offered or discovered to explain either the proportion allotted to these different classes of Sūtras according to the System of Śaṅkara or the order (or rather the disorder) in which they occur. So far as this (third) Pāda of the third Adhyāya is concerned, we have already explained a scheme which we have discovered in these Sūtras and in our Notes (in Part I) we have also stated with reference to each individual Sūtra, why we regard Śaṅkara's division and interpretation of the Sūtras as untenable.

Now, we give below the classification of the Sūtras of Bra. Sū.III.4 into those dealing with Parā Vidyā, Aparā Vidyā and Avidyā according to Śaṅkara.

Sūtras 1-17	(Relation between कर्मन् and ब्रह्मविद्या)-परा विद्या.
Sūtras 18-20	(ऊर्ध्वरेतसामाश्रमाणां सद्भावः) – A topic fit for the Smṛti (Law Books). " There is no प्रत्यक्ष Śruti for these आश्रमs " – Śaṅkara. Therfore, अविद्या.
Sūtras 21-22	कर्माङ्ग विद्या, i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtras 23-24	परा विद्या.
Sūtra 25	परा विद्या
Sūtras 26-27	परा विद्या.
Sūtras 28-31	प्राणविद्याविषयं सर्वान्नभक्षणम्—अपरा विद्या.
Sūtras 32-35	Whether a non-seeker (अमुमुक्षु) should do आश्रमकर्माणि, i. e., अविद्या.
Sūtras 36-39	Widowers and others are entitled to विद्या-(परा or अपरा ?)
Sūtra 40	No fall of the ऊर्ध्वरेतस्s. अविद्या.
Sūtras 41-42	Atonement for a lifelong celibate violating his vow of celibacy. A subject fit for Smṛti. अविद्या.

Sūtra 43	Excommunication of the *fallen* ऊर्ध्वरेतस्; अविद्या.
Sūtras 44-46	Actions performed by a hired priest give their फल to the master; अविद्या.
Sūtras 47-49	संन्यासाश्रम sanctioned by the Śruti. अविद्या (?)
Sūtra 50	Meaning of बाल्य in Bṛ.Upa.III.5.1.
Sūtra 51	The fulfilment of the विद्या in this very life. परा विद्या (?)
Sūtra 52	No distinction in the फल, viz., absolution. परा विद्या.

Though there is a possibility of difference of opinion as regards the exact calssification of these Sūtras under the above heads, we may say that *approximately* twentyeight, four and nineteen Sūtras deal respectively with परा विद्या (Sūtras 1-17, 23-24, 25, 26-27, 36-39, 51, 52), अपरा विद्या (Sūtras 28-31) and अविद्या (Sūtras 18-20, 21-22, 32-35, 40, 41-42, 43, 44-46, 47-49), and that Sūtra 50 contains a parenthetical statement, out of the total number of 52 Sūtras of Bra.Sū.III.4. It is strange that no rule emerges out of Śaṅkara's interpretation of these Sūtras, to explain the proportion and the order of these three kinds of Sūtras as they are strung togather by the Sūtrakāra (according to Śaṅkara).

In Bra.Sū.IV.1 seven Sūtras deal with परा विद्या (Sūtras 3, 14-19), six Sūtras with अपरा विद्या (Sūtras 4-5, 7-10), four Sūtras with परा and अपरा विद्या (Sūtras 1-2, 12, 13) and two Sūtras with कर्माङ्गोपासनानि or अविद्या, thus making up the total of 19 Sūtras.[12] In Śaṅkara's opinion the second and the third Pādas of the fourth Adhyāya deal with अपरा विद्या. The departure from the body (उत्क्रान्ति) described in Bra.Sū. IV.2 is common to the ignorant and to the knower of the अपरा विद्या, and this departure (उत्क्रान्ति) is described by

(12) Sūtras IV.1.1-2 deal with Parā and Aparā Vidyā, but only for second-rate students. Sūtra IV.1.11 seems to deal with *all* meditations according to S'aṅkara. Sūtras IV.1.12 deals with *kāmyāni* or *abhyudayaphalāni upāsanāni*, i. e., Avidyā (See Sā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV.1.12 and our Note 4 on the same Sūtra).

the Sūtrakāra to introduce 'the path of gods', by which the fruit is reached in the अपरा विद्याs.[13] In Bra. Sūtra IV.4 which consists of twentytwo Sūtras, eight Sūtras deal परा विद्या (Sūtras 1–4, 6, 16, 19–20),[14] thirteen with अपरा विद्या (Sūtras 5,8–9, 10–14, 15, 17–18, 21–21) and Sūtra 7 with परा and विद्याs.[15]

As already stated above, we fail to see whether any explanation of the proportion or of the order in which the Sūtras (as per शाङ्कर भाष्य) about each of the three classes of *Parā Vidyā*, *Aparā Vidyā* and *Avidyā* occur in each Pāda can be offered from the stand-point of Śaṅkara's School.[16] It is indeed strange that in some Pādas there are no Sūtras of the परा विद्या, in some there are no Sūtras of the अविद्या, while some Sūtras of the अपरा विद्या are present in all these Pādas. The number of the Sūtras of each kind varies in each Pāda. Some Sūtras are said to deal with both the परा विद्या and the अपरा विद्या, e. g., Bra.Sū.III.3.39, IV.1.1-2, 12, 13, IV.4.7. It is also strange that the whole of the departure (उत्क्रान्ति) described in Bra.Sū.IV.2 is interpreted to be *common to both* the ignorant and the knower of the *Aparā Vidyā*, the

(13) Vide S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.2.1.—अथापरासु विद्यासु फलप्राप्तये देवयानं पन्थानमवतारयिष्यन्प्रथमं तावद्यथाशास्त्रमुत्क्रान्तिक्रममन्वाचष्टे । समाना हि विद्वदविदुषोरुत्क्रान्तिरिति वक्ष्यति ।

(14) Vide S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Sūtra IV.4.16.

(15) On Bra.Sū.IV.4.7, S'aṅkara says, एवमपि पारमार्थिक चैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्याप्युपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मस्यैश्वर्यरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते ।

(16) The following table can be tentatively prepared about the proportion:-

Bra. Sū. Pāda.	Total Sūtras.	*Parā Vidyā.*	*Aparā Vidyā.*	*Avidyā.*
III.2	(11-41=) 31	37	4	0
III.3	66	7	26	31
III.4	52	28	4	19
IV.1	19	7	6	2
IV.2	21	0	(समाना हि विद्वदाविदुषोरुत्क्रान्तिरिति वक्ष्यति)	
IV.3	16	0	16	0
IV.4	22	8	13	0

same Sūtras being taken as dealing with the *Avidyā* and also with the *Aparā Vidyā* with the result that the knower of the *Aparā Vidyā* has no distinction so far as the method of departure is concerned and yet he passes on to the Path of the gods described in Bra. Sū.IV.3. This latter Pāda is consequently said to deal with *only* the *Aparā Vidyā*, though there is no other Pāda (from Bra.Sū.III.2 to IV) which is devoted solely to the treatment of *one single* topic out of these three topics of the Śāṅkara Vedānta School Moreover, there is no fixed order in which these Sūtras of these three topics should occur in a Pāda. If the Sūtras were really meant to be classified under these three heads, we think it probable that we should find some such order as that the Sūtras of the *Parā Vidyā* should be treated *first*, *then* those of the *Aparā Vidyā*, and *lastly* those dealing with *Avidyā*, or any other *fixed* order. But we come across no such fixed order. Thus, no scheme is proposed by the Śāṅkara School to explain how and why any particular Sūtra or group of Sūtras should be supposed to deal with परा विद्या, अपरा विद्या or अविद्या. The only apparent evidence for this supposition is the *meaning which Śaṅkara attributes to certain word or words of a Sūtra and certain other tactics adopted by him in his interpretation.*[17] We have amply discussed particular cases of these in our Notes (in Part I) and need not repeat them here.

Parallel to the case of Śaṅkara's above-mentioned three-fold classification of the topics, we have the case of the topics which, if his *bhāṣya* is followed, have either nothing to do with the declared aim of the work of Bādarāyaṇa, viz., the Inquiry about Brahman, or which are at least out of place in the particular Pāda or Adhyāya. Most of the Sūtras which Śaṅkara explains as dealing with subjects not bearing upon Brahmajijñāsā have been classified above by us as the Sūtras about the standpoint of the *Avidyā*.

We must note that occasionally Śaṅkara himself becomes aware of the absence of any connection of *his topic* of an Adhi-

(17) Vide the other defects of S'aṅkara's *bhāṣya* in this chapter.

karaṇa with the Brahmajijñāsā or with the topic of the Pāda or the Adhyāya wherein the Adhikaraṇa in question occurs, and tries to offer an explanation for the same, which seems to us to be far from being satisfactory. An example of this is supplied by the "ऐकात्म्याधिकरण" (Bra.Sū.III.3.53-54). Here, Śaṅkara says that in the "गुणोपसंहार" Pāda (III.3) we have a topic about the existence of the individual soul independent of the body (देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सद्भावः) because "he (the आत्मन्) is the recepient of the Mokṣa and he is declared by the Scripture to be identical with Brahman."[18] No such explanation is, however, offered by him in the case of the topics which we are now going to mention.

There are several Sūtras, which, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, discuss topics which would have found a better place in a Smṛti. In Bra.Sū.III.3.18 Śaṅkara finds a discussion of आचमन and प्राणस्य अनग्नताचिन्तन[19] based upon a comparison of Chā.Upa.V.2.2 and Bṛ. Upa.VI.1.14. In Bra.Sū.III.4.18-20 Śaṅkara has a discussion based upon Chā.Upa.II.23.1 as to whether the orders of life other than that of a householder are sanctioned by the Śruti directly mentioning them or only by Smṛti and Practice.[20] Śaṅkara holds that Bra.Sū.III.4.32 discusses the question whether a non-seeker of liberation (अमुमुक्षु) who is not desirous of विद्या should perform the duties of the orders.[21] It is rather strange that, according to Śaṅkara the Pūrvapakṣa is here based upon Bṛ.Upa. IV.4.22, while the Siddhānta is based upon the Brāhmaṇa text

(18) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.53, इह देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः सद्भावः समर्थ्यते बन्धमोक्षाधिकारसिद्धये। न ह्यसति देहव्यतिरिक्तात्मनि परलोकफलाश्चोदना उपपद्येरन्कस्य वा ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपादिश्येत ।

(19) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.18, तत्र त्वाचमनमनग्नताचिन्तनं च प्राणस्य प्रतीयते तत्किमुभयमपि विधीयते उताचमनमेवोतानग्नताचिन्तमेवेति विचार्यते ।

(20) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.18. ननु परामर्शेऽप्याश्रमा गम्यन्त एव। सत्यं गम्यन्ते। स्मृत्याचाराभ्यां तु तेषां प्रसिद्धि र्न प्रत्यक्षश्रुतेः ।

(21) S'a.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.32, इदानीं तु किममुमुक्षोरप्याश्रममात्रनिष्ठस्य विद्यामकामयमानस्य तानि (आश्रमकर्माणि) अनुष्ठेयानि उताहो नेति चिन्त्यते ।

"यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति"[22]. According to Śaṅkara Bra.Sū.III.4.40 establishes a conclusion that there is no moral fall of those who have adopted the orders of celibacy (i. e., the three orders, that of the householder being excepted), while in Bra.Sū.III 4.43 he himself comes to the conclusion that one who, though belonging to an order of celibacy, falls, must be excommunicated.[23] In Bra.Sū. III.4.41-42 as interpreted by Śaṅkara the topic is whether a life-long celibate who breaks his vow of celibacy out of carelessness, commits a महापातक 'one of the five great sins' or an 'उपपातक', 'a minor sin'.[24] Here at least Śaṅkara does not say that the discussion of this topic is based upon any Upaniṣadic text. He supports his Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta by quoting Sūtras from the Jaiminisūtra.

There are several other Sūtras also which should be considered along with the above Sūtras and in which Śaṅkara finds a topic about a विज्ञान 'a lore connected with the Karman or Sacrifice'. In Bra.Sū.III.3.42 Śaṅkara says that the topic is whether the 'meditations' (विज्ञानानि) superimposed upon the parts of a Karman like those mentioned in Chā.Upa.I.1.1 are नित्य 'obligatory' or अनित्य.[25] He holds that the topic of Bra.Sū.III.3.55-56 is

(22) As shown in our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.4.32-33 S'aṅkara's interpretation of Sūtra III.4.32 is weakened by his own interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.4.33. We believe, as a rule, both the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta must be based upon only Upaniṣads.

(23) S'a.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.40, सन्त्यूर्ध्वरेतस आश्रमा इति स्थापितम् । तांस्तु प्राप्तस्य कथंचित्ततः प्रच्युतिरस्ति नास्ति वेति संशयः ।......एवं प्राप्ते उच्यते––तद्भूतस्य तु प्रतिपन्नोर्ध्व रेतोभावस्य न कथंचिदप्यतद्भावो न ततः प्रच्युतिः स्यात् । S'a.*bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū.III.4.43, यद्युर्ध्व रेतसां स्वाश्रमेभ्यः प्रच्यवनं महापातकं यदि वोपपातकमुत्रयथापि शिष्टैस्ते बहिष्कर्तव्याः ।

(24) S'a.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.41, यदि नैष्ठिको, ब्रह्मचारी प्रमादादवकीर्येत किं तस्य 'ब्रह्मचार्यवकीर्णी नैर्ऋतं गर्दभमालभेत्' इत्येतत्प्रायश्चित्तं स्यादुत नेति ।

(25) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.42, सन्ति कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयणानि विज्ञानानि— 'ओमित्येतरक्षदमुद्गीथमुपासीत' (छा.उ.१।१।१) इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यान्येव स्युः........... ......उतानित्यानि इति विचारयामः ।

whether the thoughts fixed upon the उद्गीथ and other parts of a Karman mentioned in Chā.Upa.I.1.1 and other Śrutis (some of them being *Brāhmaṇa* texts also) are laid down for each particular Branch of each Veda or for all Branches of all Vedas.[26] The subject of Bra.Sū.III.3.61–66 is explained by Śaṅkara to be whether the meditations resting on the उद्गीथ and other parts of a Karman and laid down in the three Vedas are 'to be collected' or a ritualist may deal with them as he desires.[27] In Bra.Sū. III.4.21–22 Śaṅkara finds the discussion of a question whether the Śrutis like Chā.Upa.I.1.3, I.6.1, are meant for the glorification of the उद्गीथ, etc. (which are parts of a Karman) or for laying down an injunction about those meditations.[28] Again, Sūtras III.4.44–46, as commented upon by Śaṅkara, give different views on the subject whether the meditations which form part of a Karman are the actions of the Sacrificer or of the priests.[29] In Bra.Sū.IV.1.6, as explained by Śaṅkara, we have the solution of a doubt about the meditations fixed upon the parts of a Sacrifice mentioned in Śrutis like Chā.Upa.I.3.1, II.2.1, II.8.1, I.6.1, as to whether in these meditations the notions of the उद्गीथ, etc., are prescribed as to be superimposed on the Sun, etc., or *vice versa*.[30]

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(26) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.55, 'ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत' (छा.उ.१।१।१) 'लोकेषु पञ्चविधं सामोपासीत' (छा.उ.२।१।१), ...इत्येवमाद्या य उद्गीथादिकर्माङ्गावबद्धाः प्रत्ययाः प्रतिवेदं शाखाभेदेषु विहितास्ते तत्तच्छाखागतेष्वेवोद्गीथादिषु भवेयुरथवा सर्वशाखागतेष्विति विशयः ।

(27) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.61–66, कर्माङ्गेषूद्गीथादिषु य आश्रिताः प्रत्यया वेदत्रयविहिताः किं ते समुच्चीयेरन्किं वा यथाकामं स्युरिति संशये यथाश्रयभाव इत्याह ।

(28) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.21-22, 'स एष रसानां रसतमः परमः...............' इत्येवंजातीयकाः श्रुतयः किमुद्गीथादेः स्तुत्यर्था आहोस्विदुपासनाविध्यर्था इत्यस्मिन्संशये स्तुत्यर्था इति युक्तम् ।

(29) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.4.44-46, अङ्गेषूपासनेषु संशयः । किं तानि यजमानकर्माण्याहोस्विदृत्विक्कर्माणीति ।

(30) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū.IV.1.6, 'य एवासौ तपति तमुद्गीथमुपासीत' (छा.उ.१।३।१), 'लोकेषु पञ्चविधं सामोपासीत' (छा. उ.२।२।१),......इत्येवमादिष्वङ्गावबद्धेषूपासनेषु संशयः किमादित्यादिषूद्गीथादिदृष्टयो विधीयन्ते किं वोद्गीथादिष्वेवादित्यादिदृष्टय इति ।

In Bra. Sū.III.3.24, Śaṅkara says that we have the discussion of a fancied identification of man with a sacrifice based chiefly upon the *Rahasya Brāhmaṇa* (of the Sāmaveda) and also upon the text of the Taittirīyakas.[31] In Bra. Sū.III.3.40–41, the Ācārya finds a discussion of the अग्निहोत्र offered into the fire in the form of the प्राण, the breath, arising from Chā.Upa.IV.19-24.[32] In a group of *nine* Sūtras (BraSū.III.3.44–52) Śaṅkara says that the Sūtrakāra discusses the question whether the thirtysix thousand fires called "मनश्चित्", etc., mentioned in the Agnirahasya Brāhmaṇa are subservient to the rite or are of the nature of pure meditations.[33] Here, Śaṅkara bases his Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta on certain texts from the Brāhmaṇa and on some Sūtras from the Jaiminisūtra. He does not support them by any *Upaniṣad*. The above topics number fifteen and cover about thirtysix Sūtras from among the nintyfour topics (अधिकरणs) consisting of twohundred thirtyseven Sātras (from Bra.Sū.III.2.11 to IV.4.22), i.e., they are onesixth of Bra.Sū.III.2.11 to IV.4.22. They discuss questions which would have been better discussed either in a Smṛtí or in a book on ritualism. Most of them are not even remotely connected with the *Brahmajijñāsā* and Śaṅkara does not state that they have anything to do with the Inquiry about Brahman. That some of them deal with *meditations* resting upon ritualism does not in our opinion make it probable that the Sūtrakāra ment them to be discussed in (the particular Sūtras of) his book. We have shown (in part I) that the Sūtras in question rather deal with the अङ्गs (limbs) of Brahman (Vide Notes on Sūtras III.3.55 and 61, IV.1.6).

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(31) S'ā. bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.III.3.24, अस्ति ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनां च रहस्यब्राह्मणे पुरुषविद्या। तत्र पुरुषो यज्ञः कल्पितः।...........तत्र संशयः——किं य इतरत्रोक्ताः पुरुषयज्ञस्य धर्मास्ते तैत्तिरीयकेषूपसंहर्तव्याः किंवा नोपसंहर्तव्या इति।

(32) S'ā *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū.III.3.40--41, तत्रेदं विचार्यते — किं भोजनलोपे लोप प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्योतालोप इति ।

(33) S'ā *bhāṣyā* on Bra.Sū. III.3.44, किमेते मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः क्रियानुप्रवेशिनस्तच्छेषभूता उत स्वतन्त्राः केवलविद्यात्मका इति ।

That most of them can be or have been explained by Śaṅkara as based upon Upaniṣadic texts does not at all make it sure that the Sūtrakāra would have intended to discuss them in his book though they have nothing to do with his Inquiry. We have also shown (in our Notes in Part I) that most of these Sūtras do not at all refer to the Śrutis mentioned by Śaṅkara (See, e. g., our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.18, III.3.42, III.3.55, III.3.61, III.4. 21, etc). That the उद्गीथ as a part of a sacrifice should figure so prominently in the Brahmasūtra seems to us to be impossible and probably serves to reflect only the dominance of Ritualism in the days of Śaṅkara and his prodecessors from whom very likely he inherited a traditation about उद्गीथ, etc. The cases of Śaṅkara's interpretation of those Sūtras where he substantiates his Pūrvapakṣa or Siddhānta by referring to Sūtras from the Jaiminisūtra or to Brāhmaṇa texts are the weakest (See Śā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.44-52, III.3.24, III.4.41-42).[34]

We shall now consider cases of cross references according to Śaṅkara. There are several Sūtras in interpreting which Śaṅkara says that the Sūtrakāra *discusses the same topic also elsewhere* in the Brahmasūtra or that a later Sūtra is a modification of the statement of a former Sūtra.

In Bra.Sū.III.3.29-30, Śaṅkara finds an independent Adhikaraṇa and takes the topic to be whether '*going*' (गति) in all the Vedāntas is to be taken literally or metaphorically; he says that in the सगुण meditations '*going*' is literal, while in the higher *Vidyā* '*going*' is metaphorical. Śaṅkara adds that *the same topic* will be explained more thoroughly later in the fourth Adhyāya.[35]

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(34) We believe, there is only one Sūtra where the Sūtrakāra refers to the meditation of Brahman "referring to priestly duties", viz., Bra.Sū.III.3.32, and this is referred to by the Sūtrakāra because it is a meditation on Brahman and deserves a place in Brahmajijñāsā.

(35) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.30 गतिकारणभूतो ह्यर्थः पर्यङ्क विद्यादिषु सगुणेषूपासनेषूपलभ्यते।...............नहि सम्यग्दर्शने तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धिरस्ति। ....भूयश्चैनं विभागं चतुर्थाध्याये निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्याम : ।

Really the topic of '*gati*' or going is discussed only in Bra.Sū.-IV.3.7–14. In Bra.Sū.III.3.33 Śaṅkara says that the negative attributes of the Supreme Being are considered, while in Bra.Sū.III.3.11 the positive ones are the subject matter. He holds that in both the Sūtras the 'collection' of all attributes from all Śrutis for the purpose of meditation on Brahman is prescribed. The purpose of a fresh separate consideration of the two types of the attributes of the Supreme Being is *to give the details*.[36] According to Śaṅkara the topic of Bra.Sū.III.3.5 is continued in Sūtra III.3.10 and the subsequent Sūtras, so that the Sūtras III.3.6-9 are *a digression*.[37] In his commantary on Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 Śaṅkara says that in Bra.Sū.III.3.31 all those who meditate on any transformation of Brahman whatsoever, were declared *to go* to Brahman and *now* in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 an exception is made to the rule of Bra.Sū.III.3.31, viz., all those who meditate on transformation (like the Sun) of Brahman *other than the symbols* like नामन्, etc., have *to go* to Brahman.[38] Śaṅkara says that in Bra.Sū.III.3.34 the topic of discussion is whether the two birds in Mu.Upa.III.1.1 are the two souls in Kaṭha Upa.III.1 and says that *this same question is treated in detail* under Bra.Sū.I.2.11.[39] In Bra.Sū.III.3.58 Śaṅkara comes to the conclusion that in certain Śrutis the object to be known may be declared to be the same (e. g., the प्राण), yet the विद्याs in

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(36) S'ā. bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 33, तथा च 'आनन्दादय: प्रधानस्य (ब्र. सू. ३।३।११) इत्यत्र व्याख्यातम् । तत्र विधिरूपाणि विशेषणानि चिन्तितानीह प्रतिषेधरूपाणीति विशेष: । प्रपञ्चार्थश्च अयं चिन्ताभेद:।

(37) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū.III.3.5. अस्यैव तु प्रयोजनसूत्रस्य प्रपञ्च: सर्वाभेदादित्यारभ्य भविष्यति ।

(38) S'a. bhāṣya on Bra. Sū.IV.3.15. तथाहि–'अनियम: सर्वासाम्' (ब्र. सू. ३ ३-३१) इत्यत्राविशेषेणैवैषां विद्यान्तरेषु (गति:) अवतारिता । ....अनियमन्यायस्य प्रतीकव्यतिरिक्तेष्व-प्युपासनेषूपपत्ते: ।

(39) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III.3.34, ' गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि ' (ब्र. सू. १।२।११) इत्यत्र चैतत्प्रपञ्चितम् ।

all of those Śrutis should be understood to be different from one another, and says that Bra.Sū.III.3.1 and those that follow should be interpreted in the light of Sūtra III.3.58. Thus, Śaṅkara places SūtraIII.3.58 as if at the very beginning of the Pāda.[40] Similarly in Bra. Sū. III.3.53 Śaṅkara finds a question about the individual soul being different from or identical with the body, and his remarks show that he wants that Sūtra to be understood as if it occurred at the very beginning of the Brahmasūtra.[41]

Śaṅkara interprets Bra. Sū. III.4.25 to mean that "Because Vidyā (and not Karman) is the means of liberation (अतःएव in the Sūtra), the Vidyā does not need, in the achievement of its goal, the help of the duties of the orders (आश्रमकर्माणि), viz., (those perfomed with) the fire, fuel, etc. " Thus, he connects " अत एव " of Sūtra III.4.25 with Sūtra III.4.1, "because of the propriety, though Sūtra III.4.25 is separated from the first Sūtra (III.4.1)".[42] Thus, he finds a connection of Adhikaraṇa V with Adhikarṇa 1 of Bra. Sū. III.4. According to Śaṅkara, Sūtras 26–27 form Adhikaraṇa VI and Sūtras 32–33 are part of Adhikaraṇa VIII. He thinks that the duties of the orders for a seeker are laid down in Bra. Sū. III.4.26, and a doubt *about them*, which arises out of Sūtra 32 which deals with a non-seeker (अमुमुक्षु), is answered in Sūtra 33.[43]

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(40) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bha. Sū. III. 3 58, स्थिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

(41) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 3.53, ननु शास्त्रप्रमुखे एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम् । सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता न तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति । इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरःसरं प्रतिष्ठापितम् ।

(42) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III.4.25. ' पुरुषार्थोऽतःशब्दात् ' (ब्र. सू. ३।४।१) इत्येतद्व्यवहितमपि संभवादत इति परामृश्यते ।

(43) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 4.32, ' सर्वापेक्षा च '-(ब्र. सू. III. 4.26) इत्यत्राश्रमकर्मणां विद्यासाधनत्वमवधारितम् । and on Bra. Sū. III.4.33, विद्यासहकारीणि चैतानि स्युर्विहितत्वादेव 'तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति ' (बृ. उ. ४।४।२२) इत्यादिना । तदुक्तम्—'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्' (ब्र.सू. ३।४।२६) इति ।

In Bra. Sū. IV.4.3 Śaṅkara says that the topic of the Sūtra is that the Supreme Light in Chā. Upa. VIII.12.3 means Paramātman and that this fact *has been detailed* in Bra. Sū. I.3.40.[44] In his commentary on Bra. Sū.IV.4.22, Śaṅkara says that though the lordliness of the seeker who goes to Brahmaloka (the world of Brahman) is not absolutely eternal, there is no return of the seeker after having gone there, and that how this is so is explained in Bra. Sū IV.3.10.[45] While interpreting Bra. Sū. IV.2.20, Śaṅkara explains यान् षड् उदङ्ङ् एति मासान् (Chā. Upa. IV.15.5) ' the six months during which the Sun goes to the north ' as अयन ' the summer solstice,' in accordance with the Sūtra itself, but *then he adds that the meaning of that Śruti would be explained in* Bra. Sū IV.3.4; thus he tries to set aside the meaning of अयन given by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.IV.2.20. by relying *upon his own interpretation* of Bra.Sū.IV.3.4, (which only means that the rays of the Sun are conductors upto the world of the Lightning).[46] In Bra.Sū.IV.2.1, Śaṅkara *relies upon his own interpretation of* अविभाग, 'non-separation' in Bra Sū.IV.2.16, and says that the 'Speech' in Bra.Sū.IV.2.1 does not mean the organ Speech, but only the function of speaking (वाग्वृत्ति).

It must be noted here that we do not object to the method of comparing two Sūtras in two different places in the Brahmasūtra for the purpose of explaining either of them; rather we believe it to be a part of the proper method of interpretation. As an example we may refer to how Sūtra IV.1.3 (आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च) would help in interpreting Sūtra III.3.16 (आत्मगृहीतीतरवदुत्तरात्).—[47]

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(44) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.4.3, प्रपाञ्चितं चैतत् ब्र०सू.१।३।४० इत्यत्र ।

(45) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū IV.4.22, अन्तवत्त्वेऽपित्वैश्वर्यस्य यथाऽनावृत्तिस्तथा वर्णितम् 'कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परम्' ब्र. सू.४।३।१०इत्यत्र ।

(46) S'ā.*byāṣya* on Bra Sū.IV.2.20, श्रुतेस्त्वर्थं वक्ष्यति " आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात् " (ब्र. सू. ४।३।४) इति ।

(47) Vide our Notes on the Sūtras in Part I.

Saṅkara himself follows that method.[48] But, by pointing out the above example of वाग्वृत्ति we want to say that it is not very likely in books written in the Sūtra style that we should have *frequent cases* of the treatment of the *same* topic *in two different places of the same book*, once in detail and again in brief or *vice versa*, or that we should have cases in which the apparent meaning of a Sūtra or Sūtras should have to be modified in consideration of a Sūtra that may follow or precede the former in a place of the book *far remote from the context.*

We have above given about a dozen cases where Śaṅkara *himself notices* how in his opinion two Sūtras in two different places in the Brahmasūtra deal with the same topic or modify the the meaning of each other. But, we believe, there are several other similar cases which have not been so noticed by him. We have already seen that according to Śaṅkara the meditations on the parts of a sacrifice have been dealt with in many Sūtras; particularly the sacrificial topic of Bra.Sū.III.3.55–66 seems to have been repeated in Bra.Sū.IV.1.6 according to Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya.* Again the disposal of the good and bad deeds of the knower of Brahman is discussed in Bra.Sū.III.3.26–28 and IV.1. 13-19.[49] Sūtra III.3.42 discusses whether the कर्माङ्गविज्ञानानि are नित्य or अनित्य. But, in Bra.Sū.IV.1.18 it is established according to Śaṅkara's view that even in the case of a मुमुक्षु 'a seeker of liberation' these meditations (विज्ञानानि) need not be a necessary accompaniment of the *karmans* 'rites'. So, it would be evident that in the case of 'a soul in bondage' they would be much less necessary. Thus, one of the two discussions in Bra.Sū III. 3.42 and IV.1.18 seems to be unnecessary. Several other cases of this tpye of repetition in the Sūtras may be found out if we

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(48) Vide S'āṅkara *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.2.14,III.3.1, III.3.12, III 3.15, III.3.19, III.3.48, III.3.65, III.4.8, III.4.27,IV.2.6 and IV.4.6.

(49) It is very likely that Bra.Sū III.3.26—28 does not deal with the disposal of the good and bad deeds, because Bra.Sū.III is an Adhyāya of the Means, while the disposal in question is a part of the Phala.

follow Śaṅkara's interpretation.[50]

In our interpretation (in Part I) of all these Sūtras we have explained our reasons for our meaning thereof and for our doubts about Śaṅkara's exposition.

Another type of defect in Śaṅkara's method of interpretation results in the fact that Śaṅkara has to give *two* different explanations of the same Śrutis and Smṛtis. Thus, while commenting on the Sūtras, Śaṅkara has some, though not frequent, occasions when his interpretation of certain Śrutis differs from the same given by him in his *bhāṣyas* on the respective Upaniṣads. Cases of this type occur generally in Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra. Sū.I. We may note here only two such cases, e. g., Mu.Upa. I.1. 5-6 and Bṛ.Upa.III.8.7–12 have been interpreted by Śaṅkara in his *bhāsyas* on these Upaniṣads as dealing with the *nirguna* Brahman, but when confronted with the same Śrutis in Bra.Sū. I.2.21–23 and I.3.10-12 he has to interpret them as dealing with *saguṇa* Brahman. We have explained Śaṅkara's and the Sūtrakāra's attitude in this respect in our Notes on Bra. Sū. III. 3.37-42 in Part I.

There are some occasions when Śaṅkara has to give two different interpretations of one and the same text in his *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra and he boldly says that he differs from the

(50) According to S'aṅkara

(a) Kaṭha Upa. III.10-11 is discussed in Bra Sū.I.4.1-7 and again in Bra.sū.III.3.14.

(b) Bra.Sū.I.3.42 discusses Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.7 and the अतिदेश of Bra.Sū.I. 4.28 may easily explain Chā..Upa.VI; and again, both these S'rutis are discussed in Bra.Sū.III.3.16-17.

(c) Bra.Sū.I.3.14-17 discusses Chā.Upa.VIII.1 and Bra.Sū.I.3.42 discusses Bṛ.Upa.IV,4 and IV.3. And again Bra.Sū.III.3.39 discusses Chā.Upa. VIII.1 an Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.

(d) Bra.Sū.I.2.11 and I.3.7 discuss Mu.Upa.III.1.1 and Kaṭha Upa. III.1, while Bra.Sū.III.3.34 discusses both these S'rutis.

Sutrakāra in the interpretation of a particular Sruti. In Bra Sū. III.3.12 the Sūtrakāra takes प्रियाशिरस्त्व 'the characteristic of having प्रिय as the head', etc., as attributes of Brahman and though Sankara knows this fact, he dose not accept the Sūtrakāra's view and propounds his own view that प्रियशिरस्त्व etc., are attributes of the sheath called आनन्दमय. [51] In Bra.Sū.III.4.11, the Sūtrakāra gives his interpretation of Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.2 (तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारेभेते) as meaning that विद्या begins a new life for a *Mumukṣu* and *karman* for a *transmigrating* soul. Sankara also at first interprets that Sruti in the same sense; but then he at once gives up that interpretation and offers his own according to which विद्या and कर्मन् *unitedly* begin a new life for the transmigrating soul only. [52] In both these cases Sankara openly sets aside the clear interpretation of these Srutis given by the Sūtrakāra.

There are in fact *many* Srutis regarding the meaning of which Sankara and the Sūtrakāra differ. These can be gathered from a *correct* interpretation of the Brahmasūtra. We have treated these *Ś*rutis in Chapter VII.

As with the Sruti, so is the case with the Smṛti. In his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31 Sankara says that Bha. Gī. VIII. 26 refers to all *saguṇa vidyās*, but Bra. Sūtra IV. 2. 21 shows that the Sūtrakāra takes this Smṛti to refer to the *smārta* view about the Brahmavid Yogin. Sankara notices this difference between the Sūtrakāra and himself about Bha. Gī. VIII. 26, but still proposes to optionally interpret that Smṛti as referring to the Day, the Bright Half, etc., in the capacity of Conductor-

(51) S'ā.*bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.12, न चैते प्रियाशिरस्त्वादयो ब्रह्मधर्मा :, कोशधर्मास्त्वेते इत्युपदिष्टमस्माभिः आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् (ब्र. सू. १।१।१२) इत्यत्र ।........ब्रह्मधर्मांस्त्वेतान् कृत्वा न्यायमात्रामिदमाचार्येण प्रदर्शितं प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरिति । स च न्यायोऽन्येषु निश्चितेषु ब्रह्मधर्मैषूपासनायोपदिश्यमानेषु नेतव्यः संयद्वामादिषु सत्यकामादिषु च ।

(52) S'ā. bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 11, न चेदं समन्वारम्भवचनं मुमुक्षुविषयम् 'इति नु कामयमानः' (बृ. उ. ४।४।६) इति संसारिविषयत्वोपसंहारात्।........एवं सत्याविभागेनापीदं समन्वारम्भवचनमवकल्पते ।

deities and not as Time-deities as the Sūtrakāra takes them to be. His aim is to remove the contradiction between the Smṛti and the Śruti and therefore he expresses the difference of opinion between the Sūtrakāra and himself.[53] Śaṅkara holds the Bhagavadgītā in greater honour than does the Sūtrakāra to whom a Smṛti without the support of a Śruti has not much value. In the particular case Śaṅkara does not intsrpret the Gītā literally, as is done by the Sūtrakāra.

The tradition which Śaṅkara has himself preserved shows that the Sūtrakāra has *a scheme of division of his work* into four Adhyāyas, which are therefore called the *Samanvaya*, the *Virodhaparihāra*, the *Sādhana* and the *Phala* Adhyāyas. There seems to have been also a tradition about the classification of the matter of each Adhyāya into four Pādas with a name for each Pāda. Thus, we have such names as Smṛtipāda (Bra. Sū. II. 1), Tarkapāda (Bra. Sū. II.2), Guṇopasaṁhārapāda (Bra. Sū. III. 3). We believe that on the strength of this scheme we should take it for granted that the Sūtrakāra did not intermingle the subject-matter of one Adhyāya with that of another Adhyāya or of one Pāda with that of another Pāda. But there are several cases in which Śaṅkara does not follow this scheme of the Sūtrakāra. Some of these cases we have already mentioned under the class of Sūtras dealing with the Avidyā, and we here discuss a few of them in detail.

Śaṅkara takes Bra. Sū. III. 2-38-41 as dealing with the question of God being the giver of the fruits of the individual soul's actions. As we have seen above, the problem of the soul

(53) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31, स्मृतिरपि—' शुक्लकृष्णे गती ह्येते जगत: शाश्वते मते । एकया यात्यनावृत्तिमन्यया वर्तते पुन: ।' S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 21, ननु—'अग्निर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्लः षण्मासा उत्तरायणम्' (भ. गी. ८।२४-२६) इति च श्रौतावेतौ देवयानपितृयाणौ प्रत्यभिज्ञायेते स्मृतावपीति। उच्यते—'तं कालं वक्ष्यामि' (भ. गी. ८।२३) इति स्मृतौ कालप्रतिज्ञानाद्विरोधमाशङ्क्य परिहार उक्तः। यदा पुनः स्मृतावप्यग्न्याद्या देवता एवातिवाहिक्यो गृह्यन्ते तदा न कश्चिद्विरोध इति ।

being an agent is discussed in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 33-40 and we believe that in Bra. Sū II.3.41 (परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः) the Sūtrakāra says that the soul gets the *phala* from the Supreme Being. It is strange that कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षत्व (God's dependence on the efforts made by the individual soul) mentioned in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 42 ia taken by Śaṅkara in his commentary on that as an argument for the *causal* agency "कारयितृत्व" of God while he adduces the same as an argument for ईश्वरस्य फलदातृत्व (God's being the giver of the fruit of the soul's actions) in his commentary on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 4.[54] In fact, कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षत्व (Bra. Sū. II. 3. 42) is an argument for God's being the giver of the *phala*. We have already mentioned other reasons why Bra. Sū. III. 2. 38-41 should not deal with the question of the giver of the fruit of the worldly actions of the soul, but with that of God's being the giver of the *phala* in the form of the liberation and with that of the nature of that *phala*, as suits the title of the Adhyāya, viz., the Sādhana Adhyāya.

According to Śaṅkara's commentary, there is a number of topics in Bra.Sū.III.3, which have nothing to do with "उपसंहार" the traditional title of the Pāda or with *sādhana* the title of the Adhyāya, but which could have a more suitable place in other Adhyāyas. Here we shall only enumerate them very briefly, because we have fully explained our arguments in our Notes on the respective Sūtras (in Part I).

According to Śaṅkara,

(1) अनुपसंहार is taught in Bra.Sū.III.3. 6–8 in a Pāda dealing with उपसंहार 'Collection (of attributes, etc. of Brahman).'

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(54) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. II. 3. 42, नन्वेवमीश्वरस्य कारयितृत्वे सति वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये स्यातामकृताभ्यागमश्च जीवस्येति। नेत्युच्यते........। कुतो यः प्रयत्नो जीवस्य धर्माधर्मलक्षणस्तदपेक्ष एवैनमीश्वरः कारयति।......परायत्तेऽपि हि कर्तृत्वे करोत्येव जीवः। कुर्वन्तं हि तमीश्वरः कारयति।

S'ā *bhāṣya* on Bra, Sū. III. 2. 41, तदेव चेश्वरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मानुरूपाः प्रजाः सृजतीति। विचित्रकार्यानुपपत्त्यादयोऽपि दोषाः कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षत्वादीश्वरस्य न प्रसज्यन्ते। The पूर्वपक्ष adduces these as दोषs of "ईश्वरस्तु फलं ददातीत्यनुपपन्नम्'।

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.16–17 discusses whether "Atman" in Ai. Upa.I.1 means Jīvātman, Prajāpati, or Paramātman. But this is a topic fit for Bra.Sū.I.1–3. Śaṅkara avoids this difficulty by suggesting an alternative interpretation of the Sūtras.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.14-15 deal with neither उपसंहार nor अनुपसंहार. The topic, according to Śaṅkara, is that of what we may call व्याख्यान "explanation of Śrutis" and, therefore, fit for the first Adhyāya. [55]

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.26 discusses the disposal of the good and bad deeds of a knower of Brahman (Śaṅkara would say 'the lower Brahman'). But this is the *phala* of the Vidyā, Śaṅkara would say, Āparā Vidyā. Even then, it is a subject fit for a discussion in the Phalādhyāya, viz., Bra.Sū.IV. (Cf.Bra.Sū.IV. 1.13–19). Śaṅkara knows this and, therefore, tries to explain his interpretation of these Sūtras as a part of उपसंहार, the title of the Pāda.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.27 discusses the exact time when the good and bad deeds of a knower of Brahman are "destroyed". This is really discussed in Bra.Sū.IV.1.13-14.

(6) The discussion of "गति" 'going to Brahman' is a topic for the Phalādhyāya (Bra.Sū.IV.3.7-14), but Śaṅkara finds its brief discussion in the Sādhanādhyāya (Bra.Sū.III.3.29-30, and also III.3.31).

(7) In Bra.Sū.III.3.32 as interpreted by Śaṅkara the topic is whether a knower of Brahman has a new body after the fall of the present one. It is clear that this cannot be a proper topic for the Guṇopasaṁhāra Pāda. According to Śaṅkara Bra.Sū.I.3.30 says that Indra and other gods who occupy certain offices are to return to their posts after the attainment of the knowledge of

(55) Cf. Bra.Sū.I.4.28, एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता : व्याख्याता : ।
"Herewith all Vedantas have been explained, have been explained." "*vyākhyāta*' should mean only, 'explained', not 'explained as prohibited' प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता : as S'aṅkara says.

Branman; and the fall of the body of a human being who knows Brahman is discussed in BraSū.IV.1.19; and the time of exhaustion of actions in his case in Bra.Sū.IV.1.13; so, the question of a new body of the knower of Brahman which is not a proper one for the Guṇopasaṁhāra Pāda or for the Sādhanādhyāya could have been easily discussed by the Sūtrakāra in another place in his book.

(8) The immortality of the individual soul and all other questions relating to it have been discussed in Bra.Sū.II.3. 17–53. But, according to Śaṅkara's commentary, the question of the soul being not identical with the body is discussed in Bra.Sū.III.3.53–54. Śaṅkara thereon says that in Bra.SūI.1 there was no *Sūtra* about the existence of the soul [57] independent of the body and, therefore, these Sūtras have been composeed by the Sūtrakāra. But he does not notice that the question had already its proper place in Bra.Sū.II.3. The Sūtrakāra, unlike Śaṅkara, does not look upon the knowledge of the nature of the Jīvātman as a real *means* to liberation, and therefore, it is out of place in the Sādhanādhyāya.

(9) In his commentary on Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1 and IV. 1. 13, Śaṅkara says that Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1–12 pursues the *remaining portion of the means.*[58] We may also add that all the socalled Sādhanas which, according to Śaṅkara, are mentioned in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1–IV. 1. 12 seem to us to have been already mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 3.[59]

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(56) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū.III.3.26, गुणोपसंहाराविवक्षायां ह्युपायनार्थस्यैव हानानुवृत्तिं ब्रूयात्। तस्माद्गुणोपसंहाराविचारप्रसङ्गेन स्तुत्युपसंहारप्रदर्शनार्थमिदं सूत्रम्।

(57) *S'ā. bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.53, ननु शास्त्रप्रमुखे एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम्। सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता न तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति। इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरःसरं प्रतिष्ठापितम्।

(58) S'ā. *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū IV.1.1, प्रथमं तावत्कतिभिश्चिदधिकरणैः साधनाश्रयविचारशेषमेवानुसरामः। and on Bra.Sū.IV.1.13, गतस्तृतीयशेषः।

(59) Vide our Notes on Bra.Sū.IV.1.3-6; also compare the interpretation of Bra.Sū.IV.1.4 with that of Bra,Sū.III.3.61-66,

In all these cases, the particular Adhikaraṇa, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, seems to us to be out of place *in the particular* Pāda or Adhyāya like several other passages already mentioned above which were shown by us to be out of place in the Brahmasūtra, having nothing to do with an Inquiry about Brahman. We believe that the Sūtrakāra strictly follows his scheme of *one* single main topic for one entire Adhyāya and we have offered in Part I our interpretation and arguments on that basis, which may be referred to, if necessary.

Regarding the reference in the Sūtras to Śrutis, we find (i) that there are several Sūtras which contain no reference to any Śruti at all and yet which Śaṅkara interprets as referring to some Śrutis, (ii) that there are some Sūtras which refer to some Śrutis but not to those which Śaṅkara takes them as referring to, (iii) and that there are a few Sūtras which refer to the Sūtras themselves but which Śaṅkara takes as referring to certain Śrutis or to some other texts. We do not mean that Śaṅkara's *viṣayavākyas* are always wrong. We must, rather, admit that almost all his *viṣayavākyas* in Bra.Sū.I and in several cases of Bra Sū.III and IV are wonderfully correct and that in the case of certain Sūtras it would have been almost impossible for a modern student to hit upon the exact *viṣayavākya* out of the ocean of the Śruti literature, had not Śaṅkara (or his predecessor, if Śaṅkara in the particular case depended upon him) pointed out and preserved for us the correct Śruti referred to in the Sūtra, e. g., the Śruti from the Khila of the Rāṇāyaṇīya Śākhā quoted by Śaṅkara under Bra.Sū.III.3 23.[60] What we mean is that the task of finding out the exact *viṣayavākya* of a Sūtra had become very difficult even by the time of Śaṅkara who either says though rarely that he differs from his predecessor as regards the exact *viṣayavākya* of a Sūtra (e.g.Bra.Sū.III.3.38),[61] or gives two or more Śrutis as optional *viṣayavākyas* for the same Sūtra (e.g.Bra.Sū.III 3.17). Under such circumstances Śaṅkara's own *viṣayavākyas* become doubtful and require careful

attention before they are accepted. This is so, particularly with the portion of the Brahmasūtra treated in Part I (Bra.Sū.III. 2.11–IV) because that is the portion which could give scope to the commentators to differ not only about the interpretation of the Sūtra (and therefore about that of the *viṣayavākya*) but even about its *viṣayavākya* itself. Such is not the case with respect to the Śrutis referred to in Bra.Sū.I where every Adhikaraṇa is meant to refer to a particular Śruti and where every Sūtra of that Adhikaraṇa explains that Śruti. In the case of a few Sūtras either we ourselves are not satisfied with the *viṣayavākyas* we have suggested, or we are not able to suggest any *viṣayavākya* at all. But the interpretation of a Sūtra which is intended by the Sūtrakāra to refer to a Śruti depends solely upon its *viṣayaāvkya* and so far the question of tracing the exact *viṣayavākya* of a Sūtra is of supreme importance.

We here give a list of the Sūtras in which we believe no *viṣayaākya* is referred to at all and which therefore should be interpreted only in the light of the context. By way of comparison we also state the reference to the Śruti given by Śaṅkara as the *viṣayavākya* for the Sūtra in the following list :—

No. of the Sūtra	Sūtras or parts of the Sūtras which refer to no *viṣayavākya* at all.	Śaṅkara's *viṣayavakya.*
In Bra.Sū.III.2.11	सर्वत्र (सर्वेषु स्थानेषु)	ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु वाक्येषु
14	No reference	Bṛ. Upa.III.8.8
15	अवैय्यर्थ्यं	आकारवद्ब्रह्मविषयाणि वाक्यानि
III.3. 3	No reference	शिरोव्रत of आथर्वणs.
6	अन्यथात्वम्	Bṛ.Upa.I.3. or Chā.

(60) The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the late Prof. Hiriyanna of Mysore for drawing his attention to the fact that Sūtra III.3.23 can refer to no other S′ruti bnt the one quoted by S′aṅkara.

(61) केचित्पुनरास्मिन्सूत्र इदं च वाजसनेयकमक्ष्यादित्यपुरुषविषयं वाक्यं, छान्दोग्ये च—— 'अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये......' इत्युदाहृत्य...... । S′ā.*bhā*. on Bra.Sū.III.3.38.

		Upa.I.2
9	व्याप्ति	Chā.Upa.I.1.1.
10	सर्वाभेदादन्यत्र इमे	प्राणसंवाद in Bṛ.Up., Chā.Upa.,Kau.Upa.
14		Kaṭha Upa.III.10-11
29	विरोध:	Mu.Upa.III.1.3.
35	स्वात्मन: अन्तरा (within one's own self)	Bṛ.Upa.III.4.1 and III.5.1
37	व्यतिहार: (Interchange)	The text of Aitareyins and that of Jābālas
39	कामादि (we read कामात्)	Chā.Upa.VIII.15 and Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22.
42	तन्निर्धारण, तद्दृष्टे:, पृथक	Chā.Upa.I.1.1 Chā.Upa.I.1.10.
43	प्रदान (we read प्रधान).	Bṛ.Upa.I.5.21; Chā.Upa.IV.3.1
III.4.21		Chā.Upa.I.1.3, I.6.1
24	एकवाक्यता	Bṛ.Upa.IV.5.6; Chā.Upa.IV.3.1
28	सर्वान्नानुमति	प्राणसंवादs in Chā.Upa. V.2.1 & Bṛ.Upa.VI. 1.14.
40	नातद्भाव:	Chā.Upa.II.23.1
IV.1. 2	अचलत्व	Chā.Upa.VII.6.1

In a great number of Sūtras we find that the Sūtra in question does refer to a Śruti but not to the one quoted by Śaṅkara. We have tried to find out the exact *viṣayavākya* in each case. We give below a list of these Sūtras and what seem to us to be the *viṣayavākyas* along with the *viṣayavākyas* given by Śaṅkara and request the reader to refer to our Notes on the respective Sūtra for our arguments.

No. of the Sūtra.	Words conveying a reference.	Śaṅkara's *viṣayavākya*.	Our suggestion.
III.2.12.	प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्	Bṛ.Upa.II.5.1	Chā.Upa.VIII.7-12
13.	एके	Kaṭha Upa.VI.1 & Śve.Upa.I.12	Śve.Upa.III.16-20
16.	आह च तन्मात्रम्	निर्विशेषब्रह्मवाक्यS	Śruti declaring Brahman to be only *prakāśa*, e. g., ब्रह्म एव तेज एव.
17.	दर्शयति	नेतिनेति श्रुतयः	Kaṭha Upa.V.15; S've.Upa.VI.14; Mu.Upa.II.2.10; Bha.Gī.XII.12.
18.	उपमा	ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद् 12.	Kaṭha Upa.V.11, Mu.Upa.II.1.1, Bha.Gī.XI.12.
20–21.	तिरोभाव + दर्शन	Bṛ.Upa.II.5.18	Chā.Upa.VII.26.1.
22.	प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः	Bṛ.Upa.II.6.6.	Cha.Upa.VII.1–15
23.	तदव्यक्तमाह हि	Mu.Upa.III.1.3, Bṛ.Upa.III.9.26, Tai.Upa.II.7.1	Kaṭha Upa.III.11
26.	अनन्त	Mu.Upa.III.2.9, Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.6.	Kaṭha Upa.VI 8
31.	सेतुव्यपदेश	Chā.Upa.VIII.4	Kaṭha Upa.III.2
	उन्मानव्यपदेश	तदेतद्ब्रह्म चतुष्पादष्टाशफम् etc.,	Kaṭha Upa.IV.12-13
	संबन्धव्यपदेश	Chā.Upa.VI.8.1, Tai.Upa., Bṛ.Upa.	Kaṭha Upa.IV.4
	भेदव्यपदेश	Chā.Upa.I.6–7	Kaṭha Upa.III.11
36.	अन्यप्रतिषेध	Various Śrutis	Bṛ.Upa III.7.23
39.	फलमतः	Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.24	यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य; तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ।

No. of the Sūtra.	Word conveying reference	शङ्कर's विषयवाक्य	Our suggestion.
III.3.11.	आदि in आनन्दादयः	Ś. refers to विज्ञानघनत्व, सर्वगतत्व, सर्वात्मत्व	The attributes in Bra.Sū.I.1
16–17.		Ai.Upa.I.1; Bṛ.Upa. IV.3-4 & Chā.Upa. VI.2–8	Bṛ.Upa.I.4.7
18.		Bṛ.Upa.VI.1.14.	Bṛ.Upa.I.4.10
16.	समाने	A passage from Agnirahasya (Śa.Brā.X) and Bṛ.Upa.V.6.1	Any Upaniṣadic text
20.	अन्यत्र	Bṛ.Upa.V.5.1–4	असमाने (Vide Sūtra 19) text,i.e., a Śruti other than Upaniṣad texts
22.	दर्शयति	Chā.Upa.I.7.5	
24.	पुरुषविद्या	ताण्ड्यमहाब्राह्मण and पैङ्गिरहस्यब्राह्मण	Mu.Upa.II.1.2-5
	इतरेषाम्	नारायणोपनिषद् of the तैतिरीयकs	Guṇas of the Puruṣa are referred to.
25.	वेधादि	Some Mantras आथर्वणिकोपनिषदारम्भ	Mu.Upa.II.2.2-4
26.	उपायन	Chā.Upa.VIII. 13.1; Kau.Upa.I.4	Kaṭha Upa.
27.	अन्ये	Chā.Upa.VIII.13. 1 & Kau.Upa.I.4	
31.	सर्वासाम्	All अभ्युदयप्राप्तिफला सगुणा विद्याs are referred to.	धियाम् under-stood from Sūtra 33.
	शब्द	Bṛ. Upa.VI.2.16	Śrutis in general
	अनुमान	Bha.Gī.VIII.26	Smṛtis in general
32.	आधिकारिकाणाम्	अपान्तरतम and other Masters	E.g. Chā.Upa.I. 10.
34.	इयदामननात्	Mu.Upa.III.1.1, Kaṭha Upa. III.1.	Kaṭha Upa.

No. of the Sūtra	Word conveying a reference.	Śaṅkara's *Viṣayavākya*	Our suggestion.
40.	अलोपः	Chā.Upa.V.19.1-V.24.5 (प्राणाग्निहोत्र)	Some attributes of the Puruṣa or the Avyakta
III.3. 41. 44,49,50,52.	तद्वचनात्	Chā Upa.V.19.1 अग्निरहस्यब्राह्मण of the वाजसनेयिन्s–यजुर्वेद.	Śrutis in general Mu.Upa.Śrutis.
	अङ्गावबद्धाः	उद्गीथश्रुति, e. g.; Chā.Upa.I.1. 1	E. g. वैश्वानरश्रुति
58.	आदि in शब्दादि	Chā.Upa.III.14.1	शब्द, प्रकरण, संज्ञा in Sū.III.3.6-8
III.4.8.	अधिकोपदेश	Mu.Upa.I.1.9 Tai.Upa.II.8.1 Kaṭha Upa.VI.2	Mu. Upa. I. 1, I.2. 7–16, Chā. Upa. VII. 4. 1; Bha. Gī. IV. 33
15.	एके	Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22	Mu.Upa.III.1.-4, III.2.6; Śve. Upa. VI. 13. Even Bha. Gī. XVIII. 53.
16.	उपमर्दम्	Bṛ. Upa. II. 4.14	Mu.Upa.II.2.8
18.	अपवदति	Chā.Upa.II.23.1 Tai.Upa.I.11.1 Chā.Upa.V.10.1 Mu.Upa.I.2.11 etc. etc.	E. g. Mu Upa. I. 2. 12. I.2.1–10, III.1.8
19.	साम्यश्रुतेः	Chā.Upa.II 23.1 Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22	Mu.Upa.
23.	विशेषितत्वात्	पूर्वकाण्ड where मनु वैवस्वत etc occur	KaṭhaUpa.III.-16–17

31.	शब्द	काठक संहिता	Chā. Upa. 1.10, or Bṛ. Upa. V.14.8, IV. 4. 23, etc., etc
32.	विहितत्वात्	'यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति' इत्यादि	Chā. Upa. II.-23.1
34.	उभयलिङ्ग	श्रुतिलिङ्ग and स्मृतिलिङ्ग	यज्ञादिश्रुति viz., Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 and आश्रमश्रुति =Chā. Upa. II.-23.1.
35.	अनभिभवं च दर्शयति	Chā. Upa. VIII.5.3	Examples of जनक, याज्ञवल्क्य. Or, Mu. Upa. III. 2. 10.
36.	तद्दृष्टेः	The S'ruti about रैक्व, वाचक्नवी and others.	Bṛ. Upa. IV.4.22
39.	लिङ्गात्	Bṛ. Upa. IV.4.9	
44.	फलश्रुतेः	Chā. Upa. II.3.2	Chā. Upa. I. 2. 13–14
46.	श्रुतेश्च	Chā. Upa. I.7.8-9	Bṛ. Upa. I.3.25
50.	अनाविष्कुर्वन्	बाल्य in Bṛ. Upa. III. 5. 1.	मौन in Bṛ. Upa.-III. 5. 1. referred to in Sū. III. 4. 49.
IV. 1. 2.	लिङ्ग	Chā Upa. I.5.1-2	
12.	दृष्टम्	स यावत्क्रतुरस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति And Bha. Gī. VIII. 6-10	Praśna Upa. V.1
IV.1.16	दर्शन	Bṛ. Upa. IV 4.22	Chā. Upa. II.23.1
17	एकेषाम्	तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति etc	Bṛ. Upa.
IV.4. 5	उपन्यास	Chā. Upa. VIII.7	Bṛ. Upa. IV.4.4

10	आह ह्येवम्	Chā.Upa.VIII.12.5	Chā.Upa.VIII.12.1; Br̥.Upa.IV.4.7.
18	प्रत्यक्षोपदेश	Tai.Upa.I.6.2	परान्तकाले in Mu. Upa.
19	स्थिति	Chā.Upa.III.12.6	Br̥.Upa.V.10.1, VI.2.15.
21	भोगसाम्यलिङ्ग	Br̥.Upa.I.5.23	

There are a few Sūtras which, according to Śaṅkara, do not refer to any Śrutis but which seem to us to refer to certain Śrutis. These Sūtras are a few, but if our suggestion about the references be correct, they yield important information about the doctrine of the Sūtrakāra. We give below a list of these Sūtras along with our suggestion about the Śrutis alluded to in the same.

No. of the Sūtra.	Words	Śaṅkara's remarks.	Our suggestion.
III.2.11	अपि	Implies स्वत: एव	स्थानत: अपि refers to Māṇḍūkya Upa.
25	आदि		Śve.Upa.II.11
28	तेजस्त्वात्		Chā.Upa.VIII.6.3 (ब्रह्म एव तेज एव)
31	परमत:		Kaṭha Upa. III.11.
III.4.11	शतवत्	Illustration of 'शतमाभ्यां दीयताम्'	Cha. Upa. VIII.6 6
17	ऊर्ध्वरेत:सु शब्दे		
26	अश्ववत्	अश्वो न लाङ्गलकर्षणे युज्यते रथचर्यायां तु युज्यते।	Br̥.Upa I.1.1-2.
42	उपपूर्वं भावमेके	एके आचार्या: and उपपूर्वं=उपपातकम्	Chā.Upa.I.10.8.

In a few Sūtras Śaṅkara explains the reference to be one to some Smṛti, etc., but we propose to take it to be a reference to a Sūtra in the Brahmasūtra or a Smṛti or a Śruti.

No. of the Sūtra	Words	Śaṅkara's remarks.	Our Suggestion.
III.2.30	प्रतिषेधात्	Bṛ.Upa.III.7.23	न तथात्वम् in III. 2. 19.
III.4.37	विशेषानुग्रहः	Examples of Saṁvarta and others from Purāṇas and Mahābhārata.	Bha. Gī. सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज। अहं त्वा सर्व-पापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि माशुचः॥
III.4.42	अशनवत्	यथा ब्रह्मचारिणो मधु-मांसाशने व्रतलोप : पुनः संस्कारश्चैवमिति	Chā.Upa.I.10.
	तदुक्तम्	तदुक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणे in Jai. Sūtra.	Sūtra III. 4. 28.

The last point that we wish to notice about Śaṅkara's *viṣaya-vākyas* is that sometimes he gives a wrong विषयवाक्य, i. e., a quotation *which does not exactly support his contention*. We here state a few cases from his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV. 4 only. We have explained in our Notes (in Part I) how these and several other विषयवाक्यs in Śaṅkara's Commentary on other Sūtras are *wrong* in this sense.

1. His quotation under Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 21 does not prove *bhogasāmya* even between the Mukta and Īśvara.

2. Śaṅkara's *viṣayavākyas* under Bra.Sū.IV.4.20 do not show how Brahman is *vikāra-avartin*. They can at the most show only that *vikāras* like the Sun, the Moon, etc., are not in Brahman.

3. His Śruti under Sūtra IV. 4. 15 refers neither to *āveśa* nor to *pradīpa*.

4. The Śruti he quotes under Bra.Sū.IV.4.10 does not deal with the absence of a physical body; it refers only to the mind.

5. The Śruti to be referred to under Bra.Sū.IV.4.9 should have some word for *ananyādhipati*, e. g., *sva-rat* in Chā. Upa. VII.25, but he quotes a Śruti which makes no mention of this fact.

6. The point in Sūtra IV.4.5 requires a Śruti describing the rūpa of the liberated as Brāhma rūpa, e. g., Bṛ Upa.IV.4.4, while Śaṅkara quotes Chā.Upa.VIII.7.1 which describes the Muktarūpa but does not tell us that it is the Brāhma rūpa.

7. Under Bra.Sū.IV.4.4 Śaṅkara quotes many Śrutis, but only one of them, viz., Bṛ.Upa.IV.3 23 is the exact Śruti referred to by the Sūtrakāra.

We have noted these and other similar cases in our Notes (in Part I) with a view to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that if we minutely examine the sense of the *viṣayavakya* given by Śaṅkara in his Commentary on several Sūtras of Bra.Sū.III-IV, it seem to us that a better and more exact *viṣayavākya* was in the mind of the Sūtrakāra.

We may now sum up the results of our study of Śaṅkara's *viṣayavākyas* of the Sūtras :—(1) Particularly in Brahmasūtra III.3 there are many Sūtras *which refer to no* Śruti or Smṛti but Śaṅkara quotes Śṛutis chiefly from the Bṛ. and Chā. Upaniṣads, a fact which gives the impression as if Bra.Sū.III.3 were meant to be a discussion and a reconciliation of the S'rutis mainly from these two Upanisads, and as if the Śrutis of these two Upaniṣads were at conflict with one another ;

(2) S'aṅkara does not seem to have got a correct tradition about the *viṣayavākyas* in Bra.Sū.III and IV. This is in a striking contrast with S'aṅkara's commentary on Bra.Sū.I. This loss of tradition is not unlikely or unnatural if we remember that in Bra.Sū.I every Sūtra is meant to be a reference to and an explanation of a S'ruti, while in Bra.Sū.III and IV the primary object of the Sūtrakāra is to evolve and present in a

systematic form his own views about the Means and the Goal of the Upaniṣads.

(3) In Bra.Sū.III and IV there are several Sūtras which do refere to a S'ruti, though S'aṅkara does not say so.

(4) Some of these cases are very important (e.g., Bra.Sū.III.2. 11, III,2.31, III.4.11, III.4.26, III.4.42) because the *viṣayavākyas* discovered, if correct, are a great help to the correct interpretation of the Sūtras in question.

(5) And, lastly, it is necessary to examine whether the *viṣaya-vākya* of S'aṅkara brings out the exact point in a particular Sūtra or whether it is only indirectly connected with a part of the point discussed in a Sūtra.

One very important point regarding which a student of the Brahmasūtra should be very careful is *how far we can make additions* to the words of a Sūtra in consideration of its aphoristic style. How far are the Sūtras elliptical ? Every interpreter of the Sūtras has to add to every Sūtra certain words in order to make out its sense. We are here perticularly concerned with the *additions* made by S'aṅkara. It is neither possible nor necessary to enumerate and reproduce here *all* the unwarranted additions made by S'aṅkara. We have pointed them out in our Notes on the Sūtras in Part I.

We shall here first give a list of the additions to the Sūtras which Śaṅkara makes while interpreting Bra.Sū.III.3. Most of these are supported neither by any word in the Sūtra nor by the context, though S'aṅkara often supports them by referring to the *Śruti* which he supposes to be the विषयवाक्य of the particular Sūtra.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.2. भेदात्=गुणभेदात् and एकस्यामपि= =एकस्यामपि विद्यायाम्; and S'aṅkara adds "एवंजातीयकोगुणभेद : उपपद्यते—". There is no justification for the additions of गुण and विद्या. We have suggested that according to the context भेदात् should mean चोदनादिभेदात् and that in the light of Sūtra III.3.55. (अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्)

एकस्याम् should mean एकस्यां शाखायाम् Also Jai.Sū. justifies शाखायाम्.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.3. The शिरोव्रत of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad is not at all referred to in the Sūtra.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.5–अर्थाभेदात् = गुणनामर्थस्य अभेदात्.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.9. व्याप्ति : = सर्ववेदव्याप्ति :.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.11. (आनन्दादय : प्रधानस्य). Instead of interpreting the Gen. case of प्रधान in the simple sense of possession, S'aṅkara adds "धर्मा : सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्या :." It is by this unwarraned addition only that S'aṅkara applies the Sūtra to *all* the Unaniṣads.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.17. S'aṅkara adds "न परमात्मग्रहणम्" after "अन्वयात्" and thus interprets अन्वयादितिचेत् as अन्वयान्नेतिचेत् (Addition of negation !).

(7) Bra.Sū.III.3.18 S'aṅkara adds न after कार्याख्यानात्.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.3.20. संबन्धात् = एकविद्याभिसंबन्धात्.

(9) Bra.Sū.III.3.21 विशेषात् = उपासनस्थानविशेषोपनिबन्धात् and Ṣaṅkara adds "उभयोः उभयत्र प्राप्तिः".

(10) Bra.Sū.IIII.3.26. The simple word "हानौ" is interpreted by Ṣaṅkara as ब्रह्मज्ञानिनः सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः हानौ सत्याम् and उपायन as ब्रह्मज्ञानिनः सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः विभागेन प्रियैः अप्रियैः उपायनम् and then he adds "तस्मादन्यत्र केवल-हानशब्दश्रवणेऽप्युपायनानुवृत्तिः.

(11) Bra.Sū.III.3.31. अविरोधः should mean "सर्वासां शब्दानुमानाभ्याम् अविरोधः; but Ṣaṅkara makes it "प्रकरणाविरोधः"

(12) Bra.SūIII.3.32 'अवस्थितिः' means according to Ṣaṅkara "सत्यपि सम्यग्दर्शने कैवल्यहेतौ अक्षीणकर्माणः.........अवतिष्ठन्ते."

(13) Bra.Sū.III.3.33. अवरोधः = सर्वत्र अवरोद्धव्याः "सर्वत्र" is a very serious addition, because it totally changes the very sense of अवरोध 'restriction'.

(14) Bra.Sū.III.3.35. अन्तरा is explained as अन्तराम्नानाविशेषात् though there is no reference to आम्नानाविशेष in the Sūtra. Similarly, स्वात्मनः is changed to स्वात्मनः विद्यैकत्वम्.

(15) Bra.Sū.III.3.36. अन्यथा is explained as अनभ्युपगम्यमाने विद्याभेदे and भेदानुपपत्तिः as आम्नानभेदानुपपत्तिः.

(16) Bra.Sū.III.3.37. Śaṅkara adds जीवेशयोः (व्यतिहारः)......... अयमाध्यानायाम्नायते.

(17) Bra.Sū.III.3.38. After 'सत्यादयः' Śaṅkara adds "गुणा एकस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे उपसंहर्तव्याः.

(18) Bra.Sū.III.3.39. Śaṅkara changes कामादि to सत्यकामादि and आयतनादिभ्यः to आयतनादिसामान्यात्.

(19) Bra.Sū.III.3.40. In the Sūtra there is no reference to प्राणाग्निहोत्र. But Śaṅkara adds भोजनलोपे प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य (अलोपः in the Sūtra) जाबालश्रुतेः प्राणाग्निहोत्रे (आदरात् in the Sūtra).

(20) Bra.Sū.III.3.41. उपस्थिते is explained as उपस्थिते भोजने; अतः as तस्मादेव भोजनद्रव्यात् प्रथमोपनिपतितात् प्राणाग्निहोत्रं निर्वर्तयितव्यम्.

(21) Bra.Sū.III.3.42. तन्निर्धारण is explained as यान्येतान्युद्गीथादिकर्मगुणयाथात्म्यनिर्धारणानि (रसतम आप्तिः समृद्धि मुख्यप्राणआदित्य इत्येवमादीनि); अनियमः as न एतानि नित्यवत् कर्मसु नियम्येरन्; फलम् as विज्ञानस्य फलम्; and पृथक् = कर्मणः पृथक्; and अप्रतिबन्धः as कर्मफलसिद्धयप्रतिबन्धः (अप्रतिबन्धः meaning तत्समृद्धिः अतिशयविशेषः कश्चित्). All these additions are nowhere suggested in the Sūtra

(22) Bra.Sū.III.3.43. An example of unwarranted additions in Sūtra III.3.43, where not only the Pūrvapakṣa but also *all* the words of the Siddhānta are taken by Śaṅkara as implied (पृथगेव वायुप्राणावुपगन्तव्याविति । कस्मात् । पृथगुपदेशात्). Even, the Śruti which Śaṅkara takes as the विषयवाक्य of this Sūtra is not referred to by any word in the Sūtra.

(23) Bra.Sū.III.3.44. Śaṅkara takes as understood स्वातंत्र्यं तावत् [एतेषां मनश्चिदादीनामग्नीनाम्]; he explains बलीयः as प्रकरणाद्बलीयः and तदपि as तदपि उक्तं पूर्वस्मिन् काण्डे.

(24) Bra.Sū.III.3.45. Śaṅkara explains पूर्व as पूर्वस्य क्रियामयस्य अग्नेः and adds सांपादिका अप्येते अग्नयः; he explains क्रिया as क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः.

(25) Bra.Sū.III.3.47. Śaṅkara explains विद्यैव as "विद्यात्मका एवैते स्वतन्त्रा मनश्चिदादयोऽग्नयः स्युः".

(26) Bra.Sū.III.3.48. Śaṅkara adds "स्वातन्त्र्ये लिङ्गम्" and "पुरस्तात्".

(27) Bra.Sū.III.3.49. Śaṅkara explains बाधः as स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षस्य बाधः; and बलीयस्त्वात् as प्रकरणाद्बलीयस्त्वात्.

(28) Bra.Sū.III.3 50. Śaṅkara adds "स्वातन्त्र्यं मनश्चिदादीनां प्रतिपत्तव्यम्" and explains अनुबन्ध as "क्रियावयवान् मनआदि व्यापारेषु अनुबध्नाति" and पृथक्त्व as कर्मभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरेभ्यश्च पृथक्.

He explains दृष्टः as अवेष्टिः राजसूयप्रकरणपठितायाः प्रकरणादुत्कर्षः वर्णत्रयानुबन्धाद्राजयज्ञत्वाच्च राजसूयस्य दृष्टः.

(29) Bra.Sū.III.3.51. सामान्यात् = मानसग्रहसामान्यात्; उपलब्धेः = केवलपुरुषार्थत्वोपलब्धेः ; and लोकापत्तिः = लोकस्य अग्निभावापत्तिः.

(30) Bra.Sū.III.3.52. ताद्विध्यम् = केवलविद्याविधित्वम्; शब्दस्य = शब्दस्य प्रयोजनं लक्ष्यते; भूयस्त्वात् = भूयांसः तु अग्न्यवयवाः संपादयितव्याः विद्यायामित्येतस्मात्कारणात्; अनुबन्धः = अग्निना अनुबध्यते विद्या

(31) Bra.Sū.III.3 53. After एके Śaṅkara adds "देह एव तु चेतनः आत्मा" This conclusion is foreign to the Sūtra.

(32) Bra.Sū.III.3.54. उपलब्धिः is भूतभौतिकविषया उपलब्धिः.

(33) Bra.Sū.III.3.55. अङ्गावबद्धाः = उद्गीथादिकर्माङ्गावबद्धाः प्रत्ययाः; न = न व्यवतिष्ठेरन्. Śaṅkara adds "उद्गीथादिश्रुत्यविशेषात्."

(34) Bra Sū III.3.56. अविरोधः=यथाश्रयाणां कर्माङ्गानां सर्वत्रानुवृत्तिरेवमाश्रितानामपि प्रत्ययानामित्यविरोधः।

(35) Bra.Sū.III.3.57. दर्शयति = दर्शयति एकवाक्यतावगमात्.

(36) Bra.Sū.III.3.58. नाना = विद्या भिन्ना भवितुमर्हति.

(37) Bra.Sū.III.3.59. विकल्पः = विद्यानां विकल्पः.

(38) Bra.Sū.III.3.60. काम्याः = काम्याः विद्याः.

(39) Bra.Sū.III.3.61. अङ्गेषु = कर्माङ्गेषु ये आश्रिताः प्रत्ययाः; यथाश्रयभावः = यथा एव एषां (प्रत्ययानाम्) आश्रयाः (स्तोत्रादयः) संभूय भवन्त्येवं प्रत्ययाः अपि (आश्रयतन्त्रत्वात्प्रत्ययानाम्).

(40) Bra.Sū.III.3.62. शिष्टेः = यथा वाश्रया (स्तोत्रादयः) (त्रिषु) शिष्यन्ते एवमाश्रिता अपि प्रत्ययाः

(41) Bra.Sū.III.3 63. समाहारात् = वेदान्तरोदितस्य प्रत्ययस्य वेदान्तरोदितपदार्थसंबन्धसामान्यात्सर्ववेदोदितप्रत्ययोपसंहारं सूचयति........

(42) Bra.Sū.III.3.64. गुण is विद्यागुण; साधारण्य = वेदत्रयसाधारणम्.

(43) Bra.Sū.III.3.65. तत्सहभावः = उपासनानां सहभावः.

It may be that in some of the above cases of "unwarranted additions" to the Sūtras we have not been able to hit upon the exact additions or that our suggestion is open to doubt. But inspite of a few such cases we would not be wrong in our conclusion that Śaṅkara and those who have followed his way of interpreting the Sūtras have not cautiously used the right of a commentator to make additions to the Sūtras in order to bring out their full significance. This improper use is particularly prominent in the case of Bra.Sū.III.3 and the great number of these unjustified additions, we believe, is itself one more proof that the Ācāryas have not got the correct tradition for the interpretation of the Guṇsopasaṁhāra Pāda. Not only have they freely added to the words in a Sūtra but in several cases the very Proposition (Siddhānta) also is taken to be implied or understood, the Sūtra being used only as an argument to prove that Proposition.

We shall now give illustrations of the "unwarranted additions" from Ssṅkara's commentary on Bra.Sū.III.4.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.4.1. अतः means ज्ञानात् or विद्यायाः ; but Śaṅkara adds केवलायाः because he interprets अतः as केवलायाः विद्यायाः .

(2) Bra.Sū.III.4.2. शेषत्वात् would mean (ज्ञानस्य) कर्मशेषत्वात्; but Śaṅkara makes unwarranted additions when he interprets शेषत्वात् as कर्तृत्वेन आत्मनः कर्मशेषत्वात्.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.4.8. Śaṅkara explains अधिक as शारीरात् अधिकः ईश्वरः (उपदिश्यते). The addition of शारीर and ईश्वर is not even suggested by the Sūtra. Possibly the Sūtra refers to Śrutis in which *knowledge* is said to be superior to *action*.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.4.12. Śaṅkara explains शतवत् as "शतं आभ्यां दीयताम्". There is no question of दान at all in the Sūtra. We have suggested that शत in this Sūtra should be explained by referring to शताधिकया in Bra.Sū.IV.2.17.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.4.13. Śaṅkara explains स्तुति as विद्यास्तुति; though it is likely that it means कर्मस्तुति.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.4.16. 'उपमर्दम्' 'may mean' 'कर्मणां उपमर्दम्' but Śaṅkara explains it as 'कर्मणां स्वरूपोपमर्दम्.'

(7) Bra.Sū.III.4.17. By explaining 'शब्दे' as 'विद्या श्रूयते' Śaṅkara adds 'विद्या.'

(8) Bra.Sū.III.4.18. परामर्शम् is explained as आश्रमान्तराणां परामर्शम्. The Sūtra does not mention the आश्रमs at all. अपवदति is explained as अपवदति आश्रमान्तरं प्रत्यक्षा श्रुतिः.

(9) Bra.Sū.III.4.19. अनुष्ठेयम् must refer to ज्ञानम् or दर्शनम्; but Śaṅkara says, "आश्रमान्तरं अनुष्ठेयम्", 'साम्यश्रुतेः' means, according to Śaṅkara, "समा हि गार्हस्थ्येनाश्रमान्तरस्य परामर्शश्रुतिर्दृश्यते......"

(10) Bra.Sū.III.4.20, 'विधिर्वा' means, according to Śaṅkara, 'विधिर्वाऽयमाश्रमान्तरस्य.' Thus, he adds आश्रमान्तर in all the Sūtras (18–20) of the Adhikaraṇa.

(11) Bra.Sū.III.4.21. Śaṅkara takes "स्तुति" as उद्गीथादेः स्तुतिः," thus adding उद्गीथ. "उपादान" is explained as उपादानश्रवण. And, lastly he takes उद्गीथादीनि कर्माङ्गानि as understood and then changes उपादान into उपादानश्रवणात्.

(12) Bra.Sū.III.4.24. Śaṅkara takes 'एकवाक्यता.' as (आख्यानानाम्) संनिहिताभिः विद्याभिः एकवाक्यता.

(13) Bra.Sū.III.4.26. Saṅkara explains सर्वापेक्षा as 'सर्वाश्रमकर्मणामपेक्षा'; we have explained it as "all needs".

(14) Bra.Sū.III.4.27. Saṅkara begins the explanation of the Sūtra by taking as understood "यदि कश्चिन्मन्येत यज्ञादीनां विद्यासाधनभावो न न्याय्यो विध्यभावात्......... (तथापि तु शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्)". By this अध्याहार, the whole force of तथापितु is got rid of by Śaṅkara. The sense of the Sūtra is thus entirely reversed.

(15) Bra.Sū.III.4.32. Saṅkara explains अपि as आश्रममात्रनिष्ठस्य अपि अमुमुक्षोः कर्तव्यानि एव though अमुमुक्षु is not at all suggested by the Sūtra.

(16) Bra.Sū.III.4.35. Śaṅkara adds ब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनसंपन्नस्य रागादिभिःक्लेशैः (अनभिभवम्) without any implication of the same in the Sūtra.

(17) Bra.Sū.III.4.36. Saṅkara adds 'विद्यायामधिक्रियते'.

(18) Bra.Sū.III.4.38. In explaining विशेषानुग्रहः as धर्मविशेषैः अनुग्रहो विद्यायाः, Saṅkara adds धर्म and विद्या without any authority from the Sūtra itself.

(19) Bra.Sū.III.4.41. Śaṅkara adds without any restraint or hesitation अवकीर्णिनः नैष्ठिकस्य ब्रह्मचारिणः (आधिकारिकमपि = अधिकारलक्षणोक्तमपि) प्रायश्चित्तं न भवितुमर्हति अप्रतिसमाधेय (पतनस्मरणात्—from the Sūtra).

(20) Bra.Sū.III.4.42. भाव and उपपूर्वम् are respectively changed to प्रायाश्चित्तस्य भावम् and उपपातकम्, without any reason given in the Sūtra.

(21) Bra.Sū.III.4.43. Śaṅkara explains बहिः as बहिष्कर्तव्याः and he takes उभयथा as referring to महापातक and उपपातक which are mentioned in none of these Sūtras.

(22) Bra.Sū.III.4.44. Śaṅkara adds (स्वामिनः) एव फलवत्सु उपासनेषु कर्तृत्वम्.

(23) Bra.Sū.III.4.45. Śaṅkara adds विज्ञानस्य.

(24) Bra.Sū.III.4.49. Śaṅkara takes आश्रमयोः as understood.

(25) Bra.Sū.III.4.51. Śaṅkara adds विद्याजन्म as the विशेष्य of 'ऐहिकम्' without any justification from the Sūtra and explains प्रतिबन्धे as कर्मान्तरेणप्रतिबन्धे.

(26) Bra.Sū.III.4.52. Śaṅkara takes नियम as a नियम about उत्कर्षापकर्षकृताविशेष.

What we have stated above regarding Śaṅkara's additions to the Sūtras of Bra.Sū.III.3 is generally true about his interpretation of Bra.Sū III.4 also. In the latter Pāda he has always to add a particular word to each Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa in order to show that the Adhikaraṇa deals with a topic mentioned by him, e. g., Sūtras 18–20. His additions to Bra.Sū.III.4.27 and 41–42 are too clear to escape the notice of a careful student. We have not noticed here the changes which he makes in the sense of certain Sūtras by very slight additions, e. g., in the case of Bra.Sū.III.4.47–48.

We shall now mention a few cases of Śaṅkara's unwarranted additions in his explanation of Bra.Sū.IV.1.

(1) Bra.Sū.IV.1.1. Śaṅkara changes आवृत्तिः into प्रत्ययावृत्तिः.

(2) Bra.Sū.IV.1.2. Does Śaṅkara take the word लिङ्ग in the sense of an indication, since he explains it as गात्रकम्पादिलिङ्गात् and since his Sruti is not a direct statement on the topic ?

(3) Bra.Sū.IV.1.6. Śaṅkara explains अङ्गेषु as कर्माङ्गेषु and उपपत्तेः as उपपद्यते कर्मसमृद्धिः.

(4) Bra.Sū.IV.1.7. Śaṅkara takes आसीनः as आसीनः उपासीत and संभवात् as उपासनस्य संभवात्.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.1.9. Instead of connecting 'अचलत्वं च अपेक्ष्य' with आसीनः, Śaṅkara adds ध्यायतिवादो भवति (taken as understood) to the Sūtra.

(6) Bra.Sū.IV.1.11. अविशेषात् is, according to Śaṅkara, एकाग्रतायाः इष्टायाः सर्वत्र अविशेषात्.

(7) Bra.Sū.IV.1.14. Śaṅkara adds 'विनाश' to the sūtra and while he interprets पाते as विदुषः शरीरपाते, he adds without any hesitation "अवश्यंभाविनी मुक्तिः". The result of these additions is that he fails to make out the difference between पाते and अधिगमे (regarding पुण्य and पाप respectively).

(8) Bra.Sū.IV.1.17. He adds 'तस्या एष विनियोगः उक्तः' and thus he makes out a complete sentence out of only 'उभयोः' in this Sūtra.

(9) Bra.Sū.IV.1.18. Śaṅkara takes the whole conclusion as understood, viz., विद्यासंयुक्तं कर्माग्निहोत्रादिकं विद्याविहीनात्कर्मणोऽग्निहोत्राद्विशिष्टं विद्वानिव ब्राह्मणो विद्याविहीनाद्ब्राह्मणात् । तथापि नात्यन्तमनपेक्षं विद्याविहीनं कर्माग्निहोत्रादिकम्. The Sūtra has 'हि', which shows that it supplies *only an argument* for a conclusion already stated in a previous Sūtra. But as Śaṅkara begins a fresh Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra, he has to take the conclusion as understood.

A few instances of these "unwarranted additions" from Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.4 may be also noticed here :—

(1) Bra.Sū.IV.4.7. Even according to Śaṅkara himself, एवमपि can only mean 'चैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युगमेऽपि, but Śaṅkara interprets the expression as पारमार्थिकचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि; similarly 'पूर्वभावात्' should, according to him, mean पूर्वस्य ब्राह्मस्य भावात्; but he takes it as व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्य भावात्. 'उपन्यासात्' is interpreted as 'उपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य'.

(2) Bra.Sū.IV.4.16. Śaṅkara adds "विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनम्" to स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षम् in the Sūtra and he separates 'आविष्कृतं हि' which according to him means तत्रैव (उपानिषत्सु अधिकारवशात् यद् विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनं तत्स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षामित्येतद्) आविष्कृतम् ।

(3) Bra.Sū.IV.4.17. "मुक्तस्वरूपम्" should be taken as understood; but Śaṅkara adds the idea of ऐश्वर्य (ये सगुणब्रह्मोपासनात् सहैव मनसा ईश्वरसायुज्यं व्रजन्ति किं तेषां निरवग्रहमैश्वर्यं भवत्याहोस्वित्सावग्रहमिति संशयः) which is out of the context and also neither mentioned nor implied in these Sūtras (17–21).

(4) Bra.Sū.IV.4.18. Śaṅkara changes 'मण्डल' into सवितृमण्डलादिषु आयतनेषु; in the Sūtra itself there is nothing to support these additions of सवितृ, आदि and आयतन. Śaṅkara explains. 'आधिकारिक' as परमेश्वर. Moreover, "तदायत्तैवेयं स्वाराज्यप्राप्तिः" is not found in the Sūtra itself. In fact, we do not know from the Sūtras that the विषयवाक्य or the topic here is that of the मुक्त's स्वाराज्यप्राप्ति.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.4.19. Śaṅkara adds द्विरूपाम् to स्थितिम्; and he has to add the whole explanation, viz., "न च तन्निर्विकारं रूपमितरालम्बनाः प्राप्नुवन्तीति शक्यं वक्तुमतत्क्रतुत्वात्तेषाम्। अतश्च यथैव द्विरूपे परमेश्वरे निर्गुणं रूपमनवाप्य सगुण एवावतिष्ठन्त एवं सगुणेऽपि निरवग्रहमैश्वर्यमनवाप्य सावग्रह एवावतिष्ठन्त इति द्रष्टव्यम्।".

It will be seen from the above additions that it is only by *their* help that Śaṅkara finds out some of his important doctrines in the Brahmasūtra. Thus, the addition of अवश्यंभाविनी मुक्तिः to पाते in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 14 helps him to interpret that Sūtra as dealing with his distinction between liberation-in-this-life and liberation-after-this-life (*jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*). His interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 17 and IV. 4.19 as stating his idea of the lordship of the liberated (ऐश्वर्य) and that of the twofold Brahman (द्विरूप ब्रह्मन्) are also derived from the words he has added to the respective Sūtras.

In a number of Sūtras, Śaṅkara divides the words in such a way that each of the division serves as a sentence. This breaking up of a Sūtra is quite unnatural and the interpretation based upon such

a construction of the words of a Sūtra must be examined very carefully before it is accepted. We give below a few illustrations from Bra.Sū.III.3. To these words, when separated from their connection with other words, he makes unwarranted additions with the help of which he makes out complete sentences, as we have already noticed.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.3. The Sūtra runs as स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च । सववच्च तन्नियमः। Śaṅkara makes four out of the two sentences of this Sūtra. आथर्वणिके शिरोव्रतादीनां स्वाध्यायधर्मत्वेन (interpretation of तथात्वेन) स्वाध्यायस्य एव धर्मो न विद्यायाः। वेदव्रतोपदेशपरे ग्रन्थे (=समाचारे in the Sūtra) आथर्वणिका इदमपि वेदव्रतत्वेन व्याख्यातमिति समामनन्ति। अधिकृतविषयाद् (=अधिकारात्) एतच्छब्दात् (in एतां ब्रह्मविद्याम्–Mū.Upa.III.2.10) अध्ययनशब्दाच्च स्वोपनिषदध्ययनधर्म एवैष इति निर्धार्यते। सववच्च शिरोव्रतरूपधर्मानियमः (=तन्नियमः).

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.14 reads as आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्। Śaṅkara first takes प्रयोजनाभावात् as one sentence and then he takes आध्यानाय as another sentence.[62]

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.18. कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम्। Śaṅkara first interprets कार्याख्यानात् कार्यत्वने प्राप्तस्य आचमनस्य अन्वाख्यानात् आचमनस्य विधेयत्वं न उपपद्येत। And then he takes अपूर्वम् as अपां वासः संकल्पनमेवापूर्वं विधीयते or प्राणस्य अनग्नताकरणसंकल्पोऽनेन वाक्येनाचमनीयास्वप्सु प्राणविद्यासंबन्धित्वेनापूर्वः उपदिश्यते। As a matter of fact 'कार्याख्यानात्' should be taken as the हेतु for the अपूर्वम्.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.27.—सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्। तथा ह्यन्ये। Śaṅkara separates सांपराये from तर्तव्याभावात्. He takes सांपराये as सांपराये गमने एव देहादपसर्पणे इदं विद्यासामर्थ्यात्सुकृतदुष्कृतहानं भवतीति प्रतिजानीते; तर्तव्याभावात्=सुकृतदुष्कृताभ्यां प्राप्तव्यस्याभावात्।

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.28.—छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात्। Śaṅkara explains छन्दतः as तस्मात् (i. e., because of the impropriety of the human effort, stated by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya*) पूर्वमेव साधकावस्थायां छन्दतोऽनुष्ठानं तस्य (=यमनियमविद्याभ्यासात्मकस्य सुकृतदुष्कृतक्षयहेतोः पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य) स्यात्। And in order to explain the connection of this Sūtra with the preceding one, Śaṅkara adds तत्पूर्वकं च सुकृतदुष्कृतहानमिति द्रष्टव्यम्।

(62) Vide Note (18) on the Sūtra.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.39.—कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः। Śaṅkara splits up the Sūtra as "कामादीतरत्र; तत्र च; आयतनादिभ्यः". We believe, "तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः" should be taken as **one** sentence. Moreover, Śaṅkara takes 'इतरत्र' twice, though it occurs only once in the Sūtra.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.3 42.—तन्निधारणानियमः तद्दृष्टः पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्. शङ्कर makes three sentences out of this सूत्र; तन्निर्धारणानियमः=यान्येतान्युद्गीथादिकर्मगुणयाथात्म्यनिर्धारणानि (रसतम आप्तिः समृद्धि मुख्यप्राणआदित्य इत्येवमादीनि) नैतानि नित्यवत् कर्मसु नियम्येरन्। तद्दृष्टेः=तथाह्यनियतत्वमेवंजातीयकानां दर्शयति श्रुतिः। पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्=अपि चैवंजातीयकस्य कर्मव्यपाश्रयस्य विज्ञानस्य पृथगेव कर्मणः फल मुपलभ्यते कर्मफलसिद्धयप्रातिबन्धः तत्समृद्धिः अतिशयविशेषः कश्चित् (and he quotes Chā.Upa.-I.1.10).

He does not construe "तद्दृष्टेः फलम्"; but he makes one sentence out of 'तद्दृष्टेः' only.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.3.44.—लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि। Śaṅkara — स्वातन्त्र्यं तावत् (एतेषां मनश्चिदादीनामग्नीनाम्); लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्।; तद्धि लिङ्गं प्रकरणाद्बलीयः। तदपि उक्तं पूर्वकाण्डे। Thus, Śaṅkara splits up the Sūtra into three sentences. He separates लिङ्गभूस्त्वात् from ताद्धि बलीयः।

The number of Sūtras, similarly dealt with by Śaṅkara in the other Pādas than in the one discussed above (Bra.Sū. III.3), is comparatively not great.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.4.27.-शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् Śaṅkara-[यदि कश्चिन्मन्येत यज्ञादीनां विद्यासाधनभावो न न्याय्यो विध्यभावात्] तथापितु शमदमाद्युपेतः स्याद् [विद्यार्थी] ; .... [पश्येदिति च माध्यंदिना विस्पष्टमेव] विधिमधीयते ; .... तस्माद्यज्ञादीनि शमदमादीनि च यथाश्रमं सर्वाण्येवाश्रमकर्माणि विद्योत्पत्तावपेक्षितव्यानि (=तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम्). Here Śaṅkara has separated तद्विधेः and तदङ्गतया which really means "Because the Injunction about those tranquility, control of senses, etc., is subsidiary to that (Injunction about Sacrifice, etc.,)"

(2) Bra.Sū.III.4.42.—उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम्। Śaṅkara-(अपित्वेक आचार्या उपपातकमेवैतादिति मन्यन्ते) .... (तस्मादुपकुर्वाणवन्नैष्ठिकस्यापि प्रायश्चित्तस्य भावम् (इच्छन्ति) अशनवत्। तदुक्तम्. Śaṅkara does not take "उपपूर्वम्)

भावम्" together but makes out two sentences from these two words.

(3) Bra. Sū. III.4.43.-सहकार्यन्तरविधिःपक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्। Śaṅkara makes out one sentence out of सहकार्यन्तरविधिः, viz., विद्यासहकारिणो मौनस्य बाल्यपाण्डित्यवद्विधिरेवाश्रयितव्योऽपूर्वत्वात्; another sentence out of तृतीयम्, viz., तस्माद्बाल्यपाण्डित्यापेक्षया तृतीयमिदं मौनं ज्ञानातिशयरूपं विधीयते तद्वतः विद्यावतः संन्यासिनः अधिकारात्; पक्षे is as good as a sentence because Śaṅkara takes it as यास्मिन्पक्षे भेददर्शनप्राबलयान्न प्राप्नोति तस्मिन्नेष विधिरिति; and, lastly, विध्यादिवत् is interpreted as one more sentence. Here Śaṅkara has given up the case in apposition of सहकार्यन्तरविधिः and पक्षेण तृतीयं (कर्म स्यात्)," which made them only one sentence; and he has seperated तद्वतः from विध्यादिवत्; while really both these word make up only the illustration.

(4) Bra.Sū.IV.1.14.—इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु। Śaṅkara does not construe असंश्लेषः with पाते तु; but he makes two sentences by separating the two words and adding अवश्यंभाविनो विदुषः मुक्तिः —an addition necessitated by Śaṅkara's construction of असंश्लेषः and पाते तु.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.2.7. समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य। Śaṅkara separates समाना चासृत्युपक्रमाद् and अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य of which latter he makes one complete sentence, while really आसृत्युपक्रमात् gives the limit of the beginning and अमतत्वं चानुपोष्य the limit of the end of the समाना उत्क्रान्तिः

(6) Bra.Sū.IV.2.8—तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात्, । Śaṅkara separates तदापीतेः (taken with अवतिष्ठते understood) and संसारव्यपदेशात् while the Sūtra seems to mean that "the अपीति is called संसार."

We believe, in most of the above cases the unjustified splitting up of the words of the same Sūtra has made it necessary for Śaṅkara to add several other words to the Sūtra in order to bring out a sense from it which, of course, is not intended by the Sūtrakāra. We have amply explained this kind of defect in Śaṅkara's commentary in our Notes on the various Sūtras in Part I.

Another class of defects is that of single words not interpreted correctly by Śaṅkara. There is a number of cases in which *he does not give the exact sense* to a word or words of a सूत्र. We would notice here only a few cases first from Bra.Sū.III.3 :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.1.—सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम् चोदनाद्यविशेषात्। —शङ्कर does not interpret 'सर्व' as *all* the Vedāntas, but according to him 'सर्व' means " only those (or all those) in which the same विद्या (e. g., प्राणविद्या, पञ्चाग्निविद्या, etc. etc.) is mentioned ". We have shown that this modification of the sense of सर्व is not meant by the Sūtrakāra, who probably refers to " सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति ".

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.5. 'उपसंहार' means "collection in one place" but Śaṅkara takes it to mean " transference " because he explains it as अन्यत्रोदितानां विज्ञानगुणानामन्यत्रापि समाने विज्ञाने उपसंहारो भवति.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.7. प्रकरण is explained as प्रक्रम. वत् in परोवरीयस्त्ववत् is explained once as (1) विशिष्ट and again (2) as a suffix of illustration.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.9. च is taken as तु. च in its usual sense of 'and' would show that the Sūtra gives *one more* argument while च interpreted as तु would mean that a Pūrvapakṣa argument is refuted in the Sūtra.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.17. Śaṅkara interprets अन्वय as the अन्वय of the उपक्रम, though अन्वय implies the relation between two and, therefore it should mean the अन्वय of the उपक्रम and उपसंहार.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.28. Śaṅkara interprets 'छन्दतः' in such a way that *really no option* is given in the Sūtra.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.3.29. उभयथा अर्थवत्त्वम् means " गतेर्देवयानस्य पथोऽर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा=विभागेन भवितुमर्हति क्वचिदर्थवती गति; क्वचिन्नेति, न अविशेषेण । The real sense of the expression is that गति (=Mokṣa) is achieved in either way or in both the ways.[63]

(8) Bra.Sū.III.3.31. अनियमः is explained as 'अविशेषेण' which ultimately means a नियम that the गति applies to all सगुणविद्यास invariably.

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(63) Vide Note (II) on the Sūtra.

(9) Bra.Sū.III.3.33. अवरोध: means restraint or confinement (in one place); Śaṅkara by interpreting it as सर्वत्रावरोध: totally changes the sense of the word.

(10) Bra.Sū.III.3.34. 'इयत्' means 'so much', 'so large'; 'this much', 'of this extent'; but Śaṅkara explains it as इयत्तापरिच्छिन्नद्वित्वोपेतम्'.

(11) Bra.Sū.III.3.37. 'व्यतिहार' should mean 'interchange' of विशेषणs only or विशेष्यs only; but Śaṅkara explains it as जीवेशयोः मिथः विशेषणविशेष्यभावः ।

Some examples of this part of Śaṅkara's method of interpretation can be given from Bra.Sū.III.4 also :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.4.11. 'शतवत्' like अश्ववत् in Bra.Sū.III.4.26 should be a reference to some Śruti (Chā.Upa.VIII.6.6) but Śaṅkara explains it as "शतमाभ्यां दीयताम्".

(2) Bra.Sū.III.4.18. परामर्श means 'reflection' which is the same as a mental act. But Śaṅkara explains it as 'a reference'.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.21. उपादान should mean 'receiving' or acceptance'; but Śaṅkara interprets it as "with reference to".

(4) Bra.Sū.III.4.22. Śaṅkara interpret भाव as विधि which seems to us to be an unusual sense. We take it as 'existence' in which sense the word occurs often in the Sūtras.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.4.24. Śaṅkara interprets एकवाक्यता as the एकवाक्यता of the episodes with the विद्याs they teach due to the fact that the episodes are aimed at प्ररोचन and प्रतिपत्तिसौकर्य.[64] We believe एकवाक्यता can be the एकवाक्यता of two things of the same category only and in this particular case it would be the एकवाक्यता of the two Sciences (Kāṇḍas) of the same Scripture, viz., the Karmakāṇḍa and the Jñānkāṇḍa of the Veda.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.4.31. A comparison of the Sūtras in which the word 'शब्द' is used shows that in the Sūtras the word means only 'the Śruti'. Śaṅkara seems to understand it in the sense of श्रुति and स्मृति.

(64) Vide Note 16 on the Sūtra.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.4.34. 'उभयालिङ्ग' should mean two types of Śrutis, as in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11. Śaṅkara interprets it (under Sūtra III. 3. 34) as Śruti and Smṛti.[65] Thus, Śaṅkara assigns no fixed sense to the word लिङ्ग.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.4.34-37. Śaṅkara does not distinguish between the meanings of लिङ्ग and दर्शन or दृष्टि, though here the Sūtrakāra seems to distinguish between all these words and also स्मृति (in Bra. Sū. III.4. 37).[66]

(9) Bra.Sū.III.4.38.'विशेषानुग्रह' should mean 'special favour'. But Śaṅkara by making unwarranted addition abandons the proper sense of अनुग्रह altogether. Śaṅkara=(1) धर्मविशेषैः अनुग्रहः विद्यायाः and (2) जन्मान्तरानुष्ठितैरपि आश्रमकर्मभिः संभवत्येव विद्यायाः अनुग्रहः।

(10) Bra.Sū.III.4.42. "उपपूर्वं भावम्" would mean a subsidiary existence (of official or priestly duties). But Śaṅkara making unwarranted additions takes the expression to mean 'उपपातकम्' and 'प्रायश्चित्तस्य भावम्'

There are several similar cases in Bra.Sū.IV also :—

(1) Bra.Sū.IV.1.14. Śaṅkara explains तु as एव.

(2) Bra.Sū.IV.4.1. Śaṅkara takes स्वेन, not as आत्मीयेन, but as आत्मना.

(3) Bra.Sū.IV.1.17. प्रकरणात् is explained in most cases by Śaṅkara as referring to the context of a text but in this सूत्र he interprets it as नित्येश्वरस्य तत्र (=जगद्व्यापारे) प्रकृतत्वात्.

(4) Bra.Sū.IV.4.18. आधिकारिक cannot be पर ईश्वर; the word can mean an officer like इन्द्र, वरुण, वायु, and others.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.4.19. स्थिति should mean 'continuation,' but Śaṅkara explains it as 'existence.'

It is likely that in some of the above cases the explanation of Śaṅkara may be interpreted as correct. It is also likely that

(65) Vide Note 34 on Bra.Sū.III.3.34.

(66) Vide Note 34 on the Sūtra.

perhaps the Sūtrakāra did not distinguish between दर्शन and दृष्टि or लिङ्ग, शास्त्र and शब्द; or that it is not possible now to find out any such distinction even if it had once been meant. But we believe that *in most of the cases* collected by us above and in our Notes on the Sūtras in Part I as well as in the case of the Sūtras not examined in that work, we must always try to know whether the particular word is interpreted in its exact sense by a commentator, before his explanation of a Sūtra is accepted.

There are some Sūtras for which or for a certain word or words in which Śaṅkara offers two and sometimes even three interpretations. We give here some examples from Śaṅkara's commentary on Bra.Sū.III :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.33. पाद is interpreted both as a foot and as a quarter.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.2.34-35. Śaṅkara says that *each* of these Sūtras is a reply to *each* of the last *two* arguments of the opponent in Sūtra III.2.31; thus, he interprets स्थानविशेषात्........ (Sūtra 34) in two different ways, one of which applies to the refutation of संबन्धव्यपदेश and the other to that of भेदव्यपदेश.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.16-17. Each of these two Sūtras is interpreted in two different ways. According to one interpretation, the Sūtras refer to Ai.Upa.I.1, while according to the other they deal with Bṛ.Upa.IV.3-4 and Chā.Upa.VI.2-8.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.17. The word 'अवधारण' is interpreted in *three* different ways.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.26. Śaṅkara gives *two* interpretations (अथवैतास्वेव विधूननश्रुतिष्वेतेन सूत्रेणैतच्चिन्तयितव्यम् ।)

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.28. उभय in उभयाविरोधात् is explained by Śaṅkara in *two* different ways.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.3.29. गति is explained (1) as देवयानः पन्थाः and (2) as "attainment", e.g., in साम्यमुपैति.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.3.35 The illustration of भूतग्रामवत् is explained in two different ways.

Whoever tries to interpret the Brahmasūtra would be invariably faced with the difficulty of fixing the sense of some of the Sūtras or of deciding the विषयवाक्यs of certain Sūtras. We must admit our own inability to find out the exact विषयवाक्यs referred to by certain Sūtras (Bra.Sū.III.3.27, Bra.Sū.III.3.33, Bra.Sū.III.3.36, III.4.44). But to assert that certain Sūtras have *two* meanings, meaning thereby that they are composed with the idea of refuting two different arguments of a Pūrvapakṣa, is not the same as admitting one's interpretation as doubtful. Except in the case of such Sūtras, the above examples illustrate the interpretor's difficulties. *It would be also seen that in a passage of 20 Sūtras* (Bra.Sū.III.3.16–35), *Śaṅkara is doubtful about six cases.* This position of Śaṅkara means nothing more than the diffidence he had about his interpretation of *this particular Pāda*, viz., Bra.Sū.III.3 only. And it corroborates our opinion that the Ācāryas did not possess a correct unbroken tradition about the teaching of this Pāda, which seems to us to be the most important portion of the Brahmasūtra.

In certain Sūtras as interpreted by Śaṅkara, it seems, we have *to take some part of the Sūtras as making no addition to the sense* of the Sūtra obtained from the rest of it. Thus, Śaṅkara seems to explain तद्दर्शनात् and अधिकोपदेशात् in Bra.Sū.III.4.8 almost in the same way, so that one of the two expressions would be redundant. In Bra.Sū.III.4.41 Śaṅkara seems to leave out तद्योगात् as superfluous. In Bra.Sū.IV.1.3 Śaṅkara's interpretation (जाबालाः उपगच्छन्ति श्रुतयः ग्राहयन्ति च) shows that 'ग्राहयन्ति' alone was sufficient to convey the sense because 'जाबालाः' refers a Śruti which could be easily included in "the Śrutis" referred to by ग्राहयन्ति. Śaṅkara interprets Bra.Sū.IV.1.4 (न प्रतीके न हि सः) as "न प्रतीकेष्वात्ममतिं बध्नीयात्। न हि स उपासकः प्रतीकानि व्यस्तान्यात्मत्वेनाकलयेत्।" Thus, 'न प्रतीके' is refuted by 'न हि सः' and therefore only one of the two experessions would have been sufficient to convey the sense of either. 'संभवात्' in Bra.Sū.IV.1.7 is explained as उपासनस्य संभवात् which makes Sūtra IV.1.8 (ध्यानाच्च) redundant.

As distinguished from the cases of the errors of a wrong division of the words of a Sūtra (See PP. 257-260 above), there are some cases of a wrong construction of the words of a Sūtra. In Bra.Sū.III. 3.35, 'अन्तरा' is not taken as connected with 'स्वात्मनः'. In Bra.Sū. III.4.27, 'तथापितु' must be construed *after* 'शमदमाद्युपेतःस्यात्'; so that "even one who is possessed of शमदमादि must perform the sacrifice, etc"., would be the sense of the Sūtra; but *Ś*aṅkara connects तथापितु with 'यदि कश्चिन्मन्येत यज्ञादिनां विद्यासाधनभावो न न्याय्यः" taken as understood, and places "शमदमादिद्युपेतःस्यात्" *after* तथापितु. This totally changes the force of 'तथापितु'. In Bra.Sū.III.4.43 *Ś*aṅkara places बहिस्तु *after* उभयथाऽपि, though the Sūtra gives the reverse order. In Bra.Sū.IV.1.1, असकृत् should be *naturally* taken with आवृत्तिः, but Śaṅkara interprets it with 'उपदेशः'.

One of the more important defects to be noticed about Śaṅkara's method of interpretation partains to his Pūrvapakṣas and Siddhāntas in the several Adhikaraṇas or Sūtras. In a number of cases the Pūrvapakṣa as presented by *Ś*aṅkara seems *to be impossible or even absurd if we look to the viṣayavākya.*

Let us first examine the Pūrvapakṣas and the Siddhāntas of *Ś*aṅkara in his interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.2.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.11. न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि। We have shown that this Sūtra would mean, न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र (=सर्वेषु स्थानेषु) हि परस्योभयलिङ्गम्। But *S*aṅkara interprets सर्वत्र हि as सर्वत्र हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु वाक्येषु 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्' (क० उ० ३।१६) इत्येवमादिष्वपास्तविशेषमेव ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते। Here the valid Siddhānta is that Brahman is twofold (उभयलिङ्गम्, having two aspects). This correct Siddhānta is represented by Saṅkara as an absurd Pūrvapakṣa because *Ś*aṅkara makes an unwarranted addition after सर्वत्र हि.[67]

(2) Bra.Sū.III.2.19. अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम्। As we have shown, this is a Siddhānta Sūtra; but *Ś*aṅkara has taken it as a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.[68] Moreover, according to *Ś*aṅkara the Pūrvapakṣa

(67) Vide Note (7) etc. on the Sūtra.
(68) Vide Note (8) on Sūtra III.2.20.

in Bra.Sū.III.2.19 is the same as in Bra.Sū.II.3.50 (आभास एव च), viz., how Brahman can have a reflection, and the reply in both the Adhikaraṇas is also the same. One may ask, Why this repetition ?

(3) Bra.Sū.III.2.22. Śaṅkara says that the topic of the Sūtra is the meaning of 'नेति नेति' in Bṛ.Upa.II.3.6. We have shown that this discussion of this Śruti is not likely, because, as Śaṅkara himself admits, that Śruti itself (Bṛ.Upa.II.6.6) clearly explains the expression 'नेति नेति'.[69]

(4) Bra.Sū.III.2.25. According to Śaṅkara the topic of discussion is whether the individual Soul and the Supreme Soul are different. We believe, these Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta are out of place in the Context of the Adhikaraṇa. Really, the topic of discussion taken by Śaṅkara here is fit for treatment n Bra. Sū.II.3, particularly in Bra.Sū.II.3.28-32. We may add that Śaṅkara finds the discussion of the relation of the Jīva and Paramātman in many a Sūtra in the Brahmasūtra, but he finds no Sūtras about the same in Bra.Sū.II.3 which (Pāda) is specially devoted to the treatment of the nature of the Soul.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.2.31. Śaṅkara is right when he says that here the Opponent holds that there is a principle higher than the Unmanifest discussed in the preceding Adhikaraṇa; but he is indeed wrong when he says that according to this Opponent the Principle beyond the unmanifest Brahman is a non-Atman (अनात्मन्). We cannot imagine a system or an Opponent who would have believed in Atman and insisted that there was a material principle beyond It.[70]

Moreover, Śaṅkara says that according to the Opponent Brahman is declared to be a bridge, to be measured, to be coming into connection with the individual soul in the deep-sleep state and to be different from the individual soul.

(69) Vide Note (17) on Bra.Sū.III.2.22.

(70) Vide Note (6) on Bra.Sū.III.2.31.

According to Śaṅkara, the Opponent bases his arguments on Śrutis which have been already discussed in Bra.Sū.I.1–3. We have suggested that if these very Śrutis were to be the basis of the arguments of the Opponent in this place (in Bra.Sū.-III.2), then, why should not these objections have been raised by him when these Śrutis were discussed in Bra.Sū.I.1–3 ? In our opinion, the Pūrvapakṣa emphasises the fact that the Puruṣa is higher than the Unmanifest and bases all its arguments on the Śrutis of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad only.[71]

Again, Śaṅkara explains सम्बन्ध in the Sūtra to mean ultimately the same as the उन्मान or measure[72], which is also *separately* mentioned in the very Sūtra (III.2.31).[73] We think that such an explanation of सम्बन्ध makes one of the two arguments of सम्बन्ध and उन्मान superfluous.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.2.32. According to Śaṅkara the Opponent argues that Brahman is called 'bridge' in several Śrutis and that, therefore, there must be a principle beyond Brahman, just as when we cross a bridge we reach a place beyond the bridge, while the Siddhāntin replies that 'Brahman is not really a bridge, but It is called a bridge on account of a common characteristic between Brahman and a bridge (सामान्यात्). We believe that no Pūrvapakṣa would have argued that Brahman was called 'Bridge' in the Śrutis in any other sense than that of a mere comparison or metaphor. Śaṅkara's Siddhānta makes the Pūrvapakṣa look absurd and childish.[74]

(7) Bra.Sū.III.2.34 and 35. Here according to Śaṅkara *each* of these two Sūtras is an answer to *two* different arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa. We know that different Ācāryas interpret the same Sūtra to suit their different needs, but here we have a

(71) Vide Notes (8), (10) and (12) on Bra Sū.III.2.31.

(72) Cf. Śāṅkara *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.2.31—मितानां च मितेन संबन्धो दृष्टो यथा नराणां नगरेण.

(73) Vide Note (10) on the Sūtra in Part I.

(74) Vide Note (17) on Bra.Sū.III.2.32.

peculiar case in which one and the same Ācārya interprets the same Sūtra to meet two different objections of an Opponent!

(8) Bra.Sū.III.2.37. This Sūtra establishes the omni-presence of Brahman according to Śaṅkara.[75] Śaṅkara, however, is able to give no adequate argument from the Opponent's side to explain the necessity of this important problem being required to be discussed at this place in the Brahmasūtra after more than half of the book is finished.

We will now discuss the propriety of the Pūrvapakṣas given by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.6–10. According to Śaṅkara, the Opponent raises a discussion about the Prāṇa *Vidyā* and the Udgītha *Vidyā* and the Siddhāntin answers the Opponent's objections. We have shown that in an Inquiry about Brahman both the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta about these *Vidyās* are out of place. They are foreign to the very aim of the work. Moreover Śaṅkara (on Bra.Sū.III.3.9) raises a Pūrvapakṣa on the interpretation of Chā.Upa.I.1.1. (ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत ।). We beg to suggest that a reading of the Upaniṣad text would hardly justify Śaṅkara's Pūrvapakṣa that the सामान्याधिकरण of ओम् and उद्गीथ is likely to be interpreted as meaning अध्यास, अपवाद and एकत्व as well as विशेषण. As a matter of fact, Śaṅkara himself shows that the words of the Śruti are too clear to make such a Pūrvapakṣa possible. In fact, there is no absence of a word that would decide the point in favour of any *one* of the above four possibilities in the Sruti itself.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.10. Though the knowledge of प्राण as ज्येष्ठ may be helpful in ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, it looks impossible that the प्राणसंवादs in Chā., Bṛ., and Kau.Upaniṣads are meant *to teach meditation* on the वसिष्ठत्वादिगुणs of प्राण as help to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. Therefore, a Pūrvapakṣa

(75) In our opinion the Sūtra is meant to prove the omnipresence of the Unmanifest, beyond which the Opponent tries to postulate a higher principle in Bra.Sū.III.2.31.

based upon such a view is out of place in the Brahmasūtra. The meditation on the attributes of Brahman only is in our opinion taught in the Brahmasūtra.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.14-15. According to Śaṅkara, the Pūrvapakṣa asserts that each succeeding member in the series of senses, objects of sense, mind, etc., etc.,.......upto the Puruṣa *is intended* in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (III.10-11) *to be taught as being higher* than each preceding member while the Siddhānta establishes that the higherness (परत्व) of the Puruṣa alone is desired to be taught by the Śruti. We believe that such a Pūrvapakṣa is absurd and therefore not likely to be raised at all.[76]

(4) Bra.Sū.III.3.16. Śaṅkara says that Ai.Upa.I.1. is the *viṣayavākya*. According to him, the Opponent asserts that Atman in "आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्, नान्यत्किञ्चन मिषत्" is a जीव, e.g., the Prajāpati or Brahman, and not Paramātman. We believe that the Śruti is too clear to admit of a doubt giving rise to such a Pūrvapakṣa.

(4a) Bra.Sū.III.3.16–17. Śaṅkara gives another interpretation of these *two* Sūtras. According to this interpretation, the Opponent says that the topic of Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.7-IV.4.25 is *not the same* (अतुल्यार्थत्व) as that of Chā.Upa.VI.2–8, because *the two Śrutis differ in their statements* (आम्नानवैषम्य). This excuse for showing a Pūrvapakṣa as possible must be contrasted with the excuse for the possibility of a Pūrvapakṣa given by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.6–8, where the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the प्राणप्रशंसा passages teach the same *vidyā* (विद्यैकत्वम्), because there are many *points of similarity* in the two Śrutis though there are some points of dissimilarity as well (अविशेषस्यापि बहुतरस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात्). In Bra.Sū.III.3.6–8, the Opponent bases his view of विद्यैकत्व of the two Śrutis on अविशेष. Thus, once Śaṅkara makes

(76) Vide Note (16) on Bra.Sū.III.3.14.

the Opponent conclude विद्याभेद because there is आम्नानभेद and, again, he makes another Opponent hold the view of विद्यैकत्व inspite of there being आम्नानभेद. We believe, it is very dangerous to raise Pūrvapakṣas on very subtle or sharp distinctions, since any Pūrvapakṣa may be supported on such excuses because it is then left to the Opponent to judge whether the dissimilarity between the two Śrutis is greater than the similarity.

Again, let us compare the excuse for the Pūrvapakṣa of Bra.Sū.III.3.16–17 (the second interpretation) with the same in Bra.Sū.III.3.10 according to Śaṅkara. In the latter, he makes the Opponent argue that, "*Though* there are many points of similarity between the Śrutis, the वसिष्ठत्वादिगुणs are not to be added where they do not occur." Thus, "there is विद्याभेद *inspite of* आम्नानभेद" in Bra.Sū.III.3.10, while there is विद्याभेद *because of* आम्नानभेद in Bra.Sū.III.3.16–17. There is no definite rule for raising a Pūrvapakṣa.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.3.18. After reading the विषयवाक्यs (Bṛ.Upa.VI.1.14 and Chā.Upa.V.2.2.) one wonders why Śaṅkara should have raised the discussion of these Śrutis being a विधि of either आचमन or अपां वासःसंकल्पन in an Inquiry about Brahman. How can this Pūrvavapakṣa be a means (साधन) to ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ?

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.19. Here the topic is said to be एकवाक्यता or harmony of sense of two passages in the same Branch of the same Veda, viz., अग्निरहस्य (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X) and Bṛ.Upa. which forms the last portion of the same Brāhmaṇa. Though evidently both passages deal with the same topic just as both the passages of the Yājñavalkya–Maitreyīsaṁvāda in the Bṛ. Upa.II.4 and IV.5 do, the Pūrvapakṣa is made by Śaṅkara to argue that the Vidyā in the one Chapter must be taken as different from the Vidyā of the other Chapter of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa because of पौनरुक्त्यप्रसङ्ग 'Contingency of one of the two Chapters being tautologous or superficial'; and the Siddhānta is

represented by Śaṅkara as replying that "there is no पौनरुक्त्यप्रसङ्ग because one Chapter lays down the Vidyā and the other Chapter the *guṇas* of that Vidyā" inspite of the fact that we find some *guṇas* in both the Chapters. We hold that here the Siddhānta view is absurd because the Pūrvapakṣa is equally absurd.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.3.20-22. According to Śaṅkara, these Sūtras discuss Bṛ.Upa.V.5.1 and V.5.2 and the Pūrvapakṣa is represented as arguing that the *Upaniṣad* अहः of Bṛ.Upa.V.5.1 and the *Upaniṣad* अहम् of Bṛ.Upa.V.5.2 should be mutually added to each other, while the Siddhānta establishes that the particular *Upaniṣad* in each case must remain only where it is stated, because Bṛ.Upa.V.5.1 is the *Upaniṣad* of आदित्यमण्डले पुरुषः and Bṛ.Upa.V.5.2 that of दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुषः. We suggest that there is no possibility of a doubt of this nature being raised at all about these passages, because it was very easy to see that the two *Upaniṣads* are stated with reference to the *two different* aspects of the same principle. If we read the original text it looks too absurd for an Opponent to argue that the two *Upaniṣads* belong to *only* आदित्यपुरुष or *only* दक्षिणाक्षिपुरुष.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.3.23. According to Śaṅkara, the question here is whether वीर्यसंभृति and द्युव्याप्ति which are ब्रह्मगुणs mentioned in the Rāṇāyanīya Khila are to be added to the ब्रह्मविद्याs mentioned in the Upaniṣads of the same Branch such as शाण्डिल्यविद्या (Chā.Upa.-III 14.3), दहरविद्या (Chā.Upa.VIII.1.1), उपकोशलविद्या (Chā.Upa.IV.-15.1), which all are ब्रह्मविद्याs.

The Opponent holds that because all these are ब्रह्मविद्याs and because वीर्यसंभृति and द्युव्याप्ति are ब्रह्मगुणs though mentioned in the Khila and not in the Upaniṣads, वीर्यसंभृति and द्युव्याप्ति should be added to the attributes of Brahman given in the ब्रह्मविद्याs of the Upaniṣads. The Sūtrakāra, according to Śaṅkara, rejects the Opponent's view and argues that the ब्रह्मविद्याs of the Upaniṣads contain *such* attributes of Brahman as belong to the *ādhidaivika*

aspect of Brahman, while the Khila mentions such attributes of Brahman as belong to the *ādhyātmika* aspect (or abodes) of Brahman.

In our opinion, the addition or collection (*upasaṁhāra*) of the attributes of Brahman is meant for meditation on, or knowledge of, Brahman; and Śaṅkara does not distinguish between the aspects of Brahman from the standpoint of *ādhyātmika* or *ādhidaivika* attributes; rather he distinguishes only between *jñeya* and *upāsya* aspects of Brahman, there being no further sub-aspects of either of these two aspects, such as may be characterised by *ādhidaivika* or *ādhyātmika* attributes. Therefore, the argument that the attributes of the *ādhidaivika* aspect of Brahman cannot be mixed with or collected along with those of its *ādhyātmika* aspect for the purpose of meditation is not consistent with Śaṅkara's own doctrine and that of the Sūtrakāra as interpreted by Śaṅkara or is at least foreign to the doctrine usually taught by Śaṅkara. In a further discussion, Śaṅkara admits that even in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad passages, as in the Khila, we have *ādhidaivika* attributes, but he says that the group of *ādhidaivika* attributes of the Upaniṣad and that of the Khila are exclusive of each other (परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वरूपत्वात्). We believe, this is a very feeble defence of his position by Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara's other argument (एकमपि हि ब्रह्म विभूतिभेदैरनेकधोपास्यते इति स्थितिः) gives rise to as many sects of the Vedānta School as there are विभूतिs of Brahman and strikes at the very root of the intention of the Sūtrakāra, viz., to establish a Vedānta Darśana on the basis of *all* the accepted revealed texts (सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् । Bra.Sū.III.3.1).

As regards our interpretation of this Sūtra, we have shown that the Pūrvapakṣa arises because it insists on the unanimity (*ekavākyatā*) of the Pūrvakāṇḍa (which includes the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Khila) with the Uttarakāṇḍa (i. e., only the Upaniṣads) in such a way that Brahman becomes the

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only goal of the entire Scripture. But the Sūtrakāra accepts the authority of *only* the Upaniṣads or the Uttarakāṇḍa for his Inquiry of Brahman and therefore drops even the attributes of Brahman in case they are mentioned in the works of the Pūrvakāṇḍa.

(9) Bra.Sū.III.3.24. Here the Pūrvapakṣa is represented by Śaṅkara as misunderstanding the genitive forms in तस्यैवंविदुषो यज्ञस्य आत्मा यजमानः. He takes these forms as समानाधिकरणे षष्ठ्यौ and interprets the Śruti to mean that the विद्वान्पुरुष is *himself* the यज्ञ, while actually they are व्याधिकरणे षष्ठ्यौ and the Śruti should be interpreted as dealing with a यज्ञ *performed by* a विद्वान् पुरुष. We believe that the Pūrvapakṣa could have very easily understood the वैय्यधिकरण्य of the genitive forms, because the Śruti mentions the Ātman of the विद्वान्पुरुषः as the यजमान the Sacrificer and this clearly means that the Śruti speaks of a यज्ञ performed by the विद्वान्. The two genitive forms पुरुषस्य and यज्ञस्य do not at all require to be explained. The Pūrvapakṣa presented by Śaṅkara is an unlikely one.

(10) Bra.Sū.III.3.25. Śaṅkara mentions a Pūrvapakṣa arguing that when the Upaniṣad texts about *rituals* occur very *near* the Upaniṣad texts about Brahmavidyā, the rites of the former should be *collected (upasaṁhriyeran)* in the Brahmavidyā of the latter, because *the two texts are so near each other.* In the light of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, this view of the Opponent amounts to making *rites* part and parcel of Brahmavidyā *(jñāna). Karman* (rites) can be help to *jñāna*, but it is quite absurd to argue that *Karman* is part of *jñāna* and should be mixed with *jñāna,* when, as Śaṅkara says, even the attributes of the two विभूतिs of Brahman were not allowed to be mixed together for the purpose of the meditation on Brahman. Here also, Śaṅkara's Pūrvapakṣa is too absurd to be likely.

(11) Bra.Sū.III.3.26. Śaṅkara points out that with regard to a Brahmajñānin there are three types of Śrutis: (1) One

declares that the knower of Brahman *abandons* his good and bad deeds which are then *received* by others; (2) another type of Śrutis does not mention his getting rid of them but only the reception of good and bad deeds of the Brahmajñānin by others; (3) while the third type asserts that the Brahmajñānin abandons his good and bad deeds but says nothing about the same being received by others. According to Śaṅkara, the discussion here refers to only the third type of Śrutis and the Opponent who is said to be curious (!) to know what happens of the good and bad deeds of the Brahmajñānin after he has abandoned them according to the texts with which he (the Opponent) is concerned, is made to conclude that no receiving of the good and bad deeds of the Jñānin should be taken as implied in the case of such Śrutis as mention only their *being got rid of* by the knower of Brahman (तस्मादसंनिपाते हानावुपायनस्येति). The Opponent is made to give three arguments for his conclusion:—viz., (1) No 'receiving' is stated in these Śrutis, (2) The other Śrutis which mention 'receiving' refer to Vidyās other than the Brahmavidyā, and (3) The 'abandonment' of good and bad deeds is an act done by the Jñānin, while 'their reception' is an act to be done by others than the Jñānin and therefore the former cannot imply the latter, because the two are not invariably connected.

We believe, no Opponent will offer arguments like these because what is essential here is the *abandonment* (हानि) and not *reception* (उपायन) and because he will never believe that the Śruti mentioning both the abandonment and the reception, deal with a person other than a Brahmajñānin since it is very clear. In fact, the Sūtrakāra as we have shown[77] does not at all discuss the question of the उपायन since it is not essential to his Inquiry of Brahman.

The other interpretation of the Sūtra given by Śaṅkara involves a wrong explanation of विधूनन (shaking off, abandonment)

(77) Vide Notes on Bra.Sū.IV.1.17.

of the good and bad deeds of the Brahmajñānin, viz., कम्पन or चालन (i. e., सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः कंचित्कालं फलप्रतिबन्धनाच्चालनम्). We suggest that Śaṅkara would have hardly found an Opponent interpreting विधूनन in the sense of 'making the good and bad deeds temporarily ineffective'.

(12) Bra.Sū.III.3.27–28. We wonder by what method of interpretation the Kauśītakī Śruti about the abandonment of the good and bad deeds of a Jñānin during his halt at the Station-the River Virajā-on the Devayāna be reconciled with the other Śruti teaching their abandonment as taking place simultaneously with the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman in this very world. No Pūrvapakṣa could have proposed *to interpret* the Kauśītakī Śruti in such a way that its literal sense which is so clear would be totally given up. To us it appears that on such a question of minor importance as this, where the Śrutis differ, the Sūtrakāra gave complete independence to the followers of the Vedānta School and, therefore, did not try to reconcile the contradictory Śrutis on these points, as he actually does with regard to the essential Śrutis in Bra.Sū.II.

(13) Bra.Sū.III.3.29–30. There is no invariable connection between the abandonment of the good and bad deeds of a knower of Brahman and the starting on the Devayāna, because the abandonment may be followed in Śaṅkara's School by no journey on the Devayāna as is clear from Śaṅkara's interpretation of Śrutis like अत्रैव ब्रह्म समश्नुते, न तस्य प्राणा ह्युत्क्रामन्ति. Therefore, there is no likelihood of a Pūrvapakṣa of that nature. Śaṅkara quotes no Śruti to support his doubt.

Moreover, no Siddhāntá believing in *both* the possibility and the impossibility of the Devayāna immediately followiug the abandonment is likely, because no option between गति and अगति is given to the Jñānin by the Scripture, though, of course, either गति or अगति is *certain* in his case.

(14) Bra.Sū.III.3.31. That Śaṅkara later on[78] finds it necessary to amend the Siddhānta established by him under this Sūtra shows, in our opinion, the impossibility of both the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta discussed by him under this Sūtra.

(15) Bra.Sū.III.3.34. This seems to us to be a case of an absurd Siddhānta, and, therefore, of an impossible Pūrvapakṣa. The Muṇḍaka Śruti in question distinctly refers to Paramātman and the soul in transmigration while the Kaṭha Śruti deals with Paramātman and the released soul (Cf. Tai. Upa.II.1). But S'aṅkara takes both the S'rutis as dealing with Paramātman and the soul in bondage and then he thinks that a Pūrvapakṣa can be raised about these two S'rutis, which will argue that the Vidyās taught in these S'rutis are different, though really they teach the same Vidyā. Such a Pūrvapakṣa is not at all likely to have appeared, since the Kaṭha S'ruti distinctly mentions the enjoyment of[79] the Supreme Soul and the released soul and, thus, its topic is easily distinguished from that of the Muṇḍaka Śruti.

(16) Bra.Sū.III.3.35-36. The agreement between the Bṛ.Upa. III.4.1 and III.5.1 is so clear and so complete that we do not believe, any opposition would have been raised on the ground of पुनरुक्तिदोष in the S'ruti.

(17) Bra.Sū III.3.38. The two passages Bṛ.Upa.V.4.1 and V.5.2 are closely connected and also Bṛ.Upa.V.5.1 mentions the *satya* Brahman which is mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.V.4.1 and V.5.2. We, therefore, believe that no Pūrvapakṣa interpreting these sections of the Bṛ.Upa. as teaching different Vidyās is at all likely. The argument which S'aṅkara makes the Opponent put forward is not at all likely because *it is very easy to see* that जयतीमाँल्लोकान् is the फल of the सत्यब्रह्मविद्या while 'हन्ति पाप्मानम्' is the फल of an अङ्ग (a part)

(78) Vide his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.IV.3.15.

(79) Vide Bra.Sū.IV.4.21 for the enjoyment.

of that Vidyā. Moreover, in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.20-22 S'aṅkara takes it granted that Br̥.Upa.V.5 discusses the same सत्यब्रह्म as in V. 4; therefore also the topic of Bra.Sū.III.3.38 seems to be not likely to be discussed here.

(18) Bra.Sū.III.3.39. S'aṅkara says that Chā.Upa.VIII.1.1-VIII.1.5 and Br̥.Upa.IV.4.22 are discussed here. According to him the Opponent wants to know whether these two texts teach the same Vidyā or not; or, rather, the Opponent argues that they do not teach the same Vidyā while the Siddhāntin establishes that they teach the same Vidyā. But S'aṅkara's remarks at the end of his *bhāṣya* on the Sūtra show that the Siddhānta *agrees with* the Opponent that the two passages do not teach also the same Vidyā. How can a Pūrvapakṣa with which the Siddhānta fully agrees, be taken as a likely Pūrvapakṣa ?

(19) Bra.Sū.III.3.40-41. A *gr̥hastha* must perform अग्निहोत्र in his household sacred fires; but only one who takes his meal and does not fast can be obliged by the Scripture to perform what is called प्राणाग्निहोत्र. S'aṅkara, however, makes the Opponent argue that even if a गृहस्थ is to fast, he must perform प्राणाग्निहोत्र even with whatever drink he may take.[80] He makes the Opponent depend upon the Jābāla S'ruti. We believe, the Pūrvapakṣa view is quite absurd here and the Opponent would never resort to the Jābāla S'ruti which is very clear inasmuch as it is clearly meant for one who eats and does not fast. So, the conclusion (तस्माद्भोजनलोपे लोप एव प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य) is a superfluous one, not being at all doubted by any reasonable Opponent.

(20) Bra.Sū.III.3.42. We hold that the *viṣayavākya* (Chā. Upa.I.1.1.-I.1.10) is so clear that nobody would doubt the efficacy of कर्मन्s done with the knowledge of the mystic meaning of the rite (कर्माश्रयविज्ञान) and the *greater* efficacy of कर्मन्s done with the same विज्ञान and therefore, it is not likely that there wouldbe any

(80) भोजनलोपेऽपि अद्भिर्वाऽन्येन वा द्रव्येणा विरोद्धन प्रतिनिधानन्यायेन प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्यानुष्ठानमिति । शां. भा. on ब्र. सू. III.3.40.

Opponent arguing that these विज्ञानs or विद्याs about उद्गीथादि कर्मन्s are नित्य or obligatory (not अनित्य or काम्य). The Sūtrakāra himself does not think such a discussion of the obligatory or voluntary nature of the secret sense of the rites to be at all necessary in his book, though undoubtedly he takes it granted that the passage (Chā. Upa.I.1.10) is eaily understood by every body to mean that whatever rites (अग्निहोत्रादि नित्य कर्मन्s or even others which may be called नैमित्तिक or काम्य, i. e., 'voluntary') are done by a मुमुक्षु *with the mystical explanation*, produce better result, viz., they work for the attainment of the Mokṣa for which the knowledge of Brahman is the chief means.[81] If, as Śaṅkara himself remarks the authers of the Kalpasūtras do not care to discuss these उपासनानि about the rites in their books, why should the Sūtrakāra or his Opponent who is mainly concerned with the Brahmavidyā, unlike Jaimini who cared for *Karman*, raise a question about these, knowing that the कर्मविज्ञानानि do not mean the *Brahmavidyā* at all ?

(21) Bra.Sū.III.3.43. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra deals with Bṛ.Upa.I.5.21 and Chā.Upa.IV.3 1–2, which mention (1) अध्यात्मं वागादीनां प्राणः श्रेष्ठः and (2) अधिदैवमग्न्यादीनां वायुः श्रेष्ठः. The Opponent is represented by Śaṅkara as arguing that Vāyu and Prāṇa must be understood as identical because the two are essentially *one element*.[82] We take this Pūrvapakṣa as unlikely because (1) from the two Upaniṣadic passages in question it is *quite clear* that the Vāyu and the Prāṇa are not to be taken as identical so far as the meditation on them and their *aṅgas*, four in each case, are concerned and because (2) the argument of the identity of the element' (तत्त्वाभेद) would ultimately obliterate the distinction made so often throughout our philosophical texts between the अध्यात्म and आधिदेव aspects of the elements (तत्त्वs'. Moreover, Śaṅkara is not able to establish a correct Siddhānta by a correct and

(81) Sūtra IV.1.18 and III.4.4,10.

(82) तत्र संशयः—किं पृथगेवेमौ वायुप्राणावुपगन्तव्यौ स्यातामपृथग्वेति। अपृथगेवेति तावत्प्राप्तं तत्त्वाभेदात्। S'ā. *bhāṣya* on the Sūtra. See Bra.Sū.II.4.

clear interpretation of 'प्रदानवत्' and 'तदुक्तम्', and this fact itself is, in our opinion, a proof that the Opponent here does not argue in the way he is assumed to have done by Saṅkara.

(22) Bra.Sū.III.3 44-52. Here is a very important group of Sūtras as we shown in our Notes in Part I. Śaṅkara, however, takes these nine Sūtras as dealing with a question whether the 36,000 fires mentioned in the *Agnirahasya* text of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* are subsidiary to the rites (क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः) or are of the nature of a Vidyā (विद्यात्मकाः), i. e., independent of the ritual. The Opponent holds that they are क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः and Saṅkara establishes the Siddhānta that they are विद्यात्मकाः, being not connected with कर्मन् as subsidiary to the latter. Saṅkara depends upon the words विद्याचितः and other arguments based upon the text. We believe, विद्याचितः cannot mean that the fires are not subsidiary to कर्मन्. We beg to suggest that here the Opponent seems to be right if we examine the entire *Agnirahasya* passage which forms the *viṣayavākya*. For this very reason, Śaṅkara seems to us to be mistaken in presenting the Purvapakṣa here, because here the Sūtrakāra does not regard the arguments of the Opponent as incorrect and hence does not refute them, though he rejects the view of the Opponent.

(23) Bra.Sū.III.3.55-56. Saṅkara makes the Opponent argue that उद्गीथादिकर्मविज्ञानs, the mystical interpretations of the *Udgītha* and other rites in *each* Śākhā of the Veda, are different from those in *all others* Śākhās, because the accent, etc., of the texts of the Udgītha and other rites are different in all Śākhās. [83] We think, this is a lame excuse for a Pūrvapakṣa to differ from the Siddhānta and, therefore, not a probable Pūrvapakṣa at all. Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.56 does not even care to reply to this absurd argument of the Opponent.

(21) Bra.Sū.III.3.57. Chā. Upa.V.11.1-V.18. 2 (वैश्वानर विद्या) is the *viṣayavākya* according to Saṅkara. Here Śaṅkara make the

(83) प्रतिशाखं च स्वरादिभेदादुद्गीथादिभेदानुपादायायमुपन्यासः।
S'aṅkara's *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.55.

Opponent argue in favour of a view for which each of the six pupils has been severely rebuked by Aśvapati Kaikeya, viz., the view that द्यु, आदित्य, वायु, etc., are, each of them taken singly, *the whole* of the Vaiśvānara Ātman and not one *aṅga* of that Ātman. (Śaṅkara calls this view the doctrine of व्यस्तोपासन). We believe that Śaṅkara would have found no student of Vedānta to represent the Pūrvapakṣa, because it is the very view for continuing the belief in which Aśvapati pronounces a severe punishment.

The probable Pūrvapakṣa would be either व्यस्तोपासन in which each one of द्यु, आदित्य, etc., is understood to be *only one part* of the Vaiśvānara Ātman or समस्तोपासन in which the Vaiśvānara Ātman with all its parts is believed to be the only object of meditation. The Siddhāntin, in reply to either of the two Pūrvapakṣas would be lying down that "the more the number of the parts of the Vaiśvānara Ātman, the higher the efficacy of the meditation itself".

In any case, to make a Pūrvapakṣa represent a doctrine which is the very subject of criticism in a particular Śruti is to discuss an impossible or absurd opposition.

(25) Bra.Sū.III.3.58. We believe that what Śaṅkara gives here as the Pūrvapakṣa view (तस्मात्स्वपरशाखाविहितमेकवेद्यव्यपाश्रयं गुणजातमुपसंहर्तव्यं विद्याकात्स्न्र्यायेति) is the natural and necessary corollary of the doctrine of Bra.Sū.III.3.1 and this corollary is actually taught by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra III.3.5 (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत् समाने च). The Sūtrakāra himself has taken the trouble to collect the attributes of the two aspects of Brahman, viz., अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, in Bra.Sū.I.1-3 and in Bra.Sū.III.3.11 and III.3.37-39 he has himself revealed his scheme of Bra.Sū.I.1-3 (See our Notes in Part I). The fact that the Sūtrakāra makes one Darśana or Philosophical School out of *all* the authentic Upaniṣads is itself enough to prove that according to him the same Brahman (n.) is taught in *all* the Śākhās of *all* the Vedas and

is to be meditated upon as such and this meditation would be practically carried out only by collecting all the attributes of Brahman from the different Upaniṣads of all the Vedas. So Śaṅkara's Pūrvapakṣa here is rather the Siddhānta of the Sūtrakāra. Śaṅkara's Siddhānta would mean that no central system would be evolved out of a union of *all* the Upaniṣadic sects which would for all practical purposes remain disunited. His argument for this Siddhānta that the *word* (शब्द) is different in *all* the Upaniṣadic texts is also very weak. He says that the expressions 'वेद', 'उपासीत', 'स क्रतुं कुर्वीत' have each of them a quite different meaning. "The Opponent" here is quite correct in pointing out that these expressions *differ only in word*, but *not in sense* (ननु वेदेत्यादिषु शब्दभेद एवावगम्यते न यजतीत्यादिवदर्थभेदः). His Siddhāntin's reply to this view (मनोवृत्त्यर्थत्वाभेदेऽप्यनुबन्धभेदाद्वेद्यभेदे सति विद्याभेदोपपत्तेः) is *too weak* to be accepted by anybody except a dualist or a pluralist. It is due to this absurdity underlying both his Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta that Śaṅkara is led to a further conclusion that this Sūtra (Bra.Sū.III.3.58) should be regarded as mentioning a rule which ought to have been mentioned at the very beginning of the Pāda (Bra.Sū.III.3) i. e. before Bra.Sū.III.3.1 (स्थिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्).

(26) Bra.Sū.III.3.59. Śaṅkara has established in his *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.III.3.58 that *all* the Upaniṣadic texts teach different विद्याs and that therefore there should be no collection of *all* the attributes of Brahman from *all* these texts.

Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3.59 is such that he seems to reopen the topic settled and decided already in the previous Sūtra. Moreover, the Pūrvapakṣa is here made to argue that from among all the various *vidyās* which all have a common aim, viz., the realization of God, the meditator may have 'याथाकाम्यम्', i. e., complete independence of choice between that of resorting to *many vidyās* (i. e. समुच्चय) at one and the same time, and that of selecting only *one* according to his desire and resorting to only that one. The Siddhāntin then replies that

the समुच्चय if resorted to would be a cause of disturbance in the mind (चित्तविक्षेपहेतु) and finally an obstacle to the realization of Brahman, the very aim; and that, therefore, only one विद्या out of so many should be selected by a meditator. After the decision arrived at in Bra.Sū.III.3.58 the Opponent's arguments for याथाकाम्य and the Siddhāntin's reply of चित्तविक्षेप seem to us to be not convincing at all.

The following Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta views from Śaṅkara's commentary on Bra.Sū.III.4 deserve to be examined before they are accepted as probable :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.4.1–17. Here the Pūrvapakṣa of Jaimini (Bra.Sū.III.4.2) as presented by the Sūtrakāra is that *the knowledge* (of Brahman) *is subsidiary* to the sacrifice and, therefore, the reward of knowledge is called 'the Aim of the human life' in a secondary sense. But Śaṅkara represents the Pūrvapakṣa argument in this Sūtra to be that *the individual soul is subsidiary* (शेष) to the sacrifice in so far as he is the agent.[84] Moreover, the Siddhānta of Bādarāyaṇa seems to us to be that the knowledge is not subsidiary to the sacrifice and therefore the Aim of the human life is primarily achieved by means of the knowledge of Brahman. But Śaṅkara represents the Siddhānta to be that the knowledge *(Vidyā) alone* is the means of attaining Brahman[85]. Here Śaṅkara seems to us to overlook the possibility, and, as far as we can interpret the Sūtra, the fact, that Bādarāyaṇa regards the knowledge of Brahman as the means of Liberation, but he at the same time, regards certain actions, viz., the actions of the Sacrifice, religious gifts and penance (Bṛ.Upa. IV.4.22, Bra.Sū.III.4.26–27) and the duties of the orders of life (Bra.Sū.III.4.32) as *helps to that knowledge* (Bra.Sū.III.4.33, III.4.34. Vide our interpretation of these Sūtras). As there is

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(84) कर्तृत्वेन आत्मनः शेषत्वात् is S'aṅkara's explanation of शेषत्वात् in Bra Sū.III.4.2.

(85) Cf. (a) श्रुतिः केवलायाः विद्यायाः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वं श्रावयति—S'ā.bhā. on Bra.Sū.III.4.1 (b) केवलाच्चेज्ज्ञानात् पुरुषार्थसिद्धिः स्यात्—S'ā.bhā. on Bra.Sū.III.4.3.

no word (in Sūtra III.4.1) suggesting that the Vidyā *alone* is the means to Liberation, we believe, Śaṅkara is not right in adding such a word, viz., (केवला), in his inter pretation. Thus, Śaṅkara seems to us to have presented correctly neither the Pūrvapakṣa nor the Siddhānta in Bra.Sū.III.4.1–17.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.4.18–20. Śaṅkara takes these Sūtras as giving Jaimini's Pūrvapakṣa about the orders oflife (आश्रमs), other than that of the house-holder, being *only referred to* in the Śrutis in question, but not laid down therein. We have suggested elsewhere in this book that it is not likely that a Pūrvapakṣa about the orders with no reference to their connection with the knowledge of Brahman is found in the Brahmasūtra. Here we only wish to point out that while Śaṅkara represents Jaimini as offering a Pūrvapakṣa on the point, he makes him forget or neglect, for the time being, an important Śruti, viz., the Jābāla Śruti,[86] the recollection of which would never have made him take up a view against the Sūtrakāra. As Śaṅkara himself regards the Jābāla Śruti as taken to be one of the authoritative revealed texts (Śā.bhāṣya on Bra.Sū.IV.1.1), we believe that the Pūrvapakṣa presumed by him in these Sūtras is not at all a likely one.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.4.21–22. Here, again, Śaṅkara thinks that the discussion is about some parts of the Sacrifice (कर्माङ्गानि), which we do not think to be possible in a book on the Inquiry about Brahman, unless the parts of the Sacrifice be such as are indirectly connected with Brahman (Chā.Upa.I.11.4-5, Bra.Sū.-III.3.32). Moreover, it may be added here that there is no possibility of a Pūrvapakṣa holding that these Śrutis mention *stuti* '*mere praise*' of the उद्गीथ and the other parts of the sacrifice, because the word "उपासीत" in Chā.Upa.I.1.1 is very clear about the meaning of the Śruti, viz., that the meditation on the Udgītha is the very *teaching* of the text and not '*mere*

(86) Cf. ननु ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेदिति विस्पष्टमिदं प्रत्यक्षं पारिव्राज्यविधानं जाबालानाम्। सत्यमेवैवमेतत्। अनपेक्ष्य त्वेतां श्रुतिमयं विचार इति द्रष्टव्यम्। S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.4.18.

praise.' The Pūrvapakṣa is represented by Saṅkara as basing its arguments upon a comparison of the Chā.Upa. text with a Sruti (probably a Brāhmaṇa text). We must admit that we do not think ourselves fully competent to discuss the correctness of an argument advanced on the basis of some illustrations given from the Mīmāṅsā; yet we may be allowed to record our opinion that a comparison of the two texts (the Chā.Upa. and the Brāhmaṇa) in question shows that the absence of उपासीत in the Brāhmaṇa text is quite easily noticeable.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.4.25-27. Śaṅkara finds that the Siddhānta established in Sūtra 25 as interpreted by him is in conflict with the same as established in Sūtra 26. He finds out a solution of this conflict between the two Siddhāntas by distinguishing between the rise of the knowledge and the achievement of the Fruit of the knowledge.[87] Though Saṅkara may be right in making this distinction in his own system, we beg to state that the Sūtras in question do not seem to us to contain the slightest suggestion for this distinction. The real cause of the clear confict between the two *Siddhāntas* lies in the Pūrvapakṣa imagined by Śaṅkara, viz., the knowledge of Brahman requires absolutely no help in the form of the preformance of the duties of the orders of life.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.4.28-31. According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 28 discusses the question whether सर्वान्नभक्षण is laid down as a विद्याङ्गविधि or as a स्तुति. We do believe that this Adhikaraṇa discusses the question of a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman being allowed to eat *all* food or food of all persons (सर्वान्न). But according to Śaṅkara, the Opponent argues that "because the seeker seeks the knowledge of Brahman or has got the knowledge of the particular सगुण form of Brahman, he need not observe "the rule of food allowed and prohibited" (भक्ष्याभक्ष्यशास्त्र). We doubt, if

(87) ननु विरुद्धमिदं वचनमपेक्षते चाश्रमकर्माणि विद्या नापेक्षते चेति । नेति ब्रूमः। उत्पन्ना हि विद्या फलसिद्धिं प्रति न किंचिदन्यदपेक्षते उत्पत्तिं प्रति त्वपेक्षते ।—S'a. *bhā.* on Bra.Sū.III.4.26.

any genuine seeker of the knowledge of, or any real knower of Brahman would ever hold such a view about the ethics and morality of the Vedānta School, as the Pūrvapakṣa is here supposed by Śaṅkara to do. Śaṅkara's reference to the Vidyā of Vāmadeva (Chā.Upa.II.13.2) does not seem to us to be satisfactory. Looking to the context we believe that the real reason (हेतु) of the Opponent for his conclusiou of सर्वान्नानुमति was that he took *the acquisition of the control of mind* (शम), *control of senses* (दम,) etc. " (Sūtra III.4.27) to be a qualification which was sufficient to give to the seeker of Liberation an exemption from the Scriptural rule of food allowed and prohibited. Thus, the *hetu* of the Pūrvapakṣa according to Śaṅkara in Sūtra III.4. 28 seems to be an impossible one.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.4.32. We wonder, if ever a house-holder in Hinduism dare ask or deny that he should perform the obligatory duties (नित्यकर्माणि) even though he may not seek the Vidyā of Brahman. For this simple reason, the Pūrvapakṣa presented by Śaṅkara seems to us to be impossible. Moreover, though the present writer does not feel fully competent to discuss the illustration of the rite other than the obligatory अग्निहोत्र from the text of the Kuṇḍapāyins given by Śaṅkara, he is inclined to doubt how a Pūrvapakṣa be found, who would think that the अग्निहोत्र which being an आश्रम कर्मन् is recommended by tbe Sūtrakāra as a help to the Vidyā *is in nature something else than the usual obligatory* अग्निहोत्र. The very fact that it is the आश्रमकर्मन् proves that it is nothing else but the usual obligatory अग्निहोत्र rite. Thus, Śaṅkara's doubt in his commentary on Bra.Sū.III.4.34 seems to be an impossible one.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.4.36-39. Śaṅkara's Pūrvapakṣa view here is based upon the fact that the duties which the Sūtrakāra regards as *help to the knowledge* of Brahman in the achievement of the goal of liberation, are regarded by him as only विद्याहेतु, i.e., as means to *knowledge* as distinguished from the fruit of that knowledge (liberation). Thus, his Pūrvapakṣa here is made to

look possible if we accept his own distinction between विद्याप्राप्ति and विद्याफलप्राप्ति, and not upon the statement in any of the Sūtras.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.4.40. Here the Pūrvapakṣa is reasonable while the Siddhānta seems to us to be absurd. The Pūrvapakṣa holds that one who has reached any stage of the celibates (ऊर्ध्वरेतस्) viz., the stage of a religious student, the stage of a hermit or the stage of an ascetic, is liable to suffer 'a moral fall'. But the Siddhānta is made to assert that there is no possibility of a moral fall of an ऊर्ध्वरेतस्. This Siddhānta is impossible, as can be easily seen even from Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.4. 41–42.

(9) Bra.Sū.III.4.41–43. Here Śaṅkara makes an Opponent *quote a text* in which only an ordinary celibate, i. e., an ordinary *religious* student is mentioned, while he is represented as *arguing* that a *life-long* religious student who breaks his vow of celibacy cannot wash off his sin by performing an atonement. This Opponent also refutes the view of Jaimini about the possibility of an atonement in Jai.Sū.VI.8.21, even though this passage mentions only an ordinary Brahmacārin and not a life-long one. The only text that really lends support to this Opponent is a Smṛti. While establishing the Siddhānta, it is stated by Śaṅkara that the Siddhānta is the view of only some teachers; so that this Siddhānta is not a complete denial of the Pūrvapakṣa, as is usually the case. Moreover, the Opponent discusses the case of a life-long celibate who violates his vow by intercourse with any woman, while the Siddhānta expresses his opinion only with reference to a life-long celibate whose sin consists of an intercourse with any woman other than the teacher's wife. Lastly, Sūtra 43 is interpreted to mean that the Sūtrakāra would inflict *the same punishment*, viz., excommunication, indifferent of the fact whether the violation of the vow of celibacy (of the three orders of life) is considered to be 'a great sin' (महापातक, for which no atonement is possible) or 'a secondary sin' (उपपातक, which admits of the possibility of an

atonement). All this seems to us to prove that the Opponent here holds a view which cannot be refuted and that therefore he is not a likely Opponent. For our interpretation see Part I.

(10) Bra.Sū.III.4.44--46. Though the Scriptures always state that the priests are to be selected and employed by one who is to perform a sacrifice, the Opponent here is said to be one who holds that the sacrificer *must himself perform* certain meditations which are parts of the sacrifice. The Siddhāntin easily draws the attention of the Opponent to the fact that priests are employed on the promise of a payment of fee for the entire sacrifice. We believe, this topic cannot find a place in the Brahmasūtra, unless it is shown that it has some connection with the knowledge of Brahman and with the seeker of that knowledge. Moreover, the Opponent here is represented to be ignorant of even the primary knowledge of the Ritualism.

(11) Bra.Sū.III.4. 47--49. Here the simple word 'मुनि' which usually means a sage, who is an ascetic, is interpreted in the unusual sense of 'perfect knowledge (ज्ञानातिशय)' by Sankara's Opponent. Then, he is told by the Siddhāntin that if one has knowledge he is sure to get, in due course, perfection in that knowledge; and such being the case he is asked by the Siddhāntin, "Why should there be an Injunction for the perfect knowledge as distinguished from the Injunction for knowledge?" The Opponent is at this stage made to argue that this special Injunction for *perfect* knowledge of which he is a staunch upholder is meant for a seeker in whose case the perception of duality is so strong that his knowledge is never able to become perfect knowledge.[88] We doubt, if the knowledge which is not likely of its own accord to become perfect in due course would ever become so by reason of Injunction.

(88) ननु सति विद्यावत्त्वे प्राप्नोत्येव तत्रातिशयः किं मौनविधिनेत्यत आह-पक्षेणेति। एतदुक्तं भवति-यास्मिन्पक्षे भेददर्शनप्राबल्यान्न प्राप्नोति तास्मिन्नेष विधिरिति।-S'ā. *bhā.* on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 47.

In Bra.Sū.III.4.48–49, the Opponent who provisionally admits the order of renunciation is made to argue that the Śruti has great regard for the order of a householder because the Chā. Upa. closes its topic with the mention of the householder's stage of life (Chā. Upa VIII. 15. 1). The Siddhāntin, according to Śaṅkara's interpretation replies that the householder's stage is the one in which a man is asked to do many duties which are full of great trouble and so he forms the concluding topic of the famous Vedānta text. We fail to see the significance of this discussion so far as the Opponent's view of a special Injunction is concerned. Moreover, Śaṅkara's interpretation of Sūtra 49, involves an unusual or rather absurd meaning of इतरेषाम्.[89]

(12) Bra. Sū. III.4.50. Śaṅkara interprets the Sūtra as discussing the meaning of बाल्य in Bṛ.Upa. III.5.1. Here the Opponent is made to hold the view that the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman is asked by the Śruti to behave like a child, i. e., to move, to speak, and to eat at his own whim and to give out urine and excrement in the very place where he feels the nature's call. The Opponent holds this view as against the view that बाल्य should be interpreted to mean that a seeker of Brahman should have purity of mind, should be devoid of fraud, pride, etc., and should avoid those things which a man whose senses are fully developed would do (अप्ररूढेन्द्रियत्व). This पूर्वपक्ष is rather a very strange view about the hygiene of the Vedānta, just as the Pūrvapakṣa view in Sūtra III. 4. 28 was a strange one about the morality of the Vedānta.

(13) Bra.Sū.III.4.51. Here the Opponent, who must be taken as the believer in the doctrine of the cycle of births and rebirths, is made to argue that the achievement of the knowledge of Brahman which one seeks must *in all cases* take place in this very birth of the seeker, and the Siddhāntin is made to hold that it is only *in a few cases* in which there is nothing to impede

(89) इतरेषामिति द्वयेाः आश्रमयोः बहुवचनं वृत्तिभेदापेक्षयाऽनुष्ठातृभेदापेक्षया वेति द्रष्टव्यम्।
S'ā. *bhā*. on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 49.

the operation of the means of the knowledge which the seeker pursues in this world. One of the arguments of the Opponent is that no seeker of the knowledge starts with the aim of achieving the knowledge in the next birth and the Siddhāntin is made to reply that it is not always so because a seeker should have freedom about his aim of achieving the knowledge in this life or in the next. We believe that the aim of the attainment of the Vidyā in the duration of a single life *in the case of all seekers* is not a likely Pūrvapakṣa.

We may conclude by saying that we may not be correct in all the examples given by us to illustrate these "defects," as we have called them, of Śaṅkara, and that we may not have ourselves escaped from committing similar mistakes. But, inspite of such a possibility, our general conclusions about these blemishes will be found to be valid and that is why we have devoted one chapter to the subject of the method of interpretation of Śaṅkara. Moreover, Śaṅkara, as an Ācārya, enjoyed the latitude allowed to philosophical systematisation.[90] In any case, we do not hold that the Upaniṣads do not allow themselves to be systematised, because we do hold that underlying all the principal Upaniṣads there is the chief doctrine of Advaita; and so if an Ācārya attempts the task, we do not think, it would be impossible for him to accomplish the same fairly and honestly. This of course does not mean that he would not commit mistakes like those discussed in this Chapter. But a modern scholar may avoid some of these mistakes if he carefully applies the modern critical method to the Sūtras while interpreting them, as we shall see in the next chapter.

(90) About the extent of this latitude vide K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Vedantism, PP. VI-VIII.

CHAPTER 11.

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION : SOME SUGGESTIONS.

The necessity to make some definite rules regarding the method of interpretation of our Scripture was at the bottom of the origin of the Jaiminisūtra and has been felt by every commentator. Śabara's words [1] on this question at the very beginning of his commentary on the Jaiminisūtra are indeed inspired by the realization of the same necessity. Thibaut while admiring the clearness and conciseness of other *darśana sūtras* complains that "Altogether different is the case of the two Mīmāṅsāsūtras. There scarcely one single Sūtra is intelligible without a commentary because the most essential words are habitually dispensed with and the phrasiology is so eminently vague and obscure." In these words of the great pioneer of the critical study of the Brahmasūtra in modern age we find him registering his protest against the method of interpretation followed by the commentators rather than a protest against the author or authors of the Sūtras themselves. [1a] Professor Strauss calls the method of the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara "system-making orthodx" in contrast to the modern "historicocritical method". He adds that the old method is *system-making* because it works with the conception of the unanimity of the Scripture and *orthodox*, because, it on the one hand pertains to the cultural

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(1) लोके येष्वर्थेषु प्रसिद्धानि पदानि तानि सति संभवे तदर्थान्येव सूत्रेष्वित्यवगन्तव्यम् नाध्याहारादिभिरेषां परिकल्पनीयोऽर्थ : परिभाषितव्यो वा। एवं वेदवाक्यान्येवैभिर्व्याख्यायन्ते, इतरथा वेदवाक्यानि व्याख्येयानि स्वपदार्थाश्च व्याख्येया इति प्रयत्नगौरवं प्रसज्येत।
S'abara's Introduction to his *bhāṣya* on Jai.Sū.I.1.1.

(1a) Radhakrishnan also holds the view that the Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa reflects the indecision and vagueness of the Upaniṣads. Vide his Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, P.444.

need which we can know only from the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and, on the other hand, because it strictly follows the principles of the Pūrvamīmāṅsā. Professor Ghate enumerates some of the great difficulties which are sure to stand in the way of any effort to reconstruct the original sense of the Sūtras.[2] He also makes the suggestion that we should apply to the Sūtra the critical method as distinguished from the traditional method applied by several commentators.

Professor Ghate explains the critical method as a method which presupposes an attitude of absolute impartiality, considering the work by itself without a leaning to any one particular doctrine. He says that the essentials of this method are given in the following verse, which is quoted in the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha and ascribed to the Bṛhatsaṁhitā :—

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥

We may say that partly it is this method which Thibaut, Mr. Teliwala and Professor Ghate have applied to the Brahmasūtra in their enquiries. But, as Professor Ghate admits, the commentators also knew this method and claimed to have used it themselves. In fact, the method pursued by all of them consists in (1) interpreting each Adhikaraṇa *by itself*, (2) considering what other *Ācāryas* or interpreters of the Sūtras have said on that Adhikaraṇa and (3) examining whether the Śruti quoted under a particular Sūtra by an Ācārya has the same sense when interpreted in the light of *the context in the Upaniṣad* from which it is quoted.

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(2) These difficulties are (1) the very concise nature of Sūtra literature in general, in which many words have to be supplied from the context, (2) the difficulty to decide which Sūtras contain the Pūrvapakṣa and which the Siddhānta, (3) No division into Adhikaraṇas unanimously accepted has come down to us, (4) there is no *pada-pātha* handed down by an authoritative tradition, (5) the fact that the Upaniṣad passages under discussion are not actually mentioned in the Sūtras. Vide *The Vedanta* by V. S. Ghate, PP. 44-49.

We neither deny nor do we belittle the utility of the above line of argument adopted for arriving at the exact sense of the Sūtras, because this task is to difficult to allow us to disregard any help that we may get from any source. But looking to the fact that the same method is used by the ancient Ācāryas and modern scholars with quite contradictory conclusions, we feel that the method is not sufficient for the achievement of its aim.

We do not believe that the Sūtras were meant to be 'omnifaced' in the sense of being capable of being interpreted in various senses *ad libitum*.[3] It is never possible that the Sūtrakāra should have more than one system in his mind. The Sūtras are not written in the style of works like the Rāghavapāṇḍavīyam so that they may be interpreted in favour of both the Kevalādvaita of Śaṅkara and the Dvaita of Madhva. Also we hold that the Sūtrakāra had a definite division of Adhikaraṇas, though it has not been preserved in course of time. We believe that when the Sūtras were originally composed, they were never vague and that therefore they did not then require the help of "a voluminous commentary" for being understood.

In order to get at this original sense of the Sūtras we should not proceed by asking ourselves, "How far Śaṅkara truly represents the view of the auther of the Brahmasūtra ?" Nor should it be from the very start our object to see which, if any, of so many interpretations, has faithfully represented the natural and straightforward meaning of the original. Nor, even should we begin our work by putting before us the question, "How far does the author of the Brahmasūtra represent correct-

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(3) Ghate refers to the words 'विश्वतोमुखम्' in the famous definition of a Sūtra :--

अल्पाक्षरमसंधिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदु : ॥

Dr. Belvalkar explains विश्वतोमुखम् as "having a universal appplication". We agree with him.

ly the views of the chief Upaniṣads ?" We think, the solution of these and similar questions can be satisfactorily had only at a later stage. We should take up such questions only after fixing the sense of the Brahmasūtra as a whole.

The first stage should be that of studying the Sūtras *intensively* and *internally*. Instead of going from Upaniṣads to the Sūtras, as most probably the earlier Ācāryas did; or instead of going from Upaniṣads, the Gītā and one or two Purāṇas to the Sūtras as was done by some of the later Ācāryas, or also instead of going from the commentators to the Sūtrakāra as modern scholars have done, we should go from the Sūtrakāra to the Upaniṣads. After the necessary preliminary knowledge of the Brahmasūtra we should repeatedly read only the Sūtras and when we get some idea of the sense of a Sūtra from its context etc., we should consult the Upaniṣads in order to find out the Śruti referred to by the Sūtra. We should, *for the time being* set aside the belief in the unanimity (*ekavākyatā*) of the three Prasthānas, in the correctness of the commentary of any particular Ācārya, and also in the form in which we have been accustomed to think of this unanimity from our preliminary study. We should first try to go deep into the Sūtras themselves and only at a second stage should we reopen and consult a commentary or commentaries.

If we adopt the above line of research we should take up the following points for study :—

(1) We should inquire whether the Sūtrakāra, in the course of his work, anywhere refers to what he himself has said in the preceding portion of his work itself.

We meet with several (about eight in number) Sūtras in which we find the expression 'तदुक्तम्', 'It has been said'. By comparing what has been said on the same problem in the foregone portion of the Brahmasūtra, we should try to make out whether the reference is to the Brahmasūtra or to any other work.

As a result of this inquiry, the present writer has come to the conclusion that 'तदुक्तम्' always refers to what the Sūtrakāra *himself* has said in the respective earlier portion of his work. We only give here a summary of the result. The arguments are given (in Part I) in our Notes on the respective Sūtras.

The *taduktam* Sūtra	The Sūtra referred to	The topic in both the Sūtras	The reference according to Śaṅkara.
1. संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि । III.3.8.	उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वाहिकुण्डलवत् । III.2.27	Brahman has two different names, अव्यक्त and पुरुष	न वा प्रकरणभेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् । Bra.Sū.III.3.7
2. हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाछन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत् तदुक्तम् । III.3.26	उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च । III.3.5	The collection of the information of meditation on Brahman from the different Branches of the Veda.	तदुक्तं द्वादशलक्षण्याम्—"अपि तु वाक्यशेषत्वादितरपर्युदासः स्यात् । प्रतिषेधे विकल्पः स्यात्।"
3. अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् । Bra.Sū.III.3.33.	इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात् । आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् आत्मशब्दाच्च । III.3.13-15.	The thoughts or attributes of the Immutable are not required for the meditation on the अरूपवत् or the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman.	तदुक्त प्रथम काण्डे गुणमुख्यव्यतिक्रमे तदर्थत्वान्मुख्येन वेदसंयोगः । जै० सू० III.3.8.
4. प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् (We have changed प्रदानवद् to प्रधानवद्.) III.3.43	आत्मगृहातारतरवदुत्तरात् । III.3.16	The method of meditation on the अरूपवत् or प्रधान aspect and the रूपवत् or पुरुष aspect of Brahman is the same, viz., that of अहंग्रह or आत्मग्रह (=अहं ब्रह्मास्मि).	तदुक्तं संकर्षे नाना वा देवता पृथग्ज्ञानात् ।
5. अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद् दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् । III.3.50	तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । III.3.42. (We read पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः for पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः.	"पुरुष" is an independent aspect of Brahman quite different from the प्रधान or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman.	तदुक्त प्रथमे काण्डे क्रत्वर्थामिति चेन्न वर्णत्रयसंयोगात् । जै० सू० XI.4.7

6. उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम्। III.4.42	सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्। III.4.28	The question of आपद्धर्म.— A monk may do priestly duties at a sacrifice; a seeker may eat all kinds of food; both these options, when there is otherwise the danger of losing one's life.	तदुक्तं प्रथमे लक्षणे — 'समा विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्।' जै० सू० I.3.8. शास्त्रस्थ वा तन्निमित्तत्वात्। जै० सू० I.3.9

Besides these, 'तदुक्तम्' occurs in two more Sūtras, viz., I.3.21- अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् which is undoubtedly a reference to the word 'व्योमवत्' in Bra.Sū.I.2.7 – अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च where 'व्योमन्' is used for 'दहराकाश' and II.1.31 विकरणत्वान्नेतिचेत्तदुक्तम् which refers probably to II.1.24 or I.2.8.

We have stated in our Notes that Rāmānuja takes तदुक्तम् as a reference to Gautamadharmasūtra I. 3 in one case, viz., Bra.Sū. III.4.42 and that Vallabha takes it as a reference to even the Bhāgavata Purāṇa in three cases (Bra.Sū.III.3.33, 50 and III.-4.42), and that these Ācāryas do not always agree as to the exact Sūtra in the Brahmasūtra or Jaiminisūtra when they take the reference to be to those works.

(2) A study of the references made by the Bahuvrīhi compounds might also help us since the author may refer to his own work by such compounds.

We have shown that आनन्दादयः in Bra.Sū.III.3.11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य), सत्यादयः in Bra.Sū.III.3.38 and आयतनादयः in Bra.Sū.III.3.39 (which we read as सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः) refer to आनन्द in Bra.Sū.I.1.2, सत्यसंकल्प in the Śruti discussed in Bra.Sū.I.2.1 and द्युभ्वाद्यायतन in Bra.Sū.I.3.1 and that the three groups of thoughts expressed by the three Bahuvrīhi compounds are respectively those collected by the Sūtrakāra in the first, second and the third Pādas of the first Adhyāya. As a result of this identification, not only do we get the correct sense of Sūtras III.3.11, 38–39, but we also get the original plan of the Sūtrakāra in the arrangement of the विषयवाक्य of Bra.Sū.I.1–3. Bra.Sū.I.1 discusses only those Śrutis which

deal with the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, Bra.Sū.I.2, those which deal with the same but use words applicable to the पुरुष aspect also, and Bra.Sū.I.3, those texts which deal with the पुरुष aspect but use terms applicable to the अरूपवत् aspect also.

One more instance is that of शब्दादि in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 58 (नाना-शब्दादिभेदात्।) which seems to us to mean शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 6-8 (अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्। न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्। संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि।). The Sūtrakāra establishes the 'collection' (उपसंहार) in the case of meditation on Brahman on the ground that the sense or the purpose is the same (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदात्-Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5), and rejects the three arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa based upon the भेद of शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा, while in the case of the अङ्गावबद्धाः उद्गीथोपासनाः he accepts the same arguments and says that these meditations are different from one another. Śaṅkara takes शब्दादि to mean शब्द, गुण, etc.

There may be other बहुव्रीहि compounds, e. g., आरंभणशब्दादि (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 14), etc., which require to be studied as above.

(3) When a Śruti which is the विषयवाक्य of a Sūtra is to be found out, as a rule we should expect that some word in the Sūtra must be also present in the Śruti. An equally important point is that the sense of the Śruti and that of the Sūtra should be the same. Neither of the two points should be given predominence over the other; otherwise both the sense and the Śruti of a Sūtra would be mistaken. In finding out the विषयवाक्य of a Sūtra, we may have often to go through a hurried reading of all the accepted Upaniṣads, which is only possible if there is already a preliminary study of these Upaniṣads. Sometimes Jacob's word-concordance of the Upaniṣads comes to our help.

It would be here noticed that sometimes the Sūtrakāra uses a synonym of a word which actually is found in the Śruti which is the विषयवाक्य. Such cases are few, though not rare. The reason why he does so, should be inquired into. Is it *metri causa*?

In these cases, it is naturally somewhat difficult to hit upon the proper reference. We mention here a few instances where, we believe, we have traced the correct विषयवाक्यs.

Sūtra	Our suggested विषयवाक्य	S'aṅkara's विषयवाक्य
1. न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि। III.2.11.	जागरितस्थानः, स्वप्नस्थानः and सुषुप्तस्थानः in Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad 9-11.	S'aṅkara explains स्थानतः as पृथिव्याद्युपाधियोगात्.
2. प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्। III.2.12.	Chā. Upa. VIII. 7-12 where प्रजापति explains to Indra how ब्रह्म with which the soul is identical is the *same in each* state.	S'.—यश्चायमस्यां पृथिव्यां तेजोमयोऽमृतमयः पुरुषो यश्चायमध्यात्मं शारीरः ... बृ. उ. II. 5. 1
3. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः। III.2.22	अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूय इति नाम्नो वाव भूयोऽस्तीति तन्मे भगवान् ब्रवीत्विति॥ वाग्वाव नाम्नो भूयसी Chā.Upa.VII.-1-15.	अथात आदेशो नेति नेति। Br. Upa.II.3.6
4. तदव्यक्तमाह हि।	महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः॥ Katha Upa.III.11 and VI.9	न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा Mu.Upa.III.1.8; Br.Upa. III.9.26; Mu.Upa.I.1.6; Tai.Upa.II.7.1; Bha.Gi. II.25.
5. अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम्। III.2.26	अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च। (व्यापक corresponds to अनन्त in the Sūtra). Katha Upa.VI.8	स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति। Mu.Upa.III.2.9. Br.Upa.IV.4.6.
6. परमतः सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः। III. 2. 31.	अव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः Katha Upa.III.11; VI. 8, and other S'ruti given by S'aṅkara.	Various S'rutis
7. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्। III. 3. 16	उत्तरात् refers to तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति......अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योहमस्मीति न स वेद...। Br.Upa. I.4.10	आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत्किंचन मिषत। Ai.Upa.-I. 1-2.

8. अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादव-धारणात् । III. 3. 17	आत्मेत्येवोपासीत । Br.Upa.-I.4.7.	एक एवाग्र आसीत् in the above S'ruti.
9. वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् । III. 3. 25	धनुर्गृहीत्वौपनिषदं महास्त्रं शरं ह्युपासानिशितं संधयीत । आयम्य तद्भावगतेन चेतसा लक्ष्यं तदेवाक्षरं सोम्य विद्धि ॥ प्रणवो धनुः शरः आत्मा ब्रह्म तल्लक्ष्यमुच्यते । अप्रमत्तेन वेद्धव्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् । Mu Upa.-II.2.3-4.	सर्वं प्रविध्य हृदयं प्रविध्य धमनीः प्रवृज्य रोऽभिप्रवृज्य त्रिधा विपृक्तः । इत्यादिः आथर्वणिकानामुपनिषदारम्भे मन्त्रसमाम्नायः।
10. सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्व-वत् । III.4.26	अश्व refers to उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य मुखमासीत्, etc, in Br.Upa.I.1.	यथा च योग्यतावशेनाश्वो न लाङ्गलाकर्षणे युज्यते रथचर्यायां तु युज्यते । एवमाश्रमकर्माणि...

Our arguments why these particular Śrutis seem to us to be the विषयवाक्य in the corresponding Sūtras have been given in our Notes under the various Sūtras. Here is also a list of other references which we have proposed as worth consideration.

1. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 12–Śve. Upa. III. 16-20, which is in sense repeated in other Upaniṣads and the Gītā also.
2. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 20–Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 1.
3. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 30.–Kaṭha Upa. VI. 9
4. Śrūti or Śrutis referred to by उन्मान in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31.

5. परमतः in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31 refers to Śrutis in the Kaṭha and Muṇḍaka Upaniṣads where we find a principle called पुरुष said to be higher than the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman.

6. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 40–Kau. Upa. III. 9.

7. Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13-15. 'इतरे' refers to the निराकार श्रुतिs.

8. Bra. Sū. III. 3. 18. कार्य refers to the effect of the meditation on Brahman in the various मोक्षश्रुतिs, e. g. Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10.

9. Bra. Sū. III. 3. 45–48. Mu. Upa. I. 1. 1, II. 2. 13, III. 2. 10.

10. Bra. Sū III. 3. 37–व्यतिहार refers to Śrutis about निराकार and साकार aspects.

In these (10+10) *viṣayavākyas* suggested by us there are several whose correctness is beyond all doubts; e. g., those of Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11, III. 2. 22, III. 4. 26, etc., and whose discovery throws a flood of light both on the Sūtra and the Śruti itself. It should be added that in a few cases we ourselves are not satisfied with the *viṣayavākya* we have suggested, or we have abstained from making any suggestion at all. These are yet to be discovered.

(4) We should always compare and contrast the statements in the various Sūtras both as regards the words used and the sense conveyed in them, without of course neglecting the context. Let us first take up the comparison of the same words used in different Sūtras.

(i) In Bra. Sū. III. 3 11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य) we have the word प्रधान, which Saṅkara explains as ब्रह्मन्; and as he says that आनन्द etc. are the धर्मs of प्रधान, we may conclude that he takes प्रधान in the sense of his सगुण ब्रह्मन्. Now, if we compare this Sūtra with Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14 (अरूपवेदव हितत्प्रधानत्वात्)we learn that प्रधान according to the Sūtrakāra is the *chief* or *main* nature or aspect of Brahman and the word is used by him in the sense of अरूपवत् or निराकार (not निर्गुण) ब्रह्मन्. By an investigation for the correct text of the Brahmasūtra we have also shown that the same word occurs also in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43 which should be read as प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् instead of प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम्. Thus, प्रधान in all the three passages is used in the sense of the अरूपवत् or निराकार aspect of Brahman.

(ii) The word स्थान which occurs in Bra.Sū.III.2. 11. (न स्थानतोऽपि-परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि) has caused a great difficulty, so much that the whole discussion of तत्पदार्थ in Bra.Sū.III.2.11-41 is suspected to be an interpolation.[4] If we compare the Sūtra with Bra.Sū.III. 2.1 (संध्ये सृष्टिराह हि।) which refers to संध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानम्।), we find that स्थान here means the three or four states, जागरितस्थान, etc. and also that probably the Sūtra (III.2.11.) refers to Māṇḍūkya Upa.9-11, where the स्थानs or states of the Supreme Being are mentioned. In Bra.Sū.III.2.34 also (स्थानविशेषात् .... ।,) the word स्थान has the sense of the particular state of deep sleep when the individual

soul comes into contact with the Supreme One in the heart. Śaṅkara takes स्थान in Sūtra III.2.11 as पृथिव्याद्युपाधियोगात् and in III.2.34 as बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिस्थानविशेषयोगात् [5].

(iii) The word उपसंहार in Bra.Sū.III.3.5 is a very importent word because it is one of the clues to the interpretation of Bra. Sū.III 3 which is traditionally called 'गुणोपसंहारपादः. Śaṅkara takes it in the sense of अन्यत्रोदितानां विज्ञानगुणानामन्यत्रापि समाने विज्ञाने उपसंहारः भवति, i. e., the collection of the attributes of a सगुणविद्या from a particular Śruti in another Śruti where the same Vidyā is taught. We think, the word has the general sense of collection of various things (attributes of Brahman, method of meditation, the effect of the act of meditation, the nature of meditation, etc.) for a particular purpose, here, for the purpose of the meditation on Brahman. The same word occurs also in Bra.Sū.III.4.48 (कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः) where Śaṅkara takes the word in the sense of 'conclusion' (of the Chā.Upa.). But we have shown that the Sūtra does not at all refer to that Śruti, but makes the collection of all other helping (सहकार्यन्तर) acts (the third type of acts according to the Sūtrakāra) compulsory for the householder-seeker of liberation, since he is complete (कृत्स्न), i. e., he possesses all conveniences which the members of the other three orders (āśramas), for whom these acts are voluntary, do not possess. In Bra.Sū.II.1.24 (उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि) the word has also the same sense.

Thus, उपसंहार in Bra.Sū.III.3.5 does not mean the उपसंहार of the attributes (which are not referred to in that Sūtra) from one Śruti to another Śruti on the same Lore, but it means the collection of all the information about the meditation on Brahman from the various Upaniṣads for the purpose of practising that meditation.

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(4) by modern scholars like

(5) The same word also occurs in Bra.Sū.I.2.14 (स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च).

(iv) The word अप्राप्ति in III.3.12 (प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे) is interpreted by Śaṅkara as (प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनां धर्माणां तैत्तिरीयकाम्नातानां) नास्त्यन्यत्र प्राप्तिः. But from the context it appears that the Sūtrakāra excludes them from the list of attributes of Brahman to be used in the meditation on Brahman (See Sūtra III.3.14); so, अप्राप्ति would mean non-acceptance for the purpose of meditation even in the Taitirīyaka Branch itself. The explanation of 'भेदे' also supports the same meaning. The word is used in the same sense in प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् (Bra.Sū.II.2.22) and in समुदाये उभय हेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः (Bra.Sū.II.2.18).

(5) We should also study the synonyms of the prominent words in the Brahmasūtra.
We have shown that the word सूक्ष्म in Bra.Sū.I.4.2 stands for अरूपवत् in Bra.Sū.III.2.14,[6] and that मुख्यम् in Bra.Sū.IV.3.12 is a synonym of प्रधान in Bra.Sū.III.2.14,III.3.11, etc.[7]

(6) We should compare several expressions in different parts of the Sūtras and we may get some important suggestions about their interpretation.

(i) Thus, we should compare एकस्यामपि in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 2 with शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55 (अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्।); we get the double suggestion that 'एकस्यामपि' means 'एकस्यामपि शाखायाम्' and that Sūtra III. 3. 2 lays down a condition about the teaching of Brahman being common to *all* the Vedāntas or Vedāntas of *all* the Vedas, while Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55 mentions the conditions why the teaching of अङ्गावबद्धाःब्रह्मोपासनाः is not to be collected in the Branches of other Vedas than in the particular Veda in which they occur. Śaṅkara takes एकस्यामपि as एकस्यामपि विद्यायाम्.

(ii) Similarly, अर्थाभेदात् in III. 3. 5 (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च) should be compared with अभेदात् in Bra. Sū.III. 3. 19 (समाने एवंचाभे-

(6) Vide Notes on the Sūtra in Port I.
(7) Vide Notes on the Sūtra in Part I.

दात्). By this comparison we come to know that अभेदात् in III. 3. 19 means अर्थाभेदात् and that 'समाने' means 'in a similar text', i. e., in a Vedānta text.

(iii) Some other examples of this method of comparison will be found in our Notes in Part I.

(7) A comparison of the doctrinal statements also will prove useful.

(i) इयदामननात् ॥ अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः ॥ Bra. Sū. III. 3. 34–35 should be compared with अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च । (Bra. Sū. 1. 2. 7), अल्पश्रुतेरितिचेत्तदुक्तम् । (Bra. Sū.I. 3. 21), हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् । (Bra. Sū. I.3. 25), and शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न तथादृष्ट्युपदेशादसंभवात्पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते । Bra.Sū.I.2. 26. We thereby understand the sense of Sūtras III. 3. 34–35, viz., 'because the प्रधान and the पुरुष are said to be of the limited size of the heart for the purpose of meditation on them as such, one should carry out the meditation on Brahman inside one's own self like (the meditation on) the group of elements. All the four passages teach the inward method of meditation on प्रधान and पुरुष.

(ii) The following Sūtras may be compared with one another:- आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् । (Bra.Sū.III.3.16), आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च (Bra.Sū. IV.1.3), शास्त्रदृष्ट्यातूपदेशो वामदेववत् । (Bra.Sū I.1.30). From the comparison we learn that Sūtra III.3.16 does not aim at explaining आत्मन् in आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । (Ai.Upa.I.1,) as परमात्मन् (as Śaṅkara says) but that आत्मगृहीति explains the अहंग्रह method (अहंब्रह्मास्मि) of meditation on Brahman and that Sūtra IV.1.3 tells us that those who have been carrying out the means (for the knowledge of Brahman) mentioned in Bra.Sū.III.3–4 but have not yet realized Brahman, when repeatedly returning to this world, approach Brahman as their own self and make others understand it similarly. So, Sūtra III.3.16 explains the means of meditation on Brahman and Sūtra IV.1.3 tells us what the advanced seeker does when he returns to this world for perfection.

(iii) अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः। (Bra.Sū.III.3.61) and न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः। (Bra. Sū.III.3.65); आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः। (Bra.Sū.IV.1.6). Here seems to be little doubt that अङ्गेषु in Sūtra III 3.61 is closely connected with अङ्गे in Bra.Sū.IV.1.6. In the former the seeker is asked to have the notion of the respective आश्रयs in the parts or limbs of Brahman. In Sūtra IV.1.6 we are told that the advanced seeker from the time of his return to this world has the notions of the Sun, the Sky, etc. in the limbs of Brahman. Bra.Sū,III.3.61,65 represent the साधन stage, while Bra.Sū.III.1.6 the stage when that साधन is about to turn into the fulfilment of the goal.

(iv) In Bra.Sū. III.3.46 (प्रकाशादिवच्चैवं परः), we are told that the individual soul is like the Light, etc., but the Supreme One is not so. In accordance with this, we have in Bra.Sū.III.2.15–18 a पूर्वपक्ष that Brahman is like the Light, while Sūtra III.2.19 says that 'But, because Brahman cannot be reflected just as the Light in the water, Brahman is not of the nature of the Light.' Similarly, in Bra.Sū.III.2.28 the two names of the Highest (अव्यक्त and पुरुष) were explained as प्रकाश and प्रकाशाश्रय because *Brahman is of the nature of the Light*;' but again in Bra. Sū.III.2.29 that explanation is given up and the one in Bra.Sū III.2 27 is preferred. Thus, a comparison with Bra.Sū.II.3.46 helps us in making out the exact sense of Bra.Sū.III.2.15-19.

(8) Like comparison, a contrast between some Sūtras also helps us in deciding the sense of the Sūtras.

(i) In Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14 (अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्।) Brahman is explained as *chiefly* अरूपवत् or निराकार, while in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23 (रूपोपन्यासाच्च।) the Sūtrakāra argues that the topic of Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6 is पुरुष "because the figure or आकार of that topic is mentioned in Mu. Upa. II. 1. 3." Thus, we have a clear proof that according to the Sūtrakāra, Brahman is both निराकार and साकार and that the former is the chief aspect. A contrast between these Sūtras helps us also in interpreting the word प्रधान in तत्प्रधानत्वात् and in other Sūtras. 'प्रधान' means chief or main, so that

the रूपवत् aspect is also admitted by the Sūtrakāra, though the अरूपवत् aspect is the chief aspect. From this, we can also conclude that Śaṅkara is not justified in adding वाक्यानि to the Sūtra (इत्येवमादीनिवाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मतत्वप्रधानानि नार्थान्तरप्रधानानि ।)

(ii) We should contrast अर्थाभेदात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5 (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदात् ।), with अर्थ भेदात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 25 (वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ।). From the contrast we learn that in the latter Sūtra the Sūtrakāra gives us an example of the absence of उपसंहार, that he bases उपसंहार and अनुपसंहार on the identity and non-identity of the subject (अर्थं), viz., Bramhan, that Sūtra III. 3. 25 is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र, that Sūtra III. 3. 26 is a सिद्धान्तसूत्र, and lastly that this latter Sūtra refers to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5 (उंपसहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत् समाने च ।).'

Other examples of this kind of contrast between the statements in two Sūtras will be found in our Notes in Part I.

(9) Above all, the context should be the most important factor to be considered in interpreting the Sūtras. We think that the various interpretations of the Ācāryas have been possible mostly on account of the *neglect of the context.* It is the context by the help of which we can decide what words should be taken as implied or understood (अध्याहार) in a Sūtra. Śabara, as we have seen, also complained of the additions made by commentators, which were not in agreement with the context. The context, if strictly followed, also helps us in fixing the number of Sūtras in each Adhikaraṇa and thereby in reconstructing the original Sūtra *pāṭha.*

It is not necessary and not possible also to repeat here how each word in each Sūtra of the following Adhikaraṇas has been interpreted by us with strict and rigid adherence to the context. Our arguments founded upon the consistency with the context and used in the interpretation of these Sūtras, have been given in their proper places in Part I. Here we can only briefly state the result of the application of this method.

(i) Bra Sū.III.2.11-19. These are very important Sūtras because they deal with the exact nature of Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra. On account of Śaṅkara's explanation of स्थान in Sūtra 11, they have been doubted as an interpolation. But on the strength of the context we have shown that 'स्थान' here means the three or four states, जागरितस्थान, स्वप्नस्थान, etc, and that here the Sūtrakāra rejects a view which explains that the निराकार and साकार श्रुतिs about Brahman refer to different states of Brahman. He establishes the view that Brahman is in *all* states both निराकार and साकार. [8]

(ii) Bra.Sū.III.3.19-24. If we strictly follow the context, it appears that in these Sūtras, the Sūtrakāra gives his view that only the Vedāntas or, in other words, the Upaniṣads are the authority for the Lore of Brahman. He clearly says that though there are some passages in the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas in which the attributes of Brahman are nentioned, he would distinguish between the पूर्वकाण्ड and the उत्तरकाण्ड because the Śrutis like Mu.Upa.I.1,Chā.Upa.VII.1, make this distinction. This important piece of information was overlooked because the strict contextual sense of अन्यत्र, अपि, विशेष, इतर [9] in these Sūtras was not followed and as a result there came to be a wrong division of the Adhikaraṇas in course of time.

(iii) The most important result of this line of argument about the method of interpretation is that if we follow it strictly in Bra. Sū. III. 3, the Sūtrakāra seems to give an option of choice between अव्यक्त and पुरुष, the two aspects of Brahman, each leading independently to absolute liberation. Throughout Sūtras 11-54 of this Pāda (III.3) there runs a consitent effort of the Sūtrakāra to explain how *the meditation on either* of these two aspects leads to the realization of Brahman. In Sūtra III.3.10 he states that he distinguishes between only the two names or aspects of

(8) See our Notes on the strictly contextual sense of स्थान, उभयलिङ्ग, सर्वत्र, भेद, तन्मात्र, तथात्वम्, etc., in this Adhikaraṇa.

(9) Vide our Notes on the Sūtras in Part I.

Brahman; in Sūtras 11-17 he gives the method of meditation on प्रधान or the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman; in Sūtras 28-30 he states the option between प्रधान and पुरुष aspects; in Sūtras 31–43 he explains the method of meditation on पुरुष; and in Sūtras 44–54 he refutes a पूर्वपक्ष which believed that पुरुष was the name of अव्यक्त or अक्षर the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, but the Sūtrakāra shows that पुरुष is a name of the Supreme Being; पुरुष is not 'a mental act' on the Unmanifest but an independent aspect of the Para. The cases where a sense strictly consistent with the context is assigned to the words in these Sūtras are too many to be enumerated here. They would be found from our Notes (in Part I) on the various words under the respective Sūtras.

(iv) Bra. Sū. III. 4. 18-28. In these Sūtras, the Sūtrakāra discusses the nature of the Brahman which he regards as a विधि and refutes the views (1) that it is only of the form of reflection (परामर्श), (2) that the knowledge of Brahman is only स्तुति, and (3) that the episodes of the Upaniṣads are only meant to serve the purpose of the पारिप्लव rite. He establishes that the unanimity of the two Kāṇḍas is based upon both of them being subject to विधि, one requiring the help of fire, fuel, etc., the requirements of the other being like that of the horse described in Bṛ. Upa. I. 1 (उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य मुखमासीत्,). The context also shows that these Sūtras make one Adhikaraṇa only, and not as many as five Adhikaraṇas, as with Śaṅkara.

(v) Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41-42. On the ground of the context we have shown that these Sūtras form a part of the preceding Adhikaraṇa, that they deal with the question whether a monk who seeks Brahman can perform official (or priestly) duties or not and that अशन in Sūtra 42 refers to सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्। (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 28). According to Śaṅkara the topic of these Sūtras which he takes as *one* Adhikaraṇa is whether a life-long celibate who commits adultery with a woman other than his

teacher's wife can atone for his sin by a प्रायश्चित्त or not. He interprets Sūtra 42 to mean that the sin in question is called 'उपपातक'.[10]

(vi) Bra. Sū. III. 4. 43–46. The context shows that these Sūtras make only one Adhikaraṇa. According to the context these Sūtras allow one who is outside the order of वानप्रस्थ and सन्न्यासिन् (meaning of बहिः) to perform both official and semi-official duties of his caste.[11] According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 43 means that whether a celibate commits a महापातक or उपपातक, he should be excommunicated from the order to which he belongs. Sūtras 45–46 deal with कर्माङ्गोपासनs according to Śaṅkara, and thus they further discuss the question stated in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55, etc.

(vii) Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 7–14. These Sūtras, if interpreted according to the context, show that the उत्क्रान्ति does take place in the case of a knower of Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra. Saṅkara has three Adhikaraṇas out of these Sūtras and they discuss various topics, Sūtras 7–11 and Sūtras 12–14 dealing with अपराविद्या (including अविद्या) and पराविद्या respectively. The context does not justify any such division.[12]

(viii) Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 15. The context shows that this Sūtra deals with the union of the elements (with which the soul is already united) with the Supreme One *in the heart* and that the topic is that of the उत्क्रान्ति of the knower of Brahman from the body. Saṅkara interprets the Sūtra as dealing with his परा विद्या.[13]

There are innumerable cases where strict adherence to the context leads us to quite different conclusions from those of the Ācāryas who seem to care more for the context of the Sūtras with the Srutis or विषयवाक्यs as they understand the latter, rather than for the context of the Sūtras themselves. These have been treated by us in Part I.

(10) See our Notes on आधिकारिक, अपि, तत्, उपपूर्वं, भाव, अशन and तदुक्तम् in these Sūtras in Part I.

(11) See Notes on बहिः, उभयथा, स्वामिनः, आर्त्विज्यम् ibid.

(12) See Notes on अमृतत्व, अनुपोष्य, तदा, शारीरात्, and एकेषाम् ibid.

(13) See Notes on तानि, परे and आह in Part I.

(10) A practical suggestion regarding the question of discovering the exact context can be made in the case of certain words when they occur in the Sūtras. In these cases we must follow the context strictly, as these words can never be taken as referring to something not stated in the immediately preceding Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa.

(a) अतः or अतः एव, e. g. in Sūtra III.2.26. अतः should refer to अव्यक्त mentioned in Sūtra 23, but Śaṅkara takes it to mean 'स्वाभाविकत्वाद्-भेदस्य अविद्याकृतत्वाच्च भेदस्य' which is a reference to an argument given by Śaṅkara in his commentary on Sūtra III.2.25.[14]

अतः in Bra. Sū. III.3.23 (संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः) should refer to the विशेष mentioned in the preceding two Sūtras. Śaṅkara takes it as referring to आयतनविशेषयोगात् which is a reference to a quotation given by Śaṅkara in his explanation of the preceding Sūtra.

अतः in Bra. Sū. III.3.41 should be taken as referring to some word in the preceding Sūtra (e. g. आदर), but Śaṅkara takes it as तस्मादेव भोजनद्रव्यात् which is mentioned in the Śruti quoted by Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya*, on the preceding Sūtra.

(b) The word 'पूर्व' should always be interpreted as a reference to what has immediately preceded.

पूर्ववत् in Bra. Sū.III.2.29 refers naturally to the example in Sūtra 27 and is meant to give preference to that example over the example in Sūtra 28. But Śaṅkara takes it to refer to his interpretation of Sūtra 25.

पूर्वविकल्पः in Sūtra III.3.44–45 is a reference to the option given in Sūtra III.3.28 (छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात्) and the subsequent Sūtra preceding Sūtra 44. But Śaṅkara explains it as क्रियामय अग्नि which is mentioned in what he thinks to be the विषयवाक्य of the preceding Sūtra. Thus, in this case, by पूर्व Śaṅkara refers to a sequence in *his* विषयवाक्य.

(14) See Note 22 on Sūtra III 2.26 in Part I.

(c) तद् or तदा must always be taken as referring to the immediately preceding Sūtra.

तद् in Bra. Sū.III.3.44 (लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि) should refer to प्रधान (or प्रदान according to Saṅkara's Pāṭha) in the preceding Sūtra, but Saṅkara takes it as referring to लिङ्गम् in Sūtra 44 itself.

तद् in Bra. Sū.III.3.42 (तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्) refers to the question of the विशेषण of प्रधान and पुरुष discussed in Bra. Sū.III.3.37–41 or it should refer to some word in Sūtras 40–41. But Saṅkara takes it to refer to तानि उद्गीथादिकर्मगुणयाथात्म्य-निर्धारणानि which निर्धारणानि are given in the Sruti which Saṅkara takes as the विषयवाक्य of Sūtra 42.

तद् in Sūtra IV.2.17 (तदोकोऽग्रज्वलनम्) should refer to the पर or the Supreme One in the heart mentioned in the preceding Sūtra, but Saṅkara takes it to refer to the individual soul who is not mentioned in the preceding Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa. As a result of this, he has to say that Sūtras 15–16 deal with परा विद्या while Sūtra 17 deals with अपरा विद्या.

(d) Expressions like अन्यथा, अन्यथात्वम्, अन्यत्र, अन्य, etc. should always refer to the reverse of what is said in the preceding Sūtra.

अन्यथात्वम् in Bra. Sū.III3.6 should mean 'the absence of the उपसंहार' which is mentioned in the preceding Sūtra, but Saṅkara takes it as 'न युक्तं विद्यैकत्वम्' with reference to a पूर्वपक्ष about a Sruti which he takes as a विषयवाक्य of Sūtra III.3.6.

In this case अन्यथात्वम् also shows that Sūtra 6 should belong to the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtra 5.

अन्यथा in Bra. Sū.III.3.36 should mean 'if not within one's self' (or it should refer to some word in the Sūtra as interpreted by Saṅkara), but Saṅkara takes it in the sense of अनभ्युपगम्यमाने विद्याऽभेदे, i. e. the reverse of the conclusion he wants to prove in the preceding Sūtra, which is of course to be taken as implied.

अन्यत्र in Bra. Sū.III.3.10 should mean 'other than अभेद' (in सर्वाभेदात् in the Sūtra) or 'in भेद'; but Saṅkara takes it to refer to Srutis other than the Sruti which is the विषयवाक्य according to him.

अन्यत्र in Bra. Sū.III3.20 should mean 'elsewhere than in the similar text', i. e., in a dissimilar text (समाने in Sūtra 19), but Śaṅkara takes it in the sense of another section of the same topic as the one in the Śāṇḍilyavidyā which he takes as discussed in the preceding Sūtra. By adding "एवंजातीयके विषये" Śaṅkara has in fact reversed the sense of अन्यत्र.

इतर in Sūtra III.3.16 should refer to the other of the two (प्रधान and पुरुष meant in Sūtra III.3.10), i. e., to पुरुष because प्रधान is mentioned in Sūtras 11–15. But Śaṅkara takes इतर as referring to other Śrutis about creation than the one which he takes as the विषयवाक्य of Sūtra 16. In fact 'इतर' throughout refers to the aspect of Brahman other than the one mentioned in the particular Sūtra, but Śaṅkara takes it in various ways, e. g., see इतरवत् in Sūtra III.3.37 (व्यतिहारः विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत्).

इमे and other pronouns should also refer to some word or words in the preceding Sūtras.

इमे in Bra. Sū.III.3.10 refers to the two संज्ञाs mentioned in Sūtra III.3.8, but Saṅkara takes it as referring to 'इमे वसिष्ठत्वादयो गुणाः' in his विषयवाक्य of Sūtra 10.

(e) Another important word the sense of which must be interpreted strictiy according to the context is अपि 'also'. This word shows that what has preceded is to be included in or added to what follows.

अपि in Bra.Sū.III.2.11 should go with परस्य. In the case of the individual soul the three states were proved to be not able to explain the two-fold condition of बन्ध and मोक्ष in the preceding Sūtras; now the Sūtrakāra says that these states do not explain the application of the two-fold Srutis to the Supreme

One *also*. So, the states explain the nature neither of the individual soul nor of the Para. But Śaṅkara takes 'स्वत: एव' as understood and connects अपि with it.[15]

अपि in Bra. Sū.III.4.32 (विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि shows that the seeker of liberation should perform the duties of his order in addition to other duties mentioned in Sūtra 27, but Śaṅkara takes मुमुक्षु as the topic of the preceding Sūtras (26–27) and in the case of Sūtra 32 he says 'अमुमुक्षोरप्याश्रममात्रनिष्ठस्य ....कर्तव्यान्येव नित्यानि कर्माणि......' Thus, he takes अपि with अमुमुक्षु who is neither expressly stated nor implied in the preceding Sūtras.

अपि in Sūtra III.4.41 (न चाधिकारिकमपि......) should refer to अतद्भावः (= तद्भूतस्य तु न अतद्भावः न च तद्भूतस्य अधिकारिकमपि कर्म), but Śaṅkara says, यद्यप्यधिकारलक्षणे निर्णीतं प्रायश्चित्तं......तदपि न नैष्ठिकस्य भवितुमर्हति .

Thus, we are left free to imagine what *other* atonement is denied to the sinner in question *in addition to* the atonement mentioned in the Jai. Sū.

अपि in Bra. Sū.III.4.51 (ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात्) should mean 'One who is outside the order of वानप्रस्थ or संन्यासिन्, should do (or may do) *even* the worldly duties *in addition to* the two-fold *duties* mentioned in Sūtra 43 and in Sūtra 48. But Śaṅkara connects अपि with अमुत्र which he takes understood perhaps on on account of ऐहिक in the Sūtra.

(11) As already said, the अध्याहारs to be taken in any Sūtra should depend solely upon the context of the Sūtra, and never upon any thing else, like the विषयवाक्य or the division of परा and अपरा विद्या, etc., which is not mentioned in the Sūtra. By the very fact of its being a sūtra, there are bound to be some gaps in any Sūtra whatever. And the interpretor's right of filling up these gaps should be exercised as rarely as possible, and only in rigid agreement with the Sūtra itself. It is mainly by a wrong

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(15) See *bhāṣya*: न ह्येकं वस्तु स्वतः एव रूपादिविशेषोपेतं तद्विपरीतं चेत्यवधारयितुं शक्यं विरोधात्। अस्तु तर्हि स्थानतः पृथिव्याद्युपधियोगादिति । तदपि नोपपद्यते ।

use of this right that one and the same Sūtra can be interpreted in more than one way, unless the Sūtra is composed of double-meaning words like the verses with the figure of speech called Śleṣa. We have given a list of some of the most important additions made by Śaṅkara without any support of the context, in Chapter 10, where we have also given our suggestions for the additions in harmony with the context.

We have given above some practical suggestions which must be considered by everyone who would like to give a critical interpretation of our Scriptures. They pertain to the method of interpretation. We have tried our best to follow this method in Part I. There are other helps to a critical interpretation, e. g., (1) the fixing of the text of the Brahmasūtra so far as each Sūtra, and what is more important, each Adhikaraṇa are concerned; and (2) also a critical study of the method followed by the commentators. The latter has been dealt with in Chapter 10 as stated above. The former will be the subject of the next Chapter.

CHAPTER 12

THE TEXT OF THE BRAHMASUTRA

Closely connected with the problem of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtra is the problem of the text of the work. Śaṅkara, our oldest authority on the text, has made remarks in his *bhāṣya*, which clearly show his interest in this question. In his commentary on Bra. Sū.III.2.21 he tells us that though he himself takes Sūtras III.2.11–21 as forming *one* Adhikaraṇa, a predecessor of his has two Adhikaraṇas, viz., one of Sūtras III.2.11–14 and another of Sūtras III.2.15–21.[1] Again, in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV.3.14 he notices that one of his predecessors regards Sūtras IV.3.7–11 as presenting the Pūrvapakṣa and Sūtras IV.3.12–14 the Siddhānta, but that he is himself responsible for his own view, viz., that Sūtras IV.3.7–11 present the Siddhānta and Sūtras IV.3.12–14 the Pūrvapakṣa.[2] In a few cases he also notices a difference of readings.[3] Professor Belvalkar has carefully compared the Sūtrapāṭha as given by Śaṅkara with those by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha, Bhāskara, Vijñānabhikṣu and Śrīkaṇṭha and has been able to gather evidence tending to prove that these latter Bhāṣyakāras freely altered the very text of the Sūtras not only by joining two

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(1) अत्र केचिद् द्वे अधिकरणे कल्पयन्ति । प्रथमं तावत्—किं प्रत्यस्तमिताशेषप्रपञ्चमेकाकारं ब्रह्मोत प्रपञ्चवदनेकाकारोपेतमिति । द्वितीयं तु—स्थिते प्रत्यस्तमितप्रपञ्चत्वे किं सल्लक्षणं ब्रह्मोत बोधलक्षणमुतोभयलक्षणमिति । (Sā. *bhāśya* on Bra.Sū.III.2.21.)

(2) केचित्पुनः पूर्वाणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्त्युत्तराणि सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि इत्येतां व्यवस्थामनुरुध्यमानाः परविषया एव गतिश्रुतीः प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति, तदनुपपन्नं गन्तव्यत्वानुपपत्तेर्ब्रह्मणः । (S'ā, *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV.3.14)

(3) In Bra. Sū.II.1.15 S'aṅkara has two readings:—

(1) भावे चोपलब्धेः and (2) भावाच्चोपलब्धेः. In Bra.Sū.I.2.26 he reads पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते, but also notices the reading 'पुरुषविधमपि चैनमधीयते.'

successive Sūtras into one or splitting one Sūtra into two or changing their sequence, but they have also modified the words, omitted some Sūtras altogather and have actually inserted new "Sūtras". He gives illustrations of all these cases.[4] Dr. Ghate also complains of all these difficulties about the text and the interpretation of these Sūtras.[5] "There is a traditional division of the Sūtras into Adhyāyas and Pādas handed down to us, on which there is a unanimity of opinion. No such division into Adhikaraṇas, unanimously accepted, has come down to us."[6]

In this chapter we intend to suggest some rules derived from critical tests *to fix the text* of the Sūtras. We believe an inquiry of this nature into the text itself will better give us the correct perspective for setting forth the philosophical tenets of the Sūtras by themselves and independently of the special pleadings of the several Bhāṣyakāras, even better than a discussion concerning the probable textual evolution of the extant work.

To begin with, the particle हि would help us in reconstructing the text of the Brahmasūtra and also in interpreting the same. This particle seems to have throughout in the Brahmasūtra the sense of 'because' and, for this reason, it is evident that the Sūtra in which हि occurs, should always supply an argument for the assertion in the same Sūtra or in a preceding Sūtra. This would lead to a corrolary that *the Sūtra with* हि *cannot begin a new Adhikaraṇa.*

Let us examine some of the Sūtras with हि. We find that in most of such Sūtras 'हि' has the sense of supporting a Proposition in the same Sūtra or in a preceding one. We give here a list of those Sūtras where we find ourselves in agreement with

4 Vide Dr. Belvelkar's Paper on "The multiple Authorship of the Vedanta-sūtras" in the Indian Philosophical Review, Vol. II, No. 2, October, 1918.

5 Vide P. 46 of Dr. Ghate's 'The Vedanta'.

6 Vide P. 46 ibid.

Saṅkara. In the following Sūtras हि supplies an argument for the Proposition *in the same Śūtra* in which it occurs.

(1) न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि । Bra. Sū.III.2.11

(2) तदव्यक्तमाह हि । Bra. Sū.III.2.23

(3) प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे । Bra. Sū.III.3.12

(4) गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः। Bra. Sū.III.3.29
"अन्यथा हि विरोधः" supports 'गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा.'

(5) व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् । Bra. Sū.III.3.39
'विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत्' supports व्यतिहारः

(6) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः । Bra. Sū.III.3.51
Here "मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापत्तिः" supports "न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेः".

(7) अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् । Bra. Sū.III.3.55

(8) परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि । Bra. Sū.III.4.18
Here "अपवदति हि" supports परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना च".

(9) आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रियते" । Bra. Sū III.4.45
"तस्मै हि परिक्रियते" supports "आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिः"

(10) न प्रतीके न हि सः । Bra. Sū.IV.1.4

(11) आप्रायणात्, तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् । Bra. Sū.IV.1.12
" तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् " supports ' आप्रायणात् ' which is here as good as a Proposition.

(12) नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि । Bra. Sū.IV.2.6

(13) अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् । Bra. Sū.IV.3.10

It is easy to see that the indeclinable हि in the above Sūtras has the simple sense of 'because" and that in all of them the sentence with हि supports the first part of the same Sūtra.

The word "तथाहि" is similarly used in the following Sūtras:—

(1) अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम् । Bra. Sū.III.2.26

(2) सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्तथा ह्यन्ये । Bra. Sū.III.3.27

(3) भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथाहि दर्शयति । Bra. Sū.III.3.57

(4) तानि परे तथाह्याह । Bra. Su.IV.3.15

(5) प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथाहि दर्शयति । Bra. Sū.IV.4.15

(6) विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह । Bra. Sū.IV.4.19.

It would be noticed that while writing his work in the aphoristic style, the author of the Sūtras uses the expression तथाहि very sparingly as compared with हि the smaller indeclinable having the same sense. We may compare तानि परे तथा ह्याह (Bra. Sū.IV.3.15) with तदव्यक्तमाह हि (Bra. Sū.III.2.23) and ask ourselves why the Sūtrakāra did not frame the former as "तानि परे आह हि" or the latter as तदव्यक्तं तथाह्याह.

The following Sūtras with हि in them are arguments supporting a proposition in a *preceding* Sūtra :-

(1) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14) supports the Proposition 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि' in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11.

(2) ऊर्ध्वरेतःसु च शब्दे हि । (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 17) supports the statement in Sūtra III. 4. 8.

(3) अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषाम् (Bra.Sū.IV.1.17) contains an argument for अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव in Bra. Sū. IV. 1.16.7

(4) स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् (Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 13) supports Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 12.

(5) स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि । Bra.Sū.IV.4.16 supports प्रदीपवदावेश in Bra.Sū.IV.4.15.

Now, we shall discuss the meaning of हि in Bra.Sū.III.2.22, III. 3. 38, III. 3. 44, and IV. 1. 18.

(1) Bra. Sū. III. 2. 22 runs as: प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः । If we interpret हि in the usual sense of 'because', we cannot take the statement in the Sūtra as a Proposition; we must take the Sūtra only as an argument; and in that case it can be an argument in support of a Proposition in a preceding Sūtra. Here, of course, Sūtra 22 contains an argument in favour of दर्शनाच्च in Sūtra 21. In our Notes on Sūtras III. 2. 20-22 we have shown that (1) अन्तर्भाव in Sūtra 20 means तिरोभाव, (1) that दर्शनात् in Sūtra 20 refers to the word आविर्भावतिरोभावौ in Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 1 and that (3) प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति in Sūtra 22 refers to the fact that in Chā. Upa. VII Sanatkumāra tells Nārada that Brahman

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(7) For यदेव विद्ययेति हि (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 18) vide infra.

"is not so much" (lit. Brahman is more than the topic in question, viz; the Name, the Speech, etc. etc.) and ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः in the same Sūtra directly refers to such sentences as अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूयः इति नाम्नो वाव भूयोऽस्ति तन्मे भगवान् ब्रवीतु इति। ......वाग्वा नाम्नो भूयसी। in Chā. Upa. VII.1-14. If we have rightly hit upon the *viṣaya-vākya*, our conjecture that Sūtra 22 is meant to explain दर्शनात् in Sūtra 21 would receive further support. We may also add a remark about the Sūtrakāra's method. As we shall show below, the Sūtrakāra at first gives rational arguments and then he refers to the Śruti or Smṛti in support of the main Proposition; so, as a result of this method, it is likely that if a Sūtra containing a reference to a Śruti or a Smṛti is followed by a a Sūtra with हि, the succeeding Sūtra is most probably meant to explain that Śruti or Smṛti. In any case, a Sūtra with हि and thus making up only an argument cannot be taken as the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa. So, in the case of Bra.Sū.III.2.22 Śaṅkara does not seem to us to be correct in taking it as a new Adhikaraṇa.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.2.38–सैव हि is our reading.[8] Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa, but we have shown that 'सैव हि' means "Because one and the same Śruti (does so)" and that this Sūtra (38) is a particular illustration of the general rule in Sūtra III.2.37, viz., [श्रुतयः प्रधानपुरुषयोः i. e. अव्यक्तपुरुषयोः एकं] इतरवत् विशिंषन्ति, which itself is meant to support the main Proposition, viz., व्यतिहारः in the same Sūtra (37). In our Notes, we have stated our reasons why we do not take Sūtra 38 as beginning a new Adhikaraṇa and why we thus reject Śaṅkara's construction of the Sūtra.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.44 reads as 'लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः.' Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra. But the Sūtra contains हि and it means "*Because* that is more authentic (lit. stronger; more prominent) because of the majority of texts mentioning it...............". Thus, the Sūtra (44) does not contain any Proposition and therefore it should be

(8) Vide our Notes on the Sūtra in Part I.

taken as only supporting the Proposition in Sūtra 43. तद् also in Sūtra 44 should refer to प्रधान mentioned in Sūtra 43 (which is our reading instead of प्रदान in the traditional *pāṭha*).

(4) Bra.Sū IV.1.18.—उभयोः यदेव विद्ययेति हि। Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra (यदेव विद्ययेति हि) as a new Adhikaraṇa. But it is evident that it is only a हेतु and therefore it can only be taken as supplying an argument in support of the Proposition in Sūtra 16.[9]

Thus, it can be shown that all Sūtras with हि should be taken as only a part of an Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra in each case belongs.

In the above discussion of Sūtras with हि we have not considered one Sūtra with हि, viz., स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारे अधिकाराच्च—Bra.Sū.III.3.3. To us this Sūtra appears to contain an explanation of the argument "एकस्यामपि" in Bra.Sū.III.3.2 (भेदान्नेति चेन्न एकस्यामपि). The rule of स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः does conflict with the arguement that "even if चोदना, etc., are the same *in only one* Śākhā of each Veda, Brahman is (the principle) to be known from *all* the Vedanta Śrutis (i. e. from the accepted Upaniṣads)." We believe, even without हि, the sense of this Sūtra (3) would be the same as with हि. We here beg to leave out the interpretation of हि in this Sūtra till further study, admitting our inability to make out its sense as it is.

We may next take up the discussion of the Sūtras with तु in them. It is well-known that the usual sense of the particle तु is 'but' and it signifies the rejection of an Opponent's view (Pūrvapakṣa) and that the Sūtra in which it occurs is a Siddhānta Sūtra. In this sense the word occurs in the following Sūtras according to Śaṅkara and we agree with him.

(1) सामान्यात्तु। Bra.Sū.III.2.32. The Pūrvapakṣa is stated in the preceding Sūtra (III.2.31) and Śaṅkara explains तु as 'तुशब्देन प्रदर्शितां प्राप्तिं निरुणाद्धि।'.

(9) For other arguments vide our Notes on Sūtra IV. 1. 18.

(2) पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्। Bra.Sū.III.2.41. The Pūrvapakṣa is given in the preceding Sūtra.

(3) संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि। Bra.Sū.III.3.8. We have stated in our Notes how and why we differ from Śaṅkara as regards the interpretation of this Sūtra. Here it is sufficient to say that Śaṅkara also takes 'तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि' as the statement of the Siddhānta. Śaṅkara however seems to interpret तु in the sense of च, which[10] is evidently wrong, because he takes 'संज्ञातः इति चेत्' as the Opponent's arguement, as we also do. Thus, तु here too means the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa stated partly in a preceding Sūtra and partly in this Sūtra.[11]

(4) विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् Bra.Sū.III.3.47. Though here we differ from Śaṅkara as regards the interpretation, we fully agree with his view that the Pūrvapakṣa is given in the preceding three Sūtras (III.3.45–46) and that this is a Siddhānta Sūtra.

(5) परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्ये भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः Bra.Sū.III.3.52. For our difference from Śaṅkara's interpretation the Notes on this Sūtra may be referred to. Śaṅkara and we take the particle 'तु' as denoting the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa mentioned in Sūtras III.3.45–46. Thus, inspite of the difference of interpretation about the Sūtra between Śaṅkara and ourselves, it may be said that तु in this Sūtra signifies the refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa stated in Sūtra III.3.45–46.

(6) व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावाभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत् Bra.Sū.III.3.54 Śaṅkara takes the preceding Sūtra as stating the Pūrvapakṣa.

(7) काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्नवा पूर्वहेत्वभावात्। Bra.Sū.III.3.60. This is a Siddhānta Sūtra refuting a Pūrvapakṣa not stated in the preceding Sūtra (विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात्— (Bra.Sū.III.3.52) but to be easily inferred from it.

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(10) Cf. अस्ति चैतत्संज्ञैकत्वम् in Sāṅkara *bhāṣys* on Bra.Sū.III.3.8.

(11) The complete Pūrvapakṣa statement is अन्यथात्वं संज्ञात :। अन्यथात्वम् being understood from Sūtra 6.

(8) अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्। Bra.Sū.III.4.8. The Pūrvapakṣa is given in Bra.Sū.III.4.2-7.

(9) तुल्यं तु दर्शनम्। Bra.Sū.III.4.9. The Pūrvapakṣa is stated in Bra.Sū.III.4.3 (आचारदर्शनात्).

(10) उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् Bra.Sū.III.4.42. Though we differ from Śaṅkara as regards the interpretation of this Sūtra and the one which precedes it, viz., न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तद्योगात्; we agree with him in taking this Sūtra (III 4.42) as a refutation or rather a modification of the view expressed in Sūtra III. 4. 41. 'तु' shows that the view in Sūtra III.4.41 is refuted, while 'उप' shows that the refutation is not a complete one.[12] So, we can safely say that even according to Śaṅkara 'तु' in Sūtra III.4.42, as in other Sūtras, is an indication of the refutation of a view expressed in a preceding Sūtra.

In all these cases 'तु' is taken to mean the refutation of a पूर्वपक्ष and the Sūtra is treated as a Siddhānta Sūtra. The Pūrvapakṣa is given in a preceding Sūtra or in the Sūtra itself except in the case of Bra. Sū.III. 3. 60, where it is to be inferred from the preceding Sūtra.

Now, we shall notice those Sūtras with तु, which are Siddhānta Sūtras according to Śaṅkara with whom we agree, but in which Śaṅkara does not point out a definite Pūrvapakṣa and thus does not always give the sense of the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa to the word तु, but assigns some other sense to it, e. g., that of *qualifying* (विशेषण) some statement:-

(1) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्। Bra.Sū.III.2.27. Śaṅkara does not seem to explain the importance of तु at all. We have shown that the preceding Sūtra (III. 2.26 अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम्। gives the Pūrvapakṣa.[13]

(2) हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाछन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम्। Bra.Sū.III.3.26. Śaṅkara interprets तु in the sense of केवल, but this is not the usual sense of तु.

(12) Vide our Notes on उप in the Sūtra in Part I.

(13) Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26.

Moreover, he takes this Sūtra as forming an Adhikaraṇa by itself. We have suggested that the preceding Sūtra (वेधाद्यर्थभेदात्। Bra.Sū.III.3.25.) contains the Pūrvapakṣa and both these Sūtras (together with Bra. Sū. III. 3. 27) form one Adhikaraṇa discussing the meditation on the Syllable Om [14]

(3) कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः। Bra Sū.III.4.48. Here Śaṅkara takes 'तु' in the sense of qualification.[15] We have shown in our Notes how our interpretation differs from that of Śaṅkara and how Sūtra III.4.48 contains a refutation of the view in Sūtra III 4.47 which makes the performance of *all other helping actions optional* for *all* the orders of life. Sūtra 48 makes them *compulsory for a householder* seeking emancipation.

(4-7) इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु। Bra.Sū.IV.1.14.
अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः। Bra. Sū.IV.1.15.
अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्। Bra. Sū.IV.1.16.
\+ \+ \+
भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते। Bra.Sū.IV.1.19.

Here we have a series of Sūtras with तु. Śaṅkara interprets 'पाते तु' in Sūtra 14 as "तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः। एवं धर्माधर्मयोः बन्धहेत्वोर्विद्यासामर्थ्यादश्लेषविनाशसिद्धेरवश्यंभाविनी विदुषः शरीरपाते मुक्तिरित्यवधारयति।"—we have shown that 'पाते तु' means that the पुण्यअसंश्लेष takes place not on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman like the पापअसंश्लेष stated in the preceding Sūtra, but on the fall of the body. As long as the body lasts, the knower of Brahman must continue his contact with the religious good deeds. Thus, तु in Sūtra IV.1.14 indicates the rejection of the view that पुण्यासंश्लेष also takes places on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

Sūtra IV.1.15 contains तु and it is, as shown by us in our Notes on it, an indication that the view of पूर्वपापपुण्यअसंश्लेष stated in Sūtra IV.1.15 is modified by Sūtra 15. Sūtra 15 does not accept

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(14) Vide Note on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 25.

(15) S'a. *bhaṣya*—तु शब्दो विशेषणार्थः। कृत्स्नभावोऽस्य (गृहिणः) विशिष्यते।

the conclusion that पूर्व पाप and पुण्य both अनारब्धकार्य as also आरब्धकार्य are respectively destroyed and dissociated from the sage—a view which may be taken as expressed in Sūtras 13–14.

Again, Sūtra IV.1.16 restricts the meaning of Sūtra IV. 1. 15. The latter conveys the sense that *all* good deeds which are अनारब्धकार्य and which precede the attainment of the knowledge are dissociated from the sage (असंश्लेषः) on the fall of the body, while Sūtra IV.1.16 says that *the particular good deeds*, viz., अग्निहोत्र and others, which are नित्यकर्मन्s which *precede* the attainment of the knowledge (Sūtra 15) are useful to the sage for getting Mokṣa, the aim of the *knowledge* of Brahman, i. e., these particular good deeds work as help to *Jñāna* for the same goal.

In Sūtra IV.1.19 इतरे means आरब्धकार्ये (पूर्वे) पापपुण्ये. In Sūtras IV.1.13 and IV.1.14 we are told that *all* 'preceding' sins of a sage are destroyed on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman; in Sūtra 15 we learn that only those 'preceding sins which are अनारब्धकार्य are so destroyed while Sūtra 19 states that the आरब्धकार्य preceding sins are destroyed only by means of the sage suffering their results during his life after the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Again, from Sūtra IV.1.14 we gather that *all* good deeds of a sage are dissociated from him on the fall of his body; in Sūtras 15–16 we learn that the preceding good deeds both नित्य (like अग्निहोत्रादि) and others, which are अनारब्धकार्य, are dissociated from the sage only on the fall of the body, while Sūtra 19 tells us that the preceding good deeds which are आरब्धकार्य are dissociated from the sage only after he has had their good results during his life after the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, तु in Sūtra 19 like तु in Sūtra 15 is a partial refutation of the view expressed in Sūtras 13 and 14.

In short, the particle तु in all these four Sūtras (IV. 1. 14, 15,16, and 19) signifies partial refutation of views expressed in a preceding Sūtra, which is also a Siddhānta Sūtra.

It is necessary to add that Śaṅkara also does not regard any of these four Sūtras with तु as stating a Pūrvapakṣa; he rather takes all of them as representing the Siddhānta. He does not seem to us to expressly emphasise the fact that the Pūrvapakṣa refuted partly by the repeated तु is mainly the one implied in a preceding Sūtra which is here a Siddhānta Sūtra.[16]

In the above seven Sūtras तु indicates the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa; and, though Śaṅkara does not make out the Pūrvapakṣa from a preceding Sūtra, we have suggested that probably in all these cases the required Pūrvapakṣa can be derived from a preceding Sūtra.

We shall now quote examples of Sūtras with तु, which are Siddhānta Sūtras and which refute a Pūrvapakṣa not expressed but *only implied* :—

(1) इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात्। Bra.Sū.III.3 13. We have shown in our Notes that this and the two Sūtras which follow it mean that in the meditation on the *arūpavat* or Pradhāna aspect of Brahman, the negative attributes [17] *are not to be collected* for the purpose of the meditation. Śaṅkara's interpretation is different from ours; [18] yet he takes the Sūtra as a Siddhānta Sūtra and regards तु as conveying the sense of the refutation of a Pūrvapaksa implied in a preceding Siddhānta Sūtra (III. 3. 12). But this does not seem to us to be the correct view; because the Siddhānta eatablished in this Sūtra (13) is only a repetition of the Siddhānta established in Sūtra 11. We rather think that the Pūrvapakṣa insisting upon the meditation on the negative attributes of the Pradhāna, which is here refuted, is not given in any Sūtra here but is to be only inferred.

(2) अक्षराधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् Bra.Sū.III.3.33. In our Notes on this Sūtra, we have shown how this Sūtra,

(16) Even Sūtra IV.1.13 is a Siddhānta Sūtra.

(17) I. e. the attributes like अनणु, अह्रस्वम्, अदीर्घम्, अलोहितम्........Bṛ.Upa.

(18) Vide Notes on Bra.Sū.III.3.13 in Part 1.

though taken as an independent Adhikaraṇa by Śaṅkara, should have originally formed part of an Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras III.3 31-33 and how तदुक्तम् in this Sūtra refers to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13–15. We agree with Śaṅkara in interpreting तु as expressing the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa. This Sūtra (III. 3. 33) itself reasserts the Siddhānta established in Sūtras III. 3. 13-15, as made clear by तदुक्तम्; so the Pūrvapakṣa in both the places is the same. It is not stated in any Sūtra.

(3) शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् ।— Bra.Sū. III.4.27. This Sūtra refutes a Pūrvapakṣa holding that one who is possessed of the qualities of tranquility of mind, control of sense, etc., mentioned in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23, need not perform *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas* stated in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22, as the acts to be performed by a seeker of Mokṣa. The preceding Sūtra (26) mentions only the *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas* but does not give this Pūrvapakṣa. Śaṅkara also takes this Sūtra (27) as a Siddhānta Sūtra.

(4) अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।—Bra.Sū.III.4.36. According to Śaṅkara also this is a Siddhānta Sūtra. We think that it refutes a Pūrvapakṣa, viz., a seeker of Mokṣa must necessarily pass gradually from one order of life to the other. In the Sūtra (III.4.35) which precedes this Sūtra, it is stated that the Śruti shows that the duties of the orders and the other duties of *yajña*, *dāna* and *tapas are not suppressed* on account of a man being a seeker of Mokṣa; but there is no indication of the compulsion about these duties which would justify तु in Sūtra 36. So, we have to infer that 'तु' refutes a Pūrvapakṣa not stated in a preceding Sūtra.

(5) अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च । Bra.Sū.III.4.39. As the word 'ज्यायस्' shows, तु is meant to refute only the comparative importance of a view and not the view itself. This superior importance which is the topic of refutation is not stated in a preceding Sūtra.

(6) तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमातद्रूपाभावेभ्यः । Bra.Sū.III.4.40. We have shown in our Notes that तु in this Sūsra refutes the

view that a seeker of Mokṣa who has become a hermit or an ascetic may again become a householder or a student. Śaṅkara does not seem to interpret तु.

The Pūrvapakṣa stating the option denied in this Sūtra (40) is not given in a preceding Sūtra.

बहिस्तूभयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।— Bra.Sū.III.4.43. Here 'तु' seems to refute a Pūrvapakṣa that a seeker of Brahman, though he is *outside* the orders of a hermit or an ascetic (बहिः), should not perform the priestly or professional or semi-professional duties; but such a Pūrvapakṣa is not stated in a preceding Sūtra.

(8) आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । Bra.Sū.IV.1.3. Here Śaṅkara explains तु in the sense of एव. To us, तु seems to refute the view that the seeker of Brahman practising the Means of Mokṣa and born repeatedly on this earth forgets everything of his past births and begins his efforts quite fresh. But this view is not given in a preceding Sūtra.

(9) संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः । Bra.Sū.IV.4.8. The Pūrvapakṣa that the liberated soul would create the objects of enjoyment by his own physical labour or that the objects could be created for him by the efforts of some one else, is not stated in a preceding Sūtra.

In all these nine Sūtras (in Bra.Sū.III.2.11–IV) तु is not interpreted by Śaṅkara as used in a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra to refute or to criticise or to modify a Siddhānta view or a view supposed to be the Siddhānta. It may be that there were some Vedanta-sūtras whose views were refuted in these Sūtras without quoting them in a preceding Sūtra. It is not the habit of the Sūtrakāra to use तु so often without giving it its due significance. In fact, he does not seem to use any word that would be superfluous or redundant. There are many Siddhānta Sūtras without any तु at all. So, the use of तु is significant, and it always means the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa either stated or not in a preceding Sūtra. One important point is that so far we have examined

about 26 Sūtras with तु in them but none of them is, even according to Śaṅkara, a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.

We shall now consider how far the copulative particle च can help us in reconstructing the text of the Brahmasūtra. The importance of च in this respect would be numerically far more than that of any other particle, because in about 227 Sūtras (from Bra.Sū.III.2.11 to Bra.Sū.IV.4) the particle च occurs about 80 times.

The particle च has its usual sense of 'addition' in the following Sūtras :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.13. 'अपि च' shows that this Sūtra adds one more arguement to the Sūtrakāra's reply to 'न भेदात्'.

(2) Bra.Sū III.2.15-18. As we have shown in our Notes, Sūtra 15 is a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra. It adds one more adjective to the one, viz., *arūpavat*, stated in the preceding Sūtra, while Sūtras III.2.16 to 18, each of which has च, add three arguments to substantiate प्रकाशवत् in Sūtra 15.

(3) Bra.Sū III 2.21 adds a Śruti as an argument to 'उभय-सामञ्जस्यादेवम्' in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 20.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.2.24-25. The second च (प्रकाशश्च) shows an argument to support प्रकाशादिवच्चाविशेष्यम्.

(5–16) III. 3. 3, 5, 22, 39, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 62, 63, 64.

(17-31) III. 4. 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 43.

(32-34) IV. 1. 3, 8, 9. (35-37) IV. 2. 1, 17, 19.

(38-42) IV. 3. 8, 11, 13, 14, 15. (43-45) IV. 4. 17, 19, 20.

According to Śaṅkara, with whom we agree, the particle च in these (about) 50 Sūtras adds one more argument (*yukti*) to that already given in a preceding Sūtra, or adds a Śruti as an argument, or shows the further application of a Proposition (e. g., in Sūtra III. 3. 5).

In certain Sūtras, च performs a double function, viz., that of *adding a final* argument so that these Sūtras show the end of an Adhikaraṇa as well as the addition of one more argument to those already given. We simply give below a list of the Sūtras of this type only where we find our-selves *in agreement with* Śaṅkara.

(1) III 2. 30. (2–4) III. 3. 4, 15, 66.
(5–6) III. 4. 17, 46. (7–8) IV. 1. 2, 10.
(9–11) IV. 2. 2, 14, 21. (12) IV. 3. 16.
(13) IV. 4. 9.

Besides these thirteen Sūtras, there are several Sūtras in which according to Śaṅkara, the conjunctive particle च serves also as an indication of the Sūtra being the last one in an Adhikaraṇa, e. g., (1) Bra. Sū. III. 2. 21, (2-3) Bra. Sū. III. 2. 22, ञु 52, (4-7) III. 4. 22, 24, 31, 35, (8) IV. 4. 2, 11 (9) IV. 3 14[19]. In these nine cases, we do not agree with Śaṅkara in taking each particular Sūtra as the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa. We may, however, note here that altogether there are about twentytwo Sūtras with च which in the opinion of Śaṅkara are the *last* Sūtras of their respective Adhikaraṇas.

If we make a calculation from the above twofold usage of च according to Śaṅkara, we find that in about seventy two places *he does not take* a Sūtra with च as *standing at the beginning of a new Adhikaraṇa.*

Now, we give a list of Sūtras with च which Śaṅkara takes either as the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa or as the *only* Sūtra of a *new* Adhikaraṇa; and we also give our own reasons why we do not agree with Śaṅkara.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.9. व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् । Śaṅkara makes one Adhikaraṇa of this Sūtra. We think it is the last Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras III. 3. 5–9. Sūtra III. 3. 9 gives the

(19) Our arguments for not taking these Sūtras as the *last* Sūtras of the Adhikaraṇa are given in their proper places in Part I.

last argument of the Siddhānta for rejecting the Pūrvapakṣa, viz., अन्यथात्वम्. There should be no Collection (उपसंहार- Sūtra III.3.5).

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.19. समाने एवं चाभेदात्। — Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa, but we have shown with reasons that this Sūtra extends the rule or Proposition about the *A-pūrva* mentioned originally in the Bṛ. Upa. and discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra.Sū.III.3.18, to other Upaniṣads which also come within the range of the title 'Vedānta' as much as the Bṛ. Upa does. We have shown that समाने च in this Sūtra is like समाने च in Bra.Sū.III.3.5 (उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च)

(3–4) Bra.Sū.III 3.23. संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः। and Bra.Sū.III.3.24. पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात्। Śaṅkara makes an Adhikaraṇa of each of these Sūtras. We have shown in our Notes that these two Sūtras give two more arguments for the Siddhāntin's refutation of the Pūrvapaaṣa stated in Sūtra III.3.20 (संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि।).

For this reason also Sūtra III.3.22 should not be taken as the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa. All these three Sūtras (22, 23, 24) have each of them the particle च and we conclude that Sūtra 24 ends the Adhikaraṇa. Sūtra 25 has no च in it and makes a fresh Proposition, as we shall show below.

(5–6) Bra.Sū.III.4.25-अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा। and Bra.Sū.III.4.26. -सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्। Śaṅkara takes each of these two Sūtràs as an Adhikaraṇa by itself. We have given our arguments in our Notes to show that Sūtras 25 and 26 explain why the knowledge of Brahman is something *to be performed* (अनुष्ठेय) or even that the knowledge is of the nature of an Injunction (विधि–Sūtra 20). Because the knowledge of Brahman is *anuṣṭheya* like the Vedic Sacrifices, there is a unanimity of sense between the two Kāṇḍas of the Śruti (*ekavākyatā*-Bra. Sū. III.4.24) and it is for the reason of such a unanimity between the two that the *performance* of the knowledge of Brahman does not stand in need of fire, fuel, etc; which are needed in the Pūrvakāṇḍa (Sūtra III.4.25) and that all requirements for its *performance*

resulting from the Śruti (Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.22) which lays down the sacrifice, donation, and austerities for the knowledge of Brahman are of the nature of the Horse[20] described at the beginning of the Bṛ. Upa. (Sūtra 26). In our opinion, Sūtra 26, with च in it, is the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa consisting of Bra.Sū. III.4.18–26, which discusses the question whether the knowledge of Brahman is of the nature of simple reflection (Jaimini's view-Sūtra 18) or is something to be performed (Bādarāyaṇa's view-Sūtras 19–20).

(7) Bra.Sū.III.4.28. – सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये वाक्यशेषात् । Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra. We have shown that a new Adhikaraṇa should begin with Sūtra III.4.27 which asserts the Proposition that though a seeker of liberation is possessed of the control of the mind *(śama)*, the senses, *(dama)*, etc, he must perform the *yajña, dāna, tapas* laid down in Bṛ. Upa. IV.4.23 for him. Sūtra III.4.28 means that even if the seeker be possessed of the *śama, dama*, etc., he should not break the rule about persons from whom he can eat his food or about the eatable and uneatable food; the violation or setting aside of that rule is allowed *(sarvānnāumati)* even to the seeker possessed of *śama, dama*, etc. only when he is in the danger of losing his life (*prāṇātyaye* – Bra.Sū.III.4.28). Thus, this Sūtra is closely connected with the preceding Sūtra.

(8) Bra.Sū.III.4.32. – विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि । Here also Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa, but we have stated with probability that Sūtra 32 is a continuation of the Adhikaraṇa begun with Sūtra 27 in so far as the latter asks the seeker to perform *yajña, dana, tapas* (in accordance with Bṛ.Upa.IV.4.23), while the former *adds* to those the duties of the order to which the seeker belongs. Only those two kinds of duties must be performed by a seeker under any circumstances (Bra.Sū.III.4.34).

(9) Bra.Sū.III.4. 36. – अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः । Without repeating our arguments given in our Notes, we may here say that also

(20) Cf. उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य etc. See Notes.

this Sūtra with च can be easily understood to belong to a digression discussed in Sūtras 36–39, which helps in clearing the conclusion in Sūtra 34. A seeker must perform the duties of the order to which he belongs, and though he *can* jump over an order or even two orders of life (e. g., when a seeker belonging to the order of the celibate takes up the order of the renunciation of the world in accordance with Śruti and Smṛti allowing such a jump); the one regularly passing from one order to another is better than the one availing himself of the Scriptural concession (Sūtra 39).

(10) Bra.Sū.III.4.41. न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात्। Śaṅkara does not see the connection of this Sūtra with the preceding Sūtra (III.4.40); most probably this Sūtra is meant to prevent a seeker belonging to the order of an ascetic from doing the (priestly or) *official* duties of his *varṇa* or caste.

(11) Bra.Sū.IV.1.6. आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः। Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as Adhikaraṇa V. We interpret it to mean that the "returned" seeker has the notions of the Sun, etc., in the parts *(aṅgas)* of the Lord. In fact, Sūtras IV.1.3-6 tell us how a returned seeker looks upon Brahman *Iteslef* (Sūtra 3), the Symbol of Brahman (i.e., the Praṇava, Sūtras 4–5) and the external world consisting of the Sun, etc., (Sūtra 6). The Sūtra is the last Sūtra of this Adhikaraṇa.

(12) Bra.Sū.IV.2.7. समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य। "And this *utkrānti* is common, during all his returns (*āvṛtti*-Sūtra IV.1.1) after he begins (to go on) the Path of gods (having given up the Path of the Pitṛs) until the attainment of immortality". So, this Sūtra is a part of the Adhikaraṇa dealing with the process of the *utkrānti* described in Sūtras IV.2.1.6.

(13) Bra.Sū.IV.2.20. अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे। The seeker who leaves the gross body through the hundred and first artery joins on his very departure the rays of the Sun, even though he may leave the body at night (Sūtra 19) and even though he may do so during

the six months of the Sun's Southern Course (*dakṣiṇāyana*-Bra. Sū.IV.2.20). Thus, Sūtra 20 solves the same doubt about the seeker's departure in *dakṣiṇāyana*, as Sūtra 19 about his departure at night. So, Sūtras 20–21 are parts of the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtras 18–19.

We have above discussed thirteen Sūtras with च and shown that in these cases where Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa, really we have the continuation of the Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra in each case belongs. We may here remark that in all these Sūtras Śaṅkara does not take च in its usual sense of mere *addition* of one more *argument* for the statement made in a preceding Sūtra; he has to find some other theme of addition or, often, to leave च unexplained.

There are two Sūtras with च, which Śaṅkara does not take as the last Sūtras of their respective Adhikaraṇas, but which we have proposed to regard as the *last* ones, viz., (1) III.2.39 (श्रुतत्वाच्च) and (2) IV.4.21 (भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।)

(1) Bra.Sū III.2.39. श्रुतत्वाच्च । Śaṅkara takes one Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras III.2.39–41. We believe, च in Sūtra III.2.39 shows that we have here one Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras III.2.38-39, because Sūtra III.2.39 gives the second and the last argument for the statement that 'the Fruit in the form of Liberation is to be had from this unmanifest One', (फलमतः Bra.Sū.III.2.38). The fact that Sūtra 40 makes a fresh Proposition *(See below)* also supports our view that Sūtra III.2.39 is the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa.

(2) III.4.21. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च । Śaṅkura takes an Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras III.4.17–22. We have proposed to regard Sūtra IV 4.21 as the *last* Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa made of Sūtras IV 4.17-20, because we think that this Adhikaraṇa deals with one topic, while Sūtra IV.4.22 deals with a different topic.

Besides the Sūtras with च already discussed, we may notice च in the following Sūtras for the correct understanding of the import of this conjunctive particle :—(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.13, 18, 35; (2) Bra.

Sū. III.2.46, 64; (3) Bra.Sū.III.4.7, 15, 22, 33. In all these Sūtras च shows the end of the arguments either of the Opponent or of the Siddhāntin, e.g., in Bra.Sū.III.2.35 च shows that *all* the arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa have been refuted; and in Bra.Sū.III.4.7 च signifies the end of the arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa.

The above examination of the use of च in the Bra.Sū. would prove that (1) when a Sūtra begins with च, most probably it is not the first or only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa and (2) when a Sūtra with च occurs in course of an Adhikaraṇa, it generally signifies the last argument for the point in question and *often* in this case the Sūtra is the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa, though not always so.

We may here add a note that in Bra.Sū.II.2.1 we have the single case of a Sūtra with च at the very beginning of a Pāda. In a separate Paper[21] published elsewhere we have tried to show that Bra.Sū.II.1 deals with the Sūtrakāra's view about the Vedānta of the Smṛtis like the Gītā, while Bra.Sū.II.2.1–11 present the same about the rational Sāṁkhya School and thus, च in Bra.Sū.II.2.1 is meant *to include* the arguments in Bra.Sū. II.1 in those of the Sūtrakāra's refutation of the rational Sāṁkhya School, which also claimed the support of several Śrutis (discussed in Bra.Sū.I.4) and Smṛtis discussed in Bra.Sū.II.1. Like the presence of च in a Sūtra, the absence of the same in some Sūtras also should be examined. We have so far come across *only one* such noteworthy case. Sūtra III.3 62 (शिष्टेश्च) and III.3.64 (गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च) have each of them च while the intervening Sūtra III.3.63 (समाहारात्) is *without* च. If there is a series of हेतुs given here in Sūtras 62–64 for proving the statement in Bra.Sū.III.3.61 (अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः), why have we no च in Bra.Sū III.3 63? We believe, we should either have च in Sūtra III.3.63 or we should have *one* Sūtra, viz., शिष्टेश्चसमाहारात्, insead of Sūtras 62 and 63. This latter seems to us to be the only possible solution. We have shown in our Notes that Sūtra III.3.61

(21) Vide the author's Paper on "Meaning of Smṛti in the Brahma-Sūtra" in the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1936.

refers to the notions of the head, the eye, etc., in the Sky (द्यु), the Sun (आदित्य), etc., mentioned in Chā.Upa.V.12, 13, etc., while the समाहारात् शिष्टि "teaching in a collection" or 'the collective teaching' refers to तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा संदेहो बहुलः etc., in Chā.Upa.V.18. Thus, we should have here one Sūtra, viz., शिष्टेश्च समाहारात् । This is our inference from the absence of च in Bra.Sū.III.3.63.

As regards the *meaning* of च we might here briefly say that though Śaṅkara mostly interprets it as a conjunctive particle, there are some rare cases in which he gives it a meaning suitable to him on the occasion. In Bra.Sū.II.3.40 (यथा च तक्षोभयथा) which is not discussed by us in the present work, Śaṅkara takes च in the sense of तु[22] while in Bra.Sū.III.3.62 he explains च in the sense of वा. We beg to suggest that it has *always* the sense of 'and' throughout the Brahmasūtra.

For recovering the original reading *(pāṭha)* of the text of the Brahmasūtra particularly with reference to the division of the Adhikaraṇa, besides the above test of the study of the use of particles like हि, तु, च, etc., we have also one more difficult test, viz., that of the study of the grammatical construction of certain Sūtras.

The most promient among these Sūtras with peculiar grammatical construction are the *Sūtras with words in the ablative case* having the sense of *hetu* 'reason', e.g., Sūtra IV.3.5 (उभयव्यामोहात्तत्सिद्धेः) gives the *hetu* for Sūtra IV.3.4 (आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात्). In this case the *hetusūtra* is like a Sūtra with हि, i.e., it is by itself incomplete in sense and *gives only a reason for a conclusion* in a preceding Sūtra which may present the Pūrvapakṣa or a the Siddhānta. Thus, Sūtra IV.3.5 could have as well been worded as उभयव्यामोहाद्धि तत्सिद्धिः । If we do not take such a Sūtra as only a *hetusūtra*, we should have to make many additions to it before we could make out a connected complete meaning from it.

(22) Vide S'ā. bhā. on Bra.Sū.II.3.40.

We give below a list of the *hetusūtras* which Śaṅkara does not take as such and with which he begins a new Adhikaraṇa, while we take them as part of an Adhikaraṇa to which the respective preceding Sūtra belongs. Our explanation of the entire Sūtras is given in our Notes. It would be eaily seen that these Sūtras with oblative case in the sense of *hetu* are like the Sūtras with हि, [23] which we have already proposed to take as closely connected with the preceding Sūtra.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.14—आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्। Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra, but unless we make several additions[24] to it, we cannot get a complete sense out of it. It really gives only a *hetu* like the *hetu* अर्थसामान्यात् in Sūtra III.3.13 and supports 'इतरे तु' in the latter.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.3.27—सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् तथाह्यन्ये। This Sūtra (सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्।) gives only a *hetu*, and makes no self-complete statement.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.53—एके आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्। 'आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्' is the statement of only a *hetu* and it is the reason advanced by 'some'. The Sūtra cannot be taken as the beginning of an Adhikaraṇa as is done by Śaṅkara.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.4.44—स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः। As in the case of the above three Sūtras, Śaṅkara takes this also as the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa, but we think 'स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेः' gives only an argument for the Conclusion "बहिस्तूभयथा" in the preceding Sūtra, it being the third argument besides स्मृतेः and आचारात् stated in Sū.III.4.43.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.2.8—तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात्। We have shown that this Sūtra supports the Assertion made in the preceding Sūtra.

(6) Bra.Sū.IV.2.12—प्रतिषेधादितिचेन्न शारीरात्। This Sūtra supports the statement in Bra.Sū.IV.2.7. This Sūtra is like Bra.Sū.III.

(23) Cf. Bra.Sū.III.2.22, III.3.44, IV.1.18.
(24) Vide our Notes on the Sūtra in Part I.

3.17 (अन्वयादितिचेत् स्यादवधारणात्) which Śaṅkara takes as an argument for the preceding Sūtra.

All these are *hetusūtras* with *pañcamī* (the Ablative Case) and therefore should not be taken as the first Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa.

There are some Sūtras which have neither हि nor a word in the Ablative as an indication of their being only an argument, but which still do not seem to us to begin a new Adhikaraṇa and so far we differ from Śaṅkara. Our reasons for joining these Sūtras with their respective preceding Sūtras are mostly contextual. Though these Sūtras are of the form of a statement, they serve as arguments for the Conclusion in a preceding Sūtra. These Sūtras taken by themselves *cannot yield a self-complete sense* and therefore they are of different nature from those which we would call "प्रतिज्ञासूत्रs" or "Sūtras of Propositions" and which invariably begin a new Adhikaraṇa (See below).

(1) Bra.Sū.III.3.6 अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् । The meaning of अन्यथात्वम् by itself is not clear and therefore we have to join this Sūtra to the preceding one. In fact the Sūtra could have as well been put us शब्दान्नेतिचेन्नाविशेषात्. It is a Pūrvapakṣa against the *upasaṁhāra* proposed in the preceding Sūtra.

(2) We have shown that Sūtra III 3.19 (समाने एवं चाभेदात् ।) should be connected with Sūtra III.3.18 (कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् ।). We believe, Sūtra III 3.20 (संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि) presents a Pūrvapakṣa and thus continues the same topic as in the preceding Sūtra as is suggested by एवम् and अन्यत्र; so this Sūtra should be grouped in the same Adhikaraṇa as the preceding two Sūtras.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.3.29 गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथाहि विरोधः । This Sūtra is closely connected with छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात् (Bra.Sū.III.3.28) through the word उभय, and gives a हेतु for Sūtra III.3.28.

(4–5) Bra.Sū.III.3.22 यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ! and Bra.Sū. III.3.33 अक्षराधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यां तदुक्तम् । We think, these two Sūtras along with Sūtra III.3.31 present the attributes or medita-

tional thoughts (धीs) on the Puruṣa and should be therefore grouped together exactly like Sūtra III.3.11–13 (also 14–15) which are taken as forming one Adhikaraṇa by Śaṅkara and which present the attributes to be used in the meditation on the Pradhāna or the Formless Aspect of Brahman.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.39 सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः । [25] This Sūtra is a corollary of the Interchange (*vyatihāra*) stated in Bra.Sū. III.3 37.

(7-8) Bra.Sū.III.3.40 (आदरादलोपः) and Bra.Sū.III.3.41 (उपस्थितेऽस्तद्वचनात् ।). We do not know to what the non-dropping (अलोपः) refers, *unless we connect the Sūtra closely* with Bra.Sū.III.3. 37-39. We have given in our Notes our reasons for taking Sūtra III.3.40 as the Pūrvapakṣa and the Sūtra III.3.41 as the Siddhānta

(9) Bra.Sū.III.3.42 (तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।). The context shows that this Sūtra must be grouped along with Sūtras III.3.37–41.

(10–11) Bra.Sū.III.4.21 (स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।) and Bra.Sū. III.4.23 (पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् । Both these Sūtras contain a Pūrvapakṣa and its refutation, thus proving the proposition of Sūtras III.4.19–20. They cannot therefore begin a new Adhikaraṇa.

(12–13) Bra.Sū.IV.1.4 न प्रतीके न हि सः । and Bra.Sū.IV.1.5 ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् । The meaning of the negation in Sūtra IV.1.4 can be understood only from Bra.Sū.IV.1.3 and the particle च in Bra.Sū. IV.1.6 also shows that Sūtras IV.1.3-6 should form only one Adhikaraṇa.

(14) Bra.Sū.IV 3.15 अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायणः उभयथाऽदोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च । If we compare this Sūtra with Bra.Sū.IV.4.5-7 and Bra.Sū. IV.4. 10-12, we should come to the conclusion that in all these three Adhikaraṇas the Sūtrakāra criticises two opposite views and then gives his own view about the same tenet with the idea of striking a reconciliation of the two conflicting views. Thus, Sūtras IV.3.7-16 would belong to the same Adhikaraṇa,

(25) Vide Notes on the Sūtra for the change in the reading.

(15-16) There are two more Sūtras (Bra.Sū.III.3.34 and III.4.50), each of which, according to Śaṅkara, forms an independent Adhikaraṇa. But Sūtra III.3.34 (इयदामननाद्) *gives by itself no complete sense.* It can at most be a हेतुसूत्र because of the ablative case of आमनन. Even then, we think it cannot be construed as a हेतुसूत्र with the preceding Sūtra. For this and other reasons, we have proposed to combine Sūtra III.3.34 and Sūtra III.3.35 (अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः) and thus to make only *one* Sūtra (इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः ।) By comparing this new Sūtra with other Sūtras (I.3.25, I.3.21, I.2.7), we have shown how this Sūtra contains a rule about the inward method of meditation on Brahman.

As regards Sūtra III.4.50 (अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् ।), we believe, this Sūtra contains an explanation of मौन which is mentioned in the preceding Sūtra and not of बाल्य as Śaṅkara thinks it to do. So, we propose to take it as a parenthetical remark on the sense of Sūtra III.4.49 and therefore we include this Sūtra (50) in the preceding Adhikaraṇa.

Thus, it will be seen that in about sixteen Sutras we have *to depend upon the context* which seems to indicate that these Sūtras cannot stand at the beginning of an Adhikaraṇa, as Śaṅkara understands them to do, but rather they form part of the same Adhikaraṇa as the Sūtra or Sūtras which precede them.

Now, we shall discuss those Sūtras, which, according to Śaṅkara, belong to an Adhikaraṇa to which the respective preceding Sūtras belong, but which appear to us to be *the first Sūtras of a new Adhikaraṇa.* Here a question would naturally arise: What are the characteristics of the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa? We may say that generally the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa is not of the form of a हेतुसूत्र (simply giving a mere argument), but it makes an Assertion which is a self-complete and easily comprehensible statement of a view and which may or may not be accompanied by a हेतु. We may give some examples:- Bra.Sū.III.2.11 contains the Proposition "न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गम्" and one argument, viz., सर्वत्र हि. Bra.Sū.III.2.31 has the Proposition

of the Opponent "परमतः" and the statement of arguments "सेतुन्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः". Bra.Sū.III.3.38 presents the Assertion "फलमतः" and one reason, viz., उपपत्तेः, the second reason being given in the next Sūtra (III.3.39- श्रुतत्वाच्च ।). We give here a list of (about forty-five) Sūtras, where we agree with Śaṅkara in taking them as the *first* Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa.

(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.11, 31, 38.

(2) Br.Sū.III.3.1, 5, 10, 11, 16, 18, 25, 31, 37, 43, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61.

(3) Bra.Sū.III.4.1, 18, 40, 43, 51, 52.

(4) Bra.Sū.IV.1.1, 3, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 17, 20.

(5) Bra.Sū.IV.2.1, 15, 16, 17, 18.

(6) Bra.Sū.IV.3.1, 2, 3, 4, 7.

(7) Bra.Sū.IV.4.1, 4, 5, 10, 15.

We have seen that there are several Sūtras which, though not composed in the form of a हेतुसूत्र (with हि or the Ablative Case), are of the nature of a statement and serve to elucidate the Proposition in a preceding Sūtra. Such Sūtras are not to be confounded with the Sūtras which we are now discussing. The former Sūtras cannot be understood without the help of the context, since they contain some word or words which can be clear only through their relation with the preceding Sūtra; while the *first* Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa contain a self-complete Assertion.

The following is a list of the Sūtras which in our opinion should *begin* an Adhikaraṇa or should form the only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa, *because they contain a Pratijña* with or without an argument :—

(1) Bra.Sū.III.2.20—वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् । The Adhikaraṇa preceding this Sutra discusses the topic of the applicability of the two-fold attributes to Brahman. The Adhikaraṇa beginning with Sutra III.2.20 deals with the two states of वृद्धि,

growth and अपक्षय, decrement, out of the six states mentioned by Yāska.

(2) Bra.Sū.III.2.23—तदव्यक्तमाह हि। This should be the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa just as संध्ये सृष्टिराह हि (Bra.Sū.III.2.1).

(3) Bra.Sū.III.2.26—अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम् । This Sūtra begins a new Adhikaraṇa about the possibility of the मुक्त uniting *with* the Infinite *from* the Unmanifest. The Sūtra is a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.

(4) Bra.Sū.III.2.37—अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः । This Sūtra discusses the topic of the omnipresence of the Unmanifest, a topic, though connected with, yet different from, that of Bra.Sū.III. 2.31-36. The so-called अतिदेशसूत्रs always begin a new Adhikaraṇa because they begin a new topic. Cf. एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहाः अपि व्याख्याताः । (Bra.III.Sū.12), एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः । (Bra.Sū.II.1.3), also Bra.Sū.II.3.8. In these three cases Śaṅkara also begins a new Adhikaraṇa.

(5) Bra.Sū.III.2.40—धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव । "अत एव" means "श्रुतत्वादेव" which (argument) is given in Sūtra III.2.39. There is a sharp distinction between Sūtras with अत एव and with अत एव च[26]. अत एव shows a new Adhikaraṇa, while अत एव च the continuation of the same Adhikaraṇa. We have shown that Bra.Sū.III.2.38-39 discusses the topic about the attainment of the fruit from the Unmanifest or from any other source, while the Adhikaraṇa beginning with Sūtra III.2.40 discusses whether the fruit is Dharma or Mokṣa.

(6) Bra.Sū.III.3.28. छन्दत उभयाविरोधात् । The context shows that this Sūtra should begin a new Adhikaraṇa and give an option of choice between the two aspects of Brahman.

(7) Bra.Sū.III.4.27–शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम्। The preceding Sūtras discuss the unanimity of the two Kāṇḍas while this Sūtra begins a new Adhikaraṇa about the performance

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(26) Cf. अत एव प्राणः Bra.Sū.I.1.23, which S'aṅkara takes as a new Adhikaraṇa. अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्—Bra.Sū.III.2.18. अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा—Bra.Sū.III.4.25. And also Bra.Sū.IV.2.2, IV.4.9.

of *yajña*, *dāna*, *tapas*, inspite of the seeker possessing *śama*, *dama*, etc.

(8) Bra.Sū.IV.2.5. भूतेषु तछ्रुतेः ।

(9) Bra.Sū.IV.3.6–वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः । Sūtras IV.3.4–5 discuss the topic of the Flame or the Rays, etc., being conductors of the knower of Brahman, while Sūtra IV.3.6 begins a new topic, viz., 'By which conductor is the Brahmavid led from वैद्युतलोक onwards ?'

(10–11) Bra.Sū.IV.4.2.–मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् and Bra.Sū.IV.4.3—आत्मा प्रकरणात्. Each of these two Sūtras begins a fresh Adhikaraṇa, because the topic of each is different. Sūtra 2 is concerned with मुक्त or बद्ध while Sūtra 3 with आत्मन् or देह.

(12) Bra.Sū.IV.4.13—तन्वभावे संध्यवत्. The Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras IV.4.10–12 discusses the topic whether a released soul has a body or not, while Sūtras IV.4.13–14 discuss the question of *how* the released soul *enjoys* the objects of enjoyment.

(13) Bra.Sū.IV.4.22—अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् । The Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras IV.4.17–21 discusses the the topic of the form of the liberated, being free from the transactions of the world, the only resemblance between his existence and that of the world being enjoyment (भोगमात्रसाम्य); while the Adhikaraṇa consisting of this Sūtra (22) discusses the question of the return or non-return of the Mukta to the world.

Out of all these thirteen Sūtras, Śaṅkara takes none as beginning a new Adhikaraṇa while we are of the opinion that each of them should begin a new topic, because each starts a new subject and consists of a Proposition and an Argument, e. g., (ब्रह्मणः) वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावात् and उभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् in Bra.Sū.III.2.20; तदव्यक्तम् and आह हि in Bra.Sū.III.2.23; अतोऽनन्तेन (सह एकतां गच्छति) and तथाहि लिङ्गम् in Bra.Sū.III.2.26; अनेन सर्वगतत्वम् and आयामशब्दादिभ्यः in Bra.Sū.III.2.37; धर्मं जैमिनिः (फलमाह) and अत:एव (=श्रुतत्वादेव) in Bra.Sū.III.2.40. Similarly, it would not be difficult to make out the Proposition and the Argument in other Sūtras.

Lastly, we may here briefly notice some changes, in the readings of some of the Sūtras, that we have suggested on the ground of several critical considerations stated in Part I :—

(1) We have combined Sūtras III.3.34-35 of Śaṅkara's *pāṭha* and made out one Adhikaraṇa of *one* Sūtra, viz., इयदामननादन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः ।

(2) We have transferred सत्यादयः from Sūtra III.3.38 to the next Sūtra; so that Sūtra III.3.38 reads as सैव हि and Sūtra III.3.39 as सत्यादय. कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ।

(3) कामादीतरत्र in Bra.Sū.III.3.39 is changed to कामाद् इतरत्र, i., e. the ई has been shortened.

(4) On the analogy of प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत् in Bra.Sū.III.3.50 we have proposed to change पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः in Sūtra III.3.42 to पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः (धा being suggested to us by प्रज्ञा in Sūtra III.3.50); so that Sūtra III.3.42 reads as तन्निर्धारणानियमः तद्दृष्टेःपृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

(5) On the strength of इतर in Bra.Sū.III.3.16 and प्रधान in Bra.Sū.III.3.11 and III.2.11, we have changed प्रदान in Bra.Sū. III.3.43 to प्रधान, so that Sūtra III.3.43 reads as प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम्.

(6) We have proposed to transfer पूर्वविकल्पः from Sūtra III.3.45 to Sūtra III.3.44 which would therefore read as लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः । and Sūtra III.3.45 would read as प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत् ।

(7) Moreover, we transfer उभयोः from Sūtra IV.1.17 to Bra.Sū.IV.1.18; thus the two Sūtras would be respectively अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषाम् । and उभयोः यदेव विद्ययेति हि ।

(8) We have also transferred प्रकाशादिवत् from Bra.Sū.III.2.34 to Bra.Sū. III.3 35; so that Bra.Sū.III.2.34 reads as स्थानविशेषात् and Bra.Sū.III.2.35 प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च ।

The arguments for these proposed changes in the readings are stated by us in their respective places in Part I and we request and expect the reader to have a perusal of the same.

A thorough intensive study of the very text of the Brahma-sūtra is bound to be very helpful in fixing the reading of the text and the grouping of its Adhikaraṇas. A study of the Sūtras with the particles हि, तु, and च and of the Sūtras which are of the form of *hetu* either on account of an ablative case or on account of contextual evidence and also a consideration of Sūtras which can only be at the beginning of a new Adhikaraṇa (because they have a self-complete sense) are only some of the important points suggested by us in Part I for the discussion of the Sūtras for the purpose of settling the original *Sūtrapāṭha.*

A critical study of the text like that of the vulgate text of the Buddhacarita made by Böhtlingk is also instrumental in the same direction. We believe, a further effort to fix the text on these philological and critical lines would surely be fruitful. The division of the Sūtras into the Pādas and the Adhyāyas is, as noticed by Dr. Ghate, the same with all the Commentators. The most important question therefore regarding the text is that concerned with the grouping of the Sūtras into the Adhikaraṇas and we believe, the inquiry into this should proceed on the lines suggested in this Chapter.[27]

(27) We have given the *pātha* of each Adhikaraṇa as fixed by us (in Bra.Sū. III.2.11-IV.4.22) in the *devanāgari* Script in its proper place at the beginning of each Section in Part I.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SYSTEM OF THE SUTRAKARA

RESUME

[N. B. : P. in the footnotes means Page of this work]

We may here briefly summarise the main results of our investigation detailed in ths preceding Chapters.

CHAPTER 1 (Bra.Sū.III.2 and 3)

CONCEPTION OF BRAHMAN AND MEDITATION ON IT

The Sūtrakāra believes in two aspects of Brahman, but according to him these two aspects are *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* or *puruṣavidha* Brahman and *apuruṣavidha* Brahman since the *rūpa* or form spoken of Brahman is that of a *puruṣa* i.e., a human form.[1] Both these aspects are *of equal status*, as far as the achievement of Mokṣa by meditation on either is concerned, so that a complete *vikalpa* or option of choice between the two is given to the seeker.[2] The *puruṣavidha* aspect or the Puruṣa is no mentation projected on the *apuruṣavidha* or the Avyakta.[3] The Sūtrakāra has a fixed terminology; so he always uses the words *pradhāna*, *sūkṣma* (Bra.Sū.I.4.2), *arūpavat*, *mukhya* (Bra.Sū.IV. 3.12), Avyakta, in the same sense. He emphasises the use of the word *puruṣa* for the *rūpavat* aspect.[4] Each aspect has its own attributes.[5] The Avyakta is taught in more Vedantas than the Puruṣa.[6]

According to the Sūtrakāra, the *prajāpatiloka* is no ordinary *loka* or world, but it is the *rūpavat* aspect of the *kāraṇa* Brahman Itself. Bādari calls it *kārya*, but Bādarāyana objects to it. Śaṅkara is not right in adding it to the worlds (or *ātivāhikas*) in

(1) They are described in Bra Sū.III.2.11-28, III.3.8, III.3.11 and the subsequent Sūtras. PP. 2-3. (2) Bra.Sū.III.3.28 etc. PP.17-18,20. (3) Bra. Sū.III.3-45-47. PP.11-12. (4) PP.7-10. (5) PP. 20-23. (6) PP. 17-18.

his *bhāsya* on Bra. Sū.IV.3.3.[7] The Sūtrakāra clearly states that the *sākāra* or *rūpavat* aspect of Brahman, which is the same as the Prajāpatiloka, is not subject to the fault of *lokāpatti*, the contingency of its being regarded as an ordinary world.[8]

The method of meditation on either aspect is the *ātmagṛhīti* method.[9]

The Sūtrakāra says that the Avyakta is taught in more Vedantas than the Puruṣa.

In his doctrine of the *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha* aspects of Brahman the Sūtrakāra seems to adopt or to follow a view of Brahman already adopted by a Vedanta School in harmony with the two aspects of the Vedic deities as taught by Yāska.[10]

The attributes of the Akṣara, viz., *ananu*, *ahrasva*, etc., etc., emphasised so often by Śaṅkara, are not so important according to the Sūtrakāra, because they are not useful for meditation on Brahman.[11] *Priyaṣirastvādi* attributes are also to be dropped.[12]

The attributes *ānandādayaḥ*, *satyādayaḥ* and *āyatanādayaḥ* form three groups of attributes and are mentioned in Bra.Sū.III. 3.11 and 38-39. They refer respectively to the three sets of attributes collected by the Sūtrakāra in the first, second and third Pādas of the first Adhyāya. He further says that *ānanda* etc., collected in Bra.Sū I.1, are attributes belonging to the Impersonal One and are to be used in meditation on the same only (Bra.Sū.III.3.11); the group of *satyādayaḥ* (ṣatyasaṁkalpa and others,—Bra.Sū.III.3.38-39) collected in Bra.Sū. I.2 by the Sūtrakāra and explained by him there as belonging to the Personal Aspect may be used by the meditator, if he so chooses, in meditation on the Impersonal One; Badarāyaṇa says the same for the *dyubhvādyāyatana* and other attributes collected by him in Bra.Sū.I.3 (*Satyādayaḥ kāmād itaratra tatra*

(7) PP. 14-15. (8) PP. 72-73.

(9) P. 17. (10) P. (11) Bra.Sū.III.3.13-15. PP. 21-22. (12) P. 21.

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cāyatanādibhyaḥ–Bra.Sū.III.3.38-39). According to Bādarāyaṇa the Śrutis discussed respectively in Bra.Sū.I.1, I.2 and I.3 mention (1) only the arūpavat, (2) expressly the arūpavat (while using adjectives of the rūpavat) and (3) expressly the rūpavat (while using the adjectives of the arūpavat). The reason for this option is that the Śrutis themselves make an interchange of the attributes of the two aspects of Brahman; and the result of this standpoint is that both the aspects are *of an equal status* so far as the achievement of Mokṣa is concerned. It is not necessary to use in meditation *all* the attributes of the aspect of Brahman on which one chooses to meditate; and, again, only those attributes of the other aspect (than the one chosen for meditation), which are present in the Śrutis one selects, are not to be dropped while meditating on the aspect of one's choice. In this way the Sūtrakāra's system of two aspects of Brahman is not in the least liable to be a dualistic one. Brahman is only *one.*[13]

A whole series of Sūtras in Bra.Sū.III. 3 deals with both the aspects of Brahman. Thus we find both of them treated in Bra. Sū.III.3.8, 28,37, 16–17, 18–19, 34–36, etc.[14]

The Sūtrakāra discusses three kinds of meditations on Brahman. (1) Meditations on Brahman fixed on the parts or limbs of Brahman. One of the two aspects of Brahman is the *puruṣavidha* aspect; in this aspect Brahman is thought of as possessing limbs, the head, the eye, etc. Also in the so-called Vidyās, e. g., the *ṣodaśakalā* Vidyā, Brahman is supposed to have parts. Meditations on Brahman supposed to have parts or limbs form one kind of meditations. (2) Meditations on the *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman form another class of meditations. These two classes of meditions give Mokṣa. (3) But there is a third class of meditations on Brahman, e. g., the meditations on Brahman conceived as *nāman*, etc , etc. in the dialogue between Sanatkumāra and Nārada except the meditation on Brahman as

(13) PP. 24-28, 31. (14) P. 31.

bhūman. These meditations are *kāmya*, i.e., they give a reward other than Mokṣa. To discuss and explain in details these three kinds of the meditations on Brahman is the sole aim of Bra.Sū. III.3. The meditations on Brahman not conceived of as possessing parts or limbs, taught in the various Branches of all the Vedas, *must be collected* for the purpose of that aspect of Brahman, i.e., the *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman. But if one chooses to meditate on Brahman thought of as possessing limbs, e.g., the *vaiśvānara* Brahman, or the *ṣodaśakala* Brahman, he can collect attributes, parts or limbs from another Śākhā only if the latter deals with the same form of the *rūpavat* aspect; otherwise no collection of the various parts or limbs, of the various *rūpas* of of Brahman, is permissible, e.g., the parts of the *vaiśvānara* Brahman and those of the *ṣodaśakala* Brahman cannot be collected and emplcyed in one and the same meditation[15].

A number of Sūtras undoubtedly deal with the meditation on the Praṇava as the only symbol of Brahman, e.g., Bra.Sū.III.3. 25–27, IV.1.4-5, IV.3.15. The teaching about the Praṇava should be gathered from all the Upaniṣads because the Praṇava taught in all of them is the same; and that teaching should be systematised. The method of meditation on the Praṇava is the *Penetration* method (*vedhādi*) taught in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. "Om Brahma" is the form of this meditation, on the *arūpavat* and rūpavat Brahman; thus, the Praṇava is to be looked upon as Brahman, not as the soul of the meditator (no *ātmagṛhīti* in this case). On his departure from this world, the meditator on the Praṇava is conducted immediately and directly to Brahman (neu.) by the Sāmans unlike the meditators on the *arūpavat* or the *rūpavat* aspect of Brahman, who are carried to their destiny (viz., Brahman, neu.) by the *ātivāhikas* through the various worlds. These are the chief points about the Praṇava meditation discussed by the Sūtrakāra.[16]

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(15) PP. 42-48. For distinction between the first two kinds of meditations, see also PP. 53-54.

(16) PP. 54-57.

The Sūtrakāra seems to consider the three states of Brahman, viz., the *pariṇāma* or the change, the *vṛddhi* or the increment (growth) and the *hrāsa* or the decrement. These are three of the six states of an entity mentioned by Yāska. The increment and the decrement of Brahman are by the self-concealment of Brahman in harmony with the fact that the *Pariṇāma* of Brahman is such that the effect is also Brahman. Thus, the greater the the degree of concealment of Brahman (in the form of its effect), the greater the decrement or *hrāsa* of Brahman. The *vṛddhi* of Brahman is nothing else but less degree of the concealment of Brahman, in its effect. [17]

The Sūtrakāra mentions the Grace of Brahman twice.[18]

The state of the released soul is the permanent non-separation from Brahman. We may therefore say that the Sūtrakāra believes in what is called *avibhagādvaita* "non-dualism of Brahman", meaning non-separation of the soul (and the world) from Brahman as the state of liberation."

The Sūtrakāra explains Brahman on the lines of the explanation of Dharma given in the Jaimini Sūtras. Though according to him the knowledge of Brahman is not simply of the nature of reflection as was the view of Jaimini, yet it is *something to be performed* like a sacrifice and it is laid down by a *vidhi* or a Vedic Injunction. [19] A Series of Sūtras are devoted to the discussion of Brahman on the analogy of Karman. The Sūtrakāra says that the Vedantas laying down Jñāna, the knowledge of Brahman, are no *Stuti* "recommendatory text" and that the episodes of the Upaniṣads are not "meant for the *pāriplava* rite."

The Sūtrakāra explains the unanimity (*ekavākyatā*) of the Pūrvakāṇḍa and the Uttarakāṇḍa of the Veda by saying that each Kāṇḍa has its own *vidhi* and its own *Apūrva* The subject of each Kāṇḍa is quite distinct from that of the other Kāṇḍa and independent of it. Brahman is not taught in the Pūrvakāṇḍa. Such attributes of Brahman as are occasionally mentioned in the Pūrvakāṇḍa *should not be* collected in the meditation on

(17) PP. 57-61. (18) P. 6. (19) P. 6 ,P. 35, PP. 37-40.

Brahman. Only the Vedāntas are the authority for the teaching of Brahman.[20]

In the course of his statement on the nature of Brahman (Bra. Sū.III.2.11-III.3), the Sūtrakāra discusses several oppositional views (Pūrvapakṣas), which proceed from several Vedanta Schools rather than from the Sāṁkhya School. Moreover, these oppositional Vedanta Schools may be classified under *two* Vedanta Systems, viz., the Śrauta Vedanta System and the Smārta Vedanta System.

A few noteworthy views of the Śrauta Vedanta Schools forming the Pūrvapakṣas against Bādarāyaṅa are as follows :—

(1) Each Branch or Śākhā of each Veda should be in its philosophical doctrines independent of all other Śākhās.[21] (a) This view opposes the Sūtrakāra's Proposition (*Pratijñā*) that Brahman is to be known from *all* the Vedantas.[22] (b) It disagrees with the Sūtrakāra as regards "*upasaṁhāra*", "the collection" of all information about the meditation severally on the two aspects of Brahman.[23] (c) It urges that the names about the ultimate principle are different in different Upaniṣads while the Sūtrakāra admits only *two* different names of Brahman and says that there are synonyms of these two names which (synonyms) are common to the two aspects of Brahman and the frequency of use, in the Upaniṣads, of a term for either of the two aspects, would show that a particular term expresses a particular aspect[24]. (d) This opposition argues that the meditations on Brahman fixed on the limbs or parts of Brahman should not be "collected" from any particular Śākhā by the followers of all other Śākhās of all the Vedas. It, thus, opposes the Sūtrakāra's proposal to frame one Vedanta Darśan.[25] (e) It also disagrees with the Sūtrakāra on the point of "collecting" all information about the meditation on the Praṇava from the several Upaniṣads.[26]

(20) PP. 39-42, also P. 6.

(21) P. 65. (22) P. 65. (23) PP. 66-67. (24) Vide our Notes on Bra.Sū.III.2.52. (25) P. 66. (26) P. 68.

(2) We find that a Pūrvapakṣa not admitting that Brahman has two independent aspects, but holding that the same Brahman is to be meditated *upon at the same time* as both *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha* is refuted by the Sūtrakāra.[27]

(3) Another Opposition School holds that *arūpavat* is the only aspect or in other words Brahman is only *arūpavat* and that the meditation on this *arūpavat* Brahman as if it were *rūpavat* or *puruṣavidha* is a mental projection of the idea of *puruṣa* on It (*mānasavat kriyā*). The discussion seems to us to be based on the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. The Sūtrakāra shows on the strength of the same text that the meditation on Brahman as *puruṣa* or a super-personality is also Brahmavidyā, just as the meditation on it as an impersonal reality[28] is. The same Pūrvapakṣa argues that the *puruṣavidha* Brahman of the Sūtrakāra will be subject to the fault of being regarded to be a world like the several worlds of Indra and others. The Sūtrakāra refutes the *lokāpattidoṣa*. In this very connection the Sūtrakāra rejects one more argument, which we believe proceeds from the Śrauta Vedanta but is based upon the Bhagavadgītā, viz., that the meditation on Brahman as the Puruṣa or *rūpavat* is taught in the Scripture because the individual soul "being itself encased in the body" can more easily meditate on Brahman if assumed to have a similar body.[29]

(4) The more important Śrauta Pūrvapakṣa is that *the Puruṣa or the puruṣavidha Brahman is other and higher than* the *apuruṣavidha* or the *arūpavat* Brahman. This Pūrvapakṣa holds that one who has reached the Avyakta, i.e., the *arūpavat* Brahman, goes further and unites with the Puruṣa who is the Infinite and, thus, it implies that the Avyakta is 'not omnipresent' or is 'limited' (*a–sarvagata*). The discussion is based chiefly upon the text of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad but generally on what Deussen calls the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. On the strength of the same texts, the Sūtrakāra

(27) PP. 69-70. (28) P. 70 (29) P. 71.

rejects this doctrine. He also appeals to the authority of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads in which we have some Śrutis denying a second Brahman or Atman (*anyapratiṣedha*), i.e., Śrutis denying two Brahmans and therefore a higher Brahman. This Pūrvapakṣa is mentioned and refuted by the Sūtrakāra more than once in his work and seems to us to be the most note-worthy as throwing a flood of light on the doctrines of the EMU and the OPU regarding the relation of the personal and impersonal aspects of Brahman, as understood even in the days of the Sūtrakāra.[30]

(5) One more Śrauta Pūrvapakṣa is that Brahman is *rūpavat* in the states of waking and dreaming (*jāgaritasthāna* and *svapnasthāna*) and *arūpavat* in the state of deep sleep (*suṣuptasthāna*). The arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa are based upon the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Sūtrakāra refutes them on the strength of the statement in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad that Atman is the same *in all* the states.[31]

(6) It is, again, a Śrauta Pūrvapakṣa that Brahman is *like* the Light, i. e., of the nature o the Light. The Sūtrakāra admits that Brahman is like the Light but not of the nature of light.[32]

There are also a number of Pūrvapakṣa views proceeding from what may be called the Smārta Vedanta System, which chiefly believed in the authority of the Bhagavadgītā and which interpreted the Upaniṣads in the light of that Smṛti. The most important of these has been already noticed above. It is an argument that the meditation on the Puruṣa is taught in the Scripture because the soul being encased in the body can better understand and meditate on the *arūpavat* Brahman if the latter be assumed be of the form of a Puruṣa. This argument is used by the Śrauta Vedanta School.[33] The Sūtrakāra remarks that a doctrine that 'a knower of Brahman who is a *yogin* must depart from the body at day time in order that he goes to Brahman, and

(30) PP. 73-75, (31) PP. 75-77. (32) P. 77. (33) PP. 75-76.

not at night' is a doctrine of the Smārta Vedanta System.[34] We may be allowed to state here that in our opinion Bra.Sū.I.4 and II.1 are partly devoted to the discussion of the *parā* and *aparā* Prakṛtis of the Bhagavadgītā (rather than the Prakṛti of the atheistic Sānkhya). We have elsewhere stated our arguments for our conclsion that Bra.Sū.II.1 which is called "Smṛti-pāda" discusses several topics of the Bhagavadgītā and the Sūtrakāra explains them in the light of the Śrutis he accepts as authority and the System he forms out of them.[35]

Bādarāyaṇa's main work seems to us to be that of constructing a Vedanta System, accepting the Super-personality of Brahman taught in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, but rejecting the second place given in them to the Impersonal Brahman, thus upholding the supreme importance of the Impersonal Brahman of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads). In effecting this reconciliation he gave the option of choice between the *arūpavat* and *rūpavat* aspects of Brahman, both being recognised to be of an equal status. Thereby he saved the Vedanta School from becoming a System of two spiritual principles as in the E.M.U. and a semi-material dualistic spiritualism as was the tendency in the Bhagavadgītā. His other great merit seems to us to be that though he believes in the word of the Scripture, *he gives a literal sense* to the Vedantas and the Smṛtis and in doing so he even rejects the Vedantas and the Smṛtis which do not agree with his System, e.g., he rejects (the authority of) the *priyaśirastvādi* Śruti for this very reason.[36]

CHAPTER II (Bra.Sū.III.4)

ACTIONS AS HELP TO KNOWLEDGE IN ACHIEVING MOKSA

The fourth Pāda of Bra.Sū.III chiefly deals with the actions which a seeker of Brahman should do or is allowed to do. In this connection the following points are discussed and we believe that we have discovered some of them for the first time :-

(34) P. 79. (35) Vide Indian Historical Quarterly, 1936. (36) PP. 82-83.

(1) The most important theme of Bra. Sū. III. 4 is the Sūtrakāra's discussion about the *nature of the knowledge* of Brahman. According to Jaimini this knowledge is of the nature of *reflection* (*parāmarśa*), while Bādarāyaṇa emphatically says that this knowledge is *something to be performed* (*anuṣṭheya*) and that it is, like karman, laid down by an Injunction (Vidhi). [37]

(2) Bādarāyaṇa holds that Mokṣa is achieved by the combination of the knowledge of Brahman and certain religious actions though the former is the more important of the two, unlike Jaimini who also believes in the combination but holds that the knowledge acts subsidiary to karman and unlike Śaṅkara who is in this respect a *kevalavidyāvādin*, one who holds that the knowledge alone is the means of Mokṣa.

(3) On the strength of Chā. Upa. II.23.1 the Sūtrakāra asserts that a *mumukṣu* (a seeker of liberation) may belong to any stage of life (*āśrama*) [38] and that he may pass from the stage of studentship to that of an ascetic but that having become an ascetic he cannot revert to the stage of student-ship or householdership; [39] though the Sūtrakāra prefers the regular course of passing from the āśramas one by one. [40]

(4) According to the Sūtrakāra all seekers of Mokṣa belonging to any stage of life *must* perform two types of religious actions as auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman, viz., (1) the Sacrifice (*yajña*), the Donation (*dāna*) and the Penance (*tapas*) as laid down in Bṛ.Upa.IV.4. 22, and (2) the duties of one's own *āśrama* which are also laid down for the *āśrama* but which he shall perform as help to the knowledge of Brahman.[41]

(5) The Śruti mentions several other duties (*karmans*) as means to Mokṣa, e. g., the study of the texts of one's own Śākhā, silence (*mauna*), faith, celibacy, truthfulness, etc., etc. These actions form a *third* group and are, like the above-mentioned two types of actions, admitted by the Sūtrakāra as *direct* means to Mokṣa

(37) P. 88 and P. 89. (38) P. 91. (39) P. 99. (40) P. 97. (41) P. 92.

though subsidiary to the knowledge. But the Sūtrakāra makes them *compulsory* for the seeker belonging to the stage of a householder and *optional* for other seekers.[42]

(6) An ascetic seeker may perform official (priestly) duties of a secondary nature, like Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa 'in the time of adversity.'[43]

(7) A householder seeker is allowed to do *both* the duties of a secondary as well as those of a primary nature *in the time of adversity*. [44]

(8) Besides this, a householder seeker should perform worldly duties (*aihikam karma*), not of course as a help to the knowledge, but in order that there be "no obstruction to the worldly duties already begun" (*aprastutapratibandha*). These *aihika* or worldly actions may include the caste duties also. In the case of a Brahmin householder seeker, the Sūtrakāra allows the practice of priestly duties for others (*ārtvijya*) but not that of teaching because the former are done for, and sold to, a sacrificer while the latter cannot be so sold. [45]

The last point the Sūtrakāra emphasises at the end of his statement of the Means, i.e., in the last Sūtra of the Sādhanādhyāya (Bra.Sū.III.4.42) is that unlike in the Karmakāṇḍa which asserts that a sacrificer who has performed the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, goes to the heaven in the very next birth, there is in the Jñānakāṇḍa no certainty (as regards the period of time), even for one who is able to carry out *all* means stated in the Sādhanādhyāya, of his getting Mokṣa immediately in the next birth. He may have to be reborn on this earth *not once* before he achieves Mokṣa.[46]

CHAPTER III (Bra. Sū. IV. 1)

BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN

The third chapter corresponds to Bra.Sū.IV.1 which, in our opinion, states the Sūtrakāra's views on two topics.

(42) PP. 92-93. (43) P. 99. (44) P. 100. (45) P. 94, P. 101 etc. (46) P. 102.

The first topic is the description of the state of an advanced seeker when reborn again and again on this earth. This state is the stage of Practice and Preaching. The Sūtrakāra describes the attitude of the advanced seeker reborn on this earth, as regards the Symbol of Brahman 'Om', the limbs or parts of Brahman when conceived as *puruṣavidha* 'a superpersonality', his activity which is only that of sitting (in meditation) as described in the picture of the *sthitaprajña* in the Bhagavadgītā (Cha. II) and lastly the place of residence of this sage. According to the Sūtrakāra such an advanced seeker is the person fit to be a preceptor since he automatically approaches Brahman as his Self and can make others understand it in the same way. The sage remains in this stage till his (last) departure from the body.[47] This state of Practice and Preaching is more like the Goal (*phala*) than like the Means (*sādhana*) and is therefore treated of by the Sūtrakāra after the statement of the Sādhana and at the very beginning of the Phala.[48]

The second topic is the state of the knower of Brahman on this earth or we may call it "*the state of sinlessness*". This may be also regarded as the state of *jīvanmukti* because, though in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra no final liberation is possible until the Mukta travels over the Devayāna Path and reaches the presence of Brahman (neu.), it is the state of the highest self-purification possible on this earth. This stage begins on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman in this life. On this achievement the soul becomes free from all sins except the *ārabdhakārya* (those sins whose result he has begun to experience); but he does not become free from religious merits till his body falls. The religious good deeds unlike sins are never destroyed by the knowledge. Even after the attainment of the knowledge he continues doing good deeds (religious merits) and these help him in the attainment of the goal of the knowledge of Brahman. According to the Sūtrakāra union with Brahman is the only

(47) PP. 105-106. (48) P. 106.

state when a soul is no longer in the need of religious good deeds, or we may say, is 'above religion.'[49]

The insistence of the Sūtrakāra on the need of the religious good deeds as cooperating with the knowledge is noteworthy. He seems to say that (1) even if a seeker be possessed of mental peace (*śama*), control over senses (*dama*), etc; he must perform the Sacrifice, Donation and Penance as prescribed by the Bṛ. Upa.; (2) that the obligatory duties must be performed as auxiliary to the knowledge, and (3) that even the voluntary (*kāmya*) rites may be performed for the same purpose as that of the knowledge, and (4) lastly that he does not make even the knower of Brahman free from good deeds.[50]

These religious good deeds are help to the knowledge in getting Mokṣa; they are not for the birth of the knowledge itself (*vidyotpatti),* as with Śaṅkara. Thus *karman* and *jñāna* cooperate with each other in realizing Mokṣa.[51]

Chapter IV (Bra. Sū. IV. 2)

DEPARTURE OF THE SEEKER FROM THE BODY

The departure (from the body) of the ignorant man (*anātmavid, iṣṭādikārin*) and his return to this world are described in Bra.Sū. III.1.7–8, not in Bra. Sū. IV. 2, as Śaṅkara says.

When a man *begins* his evolution on the Devayāna Path (*āsṛtyupakramāt*) which is the Path of the meditator unlike the Pitṛyāṇa which is the Path of the ritualist, his departure from the body assumes the form of an orderly union of the senses of the knowledge, the mind, the breath, the individual soul, and the subtle elements, each preceding uniting with each succeeding in a sequence of order.[52]

This form of the union (*saṁpatti*) always characterizes the departure as long as the soul on the Devayāna continues his progress on it, i.e., seeks after and attains any station on it.[53]

On the attainment of the Immortality there comes the last departure from the body. Besides the five steps of union there is

(49) P. 107. (50) P. 111. (51) P. 109. (52) P. 116. (53) P. 116.

a sixth step in this final *utkrānti*, viz., the elements unite with the Supreme Being in the heart of the knower of Brahman[54]; and the knower, then controlling his subtle body and with the top-part of his heart illumined, departs from the body through the hundred-and-first artery, unites with the Rays of the Sun and is then conducted onwards to the Supreme One.[55]

It seems that the subtle body of the knower of Brahman is destroyed or dissolved after he reaches the presence of the Supreme Being, when *only his soul becomes manifest in its own original form.*[56]

The departure and the return of the yogin described in Bhagavadgītā VIII are *smārta*, not *śrauta*.[57]

CHAPTER V. (Bra. Sū. IV.3)

JOURNEY OF THE BRAHMAJNANIN ON THE DEVAYANA PATH

After his departure from the body the knower of Brahman joins the Rays of the Sun *even if he departs at night.* Coming to the Devayāna, he passes by a number of worlds or stations on the Path of Gods. The Sūtrakāra has tried to fix the order of these on the basis of the Chāndogya and other texts. Śaṅkarācārya proposes *to add three worlds* (Devaloka, Indraloka and Prajāpatiloka) to those given by the Sūtrakāra.[58] We think that the Sūtrakāra purposely drops them because he identifies Devaloka and Indraloka with some of the stations mentioned by him and that he takes the Prajāpatiloka as identical with Brahman Itself, i. e., with the *puruṣavidha* aspect of Brahman, which is according to the Sūtrakāra the Cause Itself.

The Sūtrakāra's identification of the Prajāpatiloka with Causal Brahman is proved by his answers to the Pūrvapakṣas raised by Bādari and Jaimini. The main discussion between these three Ācāryas is based upon the interpretation of the Śruti '*sa enān Brahma gamayati*" (Chā. Upa.IV.15 5). '*Sa*' refers to the Conductor (*vaidyuta ātivāhika)* and the three teachers differ as

(54) P. 117. (55) P. 117. (56) P. 121. (57) P 121. (58) P. 123.

to *the capacity* of the Conductor to go to the Kārya or the Kāraṇa Itself. In Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7 (*kāryam Bādarir asya gaty-upapatteḥ*) *asya* refers to the *vaidyuta ātivāhika*, the Conductor who conducts the knower of Brahman from the Varuṇaloka to his destination. How far can the Conductor go? [59] Here the difference between the Chāndogya Upa. and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa. Śrutis is required to be explained. Bādarāyaṇa seems to us to interpret the latter in the light of the Chā.Upa. text because he takes the Prajāpatiloka of the Bṛ.Upa. as the Kāraṇa Brahman Itself, not as Kārya Brahman as understood by both Bādari and Jaimini and as is very probably the original sense. Bādarāyaṇa does not tolerate that Brahman in the Chā.Upa. Śruti should be interpreted *in a secondary sense.*[60] It may also be noted that Bādarāyaṇa also sticks to the *utkrānti* of the knower of Brahman stated in the Chā.Upa. and interprets the Bṛ.Upa. (both the recensions of which clearly deny the *utkrānti*) in the light of the Chā.Upa.

Other evidence in support of the correctness of our suggestion that Bādarāyaṇa takes the Prajāpatiloka as an aspect of the Kāraṇa Itself is as follows:—(1) He does not mention the Prajāpatiloka in the series of the stations on the Devayāna Path, (2) He says that Puruṣa or the *puruṣavidha* aspect of Brahman (=the Superpersonality of Brahman) is not subject to *lokāpattidoṣa*, (3) He gives an unqualified option of choice to the meditator from between the *sākāra* and the *nirākāra* aspects, saying that either of them directly leads to Mokṣa; [61] and (4) *nayati* in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 shows that the Sūtrakāra refers to the Conductor by *asya* in Bra.Sū.IV.3.7.[62]

An important point to be emphasised here is that all the three Ācaryas, Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, agree that "going to the Para" is absolutely necessary for one who gets the final liberation.[63] Śaṅkarācārya takes *asya* in Bra.Sū.IV.3.7 as

(59) P. 125. (60) P. 5. P. 125 ff. (61) P. 129. (62) P. 133. (63) P. 131.

Brahmaṇaḥ and *gati* as *gantavyatā* and gives his own arguments as to the impossibility of going to Brahman. [64]

We have discovered that during the above discussion, Bādarāyaṇa distinguishes between the meditators on the Praṇava the Symbol of Brahman and the meditators on Brahman Itself. Pra. Upa.V.2.5 seems to us to have been referred to in Bra.Sū.IV.3.15 and particularly 16. The meditators on the Symbol are led to Brahman by the Sāmans themselves; and out of the personal and impersonal aspects of the (Causal) Brahman Itself, the former is the Prajāpatiloka. Thus according to the Sūtrakāra, the difference (*viśeṣa*) between the Prajāpatiloka and Brahmaloka (of the Bṛ. Upa.) is not the difference between the Kārya and the Kāraṇa, as supposed by Bādari and Jaimini but it is the difference between the two aspects of the Kāraṇa Itself. Bādarāyaṇa modifies the view of Bādari and Jaimini. [65]

Chapter VI. (Bra.Sū.IV.4)

STATE OF UNION WITH BRAHMAN

'*Sampadya*' in Bra.Sū.IV.4.1 refers to '*upasampadya*' in Chā. Upa.VIII.12.3 and therefore it means "after *reaching*".[66] After reaching Brahman, the liberated soul becomes manifest in his own original form (of the nature of Brahman, or of consciousness) and remains in non-separation (*avibhāga*) from Brahman. The Sūtrakāra seems to use the word "*avibhāga*" to denote the union of the *jīva* as well as the *jagat* with Brahman in accordance with the Śruti[67] and we may note that Vijñānabhikṣu emphasises the doctrine of *avibhagādvaita* as being the original Vedanta doctrine. This union is characterized by the liberated soul enjoying all objects of desire presented 'by the mere force of his will'.[68] As to whether he should have a body for this enjoyment, he has an option, and he has an option also as regards the number of bodies he should have.[69] We have shown that according to the Sūtrakāra, the

(64) P. 132. (65) P. 128. (66) P. 135. (67) P. 137, Note (67) Bṛ.Upa.IV.3.23-32. (68) P. 138. (69) P. 139.

released soul has the quality of pervasion (*āveśa)* but this pervasion is *like that of a lamp* pervading the place where it is placed. In so far as he has this power of pervasion he has the substance of the power of omnipresence of Brahman.[70] We have also discussed that Bra.Sū.IV.4.17 emphasises the fact that the liberated soul becomes free from the operations or dealings of the world *(jagadvyāpāravarjam)* in the sense that he has no sins, no old age etc., and no relationship of parents and children, castes, etc.[71] Our interpretation of Bra.Sū.IV.4.17 also differs from that of Śaṅkara because we take it to mean that the form of the released soul is *above any change (vikārāvarti)* and is a permanent form (*sthitim āha*)[72]. The only point of resemblance between the soul's state of liberation and that of bondage is the enjoyment of objects of desire; in all other respects the two states differ entirely[73].

The above is a very short summary of most of the points where we differ from the interpretation of Śaṅkarācārya. In order to make it an exact continuous account we have stated also some points where we agree with him. Now we shall briefly recount the themes treated in Chapters VII-XII which discuss the chief problems raised by our interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.2.11-IV.

Chapter VII

THE SUTRAKARA'S INTEPRETATION OF CERTAIN SRUTIS

(1) The most important point about the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the Śrutis about Brahman is that he holds that these Śrutis *do not make a sharp distinction* between the two aspects of Brahman, viz., the *Puruṣavidha* and the *a-Puruṣavidha*, since they describe the puruṣavidha with the attributes of the a-puruṣavidha and vice versa. (1) Śrutis discussed in Bra.Sū.I.1 describe only the *arūpavat* aspect; but those in Bra. Sū. I. 2 and 3 are, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, *perferably* to be taken as describing Puruṣa. The Sūtrakāra gives as arguments for this preference

(70) P. 140. (71) P. 140, Note (36-37). (72) P. 141, Note (41).
(73) P. 141, Note (44).

the attributes (*viśeṣaṇas* or *dharmas*) of the Puruṣa as well as the very word 'puruṣa' or 'puruṣavidha' or a word for the साकार found in the respective Śrutis (See Śrutis referred to in Bra. Sū. I. 2-3.)

Thus in the light of our inquiry the basis of the distribution of the Śrutis in the first three Pādas of the first Adhyāya is respectively that the Śrutis describe the *arūpavat* Brahman only (Pāda 1); that they profess to describe the *arūpavat* aspect but the Sūtrakāra prefers to take them as dealing with the *rūpavat* aspect (Pāda 2); and that they profess to narrate the *rūpavat* while implicitly referring to the arūpavat and the Sūtrakāra takes them us dealing with the Puruṣa but allows a meditator to regard them, just as he does in the case of the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 2, as describing the *arūpavat*. We have shown how the views of the Ācāryas about the Sūtrakāra's distribution of the selected Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3 are untenable.[74]

(2) The Śrutis about Brahman in the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Khila which form the first Kāṇḍa are not to be considered in the Brahmasūtra which proceeds to discuss only the Second Kāṇḍa, i. e., the Upaniṣads.[75]

(3) In the Śruti of the Bṛ. Upa. where the Prajāpatiloka is distinguished from the Brahmaloka the former is the *Puruṣa* aspect of the Kāraṇa Brahman itself, not the Kārya.[76]

(4) The Śrutis (and Smṛtis) stating the *cogita oppositorum* mention the *puruṣavidha* and *a-puruṣavidha* aspects as both being (equally) true.[77]

(5) Śrutis which describe Brahman negatively or the *akṣara*-Śrutis deal with the *a-puruṣavidha* aspect of Brahman which is called the Avyakta.[78]

(6) According to a Pūrvapakṣa several Śrutis declare the Puruṣa or the *puruṣavidha* aspect to be *higher than* the Avyakta, the *akṣara* or *a-puruṣavidha* aspect. The Sūtrakāra also agrees

(74) P. 141. & P. 145. (75) P. 147. (76) P. 148. (77) P. 149. (78) P. 149.

with the Pūrvapakṣa so far as the interpretation of the Avyakta or the Akṣara and the Puruṣa in such Śrutis is concerned; but he explains the *higherness* (*paratva*) of the Puruṣa without making the Avyakta *lower* than Him.[79] (Vide Kaṭha Upa.III.-10–11, which is an instance of this kind of Śrutis.)

(7) The Sūtrakāra classifies the meditations on Brahman taught in the several Śrutis into *three* divisions, (a) meditation on Brahman, not fixed on its limbs or parts, and (b) meditation on Brahman fixed on its limbs, e.g., Mu. Upa.II.1.2–3,or parts, e.g., in the ṣodaśakalā vidyā. Both these forms of meditation lead to Mokṣa. (c) The third kind of meditation is the *kāmya* or the voluntary meditation on Brahman which leads to a worldly or otherworldly reward, e.g., the meditation on *nāma* as Brahman in Chā.Upa.VII.1.[80]

(8) The Sūtrakāra regards *upāsīta, veda, dṛṣṭavyaḥ*, etc. as Injunctions laying down the knowledge of and meditation on Brahman.[81] He takes these potential forms as prescribing an act of knowing, to be performed.

(9) None of the Ācārayas says that the meditation on the Praṇava and the Śrutis relating to it are discussed in any Sūtras of the Brahmasūtra. We have discovered that the Brahmasūtra deals with the same in three different places and explains Mu. Upa.II.2, Pra.Upa.V, etc.[82]

(10) According to the Sūtrakāra, the meditation on Brahman is of the shape of "I am Brahman" *ahaṁ Brahm āsmi.* The text laying down this method is Bṛ.Upa.I.3.7–10 (particularly I.3.7). The result of this meditation is not the realization of one's Self as Brahman to the exclusion of the former, but the realization of one's Self *as all,* as described in Bṛ.Upa.I.3.10. This result, moreover, is Apūrva 'not already mentioned in the Earlier Kāṇḍa of the Veda'.[83]

(11) A view based upon the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad holding that the *sthānas* or the three states of waking, dreaming and deep

(79) P. 152-158. (80) P. 158-159. (81) P. 164, P. 168. (82) PP. 169-170. (83) P. 168.

sleep affect Brahman and make it *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* is refuted by the Sūtrakāra on the ground of the Chā.Upa. Śruti, which says that Brahman is *the same in all the three states.* Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra, Brahman is both *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* in all the three states. The Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is quite different from that of Saṅkara and Gauḍapāda.[84]

(12) Another conclusion which seems to be based upon the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, viz., 'Brahman undergoes increment and decrement (lit. is *vṛddhihrāsabhāk*) owing to the three states which really affect it,' is also refuted by the Sūtrakāra on the ground of Chā.Upa.VII, particularly Chā.Upa.VII.26.1, which according to the Sūtrākara holds that Brahman undergoes increment and decrement owing to the lesser or greater degree of the self-concealment of Brahman respectively. *Vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* are two of the six states of an entity (*bhāva*) mentioned by Yāska and they are discussed by the Sūtrakāra with reference to Brahman.[85]

(13) Mu.Upa.I.2.11 mentions "*akṣara puruṣa*". The Sūtrakāra discusses whether the *puruṣa* idea is a mental projection on the Akṣara. He concludes that the same Brahman is *akṣara* or *apuruṣavidha* and also *puruṣavidha* and that the meditation on Brahman as Puruṣa is not a *mānasa kriyā* but is Brahmavidyā itself.[86]

(14) A very great importance attaches to the Kaṭha Upa. An important Pūrvapakṣa is raised by the followers of the Kaṭha Upa. to place the *sākāra* aspect *above* the *nirākāra*. The Sūtrakāra refutes this Opposition and establishes the view that these two aspects are aspects of Brahman *of the same status* and therefore giving *the same result*. In giving this judgement the Sūtrakāra has done only partial justice to the doctrine most prominent in the " Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads " and the Bhagavadgītā

(84) PP. 159-161. (85) P. 162. (86) PP.150-152.

(Vide 6 above). In accepting the *rūpavat* as *on equal status* with the *nirākāra*, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to have been influenced more by the Chā.Upa. and Bṛ.Upa. than by the E. M. U.[87]

(15) The Sūtrakāra admits that the *priyaśirastva* and other attributes in the Tai. Upa. are attributes of Brahman but he rejects them as implying *bheda* 'a *distinction* within Brahman Itself,' in the form of greater or lesser degree of the Bliss of Brahman. Thus, he interprets the Śruti literally, unlike Saṅkara who tries to explain it with reference to his doctrine of the five sheaths of the individual soul.[88]

(16) Besides these there are numerous other Srutis which we have collected and which we have shown to have been explained by the Sūtrakāra differently than by Saṅkara.[89]

(17) We may also note that where the Sūtrakāra finds a Smṛti not in agreement with a Sruti, he boldly rejects the Smṛti according to the rule of *virodhe tv-anapekṣaṁ syād asati hy anumānam* (Jai. Sū.)

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUTRAKARA AND SANKARA

The comparison offered in this Chapter (VIII) is only tentative. (a) Both the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara hold that Brahman has two aspects, the personal and the impersonal. But according to Śaṅkara, they are *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*, while according to the Sūtrakāra they are *rūpavat* and *arūpavat*, there being no aspect absolutely attributeless.[90] (b) Unlike Śaṅkara who takes the personal aspect as *lower* than the impersonal, the Sūtrakāra regards both as of absolutely equal status so far as the achievement of Mokṣa is concerned.[91] (c) Śaṅkara takes the Prajāpatiloka as the *limited* Brahman; the Sūtrakāra takes it as an aspect, viz., the rūpavat aspect, of the Kāraṇa or absolute Brahman Itself,[92] and says that It is free from the fault of *lokāpatti*. (d) According to Saṅkara, Brahman is *above* any Vedic Injunction whatsoever; according to the Sūtrakāra, Brahman is laid down

(87) P. 154. (88) P. 163. (89) PP. 165-171. (90) P. 174. (91) P. 175-176. (92) P. 177.

by a Vidhi and its knowledge is something to be performed (*anuṣṭheya*),[93] and on this basis we have the Scriptural unanimity of the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda. (e) The negative attributes (*neti, neti*) so important with Śaṅkara, are not important for meditation on Brahman in the Sūtrakāra's System.[94] (f) According to Śaṅkara, Brahman somehow associated with Māyā, creates the creation. The Sūtrakāra, however, emphasises the *ātmakṛti* as the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman and consistently with this *pariṇāma* he explains the *vṛddhi* 'increment' and *hrāsa* 'decrement' by the self-concealment of Brahman, two out of the six states of an entity according to Yāska. [95] Besides thse there are several other vital points of difference between the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara, e. g., (1) the nature and the effect (*kārya*) of the *ahaṁgrha* meditation, (2) the *saṁpatti* or the union of the senses, etc., of the released soul, (3) the giver of the fruit in the form of Mokṣa, (4) Brahman is *like* a *loka* but It is no *loka* itself, (5) the relation of *jñāna* and *karman*, (6) the state of the sage after the attainment of knowledge, (7) the nature of the knowledge of Brahman which is, according to the Sūtrakāra, *something to be performed*, (8) the admission of a householder as a seeker of Brahman, and (9) the relation of the *Jñānakāṇḍa* and the *Karamakāṇḍa*. All these points of contrast between the two Ācāryas we have tried to bring out only tentatively as the present statement is intended to be only the forerunner of a more complete one.

CHAPTER IX.

IMPORTANCE OF BRA. SU. III.3

We regard this Pāda (III. 3) as perhaps the most important part of the Brahmasūtra. We have given a long quotation from Dr. Ghate and the opinion of also Dr. Belvalkar to show how according to the Ācāryas this Pāda is a reconciliation of various Śrutis on the same *vidyā* 'Lore' or *vijñāna* 'Congnition', the various *guṇas* or qualities about each of which are to be collected (*upasaṁhāra*) from the various Śrutis for the purpose of medit-

(93) P. 177, (94) P. 178. (95) P. 178.

ation, and how these modern scholars regard this purpose as *trivial* and *of no philosophical importance.* We suggest that after the general rule of Bra.Sū.I.4.28, a discussion of this kind is not likely to be given in the Bra.Sū. Or, if at all, it should have been given in the Second Adhyāya (*Virodhaparihārādhyāya*) or in the first Adhyāya where some of the viṣayavākya Śrutis of Bra.Sū.III.3 according to the Ācāryas are already discussed.

We point out *fourteen* remarks made by Śaṅkara in his commentary on this Pāda consisting of sixtysix Sūtras, which we believe are sufficient to make the accuracy of this portion of his *bhāṣya* highly suspicious.[96] There are nineteen more points which we have called defects or blemishes of the *bhāṣya*, seven of which are ordinary and the remaining twelve such as would suggest themselves only to a more critical eye. Such defects are due to the *bhāṣya-method* of interpretation of our Scriptures, and Śaṅkara shares them in common with all the *bhāṣyakāras*; but these defects preponderate particularly in the interpretation of Bra.Sū.III.3[97].

Moreover, S'aṅkara had no correct Pāṭha of Bra.Sū.III.3. In this Pāda we have to suggest several text corrections both in the words of the Sūtras and in the grouping of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas, which show that the Ācāryas were particularly unlucky in having neither a correct *Pāṭha* nor a correct meaning of this Pāda.[98].

This Pāda contains several critical Sūtras, which in our opinion hold the key of the Sūtrakāra's System and of his scheme of the distribution of S'rutis discussed in Bra.Sū.I. 1–3. Sūtras 11, 37–42, 43–54 are the most important in this respect. The three groups of attributes *ānandādayaḥ* (III.3.11), *satyādayaḥ* (III.3.37) and *āyatanādayaḥ* (III.3.38) mean the Śrutiṣ discussed respectively in the first, second and third Pādas of Bra.Sū.I. None of the Ācāryas could satisfactorily explain these three groups. The meaning of Bra.Sū. 37–42 and 43–54 as discussed

(96) P. 191-P. 193.. (97) PP. 195. (98) P. 1951-96.

by us, if correct, throws a flood of light on the Sūtrakāra's System.[99].

There are five *tad uktam* Sūtras in this Pāda and a reference to the Bra.Sū. itself seems to us to be the only proper explanation of *tad uktam* in all these cases, unlike the Ācaryas who explain the reference to have been made to various works, viz., Bra.Sū., Jai.Sū., Upaniṣads, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, etc.

The sixtysix Sūtras of this Pāda form according to Śaṅkara thirtysix Adhikaraṇas, while according to us only eighteen. In Chapter 9 we have given side by side the interpretation of Śaṅkara and our own in the form of a very brief summary of the contents of this Pāda.[100] This comparative statement will at once impress the reader with the sequence of thoughts and consistency of topics underlying our interpretation and the absence of the same in Śaṅkara's. It is impossible to present here a summary of this summary. We only point out that the succession itself of the various links in the chain of thoughts in the Pāda may be by itself regarded as very noteworthy.

We have above mentioned several reasons which make us believe that Bra.Sū.III.3 is the most important portion of the entire work and that it holds the key of the interpretation of the book as a whole.

There are other very important portions of the Bra.Sū., e.g., Bra.Sū.III.2.11–41, III.4 (where *jñāna* of Brahman is declared to be something *anuṣṭheya* and to be of the nature of Vidhi), etc. Bra.Sū.II.1 called *Smṛtipāda* deals, in our opinion, with Smṛti in the sense of the Bhagavadgītā, etc., and not in the sense of atheistic Sāṁkhya, as, is till now believed, and is therefore important, and this importance is partly derived from the position which the Gītā itself occupied in the days of the Sūtrakāra and still occupies as a religious work. Pāda 3 of Adhyāya III is, however, of a unique significance for the stand-point of the

(99) PP. 196-198. (100) PP. 198-211.

Brahmasūtra itself, and for the hiştory of the Indian Philosophy in general, since it very clearly tells us how one of the most important eternal problems of Philosophy, viz., the relation of the personal and the impersonal aspects of the ultimate Principle, was understood in the days of the Sūtrakāra with reference to the Upaniṣads and, thus, it helps us in appreciating the System of the Sūtrakāra as well as the interpretation that must have once been given to the Upaniṣads. It is traditionally called *guṇopasaṁhāra* Pada and *guṇa* as in Jai.Sū.II.3 may mean a secondary element, a subsidiary part, here, of the meditation on Brahman which is *anuṣtheya* like a sacrifice having the *guṇas* i.e. subsidary rites. The Sūtra laying down the *upasaṁhāra* (Bra.Sū.III.3.5.) gives the illsutration of those rites which are subsidiary to a vidhi (*vidhi-śeṣavat*) and supports our meaning of '*guṇopasaṁhāra*' as the designation of this Pāda.

Chapter X

SANKARA'S METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

In this chapter we have examined Śaṅkara's method of interpretation as a typical example of the method of the Ācaryas. We admit that just as without the commentary of Sāyaṇa the Ṛgveda would have been a sealed book, even so the Brahmasūtra would have suffered the same fate had there been no commentary on it like that of Śaṅkara. Not only this, but there are, we positively know, several cases in which a modern student would have found all his scholarship baffled by the difficulties facing him in interpreting this very ancient work, had he not got the help of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, which his successors got from him even though they started with a definitely different system of philosophy. This is particularly the case when we have to discover a Śruti referred to by a Sūtra. As an example, we are quite sure, it would have been almost impossible to find out the *viṣayavākya* for Bra.Sū.III.3.23, had not Śaṅkara preserved it and had we rejected his *viṣayavākya* as impossible one out of mere prejudice against the method of Ācaryas. We should examine

the correct *viṣavavākyas* and find out the rules which ensure us of their correctness, and applying those rules we should test the validity of those *viṣayavākyas* of Śaṅkara about which we feel doubtful.

Similarly, we owe to Śaṅkara the preservation of the traditional titles of the Adhyāyas and of some of the Pādas. Keeping in mind this tradition preserved by Śaṅkara and inherited from him by the succeeding Ācāryas we should examine how far the distribution of the themes discussed by Śaṅkara himself is in agreement with the traditional names of the Adhyāyas and Pādas. Thus, partly at least, the very acceptance of Śaṅkara's interpretation as embodying correct traditions about and correct meanings of the Brahmasūtra would lead us to doubt the correctness of some portions of his *bhāṣya.*

While examining Śaṅkara's method of interpretation, therefore, we meet with several difficulties which make us often doubt and sometimes reject his interpretation. These difficulties we have called defects or blemishes of Śaṅkara's interpretation. The purpose of this Chapter (X) is to collect such blemishes and to illustrate them. We may briefly enumerate them as follows :—

(1) As stated already, Śaṅkara preserves a tradition about the names of the Adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtra and of some of their Pādas. We believe that we have no reason to doubt this tradition and that the author of the Sūtras strictly adhered to the division of his subject-matter as indicated by the names of the Adhyāyas and the Pādas. So a commentary of an Ācārya is defective in those places where it neglects this division.

(2) Sometimes Śaṅkara gives *two* different interpretations of the same Śruti or Smṛti both of which are found either in the *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra or one in the *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra and the other in the *bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣad in question or in the Bhagavadgītā.

(3) Often the *viṣayavākya* in Bra.Sū.III.2-3 is either wrong or no *viṣayavākya* is meant by the Sūtrakāra, if we test the *viṣayavākya* suggested by Śaṅkara with rules deduced from those cases where he undoubtedly gives a correct *viṣayavākya* as stated above.

(4) The Sūtras by the nature of their very form are elliptical and require to be completed by the addition of several words. We hold that these additions should be such as can be *guaranteed by the context.* If an interpreter, ancient or modern, makes additions to suit his own interpretation but not supported by the context, we should take them as a blemish of the interpretation. We find too many of such spurious additions in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya.*

(5) In a number of cases Śaṅkara wrongly splits up the words of a Sūtra and thereby makes *two* or more sentences where there is actually only one sentence. These are cases of wrong grammatical construction.

(6) Another class of defects is that of the cases where Śaṅkara gives unusual or wrong meaning or meanings to a word or words in a Sūtra.

(7) As distinguished from the cases of the wrong division of the words of a Sūtra (No. 5 above) there are some cases of the wrong construction of the words of a Sūtra. The former are cases where no splitting up of words is meant by the Sūtrakāra, but Śaṅkara splits them up so that in the place of one sentence as originally meant by the Sūtrakāra, we find more sentences. In the latter case certain word or words are construed with words in the same Sūtra, other than those meant by the Sūtrakāra. In both the types of defects we have a wrong sense of the Sūtra.

(8) A great number of wrong interpretations are due to Śaṅkara's giving wrong, absurd or impossible Pūrvapakṣa views. We hold that the Pūrvapakṣa must be in agreement with the *viṣayavākyas* and must *look probable* or plausible if we give a simple sense to the latter.

These are some of the defects of the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and we shall now illustrate them from his *bhāṣya*.

1. Under the first kind of defects we have to consider the following varieties of defects :—

(a) Śaṅkara discusses topics which cannot be possibly discussed in the Brahmasūtra because they cannot be even remotely connected with the Inquiry of Brahman (Brahmajijñāsā-Bra.Sū.-I.1.1). Thus, we find in his *bhāṣya* discussion of topics fit for discussion in a Smṛti like the Law Book of Manu [101] or a book on the Rituals.[102]

(b) Again, if the Sūtrakāra taught or accepted two aspects of Brahman of the nature admitted by Śaṅkara, he would have discussed them in certain regular divisions of Adhikaraṇas, Pādas or Adhyāyas. We ourselves have shown that the Sūtrakāra does accept two aspects, *puruṣavidha* and *a–puruṣavidha*, of Brahman and also that he treats them in certain definite order in his work (Pādas 1-3 of Adhyāya I and Pādas 2 and 3 of Adhyaya III). Śaṅkara gives no such order of Sūtras dealing with *nirguṇa* Brahman, *saguṇa* Brahman and Ignorance or *a-vidyā* [103]. We fail to see whether any explanation of the proportion in which the Sūtras about these three standpoints occur according to Śaṅkara, can be at all offered.[104]

(c) According to the traditional titles of the Adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtra, the topic of each Adhyāya is sharply distinguished from those of the rest. But Śaṅkara does not observe this distinction. (i) There are several cases of cross references (of different Adhyāyas) given by Śaṅkara himself, where he says that the discussion of a particular subject in one place is resumed in another place (Adhyāya) either for further enlightenment or for

(101) Vide S'āṅkara *bhāṣya* on Bra.Sū.Vide PP.224-225.

(102) Vide S'ā.*bhā*. on Bra.Sū. Vide 225-228.

(103) For examples of S'aṅkara's division of *a-vidyā*, *a-parā vidyā* and *parā vidyā* vide PP. 216-223.

(104) Vide remarks on PP. 222-223.

some modification of the first view. We do not object to the comparison of the two Sūtras or groups of Sūtras in two different Adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtra; rather we adopt it as an important part of the critical method of interpretation suggested by us (in Chapter 11). But we should remember that the Sūtra style itself will mean that the same topic is not likely to be discussed once in brief and again in detail or vice versa, and that we cannot disregard a distinction made by the author of the Sūtras himself.[105] (ii) Besides those noted by Śaṅkara himself there are not a few cases of cross references not noticed by Śaṅkara as such but gathered by us from his bhāṣya .[106]

(2) Defects of the form of two different interpretations of the same Śruti or Smṛti :—

(a) There are cases of the interpretation of a Śruti given by Śaṅkara in the *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra, being inconsistent with the same given by him in his *bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣad in question. Thus, he explains, e.g., a Śruti of the Muṇḍaka Upa. as dealing with the personal or the *saguṇa* aspect in his *bhāṣya* on the Bra.Sū., while he interprets the same as dealing with the *nirguṇa* aspect in his commentary on the Upaniṣad.[107]

(b) There are several cases where Śaṅkara interprets the same Smṛti in two different ways in (different places of) his *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra itself.

(c) Moreover, there are very curious cases where Śaṅkara is *forced* by the *clear* words of a set of Sūtras to give an interpretation of a Śruti (or a Smṛti) which is the correct meaning of the text accepted by the Sūtrakāra; but Śaṅkara on finding that this meaning is inconsistent with the doctrine of his School sets it aside and tries *to draw out from the same group* of Sūtras a sense of the Śruti (or the Smṛti) that would be accptable to his

(105) Vide examples on PP. 228-232.

(106) Vide examples on PP. 232-233 and other detailed examples on PP. 236-238.

(107) Vide examples on P. 233.

School; or, otherwise, he becomes bold and says that he does not agree with the sense of a text given by the Sūtrakāra as interpreted by him and that therefore he rejects the Sūtrakāra's view, and thus, gives another interpretation suitable to his system.[108] The example of the *ānandamaya* Adhikāraṇa is too well known to be reproduced. (But, in fact, there are several Śrutis in the interpretation of which Śaṅkara differs from the Sūtrakāra, Vide Chapter VII.)

(3) Cases of wrong *viṣayavākyas* or no *viṣayavākyas* :—

We must admit that there are several Sūtras in the *bhāṣya* on which Śaṅkara gives the exact *viṣayavākyas* which it would be very difficult if not impossible for a modern Scholar to discover from the ocean of the Scriptures. But having appreciated his exactness in those cases, we should draw our attention to the following facts also :—

(a) Cases where Śaṅkara gives *viṣayavākyas*, but as a matter of fact, the Sūtras in question refer to no Śrutis.[109]

(b) Cases where Śaṅkara gives wrong Śrutis as *viṣayavākyas*.[110]

(c) Sūtras which Śaṅkara takes as referring to an argument (*yukti*) but which really refer to a Śruti.[111]

(d) Cases where Śaṅkara gives the reference to be to a Smṛti or a Sūtra, other than the Smṛti or Sūtra intended by the Sūtrakāra to be the *viṣayavākya*.[112]

(e) Besides these there are several cases where Śaṅkara gives such *viṣayavākyas* or quotations from the Scripture as do not at

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(108) Vide examples on P. 233-234.

(109) Vide examples on PP.240-241. (110) Vide examples on PP. 241-246 specially in S'ā.bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 12, 22, 31; III. 3. 24-25, 58, III. 4.50; etc. We have suggested the correct S'rutis.

(111) Vide examples on P. 246, particularly in S'āñkara bhāṣya on Bra. Sū III.4. 11, 26, 42; and on P. 247 particularly in S'ā.Bhā. on Bra.Sū.III.4.42.

(112) Vide examples on P. 247.

all support his own contention. For this reason, these are cases of *absurd* quotations.[113].

(4) Cases of "unwarranted additiions" :—How far can we add to the very words of a Sūtra ? How far are the Sūtras elliptical ? No commentator should take too much liberty with the text itself. Every addition must be justified by the context. Śaṅkara (and those who adopt his method of interpretation) cannot stick to the pure wording of a Sūtra-[114]

From the great number of Śaṅkara's mistakes or rather defects of types (3) and (4) we conclude that the Ācāryas had no unbroken tradition about Bra.Sū.III.2-3.

(5) In a number of cases, Śaṅkara wrongly splits up the words (*padas*) of a Sūtra and thereby makes two or more sentences where there is actually only one.[115]

Such defects are found in a large number in Bra.Sū.III.3.

(6) Cases of words to which Śaṅkara does not assign their correct sense or to which Śaṅkara gives a limited or modified sense are as follows :—

(a) Cases of words to which only one sense is assigned.[116]

(b) Cases in which Śaṅkara gives *two* or more meanings to the words of a Sūtra and therefore to the Sūtra itself.[117]

(c) There are several Sūtras to some words of which Śaṅkara gives a sense which makes these or other words of the same Sūtra redundant.[118]

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(113) Vide examples from Bra.Sū.IV.4 on P. 247-248. Vide remarks on P.248.

(114) Vide examples from Bra.Sū.III.3 on PP. 249-253; examples from Bra.Sū III.4 on PP. 253-255; examples from Bra.Sū.IV.1 on P.255-256; examples from Bra.Sū. IV.4., PP. 256-257.

(115) Vide examples from Bra.Sū,III.3 on PP. 257-259 and from Bra.Sū.III 4 and IV on PP. 259-260.

(116) Vide examples from Bra.Sū.III.3 on PP. 261-262, from Bra.Sū.III.4 on PP. 262-263 and from Bra.Sū.IV.4. on P. 263.

(117) Vide examples on PP. 264-265.

(118) Vide examples on P. 265,

(7) Cases of a wrong construction of the words of a Sūtra.[119]

(8) Cases of wrong, absurd or impossible *pūrvapakṣa* views, if we look to the *viṣayavākyas*.[120]

We may conclude by saying that we may not be correct in all the examples given by us to illustrate these defects, as we have called them, of Saṅkara; and that we may have ourselves committed similar mistakes. But inspite of these possibilities, our general conclusions will be found to be valid.

CHAPTER XI.

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION : SOME SUGGESTIONS.

The necessity of fixing some rules for interpreting our Scriptures was felt by Jaimini. The same for interpreting the Sūtras was felt by Śabara. Thibaut, Srauss, Deussen, and Taliwala complain of the absence of clearness and conciseness of the Brahmasūtra. Ghate enumerates his difficulties and makes some suggestions for the rules of interpretation.

Ghate says that the essentials of the critical method are contained in the famous verse :

Upakramopasamhārāvabhyaso ऽ purvatā phalam
Arthavādopapattiś ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye.

But Ghate also admits that the Ācāryas have followed this method. And we may say that even the modern scholars have partly at leaset followed the same method. Ghate also deserves the credit of being more critical than others.

The traditional critical method of examining the beginning, the conclusion, etc., should not be neglected, but at the same time, it does not appear to us to be sufficient for our purpose. We must remember that the Sūtras can have one and only one meaning and one Sūtrapāṭha as well as one Adhikaraṇapāṭha.

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(119) Vide examples on P. 266.

(120) Vide examples from Bra.Sū.III.2 on PP. 266-269; from Bra.Sū.III.3 on PP. 269-282; from Bra.Sū.III.4 on PP. 282-290.

After the necessary preliminary study of the Prasthānas and the commentaries, we should devote ourselves to the Brahmasūtra itself *intensively* and *internally*. For this inquiry, we make the following practical suggestions:—

(1) We should inquire whether the Sūtrakāra in the course of his work refers to what he himself has said in his own work. Thus, we find that the Sūtras with '*tad uktam*' 'it has been stated' refer to some statement in the Sūtras that have preceded the particular Sūtra in question. We have given a list of six Sūtras with '*tad uktam*' stating in a tabular form the number of each Sūtra, the earlier Sūtra referred to, the topic of both the Sūtras and the reference according to Śaṅkara. Besides these we find two more Sūtras with '*tad uktam.*' In our Notes in Part I, we have given the views of Rāmānuja and Vallabha about the expression '*tad uktam.*'

(2) A study of several *bahuvrīhi* compounds in the Bra. Sū. shows that such compounds refer to a statement in the Sūtras preceding the Sūtra with a *bahuvrīhi* compound. We have shown that *ānandādayaḥ*, *satyādayaḥ* and *āyatanādayaḥ* in Bra. Sū.III.3.11, 38, 39 refer to Bra.Sū.I.1, I. 2 and I. 3 respectively. *Śabdādi* in Bra.Sū.III.3.58 refers to *Śabda*, *prakaraṇa* and *saṁjñā* in Bra.Sū.III.3.6–8.

(3) When a Śruti which is the *viṣayavākya* of a Sūtra, is to be found out, as a rule we should expect that some word in the Sūtra (or, as is sometimes the case, its synonym) must be also present in the Śruti. Also the sense of the Śruti and that of the Sūtra should be the same. Both these conditions must be equally fulfilled. We have thus discovered a number of the original *viṣayavākyas*. For the purpose of illustration, we have given a table containing the Sūtras together with the *viṣayavākyas* proposed as probable by us and also the references given by Śaṅkara. We have also given a list of the Sūtras along with the Upaniṣadic numbers of the *viṣayavākyas* discovered by us. The arguments for these are given in Part I.

(4) We should as far as possible compare and contrast the words and their contrary terms used in the Sūtras. (i) The word *pradhāna* in Bra.Sū.III.3.11, III.2.14, and in III.3.48 has the same sense, viz., the *arūpavat* aspect of Brahman. (ii) The word '*sthāna*' in Bra.Sū.III.2.11 and III.2 34. (iii) The word '*upasaṁhāra*' in Bra.Sū.III.3.5 and III.4.48 (and also II.1.24). (iv) The word *aprāpti* in Bra.Sū.III.3.12 and II.2.22, II.2.18.

(5) We should also study the synonyms of the prominent words used in the Bra. Sū. We find that *mukhya* in Bra.Sū. IV.3.12 is a synonym of *pradhāna*, one of the very important words in the Bra. Sū. Similarly *sūkṣmam* in Bra.Sū.I.4.2 stands for *arūpavat* in Bra.Sū.III.2.14 and *avyakta* in Bra.Sū.III.2. 23.

(6) Several expressions in different parts of the Bra.Sū. must be compared. (i) *Ekasyām api* in Bra.Sū.III.3.2. means *ekasyāṁ śākhāyām api*, because we find *śākhāsu* in Bra.Sū.III.3.55.

(7) A comparison of doctrinal statements will also prove useful. We have given *four* very prominent cases of this kind of comparison. [121]

(8) Like comparison, contrast presented by contrary terms should be carefully noticed. Thus, *arūpavat* in Bra.Sū.III.2.14 should be contrasted with *rūpa* in Bra.Sū.I.2.23. The contrast shows that the Sūtrakāra believes in *nirākāra* and *sākāra* aspects of Brahman.

(9) Above all, the context should be the *most important factor* to be considered in interpreting the Sūtras. The Ācāryas have often neglected the context. Though the Sūtras by the very nature of their style are elliptical, we should add no words to the Sūtras which are not strictly guaranteed by the context. We have given in Part I not a few cases of Śaṅkara's unguaranteed additions to the words of a Sūtra. In Chapter 10 we have examined how Śaṅkara makes such additions so often.

(121) PP. 303-304.

In the present Chapter we have briefly stated eight Sūtras or Adhikaraṇas as examples where strict adherence to the context leads us to quite different conclusions than those of the Ācāryas who seem to care for the context of the Sūtras with the Śrutis or *viṣayavākyas* as they understand the latter, rather than *for the context of the Sūtras themselves.* [122]

(10) Apart from the question of filling up the ellipses due to the nature of the Sūtra style, a practical suggestion regarding the question of discovering the exact context can be made in the case of certain words when they occur in the Sūtras. In these cases, we must follow the context strictly, as these words can never be taken as referring to something not stated in the immediately preceding Sūtra or Adhikaraṇa. We have illustrated this by interpreting words like अतः, पूर्व, तद्, अन्यथा, अन्यत्र, इतर, इमे, or अपि (in the sense of inclusion), etc. We have examined eighteen Sūtras and shown how these words should be interpreted in strict agreement with the preceding Sūtras, rather than with what the Ācāryas add to the preceding Sūtras or with the Śrutis they have in mind[122a].

The subject of this Chapter can be further amplified by that of Chapter X which deals with Śaṅkara's method of interpretation. Besides the ten suggestions about the rules of critical interpretation some more suggestions can be made. All these we have tried to follow in Part I. More help in this direction may also be had from the fixation of the text of the Brahmasūtra proposed in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER XII

THE TEXT OE THE BRAHMASUTRA

The problem of fixing the text of the Brahmasūtra, which is of a double nature, viz., (1) the grouping of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas and (2) a change in the very reading of a Sūtra, is not less important than that of interpreting it. Śaṅkara had already the problem before him. Dr. Belvalkar has been able to gather evidence tending to prove that the later Bhāṣykāras freely

(122) PP. 305-308. (122a) PP. 309-312.

altered the text of the Sūtras in a variety of ways, even by omitting and actually inserting Sūtras. Dr. Ghate emphasises the fact that no fixed division of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas unanimously accepted has come down to us.

We propose to suggest some rules derived from critical tests to fix the text. These tests are the following :—

(a) Examination of the use of the particles, viz., (1) *hi*, (2) *tu*, (3) *ca*,[123] (b) study of the grammatical construction of certain Sūtras, viz., (1) the Sūtras with *an ablative form* having the sense of *hetu* or argument, (2) the Sūtras without such an ablative form and yet to be taken as supplying only an argument, (3) the Sūtras having the characteristics of the first Sūtra or the only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa; [124] and lastly (c) Evidence leading to a change in the reading of the Sūtra itself, viz., (1) the combination of two Sūtras into one, (2) the transference of some *pada* of one Sūtra to another, (3) the shortening of a vowel e.g. ई (to इ), and (4) the change of a consonant in a Sūtra.[125]

Without reproducing the arguments, we may here give the only possible summary of this kind of discussion, viz., the statistics of the Sūtras examined and the net Sūtras affected by the results of the examination.

(a) Examination of the use of the particles :—

(1) We have altogether examined twentythree Sūtras with *hi*. In thirteen out of these, we find ourselves in agreement with Śaṅkara in our interpretation that *hi* in these Sūtras supplies an argument for a Proposition in the same Sūtra in which it occurs; and in five an argument for a proposition in a preceding Sūtra. In the case of four Sūtras we have shown that though Śaṅkara takes the Sūtra in question as the first or the only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa, we have reasons to take them as part of the same Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra belongs.

(123) PP. 315-319, 319-327, and 327-332, respectively.
(124) PP. 334-336, 336-338, 338-339 respectively.
(125) PP. 339-341 respectively.

In one Sūtra (Bra. Sū.III.3.3) we cannot explain the presence of *hi*.

We have also noticed *five* Sūtra with *tathā hi* in the sense of *hi*, though we fail to explain why the Sūtrakāra prefers to use the longer word instead of the shorter one.

We have concluded that a Sūtra or a part of a Sūtra with *hi* or *tathā hi* is only an argument in support of a preceding Sūtra or the earlier part of the same Sūtra. When a Sūtra with *hi* has no such earlier part of the nature of a Proposition, but is itself an argument only, it cannot begin an Adhikaraṇa; it can only be in the middle or in the end of an Adhikaraṇa.

(2) In all we have examined twentysix Sūtras with *tu* in them. In ten of these we find ourselves in agreement with Saṅkara who interprets it in the sense of the refutation of an Opponent's view given in a preceding Sūtra, and the Sūtra in question is treated by Śaṅkara also as a Siddhānta Sūtra. There are seven Sūtras with *tu* which, in our opinion, refute a Pūrvapakṣa not stated but implied in the preceding Sūtra which is itself a Siddhānta Sūtra though Śaṅkara does not clearly assign to the *tu* in these Sūtras the sense of the refutation of a Pūrvapakṣa, but says that here *tu* means 'modification' (*viśeṣaṇa*) etc. of the statement in a preceding Sūtra. It would appear that Śaṅkara sometimes takes *tu* as superfluous, but we suggest that it is always significant and refutes a Pūrvapakṣa either stated in the preceding Sūtra or not. None of all these twentysix Sūtras is a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra, even in the opinion of Śaṅkara. Therefore, the presence of *tu* in a Sūtra is by itself a sufficient indication that the Sūtra is a Siddhānta Sūtra.

(3) Examination of the use of the particle *ca*. It occurs about eighty times in about 227 Sūtras (Bra.Sū.III.2.11–IV). Therefore, the value of the information derived from the examination of *ca*, will be numerically far greater than that of either *hi* or *tu*.

In about fortyfive cases, the particle *ca* has the usual sense of addition (*samuccaya*) of one more argument (either a *yukti*

or a *Ś*ruti); while in thirteen Sūtras *ca* adds one more argument which is the final argument so that it also indicates the last Sūtra in an Adhikaraṇa. In these fiftyeight Sūtras, Śaṅkara and ourselves are in agreement. In nine other cases *Ś*aṅkara takes Sūtras with *ca* as the *last* Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa, but we differ from him. (Altogether in sixtyseven cases Śaṅkara does not take a Sūtra with *ca* as the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa). There are thirteen Sūtras with *ca* which *Ś*aṅkara takes as the *first* or the only Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa, but where, in our opinion, we have the continuation of the Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra in each case belongs. In these thirteen cases, it may also be noticed here, *Ś*aṅkara does not take *ca* in its usual sense of mere *addition* of one more argument for the statement made in a preceding Sūtra, and hence he has to find some other theme of addition or often to leave *ca* unexplained. There are two Sūtras with *ca*, which we, differing from *Ś*aṅkara, take as the *last* Sūtras of their respective Adhikaraṇas. We have also noticed nine Sūtras with *ca*, where it indicates the end of a series of arguments either of the Pūrvapakṣa or of the Siddhānta. From this inquiry about the sense of *ca*, we may safely conclude that (1) a Sūtra with *ca*, cannot be the flirst Sūtra of, or cannot begin, an Adhikaraṇa; it must be either in the middle or in the end of an Adhikaraṇa; and (2) when a Sūtra with *ca* occurs in the course of an Adhikaraṇa, it generally signifies the last argument for the point in question and often in this case the Sūtra is the last Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa, though not always so. As an exception to (1) we have the first Sūtra of Bra.Sū.II.2 at the very begining of a Pāda.

We have also proposed that like the presence of *ca* in a Sūtra, the absence of the same in some Sūtras also should be examined. Accordingly, Bra.Sū.III.3.62 and 63 will be only *one* Sūtra. As regards the *meaning* of *ca*, we believe that it should be *always* interpreted as a copulative or conjunctive particle, as Śaṅkara also usually does, though he rarely explains it as *tu* 'but' or *va* 'or' also.

(b) Study of the grammatical constructions of Sūtras ;—

(1) Among the Sūtras with peculiar grammatical constructions we have first examined the Sūtras with words in the *ablative case* having the sense of *hetu* 'reason'. All these *hetusūtras* give only a reason for a conclusion in a preceding Sūtra. If they are not read in this context, or in relation with the preceding Sūtra, we have to make many additions to each of them before we can make out a connected complete sense out of it, These Sūtras with the ablative form are like the Sūtras with *hi.* We have examined six *hetusūtras* which Śaṅkara takes as the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa,. but which we have proposed to take only as an argument for the statement in a preceding Sūtra. A pure *hetusūtra* can never be the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa.

(2) We have also discovered that there is a third type of Sūtras (about sixteen in Bra.Sū.III.2.11–IV) which must also be taken as *hetusūtras* on purely contextual grounds and each of which should therefore be only the second or a subsequent Sūtra in an Adhikaraṇa, though Śaṅkara takes them as the first Sūtras of the respective Adhikaraṇas.

(3) We have also discussed the nature of the *first* Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa. We believe, the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa should contain only a Proposition with or without an argument for the Proposition which is either a Pūrvapakṣa or a Siddhānta. We have given a list of about forty such Sūtras where we agree with Saṅkara. Besides these we have pointed out thirteen Sūtras which on contextual grounds, viz., that they contain a self-complete statement with an argument, that this statement or Pratijñā is different from the one in the preceding Sūtra, etc. etc., must be taken as the first Sūtras of their respective Adhikaraṇas, though Śaṅkara regards them as Sūtras in the middle of the Adhikaraṇas.

(c) Lastly, we have proposed changes in the case of eight Sūtras, of the nature of the transposition of a *pada* from one

Sūtra to another or of reading *i* for *ī*, *dh* for *gh*, *dh* for *ḍ* in a Sūtra. In these changes we are not supported by any Ācārya or any MS. Still we have supported them on contextual basis, just as Böhtlingk had suggested variants in the Buddhacarita, which are now justified by the recovery of its Tibetan translation. The number (twelve) of these suggestions of ours is not too great to make our very interpretation doubtful, since they are made in our entire portion of Sūtras (Bra.Sū.III.2.11–IV.), which come to 227 in all.

The End